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A B S T R A C T
Part I surveys official attitudes and policy over the 
whole period of the rebellion. The main points developed 
are that the early policy of armed and limited neutrality 
was not significantly biassed in favour of either Manchus or 
Taipings, although official British opinion quickly came 
to discount the religious, political and commercial possi­
bilities of the rebellion. By i860 British neutrality was 
clearly inclined to favour the Manchus, especially after 
further treaty concessions had been forced from them by the 
war of 1856-60. But the idea that British policy changed 
quickly and decisively after that war is challenged, and 
it is pointed out that the intervention actually undertaken 
after 1862 was deliberately limited in extent and began in 
quite unpremeditated fashion. The main reason for the 
change in British policy is found in the official conviction 
that the rebellion was destructive of political order and 
therefore of the conditions for British trade in China, not 
in such things as fear of a strong, nationalist Taiping 
government which would prohibit the opium trade effectively.
Part II surveys the attitudes of unofficial groups. 
British merchants, it is suggested, were somewhat dubious 
in their first reactions to the rebellion, yet were divided
over the later policy of intervention, many considering this 
a dangerous provocation of a powerful movement which, up to 
1862, had not seriously disrupted trade* British missionaries, 
although very hopeful and favourable towards the rebellion at 
first, always had considerable doubts about it. There was 
a renewal of missionary hopes about 1860-1, -but closer 
observation led to almost total rejection by 1862, though, as 
with the merchants, many opposed intervention. There is no 
evidence that the merchants, still less the missionaries, 
decisively influenced the development of official policy.
Other opinion on the rebellion is illustrated, the main point 
emerging being that there was much public debate about 1862-3 
on the wisdom of the policy of intervention.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Although defeated by the government it challenged, the 
Taiping rebellion must certainly rank as one of the most 
important and remarkable movements of mass protest in modern 
history* Lasting for some fifteen years, it ranged from 
Kwangsi in the south of China to Tientsin in the north, 
from Szechuan in the west to Shanghai in the east, and 
involved, as European contemporaries were fond of observing, 
the destinies of nearly one-third of the human race. The 
Times once called it 1 the greatest revolution the world has 
yet seen. In mere magnitude it comprises a population equal 
to that of all Europe and all America put together•n Mere 
magnitude is not its chief claim upon the interest of the 
historian, however, but rather its significance as the first 
great attempt to adapt China to the revolutionary influence 
of the West.
The term ^rebellion*1 disguises the fact that this was 
a revolutionary movement which, in programme at least,
(2)
challenged many of the traditional values of Chinese society.
(1) The Times Aug. 30, 1853; cf. also J. Scarth, Twelve Years
in China (i860), p .167 - rtIt is not a small matter with which 
we have to deal; it is the wonder of the age, and the 
destiny of millions is at stake".
(2) The term reflects the official Manchu view of the movement.
Modern Chinese historians refer to it always as uko-mingH,
i.e. a true revolution. It is indicative of the change in
the British view of the movement that it was commonly called
a 11 revolution11 in early accounts, although not in official
reports, but later lfrebellion1 became general, even among its 
sympathisersi I have continued to use the current English
term, but not in any pre;jorative sense.
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As a political revolt it was least revolutionary, insofar 
as its leaders still thought in terms of an imperial dynasty; 
but if not republican or democratic in the political sense, 
there was an element of modern nationalism in its appeal to 
the native Chinese to expel the foreign Manchu dynasty which 
had ruled China since the seventeenth century. The economic 
and social system projected in its early manifestos indicated 
a type of agrarian communism which looked back to a legendary 
golden age in Chinese history rather than forward to modern 
industrial communism, but in the later stages of the movement 
there were also proposals for the introduction of Western 
science and technology which suggest that some of the Taiping 
leaders at least were more alive to the need for far reaching 
changes in China than were their Manchu opponents. Other 
reforms proclaimed and in part applied included the promotion 
of equal status for women, the abolition of foot-binding, and 
the prohibition of prostitution and opium smoking. Finally, and 
to Western eyes most remarkable of all, the Taiping rebels 
attacked the traditional religious and Confucian teachings 
accepted by the Chinese people, and proclaimed instead an 
ideology based upon portions of the Christian scriptures which 
had become known to their leader, Hung Hsiu-chfiian, through 
tracts distributed by Protestant Christian missionaries at 
Canton. Taiping Christianity proved to be anything but
iii
orthodox by aiiy Western standards, being distorted by the 
personal idiosyncracies of Hung and other leaders, as well 
as by a weight of Chinese tradition and belief which neither 
the Taipings nor later, more successful revolutionaries could 
entirely throw off. But the religious element in the 
rebellion, although of secondary interest to most later 
historians of the movement, naturally provoked great interest 
among contemporary Western observers.^
The Taiping rebellion, in short, was a confused and 
complex movement, half backward looking, half forward looking, 
which cannot be neatly fitted into any single category of 
description, whether Confucian, Christian or Marxist. But 
in a real sense it marks the beginning of the modern Chinese 
revolution, that long process of-social, political and intellec­
tual upheaval in which the Chinese people have struggled to 
re-organise themselves and their civilisation in terms both 
of the outside world which they can no longer ignore and of 
their own proud, inescapable past.
(1) For accounts of the Taiping programme see: G. E. Taylor 
in Chinese Social & Political Science Review Vol. 16, b 
(Jan. 1933), pp.5^5-61*+5 Y£. Shih, »The" Ideology of the 
Taiping Tien-kuoM in Sinologica vol. 3 (1953)> PP«1-15>
P. M. Linebarger et. al., Far Eastern Government and 
Politics (195^)* c. 5; Teng Ssu-yii, New Light on the 
Taining Rebellion (1950) cc. *f, 6, 7 etc.
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This thesis is not directly concerned with the Taiping 
rebellion itself or with its place in Chinese history, but 
simply with the development of British policy and attitudes 
towards it. I have felt it necessary to give occasional 
brief summaries of its course, in order to provide a back­
ground of reference, but these are essentially incidental 
to the main subject. Part I of the thesis, based on the 
official Foreign Office records, aims to define the main 
lines in the development of British policy on the question, 
to analyse the nature of that policy, and to illustrate the 
kinds of opinion formed in official circles about the rebellion 
at various times in its history. Certain aspects of British 
policy towards the rebellion have already been a good deal 
written about, but only in works concerned primarily either 
with the rebellion itself, with Western and British relations 
with China generally, or with the exploits of "Chinese" Gordon 
and the so-called Ever Victorious Army which he led. There 
has been no attempt to examine the development of this policy 
over the whole course of the rebellion, or to present it as 
a distinct study in itself.
The years given most attention in existing accounts are
1853? when the rebellion first emerged as a political and
military force capable of over-throwing the existing government 
in China, and those between 1861 and l86*f, when the British
Vgovernment abandoned its early stand of neutrality for one of 
active intervention on behalf of the Manchus* These are 
certainly the key years, and provide the inevitable focal 
points for any study of the question* But merely to fill in 
the gaps, to provide some account of the earliest official 
British reactions to the rebellion and to examine the actual 
working of the policy of neutrality between 1853 i860
has seemed worth doing, while the perspective thus provided 
helps to correct the impression gained from most existing 
accounts that British policy and opinion changed suddenly 
(many add, cynically) as soon as improved treaty relations 
with the Manchu government seemed to warrant it* What is 
presented here, in Part I, is essentially a general survey 
of the whole course of British policy towards the Taiping 
rebellion,which seeks to distinguish the main features of that 
policy but not to present a detailed account of every aspect 
of its working*
As far as possible, I have set out to answer specific 
questions, these questions being posed mainly by the statements 
of other writers upon the subject. Chief among them, of course,
(1) This is especially so in the case of the chapter on British 
intervention, many of the details of which have been 
exhaustively treated in accounts of Gordon’s exploits*
The thesis of W. Davies, British Diplomatic Relations with 
China (University of Wales, Swansea, readily obtained on 
inter-university loan) also gives a good summary of much of
the detail of official British policy at^that RPint, as does 
H.B.Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire
Vol.II (1918), cc.*+ - 5.
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is why British policy changed as it did, from early neutrality 
to later active intervention against the rebellion* At a 
very general level the answer to this question is fairly 
obvious and is agreed upon by both the defenders and the 
detractors of the British action* England intervened and 
helped put down the rebellion in defence of her trading inter­
ests and treaty rights, which were held to be threatened by the 
continuance of the rebellion. Some writers go on to add that 
this intervention was also in the best interests of China 
itself; but none really suggests that the main motive behind 
British intervention was other than commercial self interest.
So Morse, the chief authority in English upon the subject,
writing of the Western powers generally but certainly with
(1)
England chiefly in mind, has concluded that, from I860,
r,in defence of their own interests, the Western powers 
were impelled more and more to intervene in the measures 
taken to suppress the rebellion and were driven from step 
to step in supporting the imperial government which, with
(1) Throughout the thesis I have not hesitated to take general 
statements about "Western" policy towards the rebellion as 
being statements about British policy. England was far and 
away the dominant influence among western treaty powers in 
China at that time, and, on this question at least, it seems 
to me that the development of her policy can be appreciated 
without much reference to that of France or the U.S. There 
is, therefore, only occasional reference to the policies of 
these powers. For discussion of their policies see Tong 
Ling-tch*ouang, La politique francaise en Chine pendant les 
guerres des Taiuings (these pour le doctorat, University of 
Paris, 1950); J.F.Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in 
Eastern Asia (19?^); T* Dennett. Americans in East Asia (l922j)
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"all its faults, was yet the power to which they were 
bound by treaties, and in resisting the rebels \*ho
(1)
brought only rapine and devastation in their train";
The real question is why England came to regard the Taipings 
as a serious threat to her interests in China*
Modern Chinese historians, for the most part not sharing 
Morse’s view of the rebels as bringing "only rapine and devas­
tation in their train"> but seeing them rather as the vanguard 
of their own revolutions, have offered more specific reasons 
for British hostility towards the movement* As one would 
expect, much emphasis is placed upon the Chinese struggle 
against Western imperialism. The Taipings are seen, especially 
by Chinese Marxist writers, as "complete patriots devoted to 
preserving the national resources", in contrast to the foreign, 
reactionary and corrupt Manchu dynasty which made the "unequal"
treaties of l8*+2 and 1858-60 and opened the way into China to
(o)
the Western imperialists. / Lo Erh-kang, the leading Chinese
historian on the Taiping movement,has written,
(1) Morse, op. cit. vol.II, p.65.
(2) See for example, (ed) Fan Wen-lan T fai-nfing T ’ien-kuo 
ko-ming vtln-tung lun-wen chi, n.50: Chang Chien-fu,
Chung-kuo chin pai nien shih chiao-cheng pp 56, 62-3; 
and below,pviii*
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"From the signing of the Treaty of Nanking China began 
to be transformed into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial 
society. But although the starting point for this gfeat 
change is with the Treaty of Nanking, the real turning 
point is with the Treaties of Tientsin and Peking, which 
were concluded in the middle of the Taiping period.
After the Manchu government had surrendered to the foreign 
invaders, and bound itself to them by these shameful 
(traitorous) treaties, the Taipings strongly opposed the 
foreign incursions. So the foreign invaders decided to 
support the Manchu government and, by openly participating 
in the struggle, cruelly strangled the Taiping revolution. 
In these exceptional times the Taipings preserved the 
honour of the Chinese people and protected their resources, 
carrying on an unflinching struggle against the foreign 
invader."^
Putting aside the question how far the Taipings can be 
said to have played such a role, the main point with which I 
shall be concerned is whether or not the British authorities in 
China at that time saw them in this way* Did British policy 
aim to crush the emerging nationalism of the Chinese people?
(1) Lo Erh-kang, T ’ai-p’ing T ’ien-kuo shih-kao* p.l60*
Were the Taipings regarded as extreme nationalists who would
withold, on grounds of political principle, the concessions
forced from the Manchus? Was British policy designed to.
uphold a "weak11 and pliable Manchu government for fear of a
(1)
"strong", intractable Taiping government?
A second major reason given for British hostility which
is emphasised by many historians, both Chinese and non-Chinese,
Marxist and non-Marxist, is the Taiping prohibition of opium
smoking. Given the importance of the opium trade to British
merchants trading with China, and of the revenue derived from
it by the British government in India, the prohibition of opium
would have been the equivalent of a death sentence, says Pan
Wen-lan, and was the basic reason for England’s leading the
(2)
Western opposition to the rebellion. Whereas the Manchu
government agreed to legalise the trade in topium by the Treaty
of Tientsin, the Taipings continued to oppose it, so that
"Englishmen began to realise that co-operation with the Taipings
(3)
was impossible", says Hsieh Hsing-yao. Questions which
(1) W. Eberhard, History of China (1950) p.311. says that the 
European powers "preferred the weak Manchu government to ar 
strong Taiping government", and the same suggestion is implied 
if not so directly stated, by many other writers as a reason 
for their intervention.
(2) Fan Wen-lan, T ’ai-p’ing T ’ien-kuo yfln-tung, p• 305 also his 
Chung-kuo chin-tai shihT vol. I. n.l2^ f.
(3) Hsieh Hsing-yao, T ’ai-n’ing T ’ien-kuo ts Mng-shu shih san 
chung, Tseh 1, p.20 (Hung-Yang I Wen)}. also his T ’ai-n’ing 
T ’ien-kuo shih-shih lun-ts’ung, p.2*+3» For other examples of 
the argument from opium see (ed) Fan Wen-lan, op.cit., pp.39- 
*+0; JA.F.'Lindley Ti-ning Tien-kwoh (1866)* vol.II, P*555i 
J.K.Fairbank and M.Banno, Japanese Studies of Modern China
(1955) P.^9, etc.
Xarise from this explanation include j^tist dangerous to the 
opium trade and revenue the Taiping prohibition was believed 
to be, and whether there is any direct evidence of pressure 
beihg exerted, either by the opium merchants or by the British 
government in India, in favour of intervention against the 
rebellion. To argue that the opium trade was very important 
to England, the Taipings prohibited opium smoking but the 
Manchus did not, therefore England helped the Manchus against 
the Taipings may be good logic, but it is not necessarily 
good history.
Certain other reasons which are given for the development 
of British hostility towards the rebellion may be more briefly 
noted. Lo Brh-kang has suggested that England was fearful 
of the influence of the Taipings throughout Asia generally, 
and has called the Indian Mutiny "without doubt an echo of the 
Taiping revolution". Although at first sight this appears 
to be a case of seeing mid-nineteenth century history very 
much in mid-twentieth century terms, it is wofcth asking never­
theless whether Taiping rebellion and Indian Mutiny were in any
(1) Lo Erh-kang, op. cit., p.17^* The Russian historian 
M. I. Baranovsky in an article in the Soviet periodical 
Vonrosui Historii for January, 1952, entitled "Anglo-Ameri­
can Capitalists - the Stiflers of the Taiping Rising", 
has argued similarly (pp 106-7, 109, 11^).
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way connected in the minds of British officials concerned 
with policy in China* The American historian W. J. Hail 
has also speculated whether an offer of aid made by the 
Russians to the Manchu government at the end of i860 11 did 
not have something to do with (England1 s) change of front*1*
The usually accepted commercial motive was, Hail suggests, 
possibly reinforced by "an even more powerful political motive, 
namely, a desire to prevent the Russians from securing the 
Yangtse trade which Great Britain regarded chiefly as her 
prerogative".^ It is necessary to ask, therefore, whether 
the change in British policy was prompted by a desire to ' 
prevent other powers, especially Russia, from gaining pre­
dominant political or commercial influence in China through 
helping the Manchus. Finally, subsidiary reasons given by 
one or two writers are dislike of the heretical tendencies in
Taiping Christianity, and dislike also of "the socialistic
(2)element in many of the measures adopted by the Taiping".
Direct discussion of the nature of the change in British 
policy and the reason for it is left until the last two chapters 
of Part I. The main questions with which the chapters preced­
(1) W. J. Hail, Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taining Rebellion (1927) 
pp 228-9; also Holger Cahill, A Yankee Adventurer (193°)
pp 285-6.
(2) w. Eberhard, op.cit., p 311; Hsieh Hsing-yao, op.cit.,
(..lun -ts*ung), p 2¥f.
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ing these are concerned are, first, what kind of neutrality
was it that England adopted in the early stages,of the rebellion,
and second, when exactly was the change in her policy made?
Was it, indeed, "made” at all? Did British policy develop
in the sure and calculated way suggested in nearly all accounts
of it, or in some less certain, more complex fashion? The
almost universally accepted argument that England had uno
sooner” concluded a new and satisfactory treaty settlement
with the Manchu government in i860 than her policy towards
the rebellion changed,certainly suggests a band of policy
makers who knew exactly where they wanted to go, and had : ."
(1)no hesitation in setting out. The trend of British policy
immediately after the conclusion of the treaties of 1858-60
is, therefore, given particular emphasis. As for the question
of British neutrality after 1853> the argument, put forward
mainly by Marxist historians, that this neutrality was never
(2)
true or sincere at all is examined. For this it is
necessary to ask what is meant by neutrality in the first place, 
what the British government meant by it in this particular case, 
and whether the policy it proclaimed in 1853 was really intended
(1) For examples of this argument see below, chapter *f; note 
also the article of J.R.Levenson, "Western Powers and Chinese 
Revolutions: the Pattern of Intervention11, in Pacific Affairs 
vol 26, 3 (Sept.1953) pp230-6 , which illustrates the view of 
British intervention as a calculated^nicely planned policy. 
This is, of course, also the Marxist view of it.
(2) For examples of this argument see Fan Wen-lan, op.cit. (..chjr 
-tai shih)p 123? (ed) Fan Wen-lan, op.cit. (..lun-wen chi)
continued at bottom of next page..
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as (la screen for the Manchus1’ until such time as England was 
ready to help crush the rebellion.
The thesis does not attempt to discuss in any detail 
the relative importance of British intervention in the final 
defeat of the rebellion. To answer that question adequately 
it would be necessary to examine the general condition of the 
rebel movement in its later years, and also the Manchu campaign 
against it, both issues beyond the scope of the material used 
here. That material is relevant in some measure to this 
question, insofar as it illustrates the actual extent of 
British action against the rebellion, and it seems to me to 
reinforce the view that British and other Western interven­
tion was neither so extensive nor so decisive as some have 
made it. But the main questions asked about British policy 
here are more limited in scone, being nart of an attempt to 
describe that policy on the basis of the official British
records, rather than of an attempt to assess its place in
(1)the general history of the Taiping rebellion.
Part II of the thesis may be more briefly introduced. In
it I have attempted to rive a general picture of non-official
(26 from previous page....
pn *+2-3; Lo Erh-kang, op.cit., pi68: Hu Sheng, Tmnerlalism 
and Chinese Politics, p. 2^; MN.Roy, devolution and Counter 
^.evolution in China (19^6), np 1?*+-5; A.F.Lindlev, op.ctt., 
p 17V; I.Scarth, British Policy in Enina (l86l),p27•
►
(1) this uage...
For discussion of this question see W.J.Hail, op.cit.,ch.125 
also 0 . 2.Taylor, on.cit. , p.6]_3*
opinion about the rebellion and also about British policy 
towards it, both in China and in England. Apart from the 
obvious problem of defining and illustrating the various 
attitudes to be found among missionaries and merchants, in 
the press and in parliament, the major question I have in 
mind in this part is whether the development of the official 
policy was at any point significantly influenced by non-official 
opinion. Did missionary disappointment in the "heresies” of 
the Taipings lead them to urge a sort of Albigensian crusade 
upon the British government? If British policy was designed 
to protect British trade interests, especially the opium trade, 
did British merchants, especially the opium merchants, urge 
a policy of intervention upon their government?
This part of the thesis is based upon a variety of sources, 
unfortunately not very evenly spread. There are very adequate 
records from which a comprehensive picture of missionary opinion 
can be obtained, but the available merchant records relevant 
to the question are much more piecemeal. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to say something about merchant opinion, especially on 
the question of intervention, which is the main point of inter­
est. Press files and parliamentary debates also make possible 
some analysis of that uncertain thing, "public opinion” so 
that, although the main emphasis in the thesis is upon the 
development of official policy and attitudes, some place is
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given to the attitudes of other interested groups. For the 
most part, the state of opinion in these groups has been 
generalised about on the basis of a few isolated examples, 
or simply assumed. The chapters in Part II of the thesis 
are therefore designed as much as anything to bring together 
as representative a selection as possible of merchant, 
missionary and other views, both upon the rebellion itself 
and upon government policy towards it.
On the problem of presentation, although division into 
two separate parts has its disadvantages^ I have felt that, 
given the difficulties involved in weaving together a compre­
hensive picture from a wide variety of sources, both official 
and non-official, concerned with policies and opinions in 
England and in China, it is justified for the sake of clarity. 
In transcribing Chinese personal names I have used the Wade 
system, and for Chinese place names the old Post Office system. 
-— — Neither of these systems was established at the time with 
which the thesis deals, so that in quoting original documents 
the spelling is sometimes different from that in the text. As 
a rule this presents no difficulty (Taeping for Taiping; 
Shanghae for Shanghai, etc.); but in the few cases in which 
confusion might arise I have put the modern English spelling 
in brackets. I have referred throughout to !lthe Manchu 
government” rather than to !,the Chinese government”, out of
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respect for the view that the Taipings were the real 
representatives of the Chinese people, but I have not 
hesitated to refer to "Chinese officials" or "Chinese 
authorities", since these were usually in fact of Chinese 
race, even though serving a Manchu government.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge help in preparing 
the thesis from a number of quarters - from the Central 
Research Fund of the University of London for a grant of 
£20 with which to purchase from the U. S. A. a microfilm 
copy of files of the North China Herald (1850-61), unavail­
able in England;^ from Dr. J. C.Ch*en and Mrs. Hung- 
Ying Bryan for assistance with translations from Chinese 
materials; from Mr. J. Lust, librarian at S. 0. A. S., 
for translation of the article in Russian referred to on 
PPXnl^^nZ; to the various missionary societies in London 
who so readily made records available to me, and to their 
librarians, especially Miss Fletcher of the London Mission­
ary Society, for their assistance in using these; to Mr.
(1) Unfortunately, although ordered early in December, 1956, 
and re-crdered in February, this microfilm has still 
(early April) not yet arrived. For the views of this 
important newspaper I have therefore been obliged to 
rely on quotations in other contemporary newspapers, 
and in later historical works, and on occasional cuttings 
from it enclosed in the volumes of China despatches in 
the Public Rocord Office. The British Museum file of 
this paper begins at 1862 and is, in any case, at present 
withdrawn from the,use of students. The R.I.I.A. has a 
file beginning in 1863. The microfilm of the years 1850-61, 
when it arrives, will be placed in the University of 
London Library.
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J. Gerson for permission to use his notes made from the 
correspondence of Lord Elgin at Broomhall, Dunfermline, 
Scotland, to which he wasgiven access by Lord Bruce, and 
also for much helpful discussion; and to both my supervisors, 
Mr. 0. P. N. B. van der Sprenkel and Mr. J. Gray, for their 
suggestions, advice and encouragement.
PART I: OFFICIAL ATTITUDES and POLICY
CHAPTER I
British Relations with the Manchu 
Government and Early Reactions to 
the Rebellion (18^0^27
Existing accounts of British policy towards the Taiping 
rebellion begin with the situation as it was in 1853* although 
the rebellion itself actually began in 1850. This is natural 
enough, since until the middle of 1852 the rebellion was 
confined to the hinterland of China’s two southernmost provinces, 
Kwangsi and Kwaxigtung, an area remote from the capital at Peking 
and from the main centre of British trade in China around 
S h a n g h a i . N o t h i n g  that can properly be called British 
policy towards it can be defined before the advance of the 
rebels to the Yangtze valley and their capture of Nanking, 
the second city of the empire, in March, 1853-
Even before then, however, certain opinions about the 
character of the movement had been formed by British officials 
in China, on the basis of the few, vague reports they received
(1) Actually about 1850 British trade at Shanghai was still less 
than at Canton, but the consul there could assert with confid 
ence that lfThe advantage enjoyed by this Port over every 
other in China, not excepting Canton, must be too evident to 
require comment”. (F.0.228/130, Alcock to Bonham, March 12, 
1851). In 1852 Consular returns of trade at the two ports 
(as given in a table in the Shanghai Almanac for 185?)
showed : Canton ... £2,368,830 Imports £1,566,61*+ Exports
Shanghai . £1,566,61*+ rl £2,l*+l,8*+5 n 
Within a few years trade at Shanghai far outstripped that of 
any other treaty port in China. See figures quoted in P.D. 
vol 17*+ col 153*+, where total foreign trade at Shanghai about 
1863 was given as £58 million against Canton £6 million.
of its progress in Kwangsi, while very definite opinions about J 
the character of the Manchu government which was being challenged 
had also been formed by these officials, on the basis of ten 
years experience of treaty relations with it* The first 
question which arises is how far British officials concerned 
with the making of policy in China were predisposed to favour |
the rebellion when it first emerged as a force of major 
importance.
In 1853 the British government quickly decided upon a
policy of neutrality. Although many Marxist historians argue
that this neutrality, was always inclined.towards the Manchus,
some other historians suggest that, in the beginning at least,
(1)it tended to favour the rebels rather than otherwise. The 
major reason given for this latter view is that British sympathy 
for the movement was aroused by the rebels1 profession of 
Christianity, but also suggested as a powerful factor working 
in the rebels1 favour is that there was a great deal of 
dissatisfaction felt with the Manchu government on account of 
its attitude towards treaty relations with the West.
"The rebel conquest of the Yangtze valley occurred at a 
time when British and American officials were becoming 
exasperated by the conduct of the Manchu officials, who
(1) See for example Morse, op.cit., vol I p ^53? T.Dennett op. 
cit. pp 216-20; W.Costin. Great Britain and China (1937) 
pp 160-1; Maybon and Fredet. Histoire de la Concession 
Francaise de Changhai (1929; pp M3-53* "
"sought to evade observance of the treaties of 18^2-^, 
particularly as they applied to the opening of trade", 
writes S. B. Boardman • M Favourable reports that reached 
Shanghai of the vigor and discipline of the insurgents and 
the Christian character of their religious beliefs indicated 
that more co-operation might be expected from them than from 
Ch’ing officials".^
The idea of the overthrow of the Manchu government, it is 
suggested, was by no means unacceptable to British and other 
western officials in China in 1853*
There is certainly a great deal of force in this argument, 
for there can be no question that relations with the Manchu 
government under the Treaty of Nanking, signed in l8^ f2, had 
proved very unsatisfactory from the British point of view.
Before that treaty, contact with China had been confined to 
Canton, the only port opened by the Manchus to western trade.
The provincial authorities there had, according to long 
established Chinese principles, treated all westerners as 
"barbarians"* who needed to be "soothed and curbed" and with 
whom relations could only be conducted on a tributary basis.
(1) E. P. Boardman, Christian Influence upon the Ideology of
the Taining Rebellion (1952), p 20; also Maybon and Fredet, 
op. cit., pp 51-2 .
Diplomatic equality was simply a principle which Chinese 
governments had never recognised. No communications from 
British or other Western officials were accepted unless 
labelled as "humble petitions" and presented, not directly 
to the governor in his yamen, but to lesser officials at the 
city gate. All westerners were confined to a factory area 
outside the city proper, which they were forbidden to enter, 
and were subject to many irritating restrictions and regulations. 
Altogether, from both a trading and a diplomatic point of view, 
the situation was highly unsatisfactory to the Westerm powers in 
China, which meant primarily England, since her trading interests 
were by far the greatest. Only a trickle of trade was being 
drawn, on hands and knees, from what seemed in all logic the 
greatest potential market and reservoir of human wealth in the 
world. The seizure of stocks of opium by the authorities at 
Canton in 1839 became the occasion, although it was hardly the 
real cause, for the first Anglo-Chinese war of 1839-^-2.^^
On paper, and up to a point in fact, the Treaty of Nanking 
which resulted from that war radically altered the situation.
Four additional coastal ports (Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and 
Shanghai) were opened to trade, and British subjects were 
guaranteed the right to reside at them, "without molestation
(1) On Western status in China before the Treaty of Nanking 
see especially J.K.Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the 
China Coast (1953). cc. 1-3.
or restraint", while British officials were to he free to
correspond directly with Chinese officials, at the capital
and in the provinces, "on a footing of perfect equality", under
such terms as "Communication", "Statement" or "Declaration". In
addition, the island of Hong Kong was ceded, to provide a secure
base for British vessels in China waters, and an indemnity, both
for the opium destroyed in 1839 and the expenses incurred in
the war by the British government, was exacted. The first of
the "unequal" treaties was intended by England to open a new
era in its relations with China.
By the Manchu government, however, this treaty was regarded
not as the beginning of a new era but merely as the end of a
disagreeable episode. A brief diplomatic honeymoon between
the actual negotiators of the treaty, Chfi Ying and Sir Henry
Pottinger, was followed by renewed frictions and many "incidents"
especially at Canton, so that the conditions for a second Anglo-
Chinese war were soon in process of creation. The reasons and
stages of this breakdown of the first treaty system have been
(2 )analysed at length elsewhere. ' Sufficient here to note the 
long wrangle over the right of British subjects to enter Canton;
(1) For texts of this and other treaties quoted or referred to 
below see Treaties. Conventions, etc.. between China and 
Foreign States (Imperial Maritime Customs, Miscellaneous 
Series, No.30, Shanghai 1908-9).
(2) See Fairbank, op.cit., cc 15-19; Costin, op.cit., c.3?
Morse op.cit. vol I c.l1*.
the refusal of the governor of that city after 18M3, Yeh Ming 
chfen, to accord recognition to the British consul, Dr. John 
Bowring, by meeting him; the triumph of the anti-foreign party 
in court circles after the accession of the Hsien Feng emperor 
in March, 1850, a triumph marked especially by the degradation 
of Ch’i Ying, the chief representative of a moderate approach 
on the Chinese side; and, most important, the rejection of an 
attempt by Palmerston ih 1850 to bypass the unco-operative 
Canton officials by communicating directly with the "Minister 
of Foreign Affairs" in Peking. After this last rebuff 
Palmerston began to rumble of war, in his best John Bull 
fashion, telling the British Superintendent of Trade in China 
and Governor of Hong Kong, Sir George Bonham, that
"the time is fast coming when we shall be obliged to 
strike another blow in China..... These half-civilized 
Governments, such as those of China, Portugal, Spanish 
America, all require a dressing every eight or ten years 
to keep them in order 
The Treaty of Nanking had obviously wrought no great revolution 
in the attitude of the Manchu government towards relations with 
the Westland apart from access to four new ports, of which only
(1) Cit. Costin, pp 1^9-50; for still earlier anticipation of 
the nossibilitv of a second war see Chinese Repository.
Dec. 18^5.
7.
Shanghai gave firm promise of becoming a major market for 
foreign trade, the British position in China seemed to have 
advanced little from what it had been before 18^2. Official, 
as well as non-official, British dissatisfaction with this 
state of affairs was certainly very great by 18?Q.
At the same time, the limits to the lengths England was 
prepared to go in its exasperation with the Manchu government 
should also be recognised. In 18*4-0 , Captain Elliot, chief 
British representative in China at the time of the outbreak 
of the first Anglo-Chinese war, had warned against a too 
vigorous attack, lest this bring about the collapse of the 
dynasty* r,I can't conceive a more unfortunate consequence 
to ourselves than extensive political convulsion in China”, 
he observed.^ With that sentiment he expressed one of the 
great principles underlying British policy in China throughout 
the period of this study and beyond, namely, to prevent the 
political break up of the country and thereby the creation of 
a situation in which England would either have to govern in 
order to trade, or not trade at all - unless under difficult 
and dangerous circumstances. Fear that this was an all too 
probable result of the Taiping rebellion tended to inhibit 
official British sympathy towards it from the start.
” 1 should be sorry to see any coercive measures resorted 
to at this juncture”, Bonham wrote to a Foreign Office
(1) Ibid, p.78
official in December, 1851* in a letter discussing general
relations with China, "inasmuch as such a measure might
throw the whole of the Two Kwangs (Kwangsi and Kwaigtung)
into a confusion from which it might be very difficult to
extract them; and it is clear that such a state of things
(1)
could not be conducive to our interests”.
In a despatch written in February, 1853* as the Taipings were 
advancing down the Yangtze towards Nanking, the consul at 
Shanghai, Rutherford Alcock, expressed his doubts of their 
ability to displace the Manchus quickly and effectively.
"A long inter-necine war, with the total destruction of 
the Empire, seems a more probable and disastrous issue. 
Disastrous alike to the prosperity of the Country and 
the maintenance of any permanent commercial relations on 
the part of Foreign powers. 11 
Certainly, this was written before any definite reports of the 
Christian beliefs and the discipline of the rebels had been 
received, and Alcock was, in any case, always more of an 
alarmist than Bonham. Yet it remains true, as later chapters 
will show, that even in the periods when the rebellion seemed 
most irresistible, and the collapse of the Manchu government 
most likely, leading British officials in China were never 
really convinced of the rebels1 capacity to establish their
(1) F.0.17/181 Bonham to Hammond* Dec. 29* 1851•
(2) F.0.228/161 Alcock to Bonham, Feb. 2 6, 1852.
authority quickly over the whole of China, or even the greater 
part of it* They had real grounds of complaint against the 
Manchu government, but it was always preferable to a state of 
political chaos. Any sympathy they might feel for the Taipings 
on religious or other grounds was conditional upon the spe©d and 
thoroughness with which the rebels seized the Dragon Throne 
and received the Mandate of Heaven.
The natural bias in British policy away from the idea of 
political change in China was accentuated in the years immediately 
preceding 1853 by a temporary change in the general direction 
of that policy. Political changes in England meant that 
Palmerston left the Foreign Office at the end of 1851 and 
was replaced by men less inclined to favour a vigorous foreign 
policy, in China or elsewhere. The development of major issues 
in Europe itself, notably the establishment of the Second Empire 
in France and the emergence of the crisis with Russia over the 
Middle East, meant that insofar as China affairs received 
attention the emphasis was upon keeping things quiet. Talk 
of war ceased, and although an improvement in the British 
situation was still to be sought, it was to be by negotiation 
for treaty revision, not by "another Blow".
This change in the temper of the British government towards 
China affairs is revealed by the instructions sent to Bowring, 
when he was appointed acting Superintendent of British Trade at
Hong Kong during Bonham1s absence on leave between April, 1852, 
and February, 1853* Bowring, after his experiences at Canton, 
was probably more exasperated with the Manchu government than 
any other British official in China; and being, in addition, 
a political protege of Palmerston - if one may use such a 
word of so proud a man - he was anxious to force the issues.
But during his temporary direction of affairs he was more 
than once instructed to avoid any sort of forceful policy, 
and to confine his actions r,to keeping everything, both as 
regards intercourse with the Chinese, and the details of 
Consular business, as quiet as possible*1. Obliged to put 
aside his plans to transform British relations with China,
£9*7?ihg/ Wjasj ^hp^oygyiy/ iykecL
"My orders to do nothing and not to quit Hong Kong 
have been most peremptory, and precious opportunities have 
been lost11, he complained in a personal letter to Lord 
Granville in November, 1852. "...But as Sir George Bonham
writes to me that both the present and the late governments 
consider the existing state of things by no means unsatis­
factory, and that he fully concurs in that opinion, my hopes 
of doing any good in China have vanished, and I trust that on
(1) A d  P 1857 (2173) P 12, Malmesbury to Bowring, July 21,
1852; cf. also ibid p 3, Granville to Bowring,
Jan. 19, 1852.
Sir George Bonham's assumption of office some other field may
he found for me, and that I may be allowed to return home -
at all events that a twelve months leave of absence may be
(1)granted me ....n 
Bowring got his leave of absence, returning to China as Sir 
John in April, 185**> to succeed Bonham with full powers at Hong 
Kong, and of course with renewed hopes of being able, this time, 
to pursue a more vigorous policy towards the Manchu government.
Yet the instructions issued to him in 1852 represented 
more than a temporary detente, brought on by his care-taker 
status at that time. This is indicated by the instructions he 
received at the beginning of 185**. ' Clarendon, who was Foreign
Secretary by then, instructed him to
i l l / / / /
"endeavour to maintain the most friendly intercourse with
the Chinese Authorities, and while steadily upholding the
rights and privileges secured for British subjects under
Treaty, you will as far as possible avoid occasions of angry
discussion calculated to lead to an interruption of friendly
(2)relations between this country and China.1'
(1) F.0.17/207 Bowring to Granville, Nov. 2*f, 1852.
(2) F.0.17/210 Clarendon to Bowring, Feb. 13, 185***
In thus urging Bowring to keep the peace in China, Clarendon 
was no doubt thinking.partly of the approaching crisis in the 
Middle East, but he also went on to summarise the past ten years 
of treaty relations with the Manchus in such a way as to suggest 
that he was far from feeling that it was impossible to treat 
with them. He authorised Bowring to raise the question of 
treaty revision, but added,
"If we have not yet reaped all the advantages which were 
anticipated, at the conclusion of our Treaties with China, 
from the intended intercourse with that country for which it 
was the object of those Treaties to provide, it is nevertheles 
unquestionable that the commerce of Her Majesty's subjects 
in that quarter has made rapid progress under the protection 
of those Treaties, and there is therefore good reason to 
expect that by prudent management commerce may be still 
further developed, and our intercourse with the Chinese 
Authorities and people set free from those obstacles which 
have hitherto beset it. So far indeed from it being a matter 
of surprise that more had not been done, it is a subject for 
congratulation that such results have already been secured, 
notwithstanding the difficulties of no ordinary character 
with which we have had to contend....There were habits of 
long standing to be overcome, prejudices deeply rooted to be
softened down, new marts for Trade to be established, new 
arrangements to be made for meeting the demands of the 
Foreign Merchant for the produce of the Soil. And it 
cannot be doubted that much of the disappointment which has 
been felt at the limited expansion of our intercourse with 
China sihce the conclusion of the Treaties has originated
(i)
in a disregard of these conditions."' '
The emphasis was upon continued negotiation with the Manchu 
government, and there was no suggestion of encouragement to 
the rebels as being likely to prove more co-operative.
It would be foolish to attempt to try to argue away 
the existence of official British impatience and exasperation 
with the Manchu government about 1853? but it is important not 
to assume that this was strong enough to dispose British policy 
favourably towards the idea of revolution in China. After 
Palmerston's departure at the end of 1851? this impatience 
was for a time much less apparent in the Foreign Office itself, 
which was the final arbiter of British policy in China. The 
difficulties which had been experienced in applying the 18^2 
treaty did, of course, prompt the question whether things would 
not be better from the British point of view under a Taiping 
government. But the answer of British officials to this questio] 
was from the start much less decidedly affirmative, and much
(1) F.O. 17/210 Clarendon to Bowring, Feb. 13? 185**•
less ready to assume ultimate rebel success, than was that 
given by many non-official observers. British officials were 
at least as much disposed to ask whether it would not be possible 
to improve the British situation in China as the price of aid 
to the Manchu government. They were certaihly not a priori 
in favour of the idea of rebellion in China5 not even Christian 
rebellion.
x x x x x x x
Turning to the question of official British opinion about 
the rebellion before 1853 > one sees the view of it that was to 
predominate ih later consular despatches in process of formation. 
The image seen through a glass darkly during 1850-2 became, 
after a relatively short period of doubt and speculation, the 
picture of the rebellion painted in ever sharper colours and 
fuller detail in most later consular reports.
The assembling of the members of the Pai Shang-ti Hui 
(God Worshippers1 Society) at the village of Chin T fien in 
Kwangsi in the middle of 1850 may be taken as the starting point 
of the rebellion, although it was not until January 1851* that 
Hung Hsiu-ch'tian assumed the title of Tien Wang (Celestial King) 
and proclaimed the Taiping Tienkuo (Celestial Kingdom of Great 
Peace). He then instituted a new dynastic calendar, thus, as 
it were, formally challenging the ruling dynasty, and appointed
five subsidiary Wangs to advise and. assist him in the government 
of his new empire. Despite these large pretensions, however, 
until the middle of 1852 the rebellion remained confined to the 
interior of Kwangsi and Kwai^ung, an area pocketed off from 
the rest of China by the Nanling mountains and an ineffective 
base for a national revolution, as Sun Yat-sen was also later 
to find. In June, 1852, therefore, partly to advance their 
claims and partly to avoid the harrying troops of the provincial 
government, the rebels began to move northward through Hunan, 
growing in numbers and strength as impoverished peasants joined 
them, and reached the Yangtze by the beginning of 1853*
During the Kwangsi period of the rebellion no first-hand 
reports about it from Western observers were received, and 
British officials were dependent for what information they got 
upon rumours, second-hand reports, ,fthe common newsman**, and 
reports in the official Peking gazette. On the basis of such 
sources of information, or mis-information, the British consulate 
at Canton sent fairly regular reports to the Superintendency at 
Hong Kong, copies of which were generally sent on to London.
But Bonham emphasized !,how imperfectly we are informed of 
important events occurring in our immediate vicinity11, at the
(1) This and other summaries of the course of the rebellion is 
based mainly on (ed) A.W.Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the
Chi*ing Period (19^3)•
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same time warning the Foreign Office that "incidents which are
even here, in my judgment, magnified, may attain a formidable
(1)
growth by the time they are repeated in England11. From
these reports, and the comments of Bonham and later Bowring
upon them, three main questions emerge as occupying the minds
of British authorities in China about the rebellion at this
stage. Given the lack of accurate sources of information^
none was easy to answer with certainty, but this did not prevent
fairly decided views being formed.
The first and basic question was whether the rising should
be regarded as a serious political revolt or simply as a big-
scale bandit movement. The first reports from Canton, written
in August, 1850,by T. T. Meadows, Interpreter to the consulate,
referred simply to f,rebels or robbers*1 defying the authorities
in Kwangsi for some months past. Bonham, forwarding copies
of these reports to the Foreign Office, gave his opinion that
"plunder and not the overthrow of this Dynasty seems to me to
(2)be the real motive of the Rebellion". A few months later,
in noting reports of the capture and dispersion of many 
"banditti" near Canton, he expressed himself strengthened in 
his belief that "there never has been adequate ground for
(1) F.0.17/169 Bonham to Palmerston Sept. 28, 1850.
(2) ibid, August 23, 1850, enc. Meadows1 report of Aug. 16.
investing their incursions with the title of insurrection.
"No person of respectability has joined them, and it is
the habit of such marauders, as.from Chinese history it
would appear always to have been, to endeavour to lure
the disaffected to their side by the assumption of rank,
(1)display of badges and banners, and similar artifices." 
Bowring also, when relieving Bonham during 1852, referred to
these "rather predatory than political movements", and was
inclined to argue that, politically, the Manchu government was
(2)far less weak than it might appear.
The most forceful, if not the most prescient,expression
j
of this tendency to discount the political and military signi- 
ficance of the rising was given by the Hong Kong paper China 
Mail, in February 18519 when it present'd views that it never 
really abandoned, despite the later successes of the rebels.
"From the first we have regarded the "rebels" as nothing 
more than freebooters, who attempt to conceal their real 
character under an imposing pretence of patriotism, and 
whose actual force has been greatly exaggerated by the 
authorities who have failed to disperse them. The pretence 
however, in both cases...has been mistaken for the reality, 
and we have accordingly been favoured, both from Europe and 
India, with sapient and solemn disquisitions on the "Civil
(1) F.O.17/I7O Bonham to Palmerston, Oc. 29, 1850
(2) F.0.17/188 Bowring to Granville, April 23> 1852; also May 5th
"War in China", and the approaching overthrow of the 
present dynasty by an organized host, already mustering 
in one distant and unimportant province, double the 
number of armed men the Duke of Wellington led to Waterloo 
The fighting, the Mail concluded, would probably end in 
"amicable negotiations", Chinese fashion.
It was partly in answer to such views that Meadows, as 
early as June, 1851, reported his conviction that the rebellion 
was a serious and organized political movement. Like the 
China Mail, he held to his point of view during the later 
history of the rebellion, even when he was practically the only 
representative of the British government in China to speak in 
its support. In 1851 he wrote of the rebels,
"They levy contributions according to established rules, 
and pay for their supplies where the contributions in kind 
are not sufficient; they are at some care not to make 
themselves obnoxious to the lower classes, and even 
occasionally share with the poor what they take from the 
rich; their object is to go on in this manner gradually 
increasing their funds and recruiting their numbers from 
the disaffected until they deem themselves sufficiently 
numerous for permanent occupation of the cities they take;
(1) CM b a  Mail Feb. 27, 1851
"they never hesitate to engage (and almost always signally 
defeat) any bodies of the Imperialists that interfere 
seriously with the prosecution of these immediate objects, 
but for Hie present they do not seek to fight; lastly, 
while they give no quarter to volunteers or to mandarins 
that go out of the strict line of their duty to act 
against them, they are far from sanguinary in their treat­
ment of regulars who fall into their hands while merely 
obeying orders.
"I conceive that men who seem to have on the whole
consistently kept in view these objects and rules for a
whole year, and whose aggregate numbers are never given
at less that 20,000 cannot, without plain perversion of
language, be termed "robbers"  That the Imperial
Government considers the affair nothing less than what
we would call a rebellion, and a verv serjous rebellion,
(1)
is made sufficiently plain by the measures it is taking..." 
But Meadows' very sympathetic view of the rebellion was not 
shared by his superiors in 1851 any more than in lo6l, when he 
was still writing in its defence.
A secondquestion which was asked at this time concerned 
the religious nature of the movement. In 1853? when authentic
(1) F.0.17/178, enc. in Bonham to Palmerston, June 21, 185-1*
information was obtained on this point, there was naturally 
great astonishment, not to say delight, at the sudden emergence 
of a native movement of rebellion proclaiming the Christian 
faith. Yet something of this was certainly suspected, although 
not fully realized, before 1853* In September 1851 Meadows 
reported that an Imperial Edict had been issued which attributed 
the disturbances to "Strange Doctrines". "No mention is made of 
Christianity", he noted, "but it is evidently included in the 
term 'Strange D o c t r i n e s B o w r i n g ,  however, was convinced 
that the movement was no more genuinely religious than it was 
political,
"It is not surprising that the progress of the insurrec­
tion has been attributed to foreign influences and the 
teaching of the missionaries,"^he wrote in May 1852. 
"...Reports reached me some time ago that Christian inscrip­
tions had been seen upon the banners of the Insurgents.
Some of the Protestant missionaries accused the native 
Catholic Christians of being prime movers of the revolt, 
while on the other hand the Catholic missionaries declared 
that the chief who had adopted the title of Tien Tih,
or Celestial Virtue, was a teacher converted by and 
connected with Dr. Gutzlaff, and one of the active members
(1) F.0.17/180, enc. in Bonham to Palmerston. Sept. 29, 1851;
cf. also Chinese Repository July-Nov., 1851, PP ^97-8 - "There 
is a very general impression in Canton and its vicinity that
they are somehow connected with foreigners and with 
Christianity..."
21.
"of the Doctor's great missionary machine known by the 
name of the Chinese Christian Mission. Some time ago 
it was reported that the rebels were destroying the heathen 
temples and were calling themselves worshippers of Shangti, 
the name which one section of the Protestant missionaries 
give to the true God. On this news reaching Hong Kong 
the Protestant missionaries sent two agents into Kwangse 
in order to report on the real state of things. Though 
the agents soon got frightened and ran away from the 
disturbed districts, I am informed by Dr. Legge that the 
rebels were Idolaters still, and that though they had 
demolished certain temples belonging to Deities whom they 
not patronize, yet the Shangti whom they worshipped 
was not the Christian Shangti (Sovereign Ruler) but an 
Idol representing the God of War - and that the Mother of 
Heaven - a female idol very popular among the Chinese, 
shared the Idolatrous devotion of the Insurgents. It 
has been said that one of the banners bore the inscription 
of A,3L. Tien Choo, which is the name for God adopted by
(1) Karl Gutzlaff was a German missionary who, after working for 
some years as Interpreter to the British authorities at 
Canton, organised the Chinese Evangelical Union. This body 
was intended by Gutzlaff to bring about the conversion of 
China by sowing the seed broadcast by means of itinerant 
preachers and Chinese agents, rather than by working out 
from a few bases as most missionary societies attempted. 
Gutzlaff was responsible for influencing a number of mission­
aries in going to China, including Hung's teacher, I.I.Robert 
See ’Karl Gutzlaff: als missionar in China (19^6) Herman
Schlyter (copy in the library of the L.M.S.).
"the Catholic Missionaries, hut I believe that there are
no grounds for the report, nor can I learn from any
authentic source that the movement has anything whatever
of a religious character."
Nor did it represent a serious political threat to the dynasty,
Bowring insisted, and altogether it had "far more of a local
than a national character". As such, he added, "It does not
affect, nor is it likely to affect us, except by interfering
with the regular course of trade, and the probability is, even
were any of the five ports menaced, of which at present there
are no symptoms whatever, that there would be no meddling with
(1)
the persons or property of Foreign residents".
The conclusion of this despatch indicated the third point 
of interest to British officials in the early reports on the 
rebellion, namely, how it might affect British interests in 
China. In 1850-1 Bonham had expressed occasional fears for 
the security of Canton and the fate of trade there, but by 
18^2, as Bowring*s despatch shows, no great alarm was felt for 
the treaty ports. On the contrary, there was a tendency to 
see the outbreak of rebellion as a possible advantage, since as 
an embarrassment to the Manchu government it might perhaps be 
used as a lever with which to extract full observance of the 
Nanking treaty, and even treaty revision. So Bonham, despite
(1) F.0.17/189 Bowring to Granville, May 5, 1852.
his warning at the end of 1851 against throwing the Two Kwangs
into confusion,was writing only a couple of months later that
"the present time is as favourable for coercing the
Chinese Government as the reign of Taukwarig, because
although the rreigning Emperor is less friendly than his
Father, his hands are full of the Kwang'se Rebellion, and
(1)his Exchequer emptied by the same cause11.
Bowring also thought the rebellion provided a good opportunity
to press the question of entry into Canton, for
"the Mandarins, menaced by Insurrectionists in the
neighbouring provindes and desirous, above all, to maintain
the public peace and to come into no collision with powerful
foreign nations would, I think, consent to our admission,
could they only be persuaded that the demand was seriously
(2)
made, and would, in case of resistance, be enforced"♦
But, between the reluctance of the Foreign Office after Palmer­
ston^ departure to encourage such moves and the sudden change 
in the course of the rebellion itself, these early speculations 
came to nothing. In any case, the danger remained that if 
British policy attempted to use the rebellion as a lever to prise 
open a wider door into China it might in fact help to bring the
(1) F.0.17/187 Bonham to Palmerston, Kan. 29, 1852.
(2) A & P 1857 (2173) P Bowring to Granville, April 19, 1852.
whole structure down. As an instrument of British policy 
the rebellion was decidedly awkward to handle, and was never 
successfully used, either as a means of getting treaty revision 
or, in its last years, as a means of injecting greater efficiency 
into the Manchu government.
The views formed by British officials about the rebellion 
in its Kwangsi period cannot, I think, be said to have had any 
very significant influence upon the trend of British policy in 
1853* They may, perhaps, have helped incline it for a short 
time towards intervention at a price on hehalf of the Manchus, 
but by the middle of the year the success of the rebellion was 
so great, and the first-hand reports upon its character and 
organisation so remarkable, that it was obviously necessary to 
rethink the official attitude. By the middle of 185^, however, 
these early views had, in essentials, re-asserted themselves.
The rebellion was once again written off in most official 
British reports as of no real political or religious worth, even 
though it remained militarily formidable, and the brief period 
in which more sympathetic and hopeful views of it were enter­
tained soon passed. In any case, the sympathy and the hope 
were always very qualified.
CHAPTER II
The Policy of Neutrality (1853)
While the rebellion was confined to the far south of 
China British representatives were in the position of interested 
spectators who were not seeing much of the game* The Foreign 
Office itself did not display any interest, and made no 
comments. But once the rebels began to move down the Yangtze 
valley, approaching Nanking, and, even more important in 
British eyes, the tea and silk districts around Shanghai, 
the case was very different. The desire to discover more 
about the rebels increased, while some definite statement of 
the official British attitude towards their movement became 
essential, especially when Chinese officials began requesting 
the aid of foreign vessels to check their advance.
The primary objectives of British policy In China at 
that time were to secure full recognition of the treaty rights 
gained in l S ^  and, if possible, to extend these to include 
direct diplomatic access to the court at Peking and the right 
to trade in the interior as well as on the coast. Policy 
towards the now serious rebellion had to be fitted into this 
general pattern of British policy in China, but in the absence 
of certain knowledge about the rebels and their attitude to
foreigners, and in the prevailing atmosphere of political and 
military insecurity, this was not easy to do with any 
confidence. Would the larger ends of British policy be best 
served by helping the Manchu government to suppress the 
rebellion, by treating with the rebels as a new de facto 
power, or by holding strictly aloof and awaiting the outcome 
of the struggle? Since it then took from three to four 
months for despatches from China to reach London and instruc­
tions in reply to be received, while events in China itself 
were moving very swiftly, the responsibility for the early 
definition of British policy necessarily rested upon Bonham 
as Chief Superintendent of Trade at Hong Kong. He soon 
decided upon the last course as the best from the British 
point of view, but certainly did not ignore the other alterna- 
tive^&ltogether. In particular, intervention on behalf of 
the Manchu government was for a short time seriously considered.
The chief advocate of this line of policy was the consul
at Shanghai, Rutherford Alcock. As early as November, 1852,
he had been anticipating that foreign consuls there might soon
have to treat with "authorities de facto in the absence of
(1)those representing the Emperor Hienfung". His despatches
to Bonham at the beginning of 1853 defined the possible dangers
(1) F.O. 228/1^8 Alcock to Bowring, Nov. 1, 1852.
and advantages that he saw in the situation. By January
more certain reports of the advance of the rebels towards
Nanking and the coast had been received at Shanghai, "with
what result to our commercial and political relations it is
scarcely safe to predict"^ Alcock wrote, "Of course if they
bring in their train obstinate civil war, interrupting the
traffic in the great trunk lines and accompanied with much
disorder and disorganization, both political and social, it
may be very fatal. If, on the other hand, they continue the
precautions hitherto reported to have been taken to establish
order, it may be a mere change of rulers in which, at first
(1)
at least, we may not be very directly concerned".
In a despatch dated February 26th, Alcock felt that the 
fall of the dynasty was by then nearly certain, but also that 
later reports of the erratic and destructive nature of the 
advance of the rebels made it very doubtful that they could 
effectively replace the Manchus, and he began to express fears 
for the future of foreign trade in China. Since the Chinese 
authorities at Shanghai were already asking for the assistance 
of foreign vessels, however, Alcock was quick to ask
"whether France, in the interests of the Propaganda and 
Roman Catholicism, or Great Britain in the interests of a
(1) F.0.228/161 Alcock to Bowring, Jan. 2*f, 1853*
"Commerce involving in its circle some £25,000,000 of capital
(1)
and an annual revenue (British and Indian) of some £9,000,000, 
may deem the occasion opportune for rescuing the Empire from 
a threatened disintegration, and largely advancing the field 
of exertion by securing as the condition unrestricted access 
to the furthest confined...... in a confidential note of this
nature I may perhaps be permitted to urge upon Your 
Excellency's attention how critical are the circumstances - 
how easily and certaihly England with threat from steamers 
and men of war might fling a sheathed sword into the balance 
with decisive effect, and dictate her own terms. And finally, 
that it appears to me from all the information that reaches 
me, no longer limited to a question whether our interests 
may be advanced by armed mediation or intervention, but 
rather whether without some such step promptly and decisively 
taken these interests - Commerce and Revenue - may not be 
utterly ruined by a state of anarchy and political disorgani^ay 
tion - which it may be in our power by a timely act to avert".
(1) For figures on trade in Chiiia in this period seeAppendix B. 
In the early eighteen-fifties the Government in England 
collected £ 5 - 6  million p.a. in tea dutv (about 2/- a lb.), 
and the British government in India £31:-*+ million p.a. from 
the opium trade. For tea revenue see A & P 1872, vol LIV 
(c.2(A-), (Account showing Quantity of Tea Annually Consumed 
in the U.K. with Aggregate Amount of Duty Collected thereon 
...); for opium revenue see table in F.S.Turner, British 
Opium Policy and its Results to India and China (I876) p306.
(tit below p4l6*)
(2) F.0.228/161 Alcock to Bonham, Feb. 26, 1853.
A few days later, on March 3rd, he was urging the point even 
more strongly, insisting that the time had come, "and no one 
may safely predict how soon the opportunity may pass away", for 
the Foreign powers together or for Britain alone to secure 
from the Emperor, "while he is yet in a position to make 
treaties1^ such long desired concessions as unlimited access 
to the interior and to all the ports on the coast, direct 
relations with Pekin and the legalization of the opium trade - 
all to he had within two months.
So rugged an imperialist as Alcock was quite untroubled 
by scruples about putting pressure on a "friendly" power in 
difficulties.
"It certainly in this view does not enter into my 
conception that Her Majesty's Government would under any 
circumstances pledge themselves to an intervention either 
unconditional as to the fruit, or unrestricted as to the 
extent or nature of the aid to be rendered, " he continued, 
in his despatch of March 3rd."Scruples as to the ungenerosit^i 
of taking advantages of the distress of a friendly power 
could scarcely find place in dealing with the Emperor of 
China, whose indisposition to carry out the provisions of 
existing Treaties in their spirit has been very evident".
(1) ibid, March 3rd, 1853*
"Even while I write", Alcock concluded on a note of near panic,
"it is confidently reported that Nankin has fallen (and)
at the bare supposition of Nankin being taken, trade is at a 
stop. If the news prove true..,...I can only repeat the 
intimation conveyed in my last confidential - namely, that I 
look upon the pillage of the place and of the Foreign settle­
ment here as all but inevitable".
As he admitted in these despatches, Alcock was making 
suggestions on issues of policy "which do not strictly fall 
within the province of a Consul to discuss". They are of 
considerable significance in this study however, for they had 
a marked influence on Bonham, only just returned from leave 
to Hong Kong, and set him thinking in terms of a policy towards 
the rebellion based on the principle of aid to the Manchus in 
return for trading and diplomatic concessions. In forwarding 
a copy of Alcockfs report of February 26th to the Foreign Office 
Bonham commented that the views it contained were "on the whole 
entitled to weighty consideration", and asked for the advice of 
the home government, "particularly to what extent if assistance 
were given, it should be granted".^ Next day, March 11th, 
having received Alcock1s despatch of the 3rd, Bonham reported 
his intention to go north to Shanghai himself, so as to be 
able "in the event of matters coming to a crisis, to take more
(1) F.0.17/200 Bonham to Malmesbury, March 10, 1853»
"decisive steps for the protection of the trade and interests
of British subjects than Her Majesty's Gonsul could be expected
(1)to undertake". Alcock was clearly sympathetic to the requests 
for aid he had received from the Shanghai authorities, but had 
not taken it upon himself to promise it definitely. Bonham 
assured the Foreign Secretary, by this time Clarendon, although 
Bonham was still addressing himself to Malmesbury, that he would 
exercise the greatest prudence, and not proffer aid too readily. 
"I shall not accede to any application for assistance 
unless that application is made directly by a High and 
properly accredited Functionary", he added, "and not 
even then without making that assistance the condition 
of advantages to our commerce in China".
But on paper at least, intervention appeared to be a real 
possibility.
Bonham left for Shanghai on March 12th in the gunboat 
"Hermes". Once arrived, however, he quickly dropped all idea 
of offering aid on any terms at all. In the same despatch in 
which he reported his arrival he reported also his determination, 
"pending the instructions of Her Majesty's Government^not 
to interfere in any shape in favour of the Chinese 
Government, as I feel confident that any such interference
(1) ibid, March 11, 1853.
32.
"on my part could only prolong the struggle,though in 
the first place it might appear to have a totally 
different result".^
It is worth examining the reasons why Bonham came so quickly 
round to a policy of neutrality, for he had clearly been 
impressed by Alcock1s assessment of the possible advantages 
in the situation for British interests in China.
The fall of Nanking and the evidence this provided of the 
strength of the rebel tide was certainly, as Lo Erh-kang 
argues, a major reason for Bonham*s change of approach. At 
the same time, it seems to me that Lo exaggerates the extent 
to which Bonham had actually moved in the direction of offering 
aid to the Imperialists, when he goes on to argue that the 
news of the fall of Nanking and of the death of the Imperial 
viceroy, Lu Chien-ying, with whom Bonham had hoped to negotiate, 
"completely upset the plans of the foreign aggressors and 
obliged Bonham to abandon for the time being the counter­
revolutionary agreement that he was just beginning to
(2)
form with the Manchus".
On this argument, a policy of neutrality was forced upon Bonham 
as a sort of temporary second-best. The corollary, which
(1) A & P 1852-3 (1667) p 1, Bonham to Russell, March 28,1853*
(2 ) Lo Erh-kang, op.cit., pp l6l-2.
Lo goes on to draw, is that it was never a sincere policy 
but always pro-Manehu in inclination, whatever it might be 
on paper. But this assumes too readily that Bonham was 
fifmly set upon the path of intervention before the news of 
the fall of Nanking reached him.
That this was the drift of Bonham’s early search for a 
policy is beyond dispute; that he was ever likely to arrive
at the point of trying to implement such a policy is rather
more doubtful. For one thing, Bonham was not an official who 
relished making the big decisions himself, and he frequently 
expressed his anxiety to receive precise instructions from 
the home government.^ ^  He was prepared to talk with Chinese 
officials about aid but not necessarily to commit himself to 
a policy of immediate and active aid. Further, he seems to 
have been more alive than was Alcock to the fact that no pro­
vincial authoiity was likely to be very willing, even in such 
a crisis as that of March, 1853* to memorialise in favour of 
trading large concessions to the barbarian in return for aid
(1) Costin, op.cit., pp 152-3 notes the existence of rather cool 
relations between Bonham and Bowring, the "activite devorantd' 
and readiness to take rapid and decisive action of the latter
being rather much for the Chief Superintendent; Morse, op.
cit. vol I pp 393-^ illustrates Bonham’s disapproval of 
Alcock*s vigorous action in blocking the Chinese grain ships 
at Shanghai in lS1^  in order to force satisfaction for attack* 
on three English missionaries; Fairbank, op.cit., pp *f26-7, 
says Bonham "ducked responsibility" during the customs crisis 
at Shanghai in 1853* Apart from his cautious temperament
Cont’d at foot of next page....
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against the rebel. To use the barbarian to suppress the
rebel was certainly in the best tradMitions of Chinese policy,
but not to pay a stiff price first - though it sometimes
happened that the barbarian exacted a stiff price afterwards.
Bonham, by nature much more cautious than Alcock, took a
calmer view of the situation, both as to its dangers and its
(2)possibilities. It is, I think, something of an exaggera­
tion to argue as if Bonham was forced against his will to adopt 
a policy of neutrality.
The argument is difficult to clinch satisfactorily because 
Bonham wrote no despatches himself between March 11th, when 
he was certainly thinking about intervention, and March 28th, 
when he adopted a firmly neutral stand. Also, unlike Alcock 
or Bowrinp, he was not given to lengthy exposition or analysis 
in his despatches, so that the official record gives no very 
clear evidence about the development of his thought on the
continued from previous page.. Bdnham’s position, being
close to retirement from..the consular service, wTas thought 
by the French minister in China at the time, Bourboulon, 
to have influenced him in favour of a ’’bystander’1 role.
See Costin, p.l6l and Tong Ling-tch’ouang, op.cit., p.23.
(1 this page.. See, for example, Bonham’s Comments upon 
Alcock!s suggestion to press for the legalisation of the 
oninrn trade in F.0.228/161 Bonham to Alcock (Draft) Feb.
22 ,  1853-
(2) For Bonham’s discounting of the danger to Shanghai see his 
letter to the 8.N.O. at Hong Kong asking for the use of 
the ’’Hermes”, F.0.17/200, enc. 2 in Bonham to Malmesbury, 
March 11th,1853* His report of March 28, from Shanghai,
he spoke of the next move of the Taiuings, as ”an Interesting 
subject for speculation”, not one for alarm.
matter during these crucial weeks. There is also the
problem of where exactly you find "British policy" at any 
given moment. Lo writes as if Alcock!s despatches were state­
ments of a settled British policy, but in fact they were no 
more than vigorous arguments in favour of a certain line of 
policy. Admittedly Bonham was ready to test this line to 
the extent of negotiation with high Chinese officials, but 
Clarendon, who was Foreign Secretary by the time copies of 
Alcock's despatches arrived in London, gave it no encourage­
ment and instructed Bonham, in a despatch dated May 7th, that 
"Her Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that the 
most just and prudent course under the existing circum­
stances is that they should observe a strict neutrality 
between the contending parties, should abstain from taking
(1) It would seem that Meadows' report of March 26, in which 
he stated that he was convinced that "the insurrectionary 
movement is a national one of the Chinese against the con­
tinued rule, or rather misrule of the Manchoos", and that 
foreign interference "would now only have the effect of 
prolonging hostilities and anarchy for an indefinite period" 
had much influence on Bonham's report of March 28. Bonham 
echoed Meadows' views on the probable effect of intervention, 
though not on the national character of the movement. {See 
A & P 1852-3 (1667) pp 1, 5*) Alcock, it may be added, 
reversed his ideas on the advisability of intervention. In 
August he wrote, "I do not think there can have been two 
opinions since Nanking fell into the hands of the insurgents 
as to the impossibility of any judicious intefvention on 
the part of the Foreign Powers, and the existence of an 
imperative obligation to observe an absolute and unequivocal 
neutrality. My opinion individually on such a matter of 
national polity is, of course, very unimportant...." (See 
F.O.228/161 Alcock to Bonham, August 6, 1853)*
"any part whatever in the dissentions now prevailing, and
should not interfere for the settlement of the question
in dispute".^
This was written three weeks before Bonham's despatch of
March 28th was received, although telegraph news of the fall
of Nanking had reached London at the end of April. The
Foreign Office, as distinct from the consul at Shanghai and
the Chief Superintendent of Trade at Hong Kong, does not seem
to have seriously considered the idea of intervention in the
(2)early stages of the rebellion.
But the Foreign Office was a long way off and some kind 
of policy had to be applied on the spot before its views could
(1) F.0.17/198 Clarendon to Bonham, May 7? 1853* Fairbank, 
op.cit., p l^*f, notes that it was June before this despatch 
was actually sent, pending overtures to the U.S. and France 
on taking advantage of the situation to raise the issue of 
treaty revision again. But on May 20, in the H.of C.,
Bussell stated in reply to a question what course the govern­
ment proposed to follow, that non-interference beyond the 
protection of British lives and property had been ordered. 
(See P.D. vol 127, cols.*+36-7) *
(2) The suggestion made to other governments by the F.O. for 
taking advantage of the crisis does nfct seem to me to weaken 
this argument. Certainly this was couched in vague terms 
("to take such course as may be calculated to turn to best 
account the opportunity afforded by the present crisis for 
opening the Chinese Empire generally to the commercial enter- 
prize of all the civilised nations of the world"), but there 
was no direct suggestion of offering aid to the Manchu 
government. On these proposals, which for the time came to 
nothing, see F.O.27/957 Clarendon to Lord Cowley (ambassador 
in Paris) May 17* 1853; F.O. 5/561 Clarendon to Crampton 
(ambassador in Washington) May 20 and June 30* 1853* and 
esp. F.O.5/565 Crampton to Clarendon, June 13* 1853* also
J.F.Cady, op. cit., pp 109-11***
be known, Had Bonham committed British forces against the 
rebels in March, 1853* this might have become, by the inexorable 
logic of events; and despite the opinions of Her Majesty's 
Government, the official British policy* That this did not 
happen is to be explained not simply by the pressure of external 
events upon Bonham, important though these undoubtedly were, but 
also by the fact that his own personality and past experience of 
Chinese affairs limited the extent to which he was likely to 
follow Alcock's lead. In any case, the rebel success at 
Nanking was a great deal less positively disturbing to Bonham 
or the British government than Lo's whole argument assumes.
The neutral line adopted by Bonham at the end of March 
became the settled British policy towards/the rebellion, on paper 
at least, for nearly ten years. Bonham adopted it in the first 
instance "pending the instructions of Her Majesty's Government", 
but in the following months it was confirmed and strengthened 
both by his own actions in China and by instructions received 
from London. Clarendon, as already noted, recommended a 
policy of neutrality even before he received the despatch of 
March 28th, and when that despatch was received* (May 30th) he 
approved Bonham's decision as being "in entire conformity with 
the wishes and intentions" of the g o v e r n m e n t . B e f o r e  this 
approval could reach him^Bonham himself had been at some pains
(1) A & P 1852-3 (1667) pp 6-7 Clarendon to Bonham May 31* 1853*
to make this policy plain to both sides, as well as to British 
subjects in China. ‘-His most important step in this direction 
was his visit to the rebels at Nanking in the "Hermes" at the 
end of April.
The rebels, as Bonham had anticipated, had made no attempt 
to advance as far as Shanghai after their capture of Nanking.
At the end of March they had captured Chinkiang, on the junction 
of the Grand Canal and the Yangtze river over a hundred miles 
from the coast, but for the time being were content simply to 
hold the Imperialist forces which besieged them there. At 
the beginning of April large Imperialist forces under Hsiang 
Jung established the "Great Camp of Kiangnan" from which a siege 
of Nanking itself was directed and maintained, after a fashion 
and with one major interruption, for over seven years. In 
1853 the rebels consolidated their gains in the lower Yangtze 
basin short of the actual coastline, at the same time sending 
off part of their forces to the north and west.
Politically, their northern campaign was of vital importance, 
for it represented their most direct thrust at Peking, the 
capture of which was essential if they were to over-throw the 
Kanchus entirely. Although the forces sent north reached the 
neighbourhood of Tientsin, within striking distance of the 
capital, their eventual destruction was perhaps the real turning 
point in the fortunes of the rebellion. The rebels were still
to win great victories, especially during 1860-2, but their 
threat to the throne was never again so immediate, nor their 
chances of complete political and military success so great 
as in the early stages of their- northern campaign. In the 
west opposition to the Taiping advance centred around the 
Chinese official Tseng Kuo-fan, who, despite defeats which 
sometimes reduced him to despair, slowly built up the provincial 
armies which were to be the main agents in the final defeat of 
the rebellion. The failure of the rebels to establish them­
selves on the coast by taking Shanghai, which they could probably
have done without difficulty in the middle of 1853* despite the 
besieging Imperial forces at Nanking and Chinkiang, was doubt­
less a major strategic error, for it denied them easy access to 
the Western arms and supplies which weretfco become an increasingly 
important element in the struggle, as well as to a valuable 
source of revenue from the customs duties of the port. But none 
of this was apparent when Bonham made his journey up the river 
at the end of April, 1853. For the Western powers the important 
thing was that the rebel advance had stopped short of Shanghai.
This meant, however, that the rebels remained very much an 
unknown quantity still. Attempts made early in April to get 
accurate first-hand information about them, first by Chinese 
messengers and then by Meadows attempting a journey in secret 
through the Imperialist lines at Chinkiang, did not yield much.
"There is a somewhat strange peculiarity distinguishing 
these insurgents'*, Bonham noted* , "The accounts received 
from Mr, Meadows describe them as Puritanical and even 
fanatic. The whole armv nrav regularlv before meals*
v .1. v  * v
They punish rape, adultery and opium-smoking with death,
and tobacco smoking with the bamboo....." But, he
added, he was "by no means satisfied in regard to the 
intentions of the insurgents towards foreigners, and as 
the former appear to be a more formidable body than has 
hitherto been sunnosed, T am unwilling to rest until I
(1)
shall have obtained a declaration of those intentions"*
Further, although he had refused the repeated requests of the
Shanghai authorities for aid, giving an "invariable reply.*.
that we \^ ere determined to remain perfectly neutral", this
had. not prevented the taotai (prefect) of the city, Uu Chien-
chang, putting out propaganda reports that such aid was in fact
being given. The two objectives of the trip therefore were
"to undeceive the insurgents in regard to the false statements
made by the Shanghae Taoutae", and to find out what the
rebellion was really like.
There are a number of accounts of the "Hermes" visit to
Hanking, and it would serve little purpose to recount it in
(2)
any detail here. What matters is the view formed by Bonham
(1 O' Ibid,, p, 16, Bonham to Clarendon, April 22, 1853*
(2) See A c: P 1852-3 (1667); T.T.Meadows, The Chinese and their 
Hebelljons (1856) pp 25i- 5 E.G,Fishbou.rne, Impressions
ofChina and the Present Revolution (1855)5 L,Brine, 
juiiPTaenin g Hebe 11 j on _i n Chi'ina, (I062) ,
about the movement and whether the policy of neutrality he 
had laid down in March was given a pro - or anti - Taiping bias 
as a result of it. Bonham was certaihly less favourably 
impressed than Meadows, who went as chief interpreter, or than 
Captain Fishbourne, who commanded the "Hermes", but the tone
(1)
of his reports to Clarendon was sceptical rather than hostile.
He was at some pains to show that the firing from rebel 
batteries to which the "Hermes" was subjected as it approached 
both Chinkiangand Nanking was understandably due to the false 
reports put out by Wu, and that it ceased when the "Hermes" made 
no reply. Once arrived at Nanking, he assured the rebel 
leaders of British neutrality, but also reminded them in no 
uncertain terms of British rights .under the treaty of l8*f2, 
threatening that
"if you or any other people presume to injure in any 
manner the persons or property of British subjects, 
immediate steps will be taken to resent the injury in 
the same manner as similar injuries were resented ten
years ago..... "
This was provoked by evidence that the rebels, though they 
spoke of Westerners as their "brethren", and not as "barbarians", 
were still far from abandoning the old Chinese assumptions of
(1) For Bonham's reports on Miieh the following account is
based see A & P l8?2-3 (1667) pp 21-35*
superiority towards "tribute bearing" nations. "The sooner 
the minds of these men are disabused in regard to their universal 
supremacy the better for all parties", Bonham commented to 
Clarendon. But in 1853 there seemed no reason to regard the 
Taipings as likely to prove more difficult to deal with on 
this account than the Manchus had already proved. On the 
contrary, it seemed reasonable to argue, as did Meadows, that 
their greater readiness to assimilate Western ideas in religion 
meant that such prejudices were likely to disappear more 
quickly among them than among the Manchus. Thus, thought 
Meadows, "with their success a totally unhoped for prospect 
would open to us of obtaining, by purely amicable means, com­
plete freedom of commercial action throughout the whole of 
the Chinese empire".^ Bonham himself did not express such 
high hopes immediately after his trip to Nanking, but a few
months later he was saying something similar in a re-port to 
(2)
Clarendon.
Bonham's innate caution and scepticism were most apparent 
in his comments on the religious ideology of the movement, and 
on its prospects for complete success. Of the former, he wrote
(1) T. T. Meadows, op. cit., p 280; see also his report in 
the North China Herald May 7* 1853*
(2) See below p 51
"they have established a hew religion which may be 
called a kind of spurious revelation. The base of 
this structure is supposed to be founded upon the 
Old Testament and religious tracts; but they have 
superadded thereto a tissue of superstition and nonsense 
which makes an unprejudiced party almost doubt whether 
there is any real sincerity in their faith, or whether 
it is not used merely as a political engine of power 
by the Chiefs to sway the minds of those whom they are 
anxious to attach to their cause".
As to their military prospects and chances of ultimate success 
Bonham did not commit himself, but warned against speculation, 
"as so much depends upon circumstances with which we are not 
at all familiar". He anticipated that the next rebel advance 
would be towards Peking, not Shanghai, but noted the existence 
of still powerful Imperial forces around Nanking. There was 
no thought of offering aid to the rebels, nor did the Taipings 
seriously ask for it, being flushed with victory and confident 
that "Our Heavenly Father helps us, and no one can fight with 
Him". It would, indeed, have been contrary to all English 
ideas of international law to have aided any rebels against 
a power with whom treaty relations existed, even such unsatis­
factory relations as those with the Manchu Government at that
time. Some observers, in fact, thought Bonham went too far 
in even visiting Nanking, at least in person, since this might 
be taken to imply a sort of de facto recognition, but Clarendon 
fully approved his proceedings. His journey had served to 
provide much valuable and remarkable information about the 
rebellion. It also served to confirm in his own mind the 
wisdom of a policy of strict and watchful neutrality, for it 
was still not plain which side would triumph nor which was 
really the mor6 likely to serve British interests ih China.
This policy was given more general application by Bonham 
after he left Shanghai in the middle of May, convinced by then 
that the crisis at that port was safely past. : On his way
back to Hong Kong he called at Amoy, which had recently been 
captured by rebels belonging to a secret society independent 
of the Taiping movement. Having satisfied himself that they 
offered no serious threat to British lives or property in the 
port he instructed the British vice-consul there to maintain 
strict neutrality, though he anticipated an early recapture by 
the Imperialists.^^ Back in Hong Kong, reports were received 
from Canton expressing fears of renewed rebel outbreaks, and 
there were indirect enquiries from the Chinese authorities 
about the possibility of British aid. These, Bonham assured
(1) F.O.17/201 Bonham to Clarendon, May 28, 1853*
Clarendon, he would certainly reject, adding that he looked
with some anxiety for the views of the Government "not only on
this particular question, but on the whole subject relative
, (1)
to the state of affairs in this country". Thus the policy
of neutrality determined on at Shanghai was extended during
the latter part of May to cover the whole revolutionary
situation that was developing in southern China under the
stimulus of Taiping successes. It was also explicitly applied
to all British subjects in China by a proclamation on July 7th
warning them against engaging in the conflict as being contrary
(2)
to both statutory and common law. The whole object of
Bonham's policy at this stage was to avoid becoming compromised 
in any way, whether officially or by the irresponsible actions 
of British nationals on the China coast, so that, whichever 
side ultimately triumphed, British treaty rights might not 
suffer.
Certain features of this policy of neutrality are worth
noting before examining its working in practice. As Bonham's
warning to the rebel chiefs indicated, the neutrality adopted
was distinctly an armed neutrality ready to "resent" any injury
to British interests in China. The difficulty was to determine
_  .
F.O.17/202 Bonham to Clarendon, June 7? 1853*
(2) F.O.17/203 enc. in Bonham to Clarendon, July 22, 1853; also 
China Mail. July l^ f, 1853*
how far British forces should he used to defend those interests
In response to a query from Bonham on this point Clarendon
thought it impossible to lay down any general rule. At Amoy,
where Clarendon believed there was no distinct area within
(1)
which British interests were concentrated, protection could 
not be provided indefinitely, and the consul should advise 
British merchants that they must either withdra\* or stay at 
their own risk. But at Shanghai, which proved to be the 
ehief case in point, the situation was different.
"There the factory is distinct from the Town and I 
believe, more easily defensible," Clarendon wrote.
"There also British Residents are more numerous, and 
the amount of property much larger; and at Shanghai, 
therefore, Her Majesty's Government would wish a concen­
tration of Naval Force and the immediate chastisement
(2)
of the party: in power from whom any injury is received". 
At Canton, roughly the same situation obtained. Where possifel 
it was the foreign settlement areas, or "factories", which, as 
the focal points of British persons and property, were to be 
defended against both sides. These were to be placed outside
(1) Actually the foreign community was concentrated on the 
Island of Kulangsu in the harbour. See Fairbank, op.cit.
pp 156-7.
(2) For Bonham’s query dated Sept. 21, 1853, see F.O.17/20^, 
and for Clarendon's reply, dated Nov.2^, 1853, see F.O.
228/153.
the field of conflict between the rebels and the Manchu 
Government.
But these areas were legally still Chinese territory.
At Shanghai the British concession or "factory11, later to 
become known as the International Settlement, was leased in the 
first instance by the British consul from the local Chinese 
authorities on payment of an annual ground rent. An area 
of 23 acres set apart for a consulate in 18^3 was later extended 
to 120 acres in 18^6 and to V60 acres in November I8*f8.^
This lease of a distinct area of land close to the river front 
on which British subjects might build their residences and 
warehouses provided a convenient arrangement both for the 
British community, soon joined by other Westerners with the 
exception of the French, who leased their own concession, and 
for the local Chinese authorities, who had no desire to see 
the foreigners established within the Chinese city. But the 
land was not leased in the way that, for example, part of the 
Kowloon area opposite Kong Kong was leased in 1898, that is 
by an agreement between governments transferring sovereignty 
for the period of the lease from one to the other. In the 
latter case the British government acquired a clear right in
(1) On growth of the settlement see Morse, op. cit., vol I c.18 
and vol II c.6, and Hsia Ching-lin Studies in Chinese
Diplomatic History (1926) l*9-?0.
international law to defend the leased territory against any
attack, hut no such right can be said to have existed in the
case of the foreign settlement areas at the treaty ports.
England's "right" to defend them was based primarily on her
capacity to do so as a power militarily stronger than either
of the two combatants in the civil war. Under the terms of
the l8*+2 Treaty of Hanking British subjects acquired a right
to reside at the treaty ports but not necessarily a right to
reside within areas specially set apart for them, while the
British government cannot be said to have acquired any clear
right by that treaty to use its forces to maintain virtually
independent control over such areas, or to forbid Chinese
forces and authorities access to them.^^
Yet however presumptuous and however questionable its
basis in law, this policy of armed and limited neutrality was
recognizably a policy of neutrality of some sort. The essence
of neutrality in international law is impartiality in action.
It does not preclude sympathy with one side as against the
other, nor even the right to intervene if a belligerent violates
(2)
a principle of international law. Putting aside the consid­
(1) On the very peculiar legal status of these foreign settle­
ment/ areas, especially at Shanghai, see Hsia Ching-lin, 
op.cit., c 2; F.C.Jones Shanghai and Tientsin (19^0) c 2. 
L.Oppenheim International Law (7th edn H.Lauternacht). vol I 
p ^56-7 n.8, distinguishes these "somewhat peculiar leases" 
from the usual kinds of divided sovereignty recognised in
international law.
For Note (2) see next page......
erable complications that, in the first place, neither the 
Manchu government nor the Taiping rebels would have admitted 
themselves to be bound by any Western inspired principles of 
international law, and that, in the second place, in the mid­
nineteenth century there was no kind of international authority 
such as exists today to which England might have appealed to 
uphold her treaty rights in China, both sides in the Civil war, 
and certainly the Manchu government itself, can be said to 
have had a belligerent right to occupy the foreign settlement 
areas if necessary for the success of their campaigns. So 
long as British subjects were not molested such action would 
not, strictly speaking, have constituted a violation of British 
treaty rights. But so long as the British government refused 
to allow either side to make use of the settlement area then its 
stand, although perhaps not strictly legal, was not inconsistent 
in practice with a declaration of neutrality. It was very 
much a mid-nineteenth century, strong power type of neutrality, 
capable of defending what it alone determined were the proper 
limits of its "rights" in China, and determined to do so.
(2) from previous page..
"Since neutrality is an attitude of impartiality, it 
excludes such assitance and succour to one of the belliger­
ents as is detrimental to the other, and, further, such 
injuries to the one as benefit the other....(it) is not 
incompatible with sympathy with one belligerent and dis­
approval of the other, so long as these feelings do not 
find expression in actions violating impartiality....Again 
(it)..does not compel (neutrals) to remain inactive when a 
belligerent in carrying on hostilities violates the rules 
of International Law". (L.Oppenheim, op.cit., vol II p65^— 
also ibid pp 659-6 and G.H.Hackworth Pi pest of International
Law vol VII pp 3^8,352.)
It was not, in the beginning, a neutrality which masked 
a decided preference fbr one side or the other. Such a prefer­
ence, in favour of the Imperialists, soon revealed itself^but 
was not apparent during 1853* At the end of May Bonham 
instructed Alcock to avoid all unnecessary communication with 
the Taipings and to "rigidly abstain from any act by which the 
Chinese Government could be led to believe that the British
Government gives any countenance to the Insurgents, or indeed
(1)
feel any interest in their success". But this concern
to avoid becoming associated with the rebels too closely is an
illustration of Bonham's caution rather than of any hostility
towards them. In fact, in conversations he had with the
French and United States representatives in China at the
beginning of August he expressed qualified hopes in the Taipings,
in contrast to both de Bourboulon and Colonel Marshall, who
(2)made no secret of their preference for the Imperialists.
(1) F.07228/161 Bonham to Alcock (Draft) May 30, 1§53*
(2) Bonham reported of Bourboulon that "he did not disguise from 
me that he considered the views of the French Government 
were to a certain extent favourable to the cause of the 
Imperialists", and of Col. Marshall that "his sympathies, as 
far as I can barn, are certainly embarkedon the side of the 
Imperialists; from the first he has made no secret of this 
predilection.." (F.O.17/20^ Bonham to Clarendon August 
1853)* Of the chief representatives of the three Western 
Treaty powers in China at that time Bonham certainly took 
the most favourable view of the rebellion, but this is not 
saying much.
Bonham^however^stated that he was opinion that more 
Political and Commercial advantages are likely to be obtained 
from the Insurrectionists than we should ever obtain from the 
Imperialists, supposing a favourable opportunity presented 
itself for opening negotiations with them* With the former 
we should have to deal with a new set of men by no means 
disinclined to serve us, or indisposed towards us, as far as 
we have hitherto been able to discern* Whereas with the 
Imperialists we should find them what theyohave ever proved 
themselves to be, proud, overbearing and inimical to an
extension of Foreign Intercourse*fl --- -— —  —  —
Bonham, at this stage, seemed to have higher hopes in the 
rebels than he had had upon his return from Nanking early 
in May.
His report on these conversations at the beginning of 
August also reveals how far he had moved away from the idea 
of intervention, for he strongly opposed the suggestion put up 
by Clarendon that this was a good time to re-open the question 
of treaty revision
ftI must at once say, My Lord, that, in my opinion, 
there never was a more unpropitious time to enter into 
negotiations for a new Treaty than the present crisis.
(i; F. 0.17/20*+ Bonham to Clarendon August *f, 1853*
In the first place, whom is the Treaty to be made with?
If with the Emperor, supposing, for the sake of argument, 
that all approaches to His Majesty were smoothed down 
and made easy, and His Majestyfs wish was as strong as our 
own to enter into close bonds (all of which suppositions,
I need not say, are not within the limits of probability),
the first condition of such a treaty would be that assist­
ance should be given to him to put down the Rebellion - 
an application, I presume, not to be entertained for one 
moment and entirely at variance with the course of policy 
prescribed by Her Majesty1s Government.....M 
In any case, Bonham went on, England might miss her aim by 
treating with the Emperor and then finding the rebels triumph.
He therefore concluded that Mthe wisest if not the only Policy
(is) to wait some time longer the issue of Events in the North11.
Clarendon agreed.^
The core of Bonham*s policy of neutrality was simply to 
watch and to wait because there was nothing much else that 
could be done. He had no firm and consistent preference for 
either side, nor was he merely biding his time until he felt 
the conditions for intervention against the rebellion were 
favourable. British neutrality, as formulated by Bonham and
(1) F.0.17/198 Clarendon to Bonham October 3, 1853.
approved by Clarendon, was not benevolently inclined towards 
anything but the preservation and possible extension of British 
interests in China. Whichever side showed itself to be the 
more able and ready to protect and further those interests 
would, in the end, win British support. But which side this 
would be was still quite uncertain in the middle of 1853*
Bonham advised, therefore, that all that could be done was to 
keep well clear of the struggle and await the course of events. 
Naturally, as the situation changed policy might change also. 
But what the course of events would be, and how British policy 
might change, neither Bonham nor anyone else had any clear 
conception, still less any clear plans.
CHAPTER III
Neutrality in Practice (1853-5)
Events soon showed that it would he difficult to await 
the outcome of the struggle without becoming, in some measure, 
involved in it. Difficulties arose not so much over the main 
rebellion at Nanking, since after the crisis of early 1853 
this did not Sgainothreaten British interests on the coast for 
seven years, with one brief exception during 1856, but rather 
over the risings of other rebels at Amoy, Shanghai and near 
Canton. British interests were for the time being more 
directly affected by these movements than by the Taiping 
rebellion itself. But since they were stimulated by the 
success of the Taipings, and since British experience of them, 
especially at Shanghai, helped influence the development of 
later British policy towards the larger movement, they must 
receive some consideration here. Further, the argument that 
British neutrality "existed in name only" and was from the 
beginning pro-Manchu in inclination is based partly on an 
examination of British policy towards these risings, which are 
also seen as part of a great national revolution of the 
Chinese people against Manchu rule. As such, it is argued, 
the success of the rebels who seized Amoy and Shanghai was
feared by the British government no less than was the success
of the Taipings themselves.
Much the most important of these risings was that which
occurred at Shanghai in September, 1853> when the city was
suddenly seized by members of the Hsiao Tao Hui (Small Sword
Society), an offshoot of a larger secret society known as the
San Ho Hui (Triad Society), whence the Shanghai rebels are
often referred to as Triads. The taotai Wu, whose requests
for aid against the Taipings had been rejected by Bonham in
March and April, fled in disguise into the foreign settlement
and was sheltered by American friends. After a few weeks in
hiding Wu set about gathering forces to recapture the city and
requested aid from Alcock, who refused it in accordance with
Bonham’s earlier instructions. Bonham, informed of these
happenings at Shanghai, even went so far as to instruct Alcock
not to allow Wu to take refuge again in the foreign settlement,
"for so long as he is suffered to reside under Foreign
Protection, and there to concoct his schemes against the
Rebels, it cannot be affirmed that the British authorities
are observing the strict neutrality which it is desirable
that they should maintain, while his residence in the
settlement might furnish the Rebels with a plausible
pretext for making a forcible entry into it for the
(1)purpose of capturing him". f
(1) F.0.17/205 enc. in Bonham to Clarendon Oct. 10, 1853*
The cautious Bonham began by being very strictly neutral 
towards the Triad rebellion.
A more important issue than the sheltering of the refugee 
officials of a displaced power was the fate of the customs 
duties at Shanghai. Much the most important result of the 
Triad rising was the emergence of the Foreign Inspectorate of 
Chinese customs, first established at Shanghai in the middle 
of l8^k and later extended to other treaty p o r t s . T h e  
creation of an efficient and honest administration of the 
Imperial customs was to prove one of the main pillars of 
continued Manchu rule in China, for it ensured to the Peking 
Government a dependable and growing revenue, and it helped 
provide the finances for the campaigns that eventually defeated 
the Taiping rebellion. In addition, the indemnity payments 
exacted from China after the second “opium" war of l8[?6-60 
were met from it. It was a system highly unpopular with most 
British merchants in China, who preferred a customs service 
more easily evaded and bribed, but it was criticised by one 
of those merchants, John Scarth, as providing clear evidence
(1) The account of the customs issue at Shanghai which follows 
is based on J.K.Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China 
Coast, cc 21-35 see also S.Wright, Hart and the Chinese 
Customs (1950) c•*+•
of the readiness of what he called "mandarin-worshipping" 
British officials In China to co-operate with an unpopular 
Manchu government at the expense of a national rebellion.^
But taking account of the very complex ; origins of this system 
it is, I think, clear that it was in no sense intended by the 
British officials who helped establish it to further the 
Imperialist cause against the rebellion at large. It began 
as a local solution to a local problem, not as the first step 
in a secret campaign against the Chinese revolution.
When the Triad rebels captured Shanghai the Chinese 
customs house, although situated in the foreign settlement 
area, was completely looted and destroyed, with the result that 
the taotai Wu had no headquarters from which to collect this 
important revenue. Alcock and the American consul were 
quick to institute a provisional system of collection, not 
in order to preserve the revenue of an imperial government no 
longer able to protect foreign trade at Shanghai, but to maintain 
the treaty basis upon which legal foreign trade with China 
depended. Under the tariff regulations attached to the 
Treaty of Nanking the British consul was required to act as 
security for the payment of customs duties by British merchants
(1) J. Scarth, Twelve Years in China pp 261-3; similar critisra 
was made by the Daily News Sept 22, 18
and to see that no British vessel left port without a customs 
clearance from the Chinese authorities. Alcock feared that 
failure on his part to observe these provisions, even during 
a rebellion against the government with which the treaty had 
been concluded, might impair the legality of British trade at 
the port. The payments due from the British vessels were 
therefore collected by him in the form of promissory notes, 
ready cash being short, which were to be honoured by the 
Merchants if the British Government approved Alcock1s action 
and agreed with him that it was legally necessary for the 
duties to be paid, whatever the political situation at 
Shanghai.
The merchants, needless to say, protested most strongly 
and argued that if the Manchu government could not maintain 
its authority at Shanghai it had no right to a revenue from 
foreign trade at the port, which it was no longer protecting. 
While instructions £*om England were awaited, however, Alcock 
continued to collect the promissory notes, at the same time 
refusing to recognize Wu*s authority to collect the duties 
himself, and denying him any facilities for re-establishing a 
customs house in the foreign settlement. In contrast, the 
American Commissioner, Colonel Marshall, was much more 
sympathetic to Wu*s attempts to re-establish control over the
customs, but in face of .opposition from American merchants, 
who were no more inclined than the Bnitish to pay duties t©aa 
discredited Imperial authority, Marshall's endeavors during 
October, 1853, to end the provisional system came to nothing. 
Bonham, cautious as ever, did not himself oppose Alcock*s 
measures but left it to the Foreign Office to decide, although 
rather sympathetic to the merchant point of view. Alcock's 
stand was between that of the majority of the merchants and 
that of Colonel Marshall. He believed the customs duties 
should continue to be collected by some authority or other, 
in order to maintain the treaty basis of foreign trade at 
Shanghai, but in the circumstances existing at the end of 1853, 
was not prepared to recognize the Imperial taotai at the port 
as a satisfactory authority for the purpose. There was no 
question of recognizing the Triads, besMged as they were by 
Imperialist forces and in no position to protect or administer 
the foreign trade.
In January 1851*, the views of the Foreign Office on the 
question were received. Clarendon held that the obligation 
placed,on British consuls by the tariff regulations of 18^3 
was not binding if the Imperial authority was subverted, and 
although he commended Alcock's attempt to deal with the situation, 
he agreed with Bonham that the consul should not be expected to
act as if the Imperial authority would return. He therefore 
instructed that Alcock*s measures "should only be enforced so 
long as it is reasonable to suppose that the suspension of 
Imperial authority is of a temporary and accidental character". 
The Triads still controlled the city so that, lacking Foreign 
Office approval and in face of merchant opposition, Alcock 
abandoned the provisional system of collection of duties. By 
this time Wu had established a new customs house outside the 
foreign settlement area, and this was now recognized by the 
British and American consuls. But it was generally and easily 
evaded by the foreign merchants, who were lessInclined than 
ever to pay duties in cash, and who argued that in the confused 
political circumstances Shanghai should be made a free port.
The ending of the provisional system of promissory notes and 
the inability of Wu to get the authority of his new customs 
house acknowledged by the merchants meant that foreign trade 
at Shanghai, during the first half of 185^, was conducted on a 
highly irregular basis. Smuggling became the norm.
Such a situation was regarded by both Alcock and Bowring, 
who replaced Bonham at Hong Kong in April, as being against the 
real, long term interests of foreign trade on the China coast. 
They feared the spread of disorder and smuggling, while Bowring
(1) P.O.228/153 Clarendon to Bonham Nov. 2*+, 1853*
also feared Imperial retaliation for the loss of the
duties in the form of an interruption to the tea trade and a
consequent loss of revenue to the British exchequer. They
therefore urged upon the Manchu authorities at Shanghai the
need to re-organize the customs service there entirely, and
this, they argued, could best be done by the introduction of
European officers who would- . be in the employ of the Chinese
government and who would be above the peculation and eoonnivance
at smuggling which characterized the old system. In order
to persuade the Shanghai authorities to accept a measure of
foreign participation in the customs administration of the
port, Bowring, as well as the American authorities, promised
to try to secure collection of the back duties for which
promissory notes were still held, subject once again to the
anproval of the home government. But although Bowring felt
*
that the Imperial government had a just claim to this revenue, 
his primary concern was for the preservation of regular and 
orderly conditions of trade at Shanghai. For the British 
government the claim of the Imperial authorities to the lost 
customs revenue was not even a secondary consideration, however, 
and Bowring was sharply reprimanded for making the agreement 
to secure payment of the back duties. British merchants were 
not required to honour their promissory notes, which amounted
to about one quarter of a million pounds, though a part of the 
American duties were paid*
Nevertheless the principle of a foreign element in the 
administration of the customs service at Shanghai became 
established in the later months of 185^* Insofar as it was 
an example of co-operation, it was co-operation only between 
local British and Chinese authorities, not between governments, 
and it was in no sense a co-operation against the rebellion, 
Triad or Taiping. By 1861, the use of foreign officers in 
the Chinese customs service did become an important element 
in a British policy designed to strengthen and uphold the 
Kanchu government* But in origin it was intended to serve 
a much more limited and local aim, and its first introduction 
in l85*f at Shanghai cannot be regarded as evidence of a 
particularly pro-imperialist policy on the part of the British 
government at that time*
(1) The U* S. Commissioner McLane reported on July 27,185*+, 
that "measures have been matured under the immediate 
supervision of the British minister and myself, for the 
efficient administration of the customs at Shanghai and 
for the protection and defence of the foreign settlement, 
with the sanction of the Imperial authorities, and without 
infringing upon the belligerent rights of those within 
the walls of the City"* (U. S. Congressional Papers, 
NcLane Correspondence, p 122-3)*
A major point in the argument that the neutrality of 
foreign governments at this time was really hostile to the 
revolutionary movement, is that Shanghai was eventually 
recaptured with the help of French forces. By easy extension 
of the argument, England and the United States are associated 
with the French action,which becomes evidence against the "so 
called" neutrality of all the Western powers.^ But in 
point of fact the British government was most adamant in its 
refusal to allow British forces to be used in any way to 
assist the Imperial assault. The best proof of this is 
provided by the controversy which developed over building a 
wall or stockade to cut the rebels off from supplies reaching 
them from the foreign settlement on the north side of the city. 
Without the aid thus received the Triads could not have held the 
city for so long, but the Imperialist forces were prevented 
from investing the city on that side by the refusal of the 
foreign powers to allow them access to the settlement area.
This refusal had led to a quite serious armed clash between 
British and American forces, many of them volunteers, and 
Imperialist forces who encroached upon the settlement, in 
April 185^* During this "Battle of Muddy Flat", as it was
(1) See Lo Erh-kang, op.cit., p 168; Fan Wen-lan, Chung-kuo 
chin-tai shih. vol I p 122; cf. Hsiao I-shan Cl^ing-tai 
tung shih. vol IV (1932) p 71*
SHANGHA I  1653-4-
To ^ aMg-tzje K..
O-boof (o l«S
J K - ^ r f c x i j n t e ^  T r< id .< . cx»->cL D ^ a lo  Q r \  ~tKc C K nih^ .  CaauSt' 0 * ^ 5 3 ^  4 T  ^ * * * 7
called, an Imperial encampment close to the settlement was
destroyed. Shortly afterwards the rebels took advantage of
the situation to attack the weakened Imperialist position, arid
of this attack Aleock reported that,
"Both parties, in the course of skirmishing, occasionally
crossed within our limits, but were speedily warned off
by a few shots from parties of British and American
marines, conveniently posted for that purpose’1. ^
This was armed neutrality beyond question, but also even-
handed neutrality.
At the same time, although they had no regard for the
calibre or discipline of the Imperial troops beseiging the
city and made their task more difficult by refusing to allow
them to attack the city from the north side, the British
authorities did recognize an obligation to try to prevent
supplies and arms reaching the rebels. Consular notifications
(2)
forbidding trafficking in arms with either side were issued, 
but in the absence of a police force it was difficult to enforce 
these upon a population in which there was a large adventurer
(1) A & P 185k- (1792) p 9, Alcock to Bonham, April 13, 185^.
For other examples of the British refusal to allow the 
Imperialists access to the foreign settlement area see 
F.0.17/205 Bonham to Clarendon, Nov. 26, 1853 enc. Alcock 
to Wu, Nov. F.0.17/212 enc. in Bonham despatch No.6,
185^ (the despatch itself is missing); Fairbank, op.cit. 
p *+30 n.
(2) F.0.228/176 Alcock to Bonham May 1, 185^ - enclosing joint 
notification of consuls of April 2*+.
element, drawn mainly from deserting seamen, and many traders 
who habitually engaged in the smuggling of opium, if of nothing 
else. The China coast generally, and Shanghai in particular, 
was already a focal point for the riff-raff of both East and 
West, a fact which did not make the strict enforeement of a 
policy of neutrality any e a s i e r . T h e r e  were frequent 
complaints from the Manchu authorities conducting the siege at 
the continuance of a trade which, even if not condoned by 
foreign officials at the port, certainly constituted a large 
breach of neutrality on the part of the foreign community 
as a whole. Alcock admitted that in this respect British 
neutrality was simply verbal, but he meant this in exactly 
the opposite sense to those later historians who attack the 
"falsity" of British policy.
"How shall we maintain that to be neutrality" in any sense 
of the word that is not meant to deceive", he asked, "which 
allows a beleaguered city to draw succour daily under the 
protection of our Flag, our guns, and the prestige of our 
power, without which they could not have held the City
(1) Note F.0.17/227 Bowring to Clarendon Jan 25* 1855j on the 
difficulty of dealing with "a host of filibustering cut­
throats and deserters (subjects of the Queen) who, under 
the pretence of joining the patriots, are committing every 
species of robbery and outrage...Our neutrality as it now 
exists, has brought into full activity every element of 
disorder..."
"in insurrection against the Government of China, and 
the withdrawal of which is certain destruction to them.
If we really desire neutrality and to give it effeet, 
this can only be done by isolating the Foreign Settle­
ment from both camps and denying succour or supplies to 
(1)either."
With the support of Bowring therefore Alcock agreed to co­
operate with the Imperial and French authorities in the 
construction of a wall between the foreign settlement and the 
besieged rebels.^
Unexpected difficulties in the way of a British contri­
bution to this project were soon met with. The Senior Naval 
Officer at Shanghai, upon whom Alcock called for forces to 
assist in the construction and protection of the wall, refused 
to co-operate, on the ground that his instructions forbade him 
to use his forces for any other purpose than the actual protec­
tion of the lives and property of British residents in the 
port. Against the protests and arguments.' of both Alcock 
and Bowring, his stand was approved by the then Commander of 
British naval forces on the China station, Sir James Stirling, 
and eventually by the Foreign Office and Admiralty also. Clarendor
(1) F.0.228/177 Alcock to Capt. Callaghan, enc. in Alcock to 
Bowring, Dec. 29, 185^ •
(2) ibid, Alcock to Bowring, Nov. 23, 185^*
on receipt of reports on this issue, insisted that Imperialist 
troops were not to be permitted to enter the foreign settlement 
at all, even if only to build a wall, and that any action taken 
by British forces “must not assume the character of active 
intervention in favour of either parties'1. By the
time these instructions reached the scene the whole affair was 
actually over. The wall was built with French assistance, 
supplies to the rebels were cut off, and the city recaptured 
in the middle of February, 1855* But the British contribu­
tion to this result cannot be put in the same catgory as 
that of the French. When the latter, provoked by rebel fire 
across their settlement, attacked the city on January 6th and 
made a breach in the wall, at the cost of some fifty casualties 
to themselves, the British forces merely looked uncomfortably 
on. Alcock complained that “the impossibility, under existing 
circumstances, of our taking part in these operations has
necessarily placed the British authorities, civil and naval,
(2)
in a very painful position11.
In all this it is apparent that both Alcock and Bowring 
had a strong preference for the Imperialists over the rebels
(1) F.0.17/22*+ Clarendon to Bowring Jan *+, 1855- For other
correspondence on the wall issue see esp. F.0.17/219 Alcock 
to Hammond Nov. 1, 185^ -; F.0.228/177 Alcock to Bowring 
Dec. 22, l851+5 F.0.17/226-7 Bowring to Clarendon, Jan 5 and 
29, 1855*
(2) F.0.228/195 Alcock to Bowring Jan 11, 1855*
occupying Shanghai, and that they wanted to restore the former
to authority in the city. But their wishes and preferences
did not constitute official British policy, ^ n o r ,  so far as
I can see did they seriously affect the working of that policy
at the expense of the rebels. The anxiety of Bowring to see
the Imperialists restored to power in Shanghai is illustrated
by his attempts to mediate between them and the Triads. He
was convinced that the latter were purely destructive, and
that sooner or later the Imperialists would recapture the
city. Their rule, for all its faults, was preferable to
disruption and anarchy. But although he speculated on
“the desirableness of our interfering to free the city
of the pests that infest it by forcibly entering and
taking temporary possession, for it is quite to be
apprehended that if the city is to be abandoned to
Imperial Troops, frightful slaughter will accompany
(2)
their entrance'*,
his main effort to resolve the situation was to offer to persuade 
the rebels to leave the city in return for an Imperial amnesty. 
This broke down over the question of what to do with the rebels
(1) Note the memo by Hammond attached to the draft of Clarendon 
to Bowring Jan *+, 1855, in F.0.17/22^: "The only safe course 
appears to be perfect neutrality as far as the Government is 
concerned, although Bowring clearly wants to take an active 
part in favour of the Imperialists, and Alcock shares his 
opinion".
(2) F.0.17/211* Bowring to Clarendon July 6, 185*+*
once they left the city. Bowring offered to transport them 
up the Yangtze, apparently to join the Taipings at Nanking, but 
Chi-erh-hang-a, the Manchu general commanding the Imperial 
forces attacking the city replied, not surprisingly, that this 
was more than his head was worth. .Chi-erh added, according 
to the British report of the conversation, "that it would be
better that our ships should fire upon the city, and his army
would lie in wait and catch the rebels as they escaped. It
would be better still if we would take the rebels to some
foreign country. Sir John said", the report concluded,
"that no such course could be taken"• ^ T h e  Foreign Office 
approved Bowringfs attempts at mediation while warning him 
"to adhere to the policy of not interfering by force between 
the Belligerents".^^
Shanghai was recaptured with foreign assistance, but this 
was French assistance, and although the British officials on 
the spot in China were certainly inclined to stretch the 
official policy of neutrality in a pro-Imperialist direction 
by 185^, they were not very successful in actually doing so 
because of the insistence of the Foreign Office upon not helping
(1) F.0.228/16^ Bowring to Clarendon June 27, 185^ enc. memos 
of conversations with the Chinese authorities at Shanghai.
For the Chinese reports on these conversations see Earl 
Swisher, Chinafs Management of the American Barbarians (1951) 
pp 212-13*
(2) F.0.17/211 Clarendon to Bowring Sept. 25, 185*+•
either side, and because of the stand taken by the commanders
of British naval forces in the area on the question of the
barrier wall. The one occasion on which British forces were
seriously engaged was at the expense of the Imperialists, not
to their benefit.
The rising at Amoy occurred some months before, that at
Shanghai, and anticipated many of its features. In particular
the qtiestion of the payment of customs duties arose, as at the
larger port, and Clarendon gave a similar ruling that the
British consul was to accept no responsibility for the collection
of customs revenue on behalf of an Imperial government no longer
in a position to protect foreign trade at the port.^1  ^ In
some ways the problem of avoiding involvement in the struggle
was even more difficult at Amoy than at Shanghai, for the
Imperial campaign to recapture the city was mainly a naval
one, so that foreign vessels in the harbour had to be always
ready to move from their anchorages if they were to avoid being
(2)
used as stalking horses by the Imperial war junks. Bequests 
from Imperial officials for the direct assistance of British 
war vessels we re refused, as they were elsewhere, but foreign 
merchants carried on a highly profitable trade in arms and
(1) See Wright, op. cit., p 91 and Fairbank, op.cit.,pp ^flO-13.
(2) See F.0.17/209 Admiralty to F.O., Nov. 19, 1853 enclosing 
report of Capt. Mellersh from Amoy.
gunpowder with both sides. When the city was finally 
recaptured in November^1853, the British consul intervened 
to put a stop to the indiscriminate slaughter of "rebels11, who 
were actually the unfortunate inhabitants of the city, the real 
leaders of the rising having safely escaped, and British vessels 
rescued many from death by drowning. It is difficult to see 
that British action at Amoy in any way compromised the.declared 
policy of neutrality. Six months after the capture of the 
city Bowring reminded the vice-consul there of "the necessity 
of every precaution in order that Her Majesty*s functionaries 
may not be supposed to be partisans in the unfortunate
(1)
commotions which agitate so many parts of the Chinese Empire".
In the case of the disturbances around Canton during
185*+-5 the issue is less clear cut, but the main conclusion the
same. Lo Erh-kang says that England, France and America
smuggled supplies of gunpowder, covered by grain, and arms to
such an extent tha^ t, on the admission of the Manchu officials
themselves, the fact that Canton did not fall to the rebels
(2)was due to the help received from Hong Kong.^ This argument 
seems to confuse the actions of Western nationals with the
(1) F. 0. 17/213 enc. in Bowring to Clarendon April 28, 185^.
(2) Lo Erh-kang, op. cit., p 168.
policies of Western governments, and to assume that when the 
former helped the Imperialists, as some of them certainly did 
at Canton, it was with the active encouragement of their 
governments. The smuggling of supplies of "Chinese snuff" 
(gunpowder) and Enfield "umbrellas" became a considerable 
business on the China coast in these years, but it was essen­
tially a private enterprise which was not selective about 
its customers. Moreover, Governor Yeh at Canton later com­
plained in a memorial that, at this time, (December 185^ to 
January, 1855), "the barbarians secretly furnished the insurgents 
cannon and powder, and also sold their loot for them. This is 
known positively." It cannot be said that one side only 
bene fitted from the smuggling of arms.
The colonial government at Hong Kong attempted to check 
this trade, as well as other breaches of neutrality, by an 
Ordinance passed by the Legislative Council of the colony on 
January 17th, 1855* This fixed penalties of up to two years 
imprisonment and fines of up to five thousand dollars (about 
£1,000) for any British subject in any part of China who 
assisted either side, whether
"by personal enlistment in the service of either of the 
said several parties, or by procuring other persons to
(1) Swisher, op. cit., p 303; also p.32^.
enlist in such service, or by furnishing, selling or 
procuring warlike stores of any description, or by 
fitting out vessels, or by knowingly and purposely 
doing any other act to assist either party by which 
neutrality may be violated".
To enforce such an Ordinance over a vast area of the China 
coast on a British population which, although small in number, i
j
was not remarkable for its amenability to legal restraints, was \
\
no simple matter, but it cannot be dismissed as proclaiming i
(2)an empty neutrality.
Another difficulty in the way of a policy of neutrality ;
which was especially apparent in the south of China was that ■
of distinguishing between rebels who had some sort of political 
programme, into which category the Taipings certainly came, and 
bandits or pirates who simply used the rebel disturbances as a j
convenient cover for their normal activities. The problem of ;
■a
piracy on the China coast was a chronic one in these years, and ]
Bowring more than once pointed to the difficulty of following any i
(1) A & P. 1861+ (525) p 18. The Ordinances of Hong Kong (London, 
1866 p95-7, says this article in the ordinance lapsed in Jan. 
1857, but it was certainly in force again about 1862. See 
below pp20S,lbb
(2) This is what Lo says of it. On the other hand it was perhaps 
aimed against the rebellion in the sense that most breaches 
of neutrality by British subjects at this time, especially
at Shanghai, were in favour of the rebels. See F.O. 17/227 
Bowring to Clarendon Jan.25, 1855 and F.O.228/16^ (56) Bowring 
to Clarendon June l*f, 185^- V  above
simple policy towards the "interblending of patriotism and 
piracy, robbery and rebellion", which he found in the situation? 
On this account he refused to recognize that the mixed forces 
attacking Canton at the beginning of 1855 had any claim to 
belligerent rights, in particular the right of blockading 
the port.
"Scarcely a day passes" he reported, "in which the
so-called rebels do not stop ships and boats bearing
the British flag, many of which they pillage, and the
whole movement seems merging into such undoubted and
palpable piracy that a collision can hardly be avoided
if our Trade is to receive protection. The rfebels
seem to have scarcely any means of support but in plunder
they exist principally by the seizure and sale of the
property of other people; and the small amount of
patriotism and insurrection entitled to the slightest
respect and consideration is sunk in the great object of
subjecting the opulent city of Canton to be sacked by the
hordes of vagabonds who exercise authority on the River 
in
and/whose hands there can be little doubt a fate as gloomy 
and desolating as that which reduced Shanghae to its 
present awful misery, would await the City..... It has
(1) F.0.17/230 Bowring to Clarendon May 1*+, 1855; also note 
below. On the problem of piracy on the China Coast at this
time see G.Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates (19*+0)
"been again announced to the Rebel Chiefs, whose followers 
are divided into independent sections not recognizing any 
common head, that any claim to the right of blockade will
not be admitted....
There is no doubt Bowring too easily ignored the real elements 
of social protest behind these movemBnts, but some of them were 
certainly very destructive expressions of the prevailing malaise 
of Chinese society. Strict neutrality was not an easy attitude 
to maintain towards them, but no official British aid was given 
to the Manchu authorities at Canton, any more than at Amoy or 
Shanghai.
Thus it seems to me that the policy of armed and limited 
neutrality laid down in 1853 was applied as consistently as was 
possible in the exceedingly difficult circumstances which
(2)
obtained on the China coast during the period from 1853 to 1855* 
The legal basis of that policy may be questioned, but so far as 
the strictly historical question of its early application is 
concerned there is little evidence to support the argument that 
it was, at this stage, a consciously biassed policy. The Battle
(1) F.0.17/228 Bowring to Clarendon Feb. 28, 1855*
(2) Even so sharp a critic of British policy as Scarth recognised 
"the difficult position in which the English and American 
Consuls were placed" (Twelve Years in China, p.212)
of Muddy Flat, the failure of British forces to help build 
the barrier wall at Shanghai or to assist the French in their 
attack upon the city, the consistent refusal of the Requests of 
Imperial officials for the direct assistance of British forces, 
the Foreign Office attitude to the fate of the Imperial eustoms 
revenue at both Amoy and Shanghai - all these show that British 
policy during these years cannot fairly be described as one 
especially inclined to favour the Manchus, whatever it later 
became.
x x x x x x x 
The question now arises how far British officials in 
China and in the Foreign Office identified the rebellion at 
Nanking with these risings on the coast which they certainly 
came to regard as undesirable movements, more piratical than 
rebellious. As already seen, this was at first the view taken 
of the Taiping rebellion also, but after 1853 it could not be 
regarded as other than a major political and military challenge 
to the reigning dynasty. During the years now under considera­
tion, the shift in official British opinion about it was, 
broadly, that although it was still regarded as a serious 
rebellion, and in that respect in a superior category to the 
other risings, its chances of ultimate success were steadily
discounted, and it came to be seen as a probably worse, rather
than a possibly better, alternative to the Manchus.
That it was put in a quite different category to the
risings at Shanghai and elsewhere, is illustrated by a memo
of Clarendon’s, written in his own nearly illegible handwriting,
attached to the draft of a despatch he sent Bowring on the wall
question at Shanghai.
nThe case of Shanghai*1, he wrote, "differs somewhat from
the rebellion - a band of thieves having no political
objects and who are wholly repudiated by the Nanking
rebels have got possession of a wealthy commercial city
and inflict serious injury upon the foreign trade that
by returns (?) is shown to be carried on there. Their
expulsion would on every account be desirable, and if the
courage and perseverance of the Imperialists could be
relied on I should be disposed, for our own sakes and not
in order to meddle between the contending parties, to
give them some assistance, but as there would be great
risk in making the Factory ground a battlefield we had
better adhere to the neutral position that has hitherto
(1)
been maintained".
Clearly, Clarendon made a distinction between the Taiping rebels 
and the "robbers*1 at Shanghai. If he insisted, whatever the
(1) F.0.17/22^, attached to draft of Clarendon to Bowring,
Jan. if’, 1855.
grounds, on remaining neutral between the latter and the 
Imperialists, it is hardly necessary to point out how much 
more disposed he was to maintain that policy between the 
Imperialists and the Nanking rebels.
Further evidence of the existence of this distinction in 
the minds of British officials is provided by a Note on the
Rebellion in China. 1852 - 5. published in September, 1855* by
Thomas Wade, then Chinese Secretary at Hong Kong. Bowring
commended this to Clarendon’s attention as the best summary of
the rebellion to that date. In it Wade wrote,
"the seizure of Amoy and Shanghai in 1853 and the attempt
on Canton last winter are episodes in (the rebellion’s)
history, but we have ho ground for believing that the actors 
in these movements were recognized by the greater body 
with which they claimed to identify themselves; and the 
wide differences between the character credibly attributed 
to the occupants of Nan-King and that of the other rebels 
in question, of which we have had evidence more direct and 
convincing, would of itself incline us to dispute that 
assumption" •
The argument that England opposed the lesser risings of 1853-5 as 
part of a policy of "false" neutrality towards the Taiping
(1) F.0.17”233 one. in Bowring to Clarendon Sept. 10,1855*
rebellion is thus weak at two points. British policy did 
not set out, secretly or openly, to destroy those rebellions, 
and they were in any case clearly distinguished from that at 
Nanking.
At the same time, the shift in official British opinion 
about the Taipings, at least among consular officers in China, 
was unmistakable. The view that the movement was worthless 
both from a political and religious viewpoint began steadily 
to reassert itself. One reason for this was the defeat of the 
northern campaign. As early as November 1853 Meadows had 
reported that,
"When it became apparent that the Imperial Government had 
not only lost all prestige but were wholly without means of 
resisting the advance of the Insurgents to Nankin, or 
strength to re-establish order in the provinces, the best 
hope of the country seemed to lie in the rapid advance of 
Taening on Pekin, and the reins of Government being seized 
before the whole Empire fell into a state of disorganization, 
The long check they seem to have had on the banks of the yellow 
river, without encouraging a hope of new energy in the Imperial­
ist camp, goes far to destroy all propeets or anticipations 
built upon the unity and decided superiority of the forces 
attacking them".(i.e. the Imperialists.)
(1) F.0.228/162 enc. in Alcock to Bonham Nov, 1, 1853: for
Bonham doubts on the likely success of the northern expedition
see F.0.17/205 Bonham to Clarendon Oct.26 & Nov.l^,l853*
In forwarding a report in June 1851* on rebel defeats in the 
north, Bowring commented that "the insurrectionary tide is not 
so irresistible as it has been generally considered among 
foreigners", ^ a n d  he frequently expressed his conviction that 
the Taipings could not resolve the internal divisions of China.
"One sees a disorganizing and destroying influence which is
everywhere undermining authority, but which seems to furnish
few materials for the establishment of order and good
government’1 he wrote soon after his return to China. "Even
if the Nanking party should obtain the mastery at Peking,
there is great reason to apprehend that a very large portion
of the vast empire would not recognize nor obey its authority,
and that it would not be competent to subdue the elements of
(2)
sedition and disorder so universally scattered".
The hopes, never more than half entertained by British officials 
during 1853? of a quick settlement of the rebellion, one way 
or the other, were soon entirely abandoned.
Apart from the obvious loss of momentum in the rebellion 
itself, doubts were increased as a result of the few contacts 
made with the Taiping rebels by Westerners after Bonham’s initial
(1) F.0.17/21^ Bowring to Clarendon June 27* 185^*
(2) F.0.17/213 Bowring to Clarendon Apiil 2o, 185^; cf. also ibid
May 21st - "There seems no unity of purpose, no common cause,
no general understanding or combination between the different
groups of the disaffected. They fight under various banners, 
recognize no common head - all is confusion and discord and 
disorganization, and it is difficult to distinguish any ele­
ment so influential and so predominant as to become a founda­
tion for the future Government of this vast Empire".
visit to Nanking. No other Western visitor actually reached 
the rebel capital until, the French minister, Bourboulon, arrived 
in the "Cassini" in December, 1853* . Before then Bonham had
instructed Alcock to avoid unnecessary communication with the 
rebels, and the rebels themselves showed a strong disposition 
to avoid contacts. A few missionaries attempted to reach them 
by independent means, but without success, so that for many 
months Western knowledge about the character of the movement, 
as distinct from its military fortunes, did not advance much 
upon what it was immediately after Bonhamfs visit. Official 
Western opinion varied from the frankly hostile, as in the case 
of the American Commissioner, Colonel Marshall, to dubious but 
moderate approval, as with Bonham. Non-official Western opinion 
was mainly favourable and hopeful, though less unanimously and 
definitely so than is sometimes suggested. There were certainly 
many who were sceptical or hostile from the beginning, especially 
the French missionaries who mistrusted the Protestant origins 
of Taiping Christianity. The visit of the "Cassini" does not 
seem to have changed things greatly. Those who were hopeful 
about the rebellion found confirmation of their ideas in the 
rebel treatment of the French visitors, as did those who were 
sceptical. On the whole, so far as British views on the 
rebellion were concerned, things remained as they had
82.
been.
The journey of the new American Commissioner, Robert 
McLane, in the "Susquehannah" at the end of May, 18J^, had 
a much more disturbing effect. McLane reported very unfavour­
ably on the Taiping attitude towards "tributary" nations and 
on their religious and political organization.
"Mr. McLane thinks that from their great valour and 
physical superiority they may succeed in overturning the 
Tartar Dynasty**, Bowring reported to Clarendon, **but sees 
nothing among them out of which a future Imperial dynasty 
can be permanently constructed..... Except as rlbrothers,f 
or "subjects11 or "tribute bearers" to the celestial king, 
it appeared that the visits of foreigners would receive no 
encouragement, but would on the contrary be most unwelcome... 
Whatever may be the grief and disappointment with which 
information will be received as to the real character of the 
Protestant religious element In this most extraordinary move­
ment, I cannot but hope that it will facilitate the opening
of China, the development of commerce, and the ultimate
(2 )reception of gospel truth".
(in FOJ7/ZI2.)
(l)Cf, for example, the North China herald Dec. 19, 1853,/which 
presented the French report as bearing out its previous favour 
able views on the rebellion, and the China Mail Jan.26, 185^, 
which presented it as further proof of the "delusions" of such 
as the N .C.H . in the movement. Bonham merely commented that 
the French appeared to have been treated as were the English 
(F.0.17/212 to Clarendon Jan 10,185*+) ♦
See next page for note (2).... ..
But hopes of this happening in fact were obviously receding.
These "griefs and disappointments" were further strengthened
and Indeed confirmed, by the visit of two British vessels,
"Rattler" and "Styx". These were sent up to Nanking by Bowring,
a few weeks after the return of the American vessel, with the
object of obtaining information both about the rebels and about
trade and coaling prospects on the Yangtze. Bowring at this
time was attempting to negotiate a revision of the 18^2 treaty
with the Manchu authorities, and hoped that this would include
the right to trade on the Yangtze, hence the double object of
the visit. It was led by W. H. Medhurst, son of the famous
missionary and at that time Chinese Secretary at Hong Kong, and
by Bowring*s own son, Lewin, who had accompanied him to China as
a private secretary. No official report of this journey was
ever printed, but it certainly greatly strengthened the swing
of foreign opinion in China away from the rebellion. The
first, summary report was such, Bowring commented to Clarendon,
"as not to leave a shadow of doubt as to the political or
(2) from previous page...
F.0.17/21^ Bowring to Clarendon June 10, 185^# McLane 
himself reported to the U.S.Sec. of State Marcy that, 
"Whatever may have been the hope of the enlightened and 
civilised nations of the earth in regard to this movement, it 
is now apparent that they neither profess nor apprehend 
Christianity, and whatever may be the true judgment to form 
of their political power, it can no longer be doubted that 
intercourse cannot be established or maintained on terms of 
equality". (U.S.Congressional Papers, McLane Correspondence,
p 50) .
8b.
"religious nature of the movement11. Medhurst and Levin
Bowring were baffled in their attempts to reach the higher
Taiping authorities and by what they called "the misguided and
absurd pretensions, religious and political,, put forward by
the promoters of this remarkable movement". Though no actual
insults were offered,
"beyond styling us as barbarians1 and issuing letters to
us in the form of mandatesj yet it was very evident that
there was a great indisposition to hold any communication
v:i ili us  We saw no indication whatever of any popular
demonstration of sympathy with the views of the Insurgents
•••• We saw no commerce or any traffic of any kind going
on  We could not find in answer to enquiries that any
properly organized form of government exists among them,
although certainly implicit obedience is shown to the
commands of the higher authorities. We noticed a total
absence of men of age, of education or of respectability..."
As to the prospects of the rebels, this report concluded, "they
appear to have no money or resources adequate to maintain a long
protracted struggle, and their ultimate success appears from
Cl)what we saw to be very problematical".
(1) P.O.228/165 or 17/21*+, enc. in Bowring to Clarendon July 7?
185*+.
The full report submitted by Medhurst and Lewin Bowring a 
few days later simply expanded this catalogue of condemnations, 
significantly adding anticipations of ultimate collision
n
between the rebels and the Western powers, and casting doubts upo 
the real effectiveness of the Taiping prohibition of tobacco 
and opium smoking* with the comment that **it is doubtful whether 
the leaders of the movement implicitly follow these tenets11.
On the religious question, the claims of Yang, the Eastern 
King, to such titles as r,Holy Ghost11 were presented as by no 
means the result of simple ignorance but rather of blasphemous 
arrogance. There was, therefore, little hope that missionary 
labours among them would meet \srith success.
The justice and accuracy of these reports is perhaps open 
to question. But the importance of this visit in the develop­
ment of official British policy and opinion about the rebellion 
is very great, for it marks the virtually complete abandonment 
of the qualified hopes occasionally expressed during 1853* The 
policy of armed and watchful neutrality was far from being 
abandoned, and the Taipings continued to be thought oft as 
serious rebels, at least by the Foreign Office. But whereas 
Bonham, in August, 1853? had expressed the view that more
(1) ibid, July 1>+, 1851**.
political and commercial advantages were likely to be obtained
from the rebels than from the Imperialists, Bowring, in sending
the full report of this 185^ visit to Clarendon, observed that
future British commercial relations with China flare certainly
not likely to be served by the progress of the rebellion, but
rather endangered thereby11. Clarendon, acknowledging Bowring*s
despatch and the reports enclosed in it, noted with regret
"that the Mission appears to have only been successful in
the
establishing the fact that/persons styled as the Eastern King 
is an impudent Impostor, and that the Imperial Authorities are 
more friendly to Great Britain than the Rebels1*. ^ A f t e r  this 
visit the prospects of British neutrality ever moving in a 
pro-Taiping direction were very remote indeed.
One other aspect of British policy in China in the years 
1853-5 which is relevant to any assessment of its bearing 
towards the rebellion remains to be noted. This is the attempt 
at treaty revision made by Bowring, with the co-operation of the 
American Commissioner, McLane, during 185^* Some writers have 
seen in these negotiations an attempt to revive the policy 
advocated by Alcock at the beginning of 1853? namely, to 
persuade the Kanchu Government to make further trading and
(1) F.O.17/211 Clarendon to Bowring Sept. 25? 185^? cf. also
F.G.17/215 Bowring to Clarendon July 21, 185^ *-
87.
diplomatic concessions in return for aid against the rebellion. 
For example, J. F. Cady says that the failure of Bowring and 
McLanefs "ill-advised" negotiations "stemmed from the fallacious 
assumption originating with Bonham that the desparate Manchu 
court would meet whatever demands the foreign powers might 
make in order to obtain their assistance in suppressing the 
rebellion” Apart from attributing to Bonham views which I 
do not think he really held, at any rate after March, 1853> 
Cadyfs explanation is open to objection on other counts. In 
the first place neither Bowring nor McLane were under the 
delusion that the Manchu court was "desperate” for help 
against the Taipings, and in the second place there is no 
firm evidence to support the idea that they actually tried to 
negotiate on those terms. On the contrary, even when Bowring 
made his opening move by sending Medhurst, in April, with a 
dispatch to Governor Yeh at Canton, requesting a meeting on 
the question, the idea of offering aid to the imperialists was 
explicitly rejected. Bowring told Medhurst
"You may have an opportunity of referring to the disorgan­
ized state of China, and of stating that the Authorities 
both at Shanghae and Amoy, have applied to the British 
Consuls for intervention and assistance, but that it is not 
the purpose of our Government to interfere in the contentions
(1) J. F. Cady, op. cit., p.128.
"which unhappily prevail in China unless the duty of provid­
ing for the safety of British subjects, or British property,
Cl)
should require interference”.
What is hinted at in these instructions and became plain in 
later discussions at Shanghai and at the Taku forts is that 
Bowring was quite prepared to use the rebellion as a talking 
point in the negotiations, and as n useful means of putting 
pressure on the Imperial government, not by offering aid 
directly but by threatening to turn to the rebels if the 
Government did not give way. There is no question that 
Britain and the other Western powers wanted to use the crisis 
created by the rebellion to force a wider door into China. But 
they hoped to do this by subtler and cheaper means than by 
actually giving material aid to the Imperial government as a 
first condition.
When, after fruitless negotiations at Canton and 
Shanghai, Bowring and McLane eventually went north to the 
Peiho in October, their interpreters, Medhurst and Parker, had 
a series of conversations with lesser Chinese officials before 
they themselves met an Imperial envoy, Ch'ung-lun, in front 
of the Taku forts on November 3rd. Medhurst submitted a long 
report to Bowring on these early conversations. On October 18th,
(1) F.O. 228/16V Bowring to Medhurst May 11, 185s* e n d  in 
Bowring to Clarendon May 15, 185*+*
after speaking of the duty question at Shanghai, Medhurst 
"went on to speak of my visit to Nanking and Chin 
Keang foo, the progress of the rebellion in the Yangtsee- 
keang valley, the power and resources of the insurgents, 
their willingness to trade with us, the entire absence of 
Imperial authority and the consequent removal of all actual
obligation on our part to apply the Treaty in these regions".
The picture drawn of the Taipings for the benefit of the 
Imperial authorities was strikingly different from that given 
in his report to Bowring after his visit to Nanking. On the 
2bthy Medhurst told the Chinese officials that
"Western Powers were aware that the Chinese Empire was
in a disorganized condition, that the Dynasty itself was
in peril .they desired nothing more than to see the
Dynasty upheld and order restored throughout the Empire.
But if their friendly and reasonable advances were rejected, 
nothing remained for them but to take such steps as they 
might deem fit to revive their trade and protect their 
interests independently of the Imperial government - and 
they might possibly find it necessary to enter into negotia­
tions with the Insurgents " ^
(1) For Medhurstfs report see F.0.17/217 enclosure 3 in Bowring 
to Clarendon Nov.10, 185^. There are about 65 pages (unnum­
bered) of the report. The extracts quoted come at about 25 
and *f5. For the report of the U.S.interpreter, Parker, see 
U.S.Congressional Papers, McLane Correspondence, pp 305-2,2 
and esp. p 321 for the threat of turning to the rebels. For
the Chinese reports see Swisher, op.cit., pp231+-6 , 2^1-2,
252-*+, 261-2.
All this might perhaps be interpreted as an oblique invitation,
Chinese fashion, to take up the question of aid against the
rebels, but if this was really what Bowring and McLane wanted
they would hardly have failed to press the point more directly
at some stage. In fact there was nothing in their conversations
with Ch*ung-lun on November 3**^  about aid against the rebels,
and they returned to the south empty handed.
This, indeed, is what they had expected to hpppen* In
pursuing these protracted negotiations up and down the coast
of China their aim was to exhaust the diplomatic means at
their disposal for persuading the Chinese government to accept
(2)
the principle of revision. They did not really expect
(1) For reports of the Bowring-McLane conversation with 
Ch'ung-lun see enclosures 6-11 in F.0.17/217 as above;
McLanefs in U.S.Papers as above pp 285-££ ; Ch'ung-lun1s
in Swisher pp 262-6, 276-7. The Chinese reports of some 
of the earlier conversations which took place at Shanghai 
refer to British and American offers of aid in "eradicating 
the rebels" (Swisher pp 212,217,222 &c.). The British 
accounts of these conversations do not suggest any general 
offer of this sort (see P.O.17/215 Bowring to Clarendon 
July 27 and Aug. 3? 185*0 though, as already noted, there 
were offers to help get rid of the Triads. That a general 
offer of assistance was not made by the Western representa­
tives during these protracted negotiations is indicated 
plainly in McLanefs report to Marcy (U.S.Congressional Papers 
p292) in which he stated that although he thought the Imper­
ial authorities had hoped for an offer of aid, this was an 
idea he had "never entertained and which I do not suppose 
could command the favour of the government of the U.S.".
The same was certainly true for the British government at 
this time.
(2) See for example F.0.17/2X6 Bowring to Clarendon Oct, *+,185*+, 
where McLane is quoted by Bowring as saying, "We are antici­
pating always that we may be refused; and if we are to be
cont!d at foot of next page....
immediate results, as they surely would had they gone to 
the north with a firm offer of aid in return for concessions 
in mind. With England at war with Russia and his instructions 
from the Foreign Office frequently enjoining strict neutrality 
upon him, Bowring was simply not in a position to bargain in 
this way. In reporting the failure of the negotiations he 
emphasized that at least now there could be no doubt that 
British grievances about the treaty were well known to the 
court, despite Yeh's obstructionism at Canton. "But I 
doubt much if peace will be maintained without the demonstra­
tion of war’1, he added. ^
The British situation in China was approaching a crisis. 
Nothing had been achieved by efforts to persuade the Manchu 
government to make further diplomatic and commercial concessions, 
and practically all faith in the Taipings as a possible alterna­
tive government had been abandoned. China seemed both intract­
able and chaotic, and unless England was prepared to be content 
with the gains made in 18^2, gains which might become nearly 
worthless if the prevailing state of rebellion continued and
con'd from previous page..
refused we had better be refused there(in the north) than 
here (at Shanghai)1^ also F.0.17/21^ Bowring to Clarendon 
June 5th, 1851+.
(1) this page..
F.0.17/217 Bowring to Clarendon, Nov. 10, 185*+.
spread, then a change in British policy towards either the 
Peking government or the rebellion, or both, was bound to 
come. During 185^-5* however, no one saw very clearly how 
this was to be brought about. In the Foreign Office, indeed, 
there was no disposition to try to bring it about. Bowring*s 
suggestion that a demonstration of force was needed was firmly 
squashed.
"Such a course would be doubtful as a matter of right
and very questionable as a matter of policy. it is
therefore the positive injunction of Her Majesty's govern­
ment that you abstain from raising unnecessarily, ques­
tions with the Chinese government calculated to make a 
recourse to force incumbent on this country......You will
take no part, directly or indirectly, in the Civil con­
tests now raging in China. Your duty is to remain a 
quiet observer of events which may be passing around you, 
keeping Her Majesty's Government fully informed of what 
is passing, but holding yourself aloof from all participa­
tion in the intestine troubles of the Country".^
So far as the British government was concerned there were more 
important issues at stake at the beginning of 1855 than the fate 
of British trade in China.
(1) F.0*17/22*f Mehx Clarendon to Bov/ring, Feb.2*+, 1855*
British officials in China, however, although obliged 
to remain "quiet observers", could not help but search for 
some way out of what seemed to them a frustrating situation.
The assumptions upon which British policy had been based since 
the emergence of the rebellion as a major force in China began 
to be questioned.
"Neither of the two contingencies which were contemplated 
in Europe and on which the instruction of Her Majesty's 
Government were naturally grounded are, as far as I can at 
present form an opinion, likely to be the result of the 
existing struggle in China, " Bowring wrote in the middle 
of 185^. "I do not expect the present Manchu dynasty will 
be able to maintain its authority over a large part of the 
Chinese territory; nor do I believe that the Nanking rebels 
are by any means likely to establish a Government which will 
be generally recognized or obeyed in China".
In these circumstances the demands for protection of British 
interests in China were likely to increase, and the danger of 
involvement in China's internal struggles also. Bowring was 
clearly apprehensive of the possible results.
"It is impossible to turn away our attention from con­
sequences contingent upon such interference. The history
of British India is full of instruction it is no
■unusual characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race, when
"settling in foreign regions, that they begin by trading 
and end by governing. It is only by anticipating the 
great tendencies of events that our policy can be safely 
guided. I do not hesitate to state to your Lordship that 
I have often my misgivings lest the future should re-tell 
the tale of British India, over a vaster field, on a 
grander scale and with larger interests :nvolved".^~'
A radical Whi* and Free Trader, Bowring was no snokesman for
extending the bounds of Emuire. Indeed, there were few such
*> /
in England in the mid-nineteenth century, and the lesson of 
the mutiny in India in 1857 served to reinforce the sort 
of fear expressed by Bowring in 185**, for that event made
the expense and danger of empire seem all too plain. One
of the objects behind the later -British policy of giving direct 
aid to the 'anchus was, in fact, to prevent the crisis in 
China developing to the point where England had either to 
govern the country herself in order to trade, or not to trade 
at all. As early as l85**-5 British officials in China were 
beginning to feel that a situation was developing in which such 
a choice might have to be made. But for the time they could
(1) F. 0.17/21** Bowring to Clarendon June 5? 185*+; also 
F.0.228/165 Alcock to Bowring July 21, 185**? where
Alcock felt the state of affairs in China was becoming
"disastrous beyond all remedv”.
only wait upon the development of events in China and in Europ 
It seemed a frustrating and unrewarding position, remaining 
neutral between two sides, one of which was unlikely to be able 
and the other had proved quite unwilling to further the pros­
pects of British trade.
CHAPTER IV
War and the Change in Treaty Relations 
with the Manchu Government (1856-60)
The solution to the dilemma facing British policy in 
China by 1855 came, not as a result of the success of the 
rebels, as Bonham had thought possible in 1853* nor by 
persuading the Manchu government to accept treaty revision, 
as Bowring had attempted in 1851*, but by direct force of 
arms. The second "opium" war of 1856-60, fought by England 
in military alliance with France, forced the Manchus to 
concede the wider openings for trade and the direct diplomatic 
access to the government in Peking which had been the chief 
objectives of British policy in China since at least 1850.
These were eventually secured by the Treaty of Tientsin (1858) 
and the Convention of Peking (i860), and the primary concern 
of British policy in China after the conclusion of these 
treaties became, not the winning of further concessions, 
although this was by no means lost sight of, but the full 
enjoyment of those now gained.
Certain difficulties remained in the way, however, chief 
among them the continuance of the Taiping rebellion in the area 
of greatest potential imnortance to the expansion of British
trade, the Yangtze valley. The conditions for a change 
in British policy were, therefore, created by the end of 
i860. A new and satisfactory treaty settlement was concluded 
with the old Manchu government, while the rebellion, from 
which no great advantage not already gained was now to be 
looked for, gave no sure sign of triumphing, of dying out, 
or of being suppressed by the unaided efforts of the Manchu 
government. Many historians have accordingly concluded that 
here was in fact the turning point in British policy. "Pre­
cisely in i860" the British attitude changed, says Hu Sheng;
"the fate of the rebellion was sealed" by the negotiations of 
i860, says Tyler Dennett; "France and. Britain had no sooner 
imposed their own terms on the Manchu Imperial Government in 
the wars of A.D.1857-60 than they perversely supplied the con­
servative Manchus with the military means of suppressing a 
spontaneous Chinese 'Westernizing movement, which the laptrial 
Government had proved unable to crush out of its own resources",
says Arnold Toynbee in a footnote to his monumental Study of
(1)
History.
(1) Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Eng.edn 1955) 
pp*fl,****; T.Dennett, op.cit., p369; A.Tovnbee A Study of 
History (195** edn) Vol VIII p'327 n.3. Ch' also W.J.Hail, 
op.cit., p228-9, who speaks of "the change of front which led 
the Allies, immediately after their success in the war, to 
turn around and give active and open help to the Imperial 
Government". Hu Sheng, op.cit., pp35***5 and Lo Erh-kang, 
op.cit., pl69 both argue that one of the reasons for the war 
was "to pave the way for co-operation" against the rebels, 
but I have found no evidence of such a motive in British
policy.
My main concern in this and the following chapter is to 
establish that the decisive change in British policy towards 
the rebellion did not follow immediately or inevitably upon 
the treaty settlement of i860, and to show that England moved 
towards a policy of intervention in a manner much less certain 
and abrupt than such statements as those above suggest. The 
course of events between 1855 and i860 was certainly such as 
to make a change in British policythereafter very probable; 
but it was also such as to make for considerable doubt and 
hesitation in adopting that change.
The fortunes of the rebellion during these intermediate 
years were very mixed. The forces sent ncbrth in 1853 were 
finally destroyed by May, 1855? but in the West considerable 
fighting continued between the provincial armies of Tseng 
Kuo-fan and the rebel forces under Shih Ta-kai, the Assistant 
King. Tseng gradually established himself in the middle 
reaches of the Yangtze, creating a base from which he was 
later to advance to the siege and capture of Nanking itself. 
Generals under his command finally captured Wuchang in December, 
1856, and Kiukiang in May, 1858. The greatest rebel success 
before i860 was their defeat of the Imperial armies besieging 
Nanking and Chinkiang in the middle of 1856. Hsiang Jung's 
"Great Camp of Kiangnan" was destroyed and the siege of Nanking
temporarily lifted, only to be re-imposed at the beginning 
of 1858 by reorganised Imperial forces under Chang Kuo-liang, 
who also captured Chinkiang in December, 1857* Thus the rebels 
failed to win any decisive advantage from their victory over 
Hsiang Jung. The chief reason for this was the outbreak of 
.internal feuds among them at the end of l8?6. The causes and 
course of these divisions need not detain us here, save to note 
that they seriously weakened the movement, both militarily and 
politically. Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the Eastern King, was murdered, 
together with some twenty thousand of his adherents, while Shih 
Ta-kai, the most able of the Taiping generals, deserted Nanking 
with many of his followers and eventually made his way to 
Szechuan, where he attempted to establish an independent kingdom. 
He was finally defeated there in 1863. Hung Hsiu-ch*tlan 
remained supreme at Nanking, but the rebellion had inevitably 
lost much of the fervour and force of its early years. The 
energies it did not dissipate in faction fighting were, until 
the middle of i860, mainly directed towards the central Yangtze 
valley, away from the existing centres of Western trade. 
Neutrality in these circumstances was not so difficult as it 
had been, or was to become.
For the time being the rebellion, which had once seemed 
to offer the chance of improving the British situation, became
just another complication in the great Chinese puzzle, although 
no longer a very distracting one. In May, 1 8 Bov/ring was 
able to report that his apprehensions were "much diminished, 
and that the tendencies are now rather towards tranquillity
(1)
and the restoration of commerce than in a contrary direction11,
while in August he wrote,
"The usual uncertainty exists as to the exact position of
the contending parties in China.... Where large bodies of
the rebels move they seem to meet with little resistance,
but they never retain by any consolidation of government
the places they abandon.
"As regard British interests, I see nothing at present
seriously to compromise them. Tranquillity is restored to
Canton and its neighbourhood, and I have no reason to think
that the piratical fleets on the coast are in a condition
to molest any of the Five Ports. We hear reports of the
death of the "Western King". *The religious element1 of
the Insurrection is now scarcely ever referred to, and as
regards the pirates, all their banners and devices show that
they profess to belong to the brotherhood of the Triads and
other secret societies, which have always existed in China
(2)since the overthrow of the Ming dynasty".
(1) F.0.17/230 Bowring to Clarendon May 26, 18??.
(2) F.0.17/233 Bowring to Clarendon Aug. 10, 18??.
From Shanghai also, D. B. Robertson, who had replaced Alcock
there as consul in April, 1855* reported at the end of the year
that there were no disturbing movements by the Taiping forces,
their "headquarters" at Chinkiang and Nanking being still
watched by the Imperialists "from a convenient distance". "The
state of affairs may be designated as being at "deadlock", he 
(i) 
concluded.
There was no change during the early part of 1856, and
the few official reports made on the subject during that year
emphasised the hopelessness of both sides from the British
point of view. "The rebel cause cannot be pronounced to be
prospering anyfchere on a grand scale", Wade reported in January,
adding that around Canton he could find "no sympathy with the
Rebels in any class, labourers, shopkeepers or, so far as I had
(2)access to them, literary men". 7 But the Imperial government 
also appeared to have no reserves of popular support. In 
forwarding yet another of Wade's reports, Bowring commented 
that he could himself
"find nowhere any growing confidence or affection for the 
Imperial Government. It is utterly unable to ^app'le with 
the difficulties of its position. On the other hand, the 
various rebel bands appear only to represent a wild disorder,
(1) F.0.228/195 Robertson to Bowring Dec. 22, 1855*
(2) F.0.17/2Mf enc. in Bowring to Clarendon Jan. 1*+, 1856.
"quite sufficient to disorganise society but helpless
for the establishment of authority. The successful
inroads of these revolutionary bands shake all confidence
in the Peking Government, whose blindness, pride and obstin-
„ Cl)acy seem impervious to all lessons of experience".
Wade concluded in the report to which Bowring added these 
comments that the rebel movement was more indebted to the 
"imbecility" of the Imperial Government for its continued 
existence than to cany vigour of its own, and he could see 
no end to the struggle.
"There is no incident in this wretched history that may 
enable one to name a term of years within which the 
struggle shall be concluded. The Emperor recovers ground 
lost in one province, only, as it v/ere, to see the rebellion 
condense in another; and the rebels, though stubborn and 
formidable, are still, considered as a ^hole, on the 
defensive, and have now to recommence, geographically 
speaking, from a point little in advance of where they were 
at the beginning of 1851**"
British officials in China were becoming increasingly impatient 
with the general state of affairs in China, but their efforts 
to prod the Foreign Office Jnto thinking about a future policy
(1) 0.17/2^6 Bowring to Clarendon April 12, 18J6,
enclosing Wade's report.
received no encouragement, Clarendon preferring to leave 
relations with China ”to their own operation, and a better
Cl) f
state of things may thus be prepared without being precipitated1!
The situation changed temporarily in May, 1856, when the
Taipings suddenly routed the forces besieging Chinkiang,
nreparatory to their attack on Hsiang Jung’s forces at Hanking,
For a time they threatened the important city of Soochow, and
it seemed nos sible that now at last thev would advance to the — ^
coast and attempt to occupy Shanghai, The unwelcome prospect 
of a second rebel occupation of the city, and a second 
Imperialist siege, no soon after the expulsion of the Triads, 
prompted a significant shift in British policy. Rather than 
allow a re-enactment of the scenes of the last .few vears,v 7
Consul Robertson argued, ’’the city should be taken possession 
of by the three treaty powers and held intact”, although with onl^ 
one man-©’war in port at uncertain intervals he was in no posi- : 
tion to initiate such a move himsel But at least, he
(1) F.0,17/225' Clarendon to Bov/ring Dec, 8,1855? in reply to 
Bowring of Sept. 13? 1855? in F.0.17/233 in which Bov/ring 
reminded Clarendon that 1 the state of China will press itself 
with growing urgency upon Your Lordship’s notice, and delay 
in deciding on a future policy will, I fear, only augment 
present difficulties and bring new complications”,
(2) F.0.17/2*4-6 Robertson to Bowring April 3? 1856, enc.' in 
Bowring to Clarendon April 13? 1856.
sup;jested in another despatch a fortnight later, ”it
would- not he inaneropriate to let the (Rebel) Chiefs
know that we should view with dissatisfaction any movement
on their part calculated to disturb us in a nlace we reside
(1)
in by Treaty Right”. The Chamber of Commerce at
Shanghai even suggested that Soochow should also be brought 
under foreign protection, since as the main entrepot for 
trade with the interior, its fall alone would have a 
serious effect upon Shanghai* For a time trade did
suffer badly at the treaty port, although neither it nor 
Soochow was actually taken by the rebels. Robertson 
reported at the end of June that ’’even Opium finds no 
purchasers’1, and that tea sunn lies from the interior 
were very uncertain. But even the total cessation of 
trade was, he recognised, ’’merely one of those chances 
that all must run whose interests a^e placed in a country 
where civil war was raging”. Uhat chiefly concerned him 
was the physical security of British residents, and to 
secure this adequately,he suggested, the existing policy 
towards the rebellion needed revision. ’’Your Excellency’s 
instructions for my guidance have hitherto been to observe 
a perfect neutrality”, he wrote to Bowring”.... and so long
Cl) F.0.228/220 Robertson to Bowring (69) April 15,l8b6.
(2) ibid. enc. in Robertson to Bowring (72) April lb, 18B6; 
also ibid July 12.
as matters go well there can be no question of the wisdom of 
such a course; but I would respectfully submit, and I hope 
you will not deem it presumption on my part, that times and 
circumstances may occur when that policy can be carried a 
little too far...."^
Bowring did not deem it presumption, for such a view 
fitted in with his own attitude to the struggle going on 
in China. Forwarding a copy of Robertson’s despatch to the 
Foreign Office, he inverted the consul’s argument and told 
Clarendon that it was not the molestation of British subjects 
that was to be feared so much as the stagnation of British 
trade. To secure this, he suggested, "all parties should be 
interdicted from making the Five Ports the seat of hostilities,11, 
and further, Min case of absolute need11, the city of Shanghai
(2)
should be put under the direct protection of the Treaty powers. 
With the war in the Crimea settled, Clarendon was more sympathetic 
to complaints from China, and his reply sent in September, 1856, 
promised more naval forces at Shanghai in future. Moreover, 
he instructed Bowring to inform the rebel chiefs that,
"any attack upon the City of Shanghai, which is full of 
British subjects and property, will be repelled by force 
of arms; but that the British Government will in no way
(1) ibid. June 28, 1856
(2) F.O.17/2^8 Bowring to Clarendon July,5? 1856*
"interfere in the Civil War if the Ports in which British 
Commerce is carried on and to to which British subjects are 
admitted are respected by the Insurrectionary Forces". 
Clarendon agreed, in effect, that neutrality could be carried 
too far. The limits of British neutrality were accordingly 
extended in September, 1856, to include not just the foreign 
settlement areas at the treaty ports, but the Chinese cities 
as well.
To exclude both sides from the settlement areas was, as
I have already argued, if not strictly legal at least not
inconsistent with the stand of neutrality in the civil war;
but to forbid one side from attacking "the Ports in which
from
British Commerce is carried on" and/Shanghai in particular, 
which is what Clarendon’s instructions amounted to, was another 
matter. In actual fact, these instructions were never acted 
upon at all. By the time they arrived in China, at the end
(1) F.0*228/208 Clarendon to Bowring Sept. 9> 1856; enc. is 
Clarendon to Admiralty asking that more ships be directed 
to Shanghai and their commanders instructed to repel any 
attack on the city, for "a bona fide observance of neutrality 
did not require that British property at Shanghai "be 
exposed to plunder in a conflict between the rebels and 
the Imperialists brought on by an attack made by the 
Rebels upon that City"* There was no question of waiting 
to see how the rebels would behave if they captured the 
city.
of 1856, the crisis at Shanghai was safely past, and was not 
renewed until the middle of i860, when a Taiping attack on the 
city was made* Shanghai was defended by British forces on 
that occasion, but not on the authority of Clarendon’s instruc­
tions, which appear to have been quite forgotten* Bowring 
had been replaced by Frederick Bruce as British Plenipotentiary 
in China by then, Clarendon by Russell at the Foreign Office, 
and Robertson by Meadows as consul at Shanghai* Thus none of 
the principals concerned in the shaping of British policy at 
Shanghai in 1856 were on the scene four years later* Bruce, 
who was a good deal of an armchair diplomat, apparently did 
not study the consular archives at Hong Kong on his arrival 
there in April, 1859? and he soon moved on to Shanghai, which 
became his headquarters until the end of i860* When the 
rebels attacked that port in August, i860, he ordered its 
defence by British forces quite consciously on his own authority. 
Russell approved his action, but neither referred to the fact 
that it had been authorised four years earlier as part of
general British policy towards the rebellion, and it would
(1)seem clear that they were in fact ignorant of this. Both
(1) See A & P l86l (275*0 pp 60, 65? 70-1* Bruce was widely
criticised for ntaking it upon himself11 (Bindley, op.cit., 
vol I p271) to break with the professed policy of neutrality, 
but he never defended himself by pointing out that he was 
really only acting on the instructions given in 1856. The
person one would have expected to know this and to have
pointed it out was E.Hammond, the Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs,.and the man chiefly responsible 
for despatches to China, but he does not appear to have done
the origin and fate of these instructions seem to me to provide 
an instructive illustration of the decidedly ad hoc nature of 
British policy on this question. They were an immediate 
response to a sudden, local crisis, and when that crisis passed 
and was not repeated for several years, they were forgotten. 
Certainly they were not referred to in i860. Such facts 
make it difficult to accept the idea of any systematic, astutely 
planned, British policy towards the rebellion. At times it is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that it was not made or 
planned at all^ blit just happened.
Yet the objection remains that by their very existence 
on paper, even if never acted upon, these instructions of 
Clarendon in September, 18?6, compromised British neutrality 
in a decidedly pro-Manchu direction. They made it potentially, 
if not yet in practice, a neutrality which protected the 
Manchus. All the ports in which British commerce was carried 
on and to which British subjects were admitted were at that 
time in the hands of the Manchu government, and it was imposs­
ible to warn the rebels away from them without at the same time 
protecting the interests of that government, at least unless 
the ports and the revenues derived from them were completely 
taken over by the treaty powers. One can, therefore, begin 
to accept in part the Marxist complaint against the nature of 
British neutrality towards the rebellion, while still rejecting
such unhelpful adjective? a? ,T false” and nempty”. It was 
not a case of British neutralitv beinr consciouslv devised to
•J 1— 1 is
deceive one'side and heln the other. But given a situation in 
which the British government was determined and able to protect 
the interests (generously defined) of its subjects residing in 
China, and a situation in which those interests were concentra­
ted in rorts exclusively in the hands nf one sj.de, then British 
policy could, not help but work in favour of that side as 
against the other. The natural bias in British policy away 
from the prospect of any change or disturbance in China which 
night upset British interests there began, by 1.8B6, to turn 
that policy into a course which ran counter to the success 
of the Tai.ni.nr rebellion. But it was not for some vears vet 
that conscious direction and added impetus was given to this 
trend.
Clarendon’s instructions of September, 1$56, were 
certainly not part of any general move towards abandoning 
a policy of neutrality altogether, however peculiar a character 
they way have given that pollcy. This is made nlain by 
Bowring’s correspondence with the newly appointed. American 
Commissioner, Dr. Peter Parker, over the letter’s attempt at 
treaty revision late in 1856. In August Parker sought Bowring’s 
co-oneration In this venture in a letter stating that he had 
evidence that the Imperial government contemplated seeking 
foreign aid against the rebellion, though by indirect means
and rtin a manner peculiarly Chinese”. Parker urged that if 
the representatives of the Western treaty powers were novr 
to nresent themselves at Peking,"most important consequences 
might follow". Having no warships readily available for 
such a purpose Bowring was in no position to co-operate, and 
thought the whole venture hopeless, not to say positively 
prejudicial to long range Western interests in China. On 
the question of aid against the rebels he told Parker he was 
not authorised to make such an offer as that suggested. In 
his despatch to Clarendon on the question he went even further, 
stating that, although convinced that British interests in 
China were seriously endangered by the present state of anarchy 
in the country, yet he
"should be less willing than ever to see the British 
Government interfering with the inter-necine quarrel and 
step beyond what is necessary for the protection of British 
persons and property, and the security and extension of 
trade, nor could I advise participation in that policy of 
intervention which is darkly indicated in Dr. Parkerfs 
despatches".^
(1) F.0.17/2^8-9 Bowring to Clarendon July 1 and Aug.21,1856, 
enclosing his correspondence with Parker. For the failure 
of Parker’s attempt at treaty revision see T. Dennett, 
op.cit., pp 279-91; U.S.Congressional Papers, McLane 
Correspondence pp olQ ff; Swisher, op.cit., pp 311 ff.
Clarendon replied in November, fully approving Bowring*s stand, 
and rejecting also the idea of offering armed intervention 
in favour of the Imperial Government as the condition of 
political or commercial concessions.^
On the eve of the outbreak of the second "opium1 war in 
China, therefore, British policy towards the Taiping rebellion 
was in a rather peculiar position which defies description in 
simple and and usual terms. Fundamentally it remained in 
intent and application what it had been since 1853> a policy 
of armed and limited neutrality. Yet the limits of this 
neutrality had been extended in such a way as to make British 
policy one which might, in certain very possible circumstances, 
work in favour of the Manchu government, while on the other 
hand there was explicit rejection of the idea of offering 
direct aid to that government. In addition, hopes in the 
possibility of either side settling the conflict satisfactorily 
and establishing a firm government conducive to the interests 
of foreign trade had receded still further from what they had 
been in l853-^* If the conditions for the expansion of that 
trade were to be created it seemed that it could only be as a 
result of independent Western action.
(1) F.0.228/209 Clarendon to Bowring Nov. 1856.
Clarendon was in fact preparing for such action just at
the time when the case of the lorchaf'Arrow11 was precipitating
the crisis at Canton which led to the outbreak of war. With the
Crimean war settled, Clarendon began negotiations with the
French government for combined action "to avert the calamities
and ruin" facing their interests in China. The object was
to be treaty revision, and the means a joint expedition to
the Peiho of far greater strength than any previously made.
In this way, Clarendon argued,
"the Treaty Powers will either place their relations
with Chinsiunder the existing dynasty on a better footing
than they have hitherto been, or will be set free by
the obstinacy of the Chinese Government from any
obligation by which they may be morally restrained
from adopting measures requisite for the security of
their subjects and calculated to extend their commerce
with the Chinese territories. Her Majesty’s Government
are far from desiring to see the over-throw of the
present dynasty in China or the success of the insurgents
.... but Her Majesty’s Government consider that it would
be imprudent in the Treaty Powers much longer to remain
H(l)in a state of listless indifference.
(1) ibid. Clarendon to Cowley Sept. 2U, 1856 enc. in
Clarendon to Bowring Nov. 8, 1856.
Just what measures Clarendon had in mind if the Manchus 
again refused to accept the idea of treaty revision does not 
emerge in the negotiations as far as they had gone before 
events at Canton led to action even more direct than a mere 
show of force at the Peiho. The threat of attempting to 
make terms with the rebels was perhaps among them, although 
equally, intervention against the rebels might have proved the 
outcome. Clarendon was determined to get either concessions 
from the Manchus. or what he considered moral ffeedom of action, 
which could have meant any one of a number of things. What­
ever it meant, the French were willing to co-operate in bring­
ing about "une demarche destinee a lever les derniers obstacles 
qui ferment au commerce et a 1* Industrie du nor.de entier le 
libre acces d*un aussi vaste empire". They were confident
that "1’apparition des pavilions Ges guerres" would quickly
(1)
bring result;
By the time Bowring received news of these preparations 
the "pavilions des guerres" were already flying at Canton.
In October, 1856, a crisis developed over the seizure by the 
Chinese authorities of the lorcha "Arrow", and England and 
France set about securing their objectives by the direct use 
of force against the Manchu Government. The length of time
(1) ibid. The correspondence between the English and French 
Governments is in printed form in F.0.17/261 Clarendon to 
Bov/ring Feb. 9> 1857*
taken to build up effective fighting forces in so distant a 
theatre of war as China, especially since some of the English 
troops sent out were diverted to help quell the. Mutiny in India, 
meant that despite the vast superiority of the allies in weapons 
of war it was not until June, 1858, that peace was concluded and 
the Treaty of Tientsin signed. Even this was,to prove far 
from the end of the struggle, however. Ratification of the 
new treaty was required by June, 1859? but before then officials 
favouring the continuance of the war regained control in the 
counsels of the Manchu Government, and when Bruce, the newly 
appointed British Minister Plenipotentiary to China; attempted 
to make his way up the Peiho,on his way to present his credentials 
and exchange treaties at Peking, his naval escort was repulsed 
with heavy losses by the Taku forts. The war was thereupon 
laboriously renewed, and Bruce’s elder brother, the Earl of 
Elgin, who had negotiated the Tientsin treaty, was sent back to 
China a second time as Minister Extraordinary to exact full 
compliance from the Manchu government. This was eventually 
secured in October, i860, the Treaty of Tientsin being then 
finally ratified and the Convention of Peking imposing additional 
conditions upon China.
The task of forcing from the Manchu government the diplomatic 
and commercial concessions demanded by England proved a bitter 
and protracted one. Apart from the fact that the Manchu govern­
ment renewed the war rather than ratify a treaty already 
negotiated and signed, other incidents which occurred during 
the campaign of i860 exacerbated feelings. In September a 
number of British and French emissaries negotiating a truce 
near Tientsin were seized and imprisoned, some of them dying as 
a result of their treatment, and in October Elgin ordered the 
burning of the Summer Palace outside Peking to punish what he 
regarded as a perfidious court. The Emperor himself had fled 
at the approach of the allied armies at the end of September, 
to Jehol, in Manchuria, leaving his half-brother, Prince Kung, 
the task of soothing the fierce barbarian. Such a background 
of deceit and destruction naturally left no gfeat legacy of 
faith or goodwill on either side. The Manchu government had 
been forced, very much against its will, to accept new terms 
on paper by the end of i860, but its readiness to carry them out 
honestly remained, for some time yet, highly suspect by the 
British representatives. Not surprisingly in such circumstances 
there was no immediate tendency in British policy towards help­
ing this government to suppress a rebellion which, by the end of 
i860, had again become a formidable threat to its security.
On the other hand, the existence of a state of war with 
the Manchus did not dispose the British government to look more 
favourably on the rebellion, or to give it any kind of encour­
agement. In October, 1856, rebels near Canton who claimed
to be connected with those at Nanking sought aid from Bowring, 
but he rejected their request, and Elgin ignored a similar
C ]
request from a Taiping chief on the Yangtze at the end of 1858.
The reasons for this refusal to regard the rebels as possible
allies are fairly obvkous. Apart from absolute confidence
that, having once concentrated their forces in China, military
victory would quickly be won, the view of the rebellion formed
by British officials since 1853 made any active encouragement
of it practically unthinkable. Doubts as to the real nature
of Taiping feelings towards foreigners remained, and until
i860 they seemed to have lost all their former military vigour.
They were neither desirable nor necessary allies. In any case,
in the war with the Manchus it was no part of the British
objective; and still less of the French, to overthrow the
dynasty entirely. The instructions issued to Elgin on his
setting out for the first time in April, 1857? were largely
devoted to defining the terms which it was hoped the Manchu
(2)
government cou^d be "induced" to accept, and even when Elgin 
had to be sent a second time, after the Manchus had shown 
their intractability at the Taku fofcts, the Foreign Office 
urgently instructed him not to go too far in undermining the
(1) A & P 1857 (2163) p50-1 and A & P 1859 Session 2 (2571) p **5
(2) A & P 1859 Session 2 (2571) PP 1-6 Clarendon to "Elgin 
April 20, 1857.
authority of the Emperor# If that were to happen,
"the Rebels would take heart, the great officers of the 
Empire might find it difficult to maintain the central 
authority, the governors of provinces might hardly be 
able to quell insurrection. In short, the whole Empire 
might run the risk of dissolution. Her Majesty (sic) 
would see with great concern such a state of things. It 
might portend a great catastrophe, and the bonds of 
allegiance once loosened, might never again be firmly 
united.
Elgin himself wondered at times whether the Manchu government 
either could or should be upheld in this way, but despite the 
suspicions of his French colleague, Baron Gros, his instructions 
on the point were definite. Setting the rebels up in place 
of the Manchus was never the policy of the British Government, 
even when at war with the Manchus.
During these years of conflict reports on the rebellion 
were much less regular than formerly, but they provide unex­
pected variety. At the beginning of 1857 Robertson wrote 
one of the few official despatches ntot from the pen' of Meadows 
in praise of the rebels.
"Under their rule no oppression of the people is allowed",
he reported. "The Husbandman cultivates his Land and the
(1) F.0.17/329 Russell to Elgin April .17, i860: cf" also the 
French instructions to Baron Gros, enclosed there, II ne
saurait, en effet, entrer dans nos vues de renverser le 
Souverain de la Chine.•"
produce accrues to himself; taxation exists only in a 
moderate contribution of grain, and the Rice required 
for the consumption of the Troops is paid for. District 
Officers of similar rank and designation as the Imperial 
Government are appointed to administer justice, and pro­
tection to life and property is guaranteed to all who come 
within the Taeping rule; that this is no promise held out 
as an inducement but actually the case all accounts lead 
us to believe, for many find their way backwards and for­
wards, either as spies or for the purpose of visiting 
their native places, and they speak of the perfect free­
dom and immunity enjoyed in the -Rebel Districts". Taiping 
discipline, Robertson continued, "stands out in such bold 
relief against the fearful demoralization of the Imperial 
Armies as to instil a feeling of respect into beholders 
and enthusiasm into its followers".
Despite these great virtues, however, Robertson doubted 
whether the Rebels could achieve more than partial national 
reform, and he questioned also whether they really wished to 
co-operate with foreigners. "The Manchoo Government may be 
effete and the people demoralized, but at all events the first 
assures to us a security for life and property insofar as it 
can, and the last a trade with above nineteen and a half
millions sterling.(sic) Whether the Rebel Government will
do as much is a matter of doubt". Bowring was not
impressed by Robertson’s sudden burst of praise for the rebels,
while Clarendon merely expressed interest.
Robertson’s enthusiasm did not last long, in any case, for
twelve months later he was reporting, in a singularly ill-
written despatch, that
"a deep feeling of discontent pervades the countryman,
and had the Taiping wang movement had in it any of the
elements of progress, any guarantee for an ameliorated
condition and peaceful enjoyment of property, the Tartar
dynasty would have ceased to exist, but it did not (sic);
the people see in it only an exchange of masters, without
any benefit to accrue therefrom, and extinction of their
religious rites, to be replaced by a formula which threatens
religious persecution and the uprooting of their religious
(2)
systems and institutions".
These were more usual views for a British Consular official,
(3)
and in harmony with the reports submitted by Wade during 1857*
(1 ) F.0.17/263 Robertson to Bowring Jan. 2 , 1857? ehc. in 
Bowring to Clarendon Jan.12, 1857? for Clarendon reaction 
see F.0.17/261 to Bowring March *+, 1857*
(2) F.0.17/29*+ Robertson to Bowring Jan.6 , 1858 enc. in Bowring 
to Clarendon Jan.13, 1858. Robertson’s original despatch 
in F.0.228/257 reads similarly.
(3) For Wade reports about this time see F.0.17/265, March l*f; 
F.017/269 May 9 and 25; F.0.17/272 0ct.l*+$ F.0.17/273?
Nov.29, 1857.
Through the greater part of the following year, 1858, the 
rebellion received virtually no attention in consular reports. 
The advance of Chang Kuo-liang’s armies forced the rebels 
still further from the coastal areas, while Western energies 
and attention were mainly directed towards the campaign against 
the Manchus.
The rebellion could hardly be forgotten, however, for 
Article X of the Treaty of Tientsin, signed on June 26, 1858, 
read,
"British merchant ships shall have authority to trade 
upon the Great River (Yangtze). The Upper and Lower 
Valley of the River being, however, disturbed by outlaws, 
no Port shall for the present be opened to trade, with 
the exception of Chinkiang, which shall be opened in a 
year.... So soon as Peace shall have been restored,
British vessels shall also be admitted to trade at such 
ports as far as Hankow, not exceeding three in number..." 
Thus the continuance of the rebellion nullified the chief 
commercial benefit gained from the recent war - the right to 
trade upon the Yangtze. But in October, 1858, before leaving 
for England, Elgin persuaded the Imperial authorities, at the 
price of modifying the clause in the treaty relating to the 
residence of the British minister in Peking, to allow him
to make an exploratory voyage up the river and to select 
suitable ports for foreign trade. Elgin stated that his 
main object was simply to confirm the principle that the 
river would eventually be opened, but part of his intention 
was to investigate afresh the state of the rebellion, about 
which little had been heard for some time. left Shanghai
on November 8th, returning on January 1st, 1859? after reach­
ing Hankow, six hundred miles inland.
The reports brought back by Elgin and his companions 
on the rebels served to confirm the official view formed since 
185^ -. The two main points which emerged from Elgin’s own 
report were his conclusion that the Taiping movement now 
lacked any real popular support, and the total absence of 
commercial activity observed in Taiping territory as compared 
with Imperialist.
"I am inclined to believe that there is little or 
nothing of popular sympathy with the rebel movement, in 
the s&nse which we give to that phrase in Europe. It 
is no doubt true that the general attitude of the population 
does not argue much enthusiasm on either side of the 
dynastic controversy, and it is also certain that we 
saw more of the districts in Imperialist than those in 
rebel occupation. But the tone of natives with whom I 
conversed certainly left on my mind the impression that
"they viewed the rebellion with feelings akin to those 
with which they would have regarded earthquake or pesti­
lence, or any other providential scourge"*
The towns in Taiping hands appeared to be merely desolate 
garrison centres, although Elgin recognised that in some 
cases at least this was the inevitable result of their being 
almost constantly in a state of siege. Yet the contrast 
with Imperialist held territory was very marked.
"When we had advanced through the rebel lines greater
signs of commercial activity displayed themselves on the
river, although I should observe that the rebels do not
appear in any part to command it beyond the range of
their guns. Nowhere did we see any rebel junks, and
both Nanking and Ngan-ching (Anking) were closely
beleaguered by Imperial fleets". ^
For Wade, who accompanied Elgin as an interpreter, it was
a "motley, planless insurrection.....without a vestige of
capability to reconstruct the edifice it has done something
(2)to undermine". The only thing to be hoped for from it
was its early collapse.
(1) For Elgin report, see A & P 1859 Session 2 (2571) pp^O-5.
(2) T.F.Wade, Account of the Expedition to Han K ’au. a copy 
of which is enclosed in F.0.17/371 Bruce to Russell.
April 29, 1862.
A readiness to help towards this end certaihly became 
apparent in official British considerations on the rebellion 
immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tientsin. 
Before Elgin’s report reached England the instructions to 
guide his brother as first British minister to China, were 
drawn up. These show that at the beginning of 1859 inter­
vention against the rebellion was considered as a possible 
development in British policy in China, although still not 
as a certain or immediate development. In February, 1859, 
Bruce wrote to the then Foreign Secretary, Malmesbury, setting 
out the major questions in Anglo-Chinese relations he thought 
likely to arise after his arrival in Peking. One of the most 
important of these, he suggested, was "the language I am to 
use to the Imperial Government with regard to the rebels"♦ 
Malmesbury made a pencil note opposite this passage in Bruce’s 
letter stating, "I think we ought to help them and drive 
them out of Nankin - the promise of this would induce them 
to repay us by good faith &c. It is important that we should 
open the Nankin trade”. T h e  actual instructions he issued 
to Bruce were, however, rather more guarded.
"It is possible that the Chinese Government may take 
advantage of your presence at Pekin to endeavour to
(1) F.0.17/312 Bruce to Malmesbury Feb. 5, 1859•
"ascertain whether Her Majesty’s Government would be 
disposed in any way to assist the Imperial Government 
in the subjugation of the insurgents now in arms against 
its authority. The question which would be involved in 
any such overture would be of momentous importance. On 
the one hand it would certainly be desirable that peace 
should be restored to the interior of the Empire, and as 
a consequence of it the navigation of the Yangtzekiang 
and access to the cities on its banks opened to foreign 
intercourse; but on the other hand, in the present 
imperfect state of our information as to the nature, 
extent and prospects of the insurrection, it is impossible 
to judge whether any attempt to serve the purposes of the 
Central Government by contributing to suppress it might 
not do more harm than good. If the insurrection were 
confined to one or two places on the banks of navigable 
channels it might be assailed by the naval forces of such 
of the Treaty Powers as might be willing to lend their 
aid to the Imperial Government, and the capture of a 
strong position occupied by the insurgents might reinstate 
the Imperial Government in the plenitude of its power. : 
But even in this case I need scarcely say that Her 
Majesty’s Government would not be disposed to enter upon 
such a course without previous concert with and without
nthe assured co-operation of its allies*
uAs far, however, as we are informed, the insurrection 
is widely spread throughout the interior; it numbers 
a large population as its adherents; and its strongholds 
are scattered far and wide and cannot be approached or 
assailed by any force that the Treaty Powers could bring 
to bear upon it.
uIt is possible that the information which Lord Elgin 
may collect in the course of his voyage up the Yangtzekiang 
may give reason to suppose that it would easily be within 
the reach of the Treaty Powers to restore peace to the 
interior of China; but in the present state of our know­
ledge, it would not be proper for you to encourage any 
expectation of material assistance on our part*1. ^  
Malmesbury clearly favoured the idea of intervention, but 
not at any price. He wanted proof that it was likely to be 
effective even if given on taly a limited scale. Elginfs
report indicated, though it did not state, that effective aid 
might be possible without a large and expensive commitment 
of British fofces, but Bruce's treatment at the Taku forts 
in June, 1859? meant that any possibility of British action
(1) F.0.17/3H Malmesbury to Bruce (No.5) March 1, l859»
was for the time being discarded. A large and expensive
commitment of British forces to China had, in fact, to be
made; but they carried war, not aid, to the Manchu government
The events of 1859-60 served to complicate rather than
resolve the immediate problems of British relations with China
The fact that the Manchu government had been prepared to
renew hostilities rather than submit to the terms of 1858,
perhaps still more its seizure and maltreatment of the truce
negotiators in September, i860, made many question whether
it was not completely untrustworthy and better overthrown.
Baron Gros certainly suspected Elgin of such thoughts, and
by the end of i860 Elgin was at least as well disposed towards
(1)the rebels as to\*7ards the Manchus.
By then, indeed, it appeared that the dynasty might be
overthrown in any case, if not by the Western barbarians
invading its capital and burning its palaces^then by the long
haired rebels.
In the early part of i860 the Taipings had suddenly
re-asserted themselves as a formidable military force under
(1) Baron Gros suspected-Elgin of having secret instructions 
and reported on Oct. 19, i860, "il agit comme s'il cher- 
chait a renverser la Dynastie pour tendre la main aux 
rebelles de Nanking11 (see H.Cordier 1 'Expedition de Chine 
de i860 pp 200,397-1+00)• As already shown, Elgin's 
instructions explicitly enjoined upon him not to overthrow 
the dynasty, but for his more sympathetic view of the 
rebellion by the end of i860 see below p 137*9 •
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the brilliant leadership of the Chung Wang, or Loyal King,
Li Hsiu-ch'eng. In May the Imperial armies besieging Hanking 
had been routed and L i ^  forces advanced triumphantly towards 
the coast, capturing Soochow at the beginning of June. In 
the latter part of the year they over-ran the rich coastal 
province of Kiangsu, attacking Shanghai itself, and began also 
a great four-pronged drive towards Hankow, in an attempt to 
relieve the strategically vital centre of Anking and to 
lessen the pressure from Tseng Kuo-fan*s armies driving 
slowly down the Yangtze. Despite the brilliance of Lifs 
generalship, the superior resources and organisation of 
Tseng1s armies eventually withstood this challenge and, by 
the end of l86l, these were r^^dy to advance to the third and 
final siege of Nanking. The military resurgence of the 
Taiping movement thus proved abortive. But this was not 
apparent at the end of i860, when rebel armies were ranging 
through wide tracts of Imperial territory on the coast and 
along the Yangtze, while in the north the armies of the 
Western barbarians were occupying the capital. It is not 
surprising that Elgin, on the eve of his entry into Peking, 
wrote to his brother, then still at Shanghai, questioning 
whether it was wise for Bruce to move north and attempt to 
take up residence in the northern capital, thus identifying
England diplomatically with a regime that appeared to be 
"tottering to its fall".^ As in 18?3> the political 
future of China seemed all uncertain, and this uncertainty 
affected the development of British policy towards the 
rebellion. In some measure, the chances of British inter­
vention on behalf of the Manchu government were more remote 
at the end of i860 than they had been at the beginning of 
1859.
Against this must be set the fact that in August, i860, 
British forces were used to prevent the Taiping rebels 
capturing Shanghai. In May, just before the capture of 
Soochow, the Chinese authorities at Shanghai requested 
foreign aid against the advancing rebels, and to this Bruce, 
in conjunction with the French minister, Bourboulon, agreed, 
although refusing to go beyond the defence of Shanghai itself. 
There is some doubt whether the rebels were fully aware of the 
allied intention to defend the city, and Li Hsiu-ch'eng claimed
(1) F.0.17/331 Elgin to Bruce Oct. 12, i860 enc. in Elgin to 
Russell, same date. Elgin wrote "There are also circum­
stances connected with the general condition of affairs in 
China at present and the prospects of the existing dynasty 
which cannot be overlooked in dealing with this subject.
It it advisable to take a step which will Hentify Great 
Britain more closely with this dynasty at a time when it 
seems tottering to its fall?"
that he was actually invited to advance upon it by foreigners
visiting him at Soochow. Whatever the truth on these points,
the rebels attacked Shanghai on August 18th over a period of
three days, and were repulsed by British and French forces,
the latter incidentally firing a suburb outside the walls
(1)
to deprive the Taiping forces of cover. While some allied
forces were thus defending an Imperial city in central China, 
in the north their brothers ’in arms were storming the trouble­
some Imperial forts of Taku, preparatory to an advance on 
Tientsin and Peking. It is difficult to apply the normal 
criteria for neutrality and belligerence to so Gilbertian 
a situation.
Yet although certainly a breach of neutrality in any 
normal and acceptable sense of the term, the British action 
at Shanghai in August, i860, did not mark a radical change 
in policy towards the rebellion. insofar as it was intended 
merely to defend Western interests at Shanghai it was of a 
piece with the action taken in l8^b at Muddy Flat, with the 
difference that it was now the rebels who were attacked as 
threatening those interests, while in addition,what the
(1) For Bruce and other reports on the situation at Shanghai 
in mid i860 see A & P l86l (275*0 pp 60-2, 68-70, 101,
129 - 36 etc.
British government regarded as the legitimate limits within 
which it might use its forces to defend those interests had 
been extended to a point at which they could not help but 
include Manchu interests also. But the action of August, i860, 
was not intended, nor did it become, as did a similar action 
in January, 1862, the starting point of a conscious and 
deliberate policy of active intervention against the rebellion 
on behalf of the Manchu government. British policy towards 
the Taiping rebellion was entering a sort.of shadowy no-man!s 
land somewhere between neutrality and active hostility.
It seems to me, therefore, over simple to say that 
"precisely in i860" British policy towards the rebellion 
changed, or that the Man-chus' had "no sooner" been forced to 
accept the new treaty dispensation than the British govern­
ment and its representatives in China began to supply them 
with aid. The best proof of this lies in an examination of 
British policy during l86l, but even looking at the situation 
as it was at the end of i860 it cannot be said that abandon­
ment of the admittedly peculiar, presumptuous and imperfect 
kind of neutrality followed since 1853^was a certain or 
immediate development. The repulse of the Taipings from 
Shanghai was an isolated response to an immediate crisis 
such as had threatened in 1856, not part of a general campaign
against the rebellion such as a similar crisis provoked 
in 1862; while the evidence of renewed vigour in the 
rebellion itself on the one hand, and of the continued weak­
ness and obstinacy of the Manchu government on the other, 
left many doubts and questions as to possible future 
political developments in China, including the future of 
British policy towards the rebellion. Would the Manchu 
government really abide by the new treaty settlement? Was 
the resurgence of the rebel movement permanent, and more 
than military? Was it possible to negotiate with them, and 
would they recognise British trading interests and treaty 
rights in China? Was intervention, in fact, really necessary 
Was it, in any case, possible to intervene effectively with­
out a large and expensive commitment of British forces, such 
as Malmesbury had hesitated over early in 1859?
These were the kinds of question which had to be answered 
before the British government was likely to be prepared to 
commit itself to a policy of active intervention against the 
Taiping rebels, and there were certainly no easy, sure answers 
to them at the end of i860. There can be no argument that 
the conclusion of a satisfactory treaty settlement with the 
Manchu government by that time made a policy of aid and 
support to it far more likely, or that most British officials 
in China, especially Bruce, took a very hostile view'of the
rebellion. But it is misleading and unhistorical to argue
back in the knowledge that aid was in fact eventually given
on a significant scale to the conclusion that this was
settled British policy at the end of i860.. The terms of
the political equation in China had been radically altered
by the war of 1856 - 60, but they still did not add up
beyond all question to intervention against the Taiping
(1>-
rebellion by the British government.
(1) The situation in Japan about this time provides an inter­
esting parallel tirith that in China. There also England 
had concluded a treaty in 1858 with a government reluct­
ant to concede or fully implement trading and diplomatic 
concessions, and which was faced by a powerful rebellion. 
England remained neutral in the struggle between the 
Tokugawa Shogunate and the rebelliousWestern fiefs, but 
was, if anything, disposed to favour the latter. The 
main difference, apart from the much smaller British inter­
ests at stake in Japan, was in the assessment made of the 
rebel movement there. The Western fiefs, in contrast to 
the Taipings, were believed to be capable of establishing 
a firm government over the whole country and thus ensuring, 
at least as well as the existing government, the conditions 
for trade. This indicates that, had the Taipings in China 
been considered as comparable in point of political capa­
city and organisation to the Western fiefs in Japan, the 
simple conclusion of a satisfactory treaty with the Manchu 
government would not have secured it active British support. 
On the British attitude to the rebellion in Japan see 
W.G.Beasley Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy (1959 
Introduction pp 77-84-; also E.H.Norman Japan1 s Emergence 
as a Modern State (19^0) pp ^5-6.
CHAPTER V
The Attempt to By-pass the Rebellion 
118611
British policy during l86l did not proceed on the 
assumption that it was absolutely necessary to assist the 
Manchu government in destroying the Taiping rebellion 
before the new treaties could be implemented satisfactorily.
On the contrary, its main concern was to get the treaties 
operating despite the rebellion, with the co-operation of 
the rebels where necessary, but without actively interven­
ing in the dynastic struggle between them and the Manchus.
The established policy of limited neutrality was re-affirmed, 
negotiations were carried on with the rebels to allow British 
vessels on the Yangtze to pass through the territory under 
their command, and there were suggestions for getting the 
agreement of both sides to the neutralisation of the treaty 
ports, although these were not very thoroughly pursued.
Yet although the main trend in British policy was towards 
making the best of things as they were, it must also be admitted 
that there was a strong tendency towards helping to change 
the situation by aiding the Manchus in some way. There was, 
however, no sustained attempt to do this in fact, as happened 
in 1862. For the first twelve months or so after the rati­
fication of the treaties, British policy was experimental
13^.
and rather uncertain* The experiment was in treating with 
the rebels as a de facto power in the Yangtze valley; the 
uncertainty was both about whether this was a really workable 
policy, and also about whether its alternative, helping the 
conservative and suspicious Manchu government, was likely 
to further British interests in China. By the early months 
of 1862 the experiment in treating with the rebels was held 
to have failed by all those concerned in the making of British 
policy, while on the other hand the Manchu government, if not 
exactly inspiring confidence, seemed at least a better pros­
pect as an ally than at the end of i860. The major question 
in British policy then became, not whether to intervene, but 
how far to do so.
The movement of British forces in China during 1861 
provides convincing evidence of the absence of any positive 
intention to intervene against the rebellion as soon as the 
Manchus had given way over the Treaty of Tientsin. The 
argument of some writers that the forces used to defeat the 
Manchus were all kept conveniently at hand, first to ensure 
that the Manchus.observed the treaty and then to help crush 
the Taipings, is one of those less than half true statements 
which seem convincing enough at a distance (after a hundred 
years there is not much difference between i860 and 1862), 
but which hardly tally with the dull, but relevant, adminis­
trative facts and figures of the time to which they
refer.
About 21,000 British troops, one-third of them Indian, 
were concentrated in China during i860. Of these, about 
16,000 were in the expeditionary force which conducted the 
campaign in the far north, but immediately following the rati­
fication of the Treaty of Tientsin 10,000 men of this force 
were embarked to return to India and England. Thus, at the 
end of i860 there were about 11,000 British and Indian troops 
in China, ^,2?0 of them in the garrisons retained at Tientsin 
and the Taku forts, 1,200 at Shanghai and the remainder at 
Hong Kong and Canton.
Even the maintenance of a force of this size, the War 
Office pointed out in April, l86l, absorbed a considerable 
part of the indemnity payments received under the treaty,
esDecially since the presence of Indian troops meant that
(2)
special rates of pay were made to the English troops.
Although admitting that the question of evacuation could not 
be peremptorily settled in England, given the disturbed and 
uncertain conditions in China, both the War Office and the
(1) E.g. Holger Cahill, A Yankee Advanturer (193°) P 286 says 
"■The troops used in that war and which i^ ere being held
in China until the indemnities should be paid were avail­
able for use against the Taipings"; also Lo Erk-kang, 
cit. below p 181 . For sources of figures quoted below
see Apex. C.
(2) F.O.I7/363 W.0. to F.0. April 20, 1861.
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Foreign Office, not to mention the Treasury, were anxious 
to reduce the number of troops retained there as quickly as 
possible. In September it was down to 9*?00 and the War 
Office was instructing the commander, Sir John Michel, to
(1)
send back to India without delay all troops from that country.
A few weeks later, after news of the death of the Hsien Feng
emperor was received, these orders were temporarily withdrawn,
but by the end of the year, nevertheless, the total force
was down to about 6,000. A suggestion made by Michel about
that time that barracks be built at Shanghai and a permanent
garrison established there was rejected, partly on the advice
(2)
of Elgin, now appointed Viceroy to India. On this
suggestion Bruce \*/rote to Michel that, although he was of 
"decided opinion" that it was not safe to leave Shanghai 
undefended, even if arrangements were made with the rebels, 
yet he thought that the total force retained in China should 
not be calculated to perform "any other service than thet
(3)retention of Taku and the protection of Shanghai". The naval 
strength of the East India and China station was also consid­
erably reduced over this period, from 66 ships with a total
(1) F.0.17/3^6 W.0.-F.0. correspondence of Sept.26, 30;
cf. Oct. 9, 10.
(2) For correspondence on this see F.O.17/367 W.O. to F.O.
Dec. 27, I86l enclosing Michel report and F.0.17/380 
Jan. 9, 20 (for Elgin), 31, Feb. 5, 18, 1862.
(3) F.0.17/357 enc. in Bruce to Bussell Dec. 31* 1861.
complement of nearly 8,000 men in March, l86l, to 38 ships 
with a complement of little over *+,000 twelve months later.
Thus both the detailed figures of British forces in China 
during l86l and the comments of British authorities upon the 
general question of military establishments there show that, 
although there was a concern to provide for the adequate 
defence of Shanghai, there was certainly no intention of main­
taining or building up a large force for a future offensive 
campaign against the rebellion.
Lord Elgin, who had actually negotiated in 1858 and 
forced the ratification in i860 of the treaty which is said 
to have "sealed the fate" of the rebellion, certainly did 
not advocate keeping large forces in China for this purpose.
On his return to England early in l86l he told the War Office 
that he thought that a force of 5*°°0 English and French 
troops combined should be enough to enforce the treaty and 
to secure indemnity payments, and that the garrison at Tientsin 
then being maintained could dispense with "as much force as 
is necessary to garrison Shanghae and Canton, if it is decided 
to maintain troops at those places". How far Elgin was
from imagining that, the Manchus having now been dealt with, 
the next step was to settle the rebels, is further indicated
(1) F.0.17/363 W.0. to F.0. April 20, l86l, quoting Elgin’s
views.
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by his correspondence with his brother at the time of his 
leaving China, On December 11th, i860, he wrote to Bruce 
from Shanghai, and, after discussing customs problems and 
indemnity payments, stated,
’’Then there is this rebel business. How is that 
to be managed in the absence both of yourself and me?
I confess that I incline to the opinion that there is 
more of 'avenir* on the Rebel than on the Imperialist 
side - bad as they both are, I saw yesterday a mission­
ary who has been at Nankin. To much of what he said I 
do not attach great importance. But some facts were 
material. He declared that there was perfect order all 
through the rebel country... The country people were 
bringing provisions and being paid... They are also 
beginning to conciliate Catholics.... Then they have 
behaved very well over the trade. £5 million of property 
belonging to merchants has passed this year through the 
country belonging to them, and not a shilling’s worth has 
been taken. This is evidence both of honesty and power. 
It never will do to come under any obligation not to 
communicate with them on the Yangtze. It would be wrong 
in principle to do so, and impossible in practice to
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*" carry out such an engagementu • ^
For Elgin, sensible negotiation, not hostility or suppression, 
was the proper policy for England to follow towards the rebels* 
Bruce did not share his brother*s rather open minded 
view of the rebels, and replied that if Shanghai and its 
customs house were permitted to fall into their hands 
indemnity payments under the recent treaty would lapse, and 
friendly relations with the Imperial government be impossible 
to establish. ^  Elgin disagreed, and wrote from Point 
Galle (Ceylon), at the end of February,' l86l,
"Then again as to the Rebels - the system of keeping 
Shanghae out of their hands by a permanent European 
occupation (and at present, I confess, I see no end to 
it) is an evil of great magnitude, though perhaps less 
of a one than letting the rebels in unless they become 
really masters of the country.... I do not quite agree 
with you in thinking that the occupation of these places 
by the rebels would necessarily cause us to lose our 
indemnities, because I think they would always be ready 
to purchase our neutrality by undertaking all the obliga­
tions enjoined on the Imperial Government by the new 
Treaty and Convention".^
(1) Elgin Correspondence (Broomhall), Elgin to Bruce Dec.11,i860
(2) F.0.228/281 Bruce to Elgin Dec. 29, i860.
(3) Elgin Correspondence (Broomhall) Elgin to Bruce Feb.28,l86l.
It would be false to suggest that, had Elgin remained as 
British minister in China instead of Bruce, later British 
policy towards the rebellion would have been very different 
from what in fact it became, for his rather favourable view 
of the rebels-at thistatage was certainly largely a reaction 
from his recent experience of the Manchus. But these letters 
indicate quite plainly that there was no pre-determined 
British policy towards the rebellion, ready to swing into 
operation as soon as the treaties with the Manchu government 
were finally settled. There was certainly room for two 
opinions about the future prospects of that policy among 
its leading agents in Chiha.
On the later working out of that policy, Elgin himself 
had little influence, while Bruce certainly never shared his 
kinder^, second thoughts about the r e b e l l i o n . B u t  even 
Bruce did not go to Peking, early in 1861, ready to plan a 
joint campaign with the Manchus against the Taipings. In 
January, while he himself remained for a time at Tientsin, 
he sent the Chinese Secretary to the Legation, Thomas Hade, on
(1) For Bruce’s hostile reports on the rebellion during i860 
see A & P 1861 (275^) pp 91, 101, 129-33; also F.0.228/281 
to Elgin Aug.26, i860, “The true representatives of the 
traditions and institutions of China are the existing Gov­
ernment, and I have more hopes of progresssbeing effected 
through the fears of the former than of any good to arise 
from arrogant and ignorant men whose system reposes on 
pretensions dictated either by fanaticism or blasphemous 
fraud".
to the capital for preliminary talks with Prince Kung, who 
was still the chief representative of the Manchu government 
there, in the continued absence of the court. Kung was soon 
to be appointed first head of the Tsungli Yamen, the board 
of experts on "barbarian affairs", (though according to the 
Treaty of Tientsin, art. LI, that term was no longer to be 
used in Chinese official documents), which was to become the 
Chinese equivalent of a Foreign Office. But despite this 
move towards setting diplomatic relations with the Western 
treaty powers on a more normal - that is, Western - basis, 
the refusal of the Esien Feng emperor to return from Jehol 
to Peking after the conclusion of peace, or to acknowledge 
in any way the presence of non-tributary foreign representa­
tives in his capital, naturally fed British doubts that the 
new settlement had still not been accepted in good faith by 
the Manchus. Therefore Bruce, although certainly himself
(1) See esp. Bruce to Wade Feb. 9 1861, enc. 6 in Bruce to 
Russell March 12, l86l in F.O.17/35O - "If the Emperor 
will only return and show that he,really accepts the treaty 
and the principle of International equality and of friendly 
intercourse which he has consented to on paper, I should 
hope to get rid of the occupation soon. But while he holds 
aloof from his capital...I cannot state to my Government 
that everything is settled, that there is no fear of re­
action, and that the troops may be therefore withdrawn... 
The events of 1858 and 1859, the rupture of negotiations 
last year, the circumstances attending the capture of the 
prisoners and their subsequent treatment will produce a 
profound feeling of distrust in Europe of the intentions 
of the Chinese Government, and nothing will overcome it
Cont’d at foot of next page..
very hostile to the rebellion and anxious to conciliate and 
re-assure the shaken Manchu government, felt it necessary to 
instruct Wade "not to press the rebel question too much".
"It is for them to adopt such measures for their
preservation as the means at their disposal allow" he
continued, "But we are not going to furnish them directly
with aid to put down this insurrection, and I do not wish
them to infer from any apparent anxiety on our part, that
our interests are much involved in a solution favourable
to the existing government. Our interests really suffer
from the protraction of the contest and the anarchy that
it produces throughout the country. Were tranquillity
restored under any government the industry and "labor
improbus" of the Chinese would soon re-animate production
and commerce. The Rebels have not declared themselves
against trade with foreigners, nor could they carry out
such a system were they to do so. The present dynasty
continuing (1) from previous page...
short of some decided step on the Emperor's part which will 
show both China and Europe that his attitude towards foreign 
nations is changed. In short, if the Emperor is really 
anxious to put himself straight with Foreign Nations and 
to be able to direct his whole resources against his 
domestic foes, he will lose no time in himself coming 
forward and giving personally by his acts an unequivocal 
proof of the course he intends to pursue in the future 
in this matter".
1 b2.
"must be irremediably blind and impracticable if the
distracted state of the country is not in itself a
sufficient motive for keeping on good terms with us.
I should despair of putting things on a satisfactory
footing if they were to make active co-operation a
condition of friendly relations. Don’t allow your
attentions to be engrossed with the dynastic avenir
of China. Our business is to work* the- Treaty through
with this Government while it stands, to avoid committing
ourselves to either party as partisans in the conflict,
and to treat the rebellion, in conversation with the
members of the Government, as an affair with which we
have nothing to do and in which we cannot, consistently
with our respect for the independence of foreign states,
take any part. The 'hundred names' (i.e. the mass of
(1)
the people) and they only must settle the question".
These instructions of Bruce to Wade show that at the beginning 
of 1861 the essence of British policy towards the rebellion 
was still very much what it had been since 1853 - a wait and 
see policy of limited neutrality.
(1) F.0.17/350 Bruce to Wade Jan. 26, l86l, enc. 5 in 
Bruce to Russell March 12, l86l.
Wade reported a discouraging apathy and indifference
among officials in the capital towards "the disease of the
south". Their main concern was not with the distant Taiping
rebellion, "which they evidently regard as next to chronic",
but with the Nien rebellion in the Shantung area, so much
nearer the capital. He received what he called "the usual
query as to whether we would and how we could help them",
but he was careful to insist that any aid given would be
"moral rather than material and contingent upon the commence
ment of diplomatic relations in earnest. "The Prince did
his best to prove that the hindrance the rebels offered to
our trade justified our action against them*} :Wade added,
(1)
"but this I could not either allow", (sic) The new era 
in British relations with the Hanchu government under the 
Treaty of Tientsin certainly did not begin with joint plans 
for the suppression of the Taipings.
It was always possible, however, that such plans might 
be made by the Manchus with other powers, and British action 
be prompted as a counter to these. About the turn of the 
years 1860-1 there was much discussion among high officials 
of the Manchu government of a Russian offer of naval aid 
against the rebels, but this was met by British officials in
(1) ibid., enc 7-8 Wade to Bruce Jan.11 and 20,1861.
China not by a similar and larger offer but by warnings to 
the Manchu authorities of the dangers involved in using 
foreign forces at all.
Arguments in favour of accepting the Russian offer
were advanced most vigorously by the Imperial Commissioner
in charge of commercial affairs at the treaty ports, Hsiieh
Huan. Hsiieh maintained that although the expenses involved
in using the barbarians might be great, so also were the
expenses of the present campaigns against the rebels, while
the issue might be more speedily settled. Further, HsUeh
argued, the English and French were fearful of the Russians,
and if-file Chinese, made an alliance with the latter this could
help to curb the pride of the English especially. "This is:>
the method of using the barbarian to control the barbarian".^
Tseng Kuo-fan was much more qualified in his support, pointing
out that China!s weakness was on land rather than on water,
and that it would be of little use for Russian vessels to
attack Nanking before Chinese land forces were in a position
to to-operate effectively. When China!s armies were better
placed, Tseng suggested, the Russian offer might be accepted,
but the terms should be clear and precise, and agreed upon
(2)well beforehand.
(1) IWSM. HF. 71, la-36.
(2) IWSM. KF. 71, 9b-12a; also Swisher, op.cit., pp689-92.
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Opposition came most strongly from the Director General
of Grain Transport, Yuan Chia-san, who expressed the fear
that the barbarian might ally himself with the rebel, with
whom he had religious affinities, and that his covetousness
would only increase. Yuan also raised practical difficulties,
such as the problem of supplies, and questioned whether the
barbarian would accept orders from the Chinese. Altogether,
the harm waslikely to be great and the advantages slight.^
In an Imperial edict issued early in January, l86l, ordering
Prince Kung and other officials in the capital to look further
into the question,these opinions were reviewed, and although
Yuanfs objections were judged to have some reason it was
considered that the Russian offer should not be rejected out-
(2)
right, and that there was possible advantage to be had from it.
That in the end it was not followed up was due in part 
at least to the advice of Wade. Oh January 2*fth, a few days 
after having talks with him, Prince Kung and his chief assist­
ants s in handling foreign affairs at this time, Wen-hsiang and 
Kuei Liang, submitted a memorial reviewing the question and 
the opinions received upon it, and advising strongly against
(1) IWSM. HF. 70, l8b-20 and HF .71 3^-37-
(2) IWSM. HF. 71* 12a-13b; also Swisher, op.cit., pp692-3
the acceptance of direct foreign aid. The Russians were, 
in the well worn official cliche, "unfathomable" and the 
French, from whom a vague offer of assistance had also been 
received, were crafty and covetous. Both would make demands 
even before doing anything, and there was always the possi­
bility of fresh "border troubles" breaking out with them 
before the trouble in the heart of China was settled. Alto­
gether little trust was to be put in them, as-Russia's recent 
usurpation of territory showed. The English "chieftain"
Wade was then quoted as revealing "the truth of the matter". 
m
"The suppression of the rebels is really something for 
China to handle", Wade was reported as saying. "If others 
lend aid, what profit will there be in it Ibr them if they 
do not occupy territory? It is not only that Russia and 
France might recapture territory and be reluctant to give 
it up, but even if England also did so he would not dare 
to say that she would not occupy it for herdelf. The 
seizure of India by England was a case in pointlf. Although 
what this chief says is not absolutely sincere,« 'Kung and 
the others commented, "yet what your officials are afraid 
of has already been seen".
They went on to commend Yuan Chia-sanfs viewpoint rather 
than Tseng Kuo-fanfs or Hsiieh Huanfs, and to suggest that 
rather than use foreign forces directly, munitions and ships
might be purchased as a means of "ensnaring" the barbarian and
preventing him from turning to the rebels.
The edict which followed this important memorial stated
that, given the suspicious nature of the barbarians, their
overtures should not be too brusquely rejected, lest they
create new troubles. "All we can do is tell them that (at
present) China1s military strength is enough to handle the
task of suppressing the rebels, but if in future the occasion
for assistance arises, we shall naturally borrow help from
them. In order to control them, "the edict continued,
echoing the recent memorial, "we should devise means of entrapp
(2)
ing them, enticing them to us by petty gain". Tseng 
and Hsileh were accordingly instructed to look into the 
question of buying or hiring foreign arms and vessels. But 
the idea of the direct use of foreign forces, among whom it 
should be noted the British were not mentioned as possibilities 
was for the time being dropped. Besides a deeply ingrained 
suspicion and fear of the foreigner, Wade's revelation of
(3)"the truth of the matter" was an important influence in this.
(1) IWSM. HF. 72, 3a-86 esp>b-?a; also Swisher pp 693-8.
(2) IWSM. HF. 72, 9b-lla esp 10a.
(3) The importance attached to Wade's warning is indicated
by the fact that Mien the question of using foreign forces 
was re-opened in January, 1862, it was again referred to 
in an Imperial Edict - see IWSM. TC. 35 ^9b.
Apart from Brucefs instructions to Wade and the latter!s
talks with Manchu officials in Peking, developments elsewhere
also indicated no intention to change British policy towards
the rebellion immediately following the treaty settlement.
In December, i860, during the first of many panics at the
prospect of a rebel advance on Ningpo, Bruce told the consul
there that he did not feel authorised to order the defence of
that port, and instructed him that, in the event of an attack,
British naval forces should not interfere beyond protecting
(1)
British subjects. in other words, the defence of Shanghai
in August, i860, was not to be taken as a precedent for the
other treaty ports. In fact, British policy at this point
had retreated somewhat from the stand taken by Clarendon in
September, 1856, when he had instructed Bowring to warn the
rebels to respect r,the Ports in which British Commerce is
carried on*1, which seems to imply an intention to defend all
the treaty ports, not only Shanghai. Later in l86l Russell
was to suggest to Bruce that **it might be expedient to defend
the Treaty Ports if the Chinese would consent not to use those
ports for purposes of aggression”, but it was not until March,
1862, that the defence of all the treaty ports was explicitly
(2)
ordered. During 1861, with the exception of Shanghai
(1) A & P 1862 (2976) p2.
(2 ) ibid p 60 Russell to Bruce Sept.7? 1861; cf ibid p.111.
and Tientsin, where garrisons were placed, only the foreign 
settlement areas were to be defended by British forces. At 
the end of the year Ningpo was in fact captured by the rebels 4 
without any opposition being offered by British naval forces 
there, or, for that matter, by the Imperial forces.
Again, at Shanghai itself in January, l86l, Meadows, who
had been acting consul there since July, 1859> refused to
co-operate with a French suggestion that allied forces be
used to clear the rebels from a 12 to 1? mile radius around
the port, and his stand on this point was approved by the
Foreign Office.^ Further, both the Foreign Office and
the War Office insisted that no payment should be exacted
or accepted from the Manchu government for the expenses
incurred in the defence of Shanghai in August, i860, as Bruce
had at first proposed, lest this lead to misapprehension, and
"induce the Imperialists to suppose that we are prepared to
quit our neutral position and to take part with them in the
(2)
Civil War11. For the British government, neutrality was
still the official policy.
(1) F.O.I7/36I Meadows to Russell Feb.l9*l86l and F.O.17/3^8 
Russell to Bruce April 22, l86l.
(2) F.O.17/3^9 Russell to Bruce July 5? l86l. Further on this 
issue of payment for the defence of Shanghai note F.O.17/363
lW.O. to F.O. April 20, enc. report of Maj.Gen.Grant who 
said the Chinese authorities at Shanghai paid the cost of 
erecting defences and quartering troops; F.0.17/35*+ Bruce 
to Russell Aug.7> 1861, who said he believed the Commissar­
iat paid the expenses; also A & P l86l (275^) p250 Bruce 
to Russell, Oct. 28, i860.
The main trend in British policy at this stage was, in
fact, towards treating with the Taipings as the power in
actual occupation of territory of vital importance to British
Rear
trade. This is clearly shown by/Admiral Hopefs first exped­
ition up the Yangtze in February. In December, i860, the 
Chinese authorities had agreed to a request from Bruce that 
the river be opened to trade, despite the provision in 
article X of the Treaty withholding this until the rebellion 
was settled, on condition that the Imperial government be not 
held responsible for the protection of British trade, and 
subject to regulations designed to prevent the smuggling
a. ^ . (1)of arms to the rebels. Elgin, as almost his last official
act before his departure from China, requested Hope’s assist­
ance in "the establishing of an understanding with the rebel 
leaders at Nankin which may secure British vessels passing 
up and down the river from being molested or interfered with 
by persons acting under orders from them". He was confident 
of rebel co-operation, but emphasised to Parkes, who went as
(l) A. & P 1861 (2777) PP 1-^. Wade’s reports from Peking in 
January, 1861, expressed the belief that the Manchu govern­
ment hoped England would get involved in difficulties with 
the rebels and was.- therefore ready to open the river to 
trade. In a memorial on the question dated Dee.2, i860, 
Prince Kung stated that "since this is a period when treaties 
have just been exchanged the barbarians still have their 
doubts (about us). (We should^ take special care to get 
them on our side so that treachery and cunning will not 
reveal themselves and other troubles develop...If we placate 
them adequately now, not only will we not have to worry about 
their being harmful to us, but they could.even be of use to 
us". (IWSM. HF. 70, *+b-5a.)
interpreter, that one of the conditions for success was
"that we should maintain an attitude of strict neutrality
„ (1)
between the Imperial Government and the rebels". Hope
took ten ships with him, the size of the expedition being
partly determined by his intention to establish consulates
at Chinkiang, Kiukiang and Hankow, and to station vessels
to regulate the trade at each of these ports, as well as
at Nanking. He left behind two of the largest vessels
available, partly on account of their draft, but partly
also to avoid imparting to the expedition "a belligerent
(2)
aspect which I think it very desirable to avoid". As a
result of this expedition three new consulates were established 
and an agreement was concluded with the rebels permitting 
British vessels to pass through the territory under their 
control if holding river passes, copies of which would be 
sent to Nanking. It was agreed that a British naval vessel 
might be stationed at the rebel capital to regulate and protect 
the trade, and also that if in future the rebels should attack 
any of the river ports, or any other places where British trade 
was carried on, they would not m&lest British subjects, while
(1) A & P 1861 (281+0) p 1-3.
(2) ibid p 5* Hsileh Huan expressed some fears about this
expedition, but an Imperial Edict in reply stated that,
"The English have just exchanged treaties with China, and 
although they will not help to eradicate the rebels they 
are not likely to connive with them and start hostilities 
again". The danger would be if foreign merchants hired 
their vessels to the rebels to transport them to the north. 
(IWSM. HF. 73 28a-29a, 31a - b).
British authorities at those places would he instructed not 
to interfere in any hostilities. In addition, although 
less readily, the Taipings agteed that during the current 
year their forces would not approach nearer than two days 
march (about 3° miles) to Shanghai. This promise later 
gave rise to what seem to me unwarranted charges of bad 
faith against them, when they did attack Shanghai again in 
January, 1862. But for the time being a satisfactory working 
arrangement had been reached on the basis, as Hope expressed 
it in his report on the expedition, "that in the districts 
of country of which they hold possession, the Taeping author­
ities must be-regarded as those of the de facto government, 
and must be dealt with accordingly".^^ Provisional Regu­
lations, permitting British vessels to trade freely upon 
the Yangtze as far as Hankow, subject only to inspection
designed to prevent any trade in arms, were published on
was (2)
March 18th, and the river/thrown open to trade. The object
(1) A & P l86l (28^0) p 7* Hope to Admiralty March 8, l86l. 
For reports of the negotiations with the rebels see ibid 
PP 7-9, 32-3 and A & P 1862 (2976) pp 10-1?. On the 
question of the duration of the agreement note transla­
tion of a Taiping edict in A & P l86l (28^0) 32-3, which 
instructed rebel commanders not to attack the ports "for 
the present year"; Bruce also spoke of the agreement as 
being "for a twelvemonth" (A & P 1862 (2976) p?6; cf pl03).
(2) For regulations see A & P 1861 (28*+0) ppl8-21. There was 
nothing in them forbidding trade with rebel centres, and 
the notification of Parkes attached to them seems to 
imply that such trade was expected to develop*
of British policy at this stage was not to get rid of the 
rebellion as the necessary condition for the development of 
that trade, but rather to get round it as conveniently as 
possible.
Of course it remained an unwelcome obstacle, and 
official reports upon it were still almost wholly condemn­
atory. Hope in the same despatch in which he defined his 
de facto approach to the rebels also stated that he could 
regard them "in no other light than that of an organised 
band of robbers". Parkes, at greater length, reported 
that their government, insofar as they could be said to 
have one, appeared to be "a pure military despotism", 
without any settled system of administration. Soldiers 
and slaves were the only two classes of population in Nanking, 
which was more an armed camp than a seat of government. "It
is clear", Parkes added, "that the behaviour of men of this
(1)
stamp towards foreigners cannot always be counted on".
Against such views Meadows argued in favour of the rebels.
The Manchu dynasty had received its "death blow" in the recent 
war, and it was of the utmost importance to find "some other 
power in the nation to take its place". The Taipings,.
Meadows held, were the obvious alternative, and although he
(1) See A & P 1862 (2976) pp 23-3? Parkes1 report.
l?lf
thought no direct steps to encourage them should be taken, 
action against them would be disastrous to British interests 
in China,as well as expensive* The usual criticisms 
levelled against the Taipings by foreigners, for example 
that they fired on white flags, were based on Western con­
ditions and assumptions, not Chinese* The general attitude 
of the rebels towards foreigners was more encouraging than 
that of the Manchus, and there was na long succession of 
irrefragable proofs that the Tae-pings do earnestly desire 
friendly commercial intercourse with usn/ ^
In addition to Meadows, a much more recent recruit 
to the consular service, R* J* Forrest, presented a report 
in March which is worth noting. Forrest travelled over­
land from Shanghai to Nanking, in order to join Hopefs 
expedition. He therefore passed through a considerable 
tract of territory recently conquered by the rebels, and 
may be assumed to have had better opportunities for observa­
tion than interpreters who merely descended from ships to 
parley with rebel chiefs at a few river towns, usually in
(1) ibid pp 3-6. Meadows to Russell Feb. 19? l86l. Cn Meadox^s 
later transfer from the key Shanghai consulate see below, 
Appx A. Despite a marked tendency to deduce inevitable 
historical consequences from a few facts philosophically 
interpreted, Meadows* general approach to China was much 
more advanced and freer of assumptions of total Western 
superiority than most of his contemporaries* It seems to 
me, though, that his very favourable view of the rebellion
was formed early and never took enough account of possible 
changed in the movement, and was based as much as anything
on his long standing antipathy to the Manchu government*
a state of siege. The picture Forrest drew of the country­
side under Taiping control was not one of chaos or anarchy.
He heard much of the melancholy effects of the Taiping 
advance into Kiangnan in i860, but things were returning to 
normal by March, l86l.
"The rebel authorities pay a visit to the rural 
districts once a month, and exact a tribute of cash 
or rice from the inhabitants of the villages. Regu­
larly appointed officers are appointed in all important 
places, in whom the people seem to have confidence, and 
unless some new military operations disturb Nanking, 
the villages around it will soon become peopled, and 
the land resume its fertile appearance".
At Nanking itself, he reported, building was going on, "and 
people who have known the place before say that a marked 
improvement is taking place....The authorities assert, with 
some show of truth, that the rulers are now giving their 
attention to the formation of a fixed order of government, 
and to the improvement of the condition of the people;
(1
measures impossible before because of the Imperialist army".
There were, then, two views on the rebellion and its 
prospects still to be found in official reports, but only
(1) For Forrestfs report see A & P 1861 (28^0) pp27-3°; ?or 
his generally more tolerant view of the rebellion than
most consular officers see also Journal of the North China 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Dec*lb67, pp lbr/-b.
just two views. Meadows and Forrest represent what was 
very much a minority opinion which did not seriously disturb 
or qualify the judgments of their superiors. Which was 
right is a question I will not attempt to pursue here. The 
rebellion had many faces, but although the prevailing 
Consular view of it can reasonably be criticised as always 
ready to assume the worst and as making insufficient allow­
ance for the military exigencies of the movement, it was, 
nevertheless, based on a variety of reports, first hand and 
second hand, official and non-official, which, by the middle 
of 1861, were nearly unanimous in condemning the rebellion 
as purely destructive from practically every point of view.
Certainly for Bruce, now established at Peking, the 
weight of evidence was overwhelmingly against the rebellion. 
"All classes of observers", he told Russell in June, "seem 
unanimous both as to the destructive nature of the insurrec­
tion and as to the blasphemous and immoral character of the 
superstitionjon which it is based". Ifthe rebels succeeded, 
China "would be reduced to a mass of agriculturists governed 
by a theocracy supported by armies collected from the most 
barbarous and demoralised part of the population", and the 
commercial prosperity of the country, including foreign trade 
with it, would receive a fatal blow. It was in no sense
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a popular, national rising, and was, indeed, irreconcilable,
not only with the Manchu dynasty but with the whole tradi(£ion-
al fabric of Chinese civilisation. The difficulty was that
the Manchu government, “though undoubtedly more generally
acceptable to the Chinese people, properly so called, than
its competitors the Taepings”, was supine and inefficient, so
that, despite its superior resources, no confidence could
be felt in its ability to triumph. The logic of all this
was that they should be given some sort of assistance, but
Bruce did not as yet suggest this to the Foreign Office.^ 
was
Bruce/, in fact, in a considerable dilemma as to the 
best policy to follow in the circumstances. He complained
in a letter to his brother in August,
“The ignorance and arrogance of this Government com­
bined make it impossible to act with safety on the cal­
culation of what is for their interest, while the effect 
of falling back on the Taepings will only be to ruin our 
trade. The mind gets weary and stale in attempting to 
solve & problem which admits of no solution, except 
that of events'*. ^
(1) A & P 1662 (2976) pp52-3 Bruce to Russell June 23, 1861.
(2) Elgin Correspondence (Broomhaihl) - Bruce to Elgin Aug.
2^, 1861; cf also A & P 1862 (297&) Parkes to Hammond 
Juhe 12, l86l, 1 It is difficult indeed to see what is in 
the future. Rebels and Imperialists appear to me to be 
almost equally hopeless....the principal difference between 
the two parties appears to be that whereas the Government 
can govern (that is, know how) but do not, the rebels do 
not govern because they cannot11.
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Events, indeed, rather than Brucefs own will, were to 
resolve his problem, which was “well illustrated by a long 
letter he wrote to Hope in June.(1) In this he switched 
from one to another possible alternative policy without 
firmly recommending any* The strict non-intervention usual 
in cases of civil war was attended in China !,with far more 
than ordinary hazard and risk to our trade”, but he thought 
that the home government would "probably abstain from render­
ing active assistance to the Imperial Government, both on 
account of the assurances of neutrality we have given to 
the insurgents, and on account of the serious and indefinite 
consequences to which such intervention would in all pro­
bability lead". Another possibility was to take all the 
treaty ports, or at least the chief ones, completely under 
foreign protection, but this had its difficulties also. "The 
insurgents would naturally object that in leaving the revenue 
and administration of these places in Imperial hands we do 
in reality assist the Imperialists", while Bruce saw little 
prospect of persuading the Emperor to regard them as completely 
neutral cities and to abstain from using them as bases for 
offensive operations. In any case, he asked, how could such 
a principle he enforced upon the rebels? Could a purely
(1) See A & P 1862 (2976) pp 56-9
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naval force keep them in check, "withchastisement at their 
capital in case of hostile movement on any of the ports?11 
This suggestion of possible direct action at Nanking was, 
it may be noted,here, decidedly rejected by both Hope and 
the Foreign Office. Thus three possible lines of policy
were outlined by Bruce - strict non-intervention, active 
assistance to the Imperial government, and the neutralisa­
tion of the treaty ports backed by a readiness to use naval 
force at Nanking to enforce this - and none of them seemed 
completely acceptable or practicable.
Bruce concluded his uncertain analysis by stressing 
the importance of avoiding "partial collisions" with the 
rebels lest this create a feeling of animosity in them 
towards foreigners, "which does not seem to exist at present". 
Moreover, were such collisions to lead to a serious blow 
being struck by British forces without instructions f*om 
home,
"on the one hand Her Majesty’s Government would not 
approve of being committed without being consulted, and 
on the other we should lose a favourable opportunity of 
placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory 
footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event,
(1) ibid p 60.
“of the power of making our aid a matter of bargain
with the Imperial Government”. .
Bruce obviously felt that aid to the Manchu government was
the ultimately logical policy for England to follow, but
that it should not be involuntary or unconditional aid.
He wanted it to be given in such a way as to achieve more
than simply the suppression of a troublesome rebellion.
At this stage, however, he was not prepared to take a strong
initiative himself in the direction of intervention, both
for fear that the Foreign Office would not approve, and
because of his doubts whether, given the attitude of the
Emperor to the recent treaty settlement, it would effect any
fundamental improvement in British relations with the Manchu
government.
Rear.
/Admiral Hope, the other main influence in China on 
the shaping of British plicy towards the rebellion at this 
time, had greater faith than Bruce in the possibility of 
negotiating effectively with the rebels. One of the reasons 
in addition to tactical considerations that he gave for re­
jecting the idea of a naval attack on Nanking was that so 
long as the rebels held that city as the seat of their power 
they would be easy of access^
“and from such experience as our short intercourse has 
afforded, I see a fair prospect of our acquiring sufficient
(1) For further discussion of this point see below pp 181-3 •
“influence with them to enable us to carry all points which
are essential to our commercial interests, even to that
(1)
of eventual abstinence from the Consular ports11 •
Hope believed that it was, in any case, unwise to provoke
the rebels, since they were in a position to cut off tea
and silk supplies coming down to Shanghai. Despite one or
(2)
two “incidents11, large supplies of these commodities con­
tinued to reach Shanghai, and many merchants shared Hope*s 
views on the dangers of interfering against a rebellion 
which, for all its unwelcome aspects, yet allowed trade to 
continue. Bruce, however, expressed his surprise that 
trade should continue at all, and was "not so sanguine as
to our influence with the Tae-pings being sufficient to
(3)save our trade from injury".
It was Hope also who had first urged the neutralisation
of the treaty ports as the best approach from the British
point of view, arguing that so long as they continued as
trading centres, "the ingenuity of the Chinese would not
fail to devise modes by which the produce of the country
(1+)
would be brought there in defiance of every obstacle".
(1) A & P 1862 (297^) p 60; on Hope's policy see A.Michie,
The Englishman in China (1900) vol I pp 375-80.
(2) For examples see A & P 1862 (2976) pp 62-3 and F.0.228/311 
Medhurst to Bruce Aug.10, 1861.
(3) A & P 1862 (2976) pp 68, 70.
(m-) A & P l86l (28*+0) p.10 Hope to Admiralty April 6 , 1861.
The Foreign Office was impressed by this possibility, and 
in July instructed Bruce,
"to endeavour to make arrangements to secure the 
neutrality of all the Treaty ports against the rebels.
"The Government of Peking will, probably make no 
difficulty in abstaining from using the Treaty ports 
as bases of operations against the rebels, provided 
the rebels on their side refrain from attacking these 
ports; and it may be hoped that the rebels will see 
that it is not for their interest to run the risk of 
collisions with foreign nations whose trade is pro­
tected by Treaties.
"You will understand, however, that Her Majesty*s 
Government do not wish force to be used against the 
rebels in any case except for the actual protection 
of the lives and property of British subjects".
But so long as the Manchu government was left free to con­
tinue to collect the rich customs revenues of these ports, 
especially Shanghai, it was hardly reasonable to expect the 
rebels not to attack them in return simply for a guarantee 
that they would not be used as bases of attack. Bruce, as
already indicated, was aware of this, and thought Hope*s
(2)suggestion impracticable. So far as I can discover,
II) A & P 1862 (2976) p22 Russell to Brace July 2V,l86l.
(2) ibid pp 1 7, ?7.
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Bruce made no very serious effort to win Imperial acceptance 
of the idea, despite Russellfs instructions. He held firmly 
to the view that the Manchu government was still the legiti­
mate and established government in China, to which alone he 
was accredited and with which alone treaties had been made.^^ 
England had no right to attempt to deprive the Imperial 
government of its claims upon the treaty ports, whether as 
sources of revenue or as bases of operations, and he rejecte d 
all suggestions for doing so, as for example Medhurstfs plan 
in July, 1861, for placing Shanghai under an Allied Commission 
which should collect the customs duties and place them in trust, 
11 on account of the future government, whatever it might prove 
to be, whether rebel or Imperialist”, after deductions had
(2
been made for indemnity payments and administrative expenses.
Thus the idea of putting the treaty ports completely 
outside the field of conflict, either by getting the agree­
ment of both rebels and Imperialists or by the Allies taking 
them over themselves, came to nothing* By the end of 1861 
the "neutrality” of these ports meant simply a demand by the 
British authorities that the rebels stay clear of them with­
out any compensating guarantee that the Manchus would be
(1) See for example ibid p5l Bruce to Russell June 22,l86l, 
and P.0.228/281 Bruce to Elgin Aug.31, i860.
(2) F.0.17/35^ 3-edhurst to Bruce July 28,l86l enc. in Bruce to 
Russell Aug.?,1861. For similar proposals and reactions 
see also F.O.228/281 Bruce to Elgin Aug.31,i860; F.O.228/ 
327 Medhurst to Bruce Jan20,l862; A&P 1863 (310»+)pp87,92.
prevented from making use of them. Bruce really held to 
this view all along; Hope and the Foreign Office came to 
accept it without argument later. It was, virtually, a 
denial of belligerent rights to the rebels so far as certain 
key cities in China were concerned, and as such, quite in­
consistent with a profession of strict neutrality.
Certain other aspects of British policy at this time 
also show that, although the main emphasis was upon still 
avoiding direct involvement in the struggle and upon test­
ing the possibilities of a modus vivendi with the rebels, 
there was a strong inclination towards helping the Manchus 
in some way, short of active intervention. In May, for 
example, naval forces under Captain R. Dew were sent to 
Ningpo to help re-organise the defences of that port. Although 
British forces were still not to be committed beyond the 
defence of British subjects and .property, advice was given to 
the Imperial authorities as to the best use of their resources, 
guns were mounted on the walls, and Imperial soldiers trained 
in their use. Acting upon instructions from Hope, Dew also 
obtained a promise from the rebel chiefs in the vicinity that 
they would not attack Ningpo during the current year. This 
served to confirm Hopefs belief that, although the Taiping 
movement
"can only be viewed as that of a banditti bent 
on free quarters and plunddr, yet sufficient organisa­
tion exists among them to admit of the hope that, by 
a due admixture of firmness and conciliation in dealing
with them, they may be deterred from interfering with
(1)
our Consular ports and trade”.
The fact that the rebels did attack Ningpo within the year,
despite this promise, was one of the main reasons for Hope
and the Foreign Office coming to the conclusion that the
Taipings "did not appreciate the nature of bonds and.obliga- 
(2)
tions". But for the present, unlike Bruce, they con­
tinued to believe in the possibility of negotiating the 
security of the treaty ports and foreign trade. The negotia­
tions were, however, very one-sided. The rebels were half 
persuaded, half warned to keep away from Ningpo, while the 
Ilanchus on the other hand were advised about its defence.
There was also apparent in the latter half of l86l some 
sign of a milder view being taken of the enlistment of British 
"volunteers" on the Imperialist side. In the early part of 
l86l the American filibuster, F.T.Ward, began recruiting the 
mercenary force which was later to receive Imperial recognition 
under the name of the Ever Victorious Army, and which was
(1) A & P 1862 (2976) p^6; on aid in organising defences of 
Ningpo see ibid pp 16,^6-50, l*+3•
(2) P.D.vol 168 (1862), col.62; also F.O.I7/38O, memo of Feb. 
22,1862. The government claim that the Taipings had failed 
to observe agreements was challenged by Earl Grey see 
P.D.168, Cols 883, 899 exp.
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later still to pass under the command of "Chinese1* Gordon*
¥ardfs activities were at first strongly disapproved of by
the foreign consuls at Shanghai, both as a breach of neutrality
and because he encouraged seamen to desert their vessels*
Bruce reported "with satisfaction", but prematurely, the
(1)disbandment of this force at the beginning of July, Russell,
however, \\rrote in August that since the Chinese people
appeared to be better off under the Manchu government than
under "the so called National Party", if the Emperor were to
establish "an Imperial Legion of Foreigners" there would be
(2)
no reason to object to British subjects entering it. The
Neutrality Ordinance of 1855 was still being enforced in 
China at this time, and under its provisions nine British 
subjects who had been enlisted by Ward were sentenced to 
nine month!s imprisonment at Hong Kong. But since a similar 
charge against other men for serving on the rebel side had 
been dropped, these men appealed for a remission of sentence, 
and in this were supported by Bruce. J The legal position 
on the question of British subjects serving either side in 
the struggle was, in fact, rather obscure, but Russell's 
despatch of August, l86l, indicates the existence of readiness
(1) A & P 1862 (2976) pp 60-I. Bruce to Russell July 3* 1861.
(2) F.O.17/3^9 Russell to Bruce Aug. 8 , 1861.
(3) F.0.17/355rPQt«l* .1861. There were some doubts in England 
whether ^ ^ as^TijLl in "force (see F.O.17/383 F.O.-C.O. 
correspondence July 1, l86l and P.D.vo1.17h- (l86l+) col.15'11- 
2), but it seems to have been applied in China still.
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to release British subjects in favour of the Imperialists 
which was to become quite explicit later.
The issue of Revised Regulations for British trade upon 
the Yangtze at the end of 1861 also illustrates how Bruce’s 
general policy of seeking to win the confidence of the Manchu 
government and its willing co-operation in Implementing the 
new treaties made him ready to approve measures which weakened 
the prospects of the rebellion. The original regulations 
issued in March, l86l, had thrown the whole river open as 
far as Hankow, and had not set any limits to the trade beyond 
making provisions against arms running# The result was that 
trade with rebel centres soon developed, and as early as July 
Tseng Kuo-fan was complaining that the capture of Anking 
might be delayed, since supplies were reaching the besieged 
rebels from vessels flying foreign flags.^ Prince Kung 
accordingly began negotiations with Bruce for the stricter 
control of British trade upon the river, with the result that 
new regulations were issued in December. These specifically 
limited the right of British vessels to trade to only two 
ports above Chinkiang, namely Hankow and Kiukiang, and ship­
ments of goods classified as war supplies, including hemp, 
oil, timber, steel and iron, were subject to inspection, as
(1) IWSM. HF. 80, Ibsi - ljb
well as the arms carried. These stricter regulations 
aroused the complaints of British merchants in China, who 
saw them as an invasion of their established treaty rights, 
but Bruce insisted that the presence of British trade upon 
the Yangtze at all, while the rebellion continued, was an 
extension of those rights and an act of favour on the part of 
the Manchu government, which had every right to demand that 
the trade should not become a source of strength to the rebels. 
The original regulations of March, l86l, Bruce later told . 
Russell, "would certainly have done much to perpetuate the 
disorder nrevalent in the centre of China, which it is as
(2)
much our interest as that of the Chinese to see put down."
The Foreign Office supported Bruce against the complaints 
of British merchants, so that, although British trade on the 
Yangtze continued still, it became one of the objects of 
British policy from the end of l86l on to help the Manchu 
government prevent the rebels from benefitting from it.
(1) See A & P 1862 (2976) p.70 ff.
(2) A & P 1863 (310W) p.80 Bruce to Russell August 2*+, 1862; 
also F.O.17/35? Bruce to Russell Oct.26, 1861. For merchant 
complaints and F.O.support of Bruce see A & P 1863 (301*+)
pp 121-2, 156-8.
British policy was thus strongly weighted in favour 
of the Manchus during l86l, but was still one of hbutrality, 
at least in the sense that there was no active intervention 
against the rebellion. The change in that direction came 
about in the early part of 1862, primarily as a reaction 
against the renewal of rebel attacks upon Shanghai. But 
before that certain other events helped provide the condi-tions 
for the abandonment of the former policy. The first of these 
was a change, more apparent than real, within the Manchu 
government itself after the palace revolution of October- 
November, l86l. The Hsien Feng Emperor died at Jehol in 
August, refusing to the last to recognise the presence of 
Western diplomats in his capital and surrounded by advisers 
of conservative, anti-foreign viewpoint. From among these 
a Regency Council was appointed to govern for his successor, 
a child of only five. A struggle for power quickly developed 
between this Council and the Empress Dowager, the famous 
"Old Buddkia" as she was later called, who received the 
support of Prince Rung. The return of the court to Peking 
at the end of October, a move long advocated by Prince Kung, 
became the occasion for a coup d*etat which replaced the 
original Regency Council by a smaller Council, dominated by 
the Empress Dowager and of which Kung also was a member.
In a decree issued to justify this coup, members of the former 
Council were condemned among other things for their part in 
the seizure of the allied emissaries in i860, and for their 
alleged misrepresentation to the Emperor of the attitude of 
the foreign powers towards China. It naturally appeared to 
Bruce and other Western observers, therefore, that the more 
enlightened and conciliatory party in Chinese counsels had 
triumphed over reaction, and they greeted the change with 
high approval. It constituted ”the most favourable incid­
ent that has hitherto taken place in the course of our rela­
tions with China”, Bruce reported to Russell, and he was 
encouraged to hope that the old style difficulties which had 
stood in the way of easy diplomatic relations with the Manchu 
government would soon disappear.
Like most palace revolutions, the struggle between the 
Regency Council and the Empress Dowager was over power rather 
than principle, and there was no real success for a party 
of reform and conciliation. At the time, however, the 
emphasis in British comments and reports was upon the triumph 
of ”Prince Kung's party”, and the argument was quickly advan­
ced that more direct support should now be given to the
(2)existing government of the empire. Bruce himself was far
(1) F.07l7735^Bru7e^to^ussell Nov.12, l86l. “  “
(2) See for example North China Herald Dec.21, l86l (cit.Morse 
op.cit. vol II p^3n^ - M at this particular juncture we are 
more than at any other period of our connection with China 
bound to support the existing government of the empire...”
cont*d at foot of next page....
from advocating such aid immediately. Indeed, in January,
1862, after receiving reports of the fall of Ningpo, he 
complained vigorously of a government still l1too enervated to 
act and too proud to beg assistance openly11. ^ B u t  on the 
whole there was a real, if rather short-lived, improvement in 
official British opinion about the Manchu government, "The 
new administration does certainly manifest a disposition to 
grapple in a more bold and practical spirit with its diffi­
culties” , Bruce reported at the end of February, while in 
the House of Commons in March, the Under-Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, Layard, assured members that tfwithin 
a very short time a very great change had taken plaed” in
the government at Peking, and used this as an argument to
(2)
help justify the abandonment of neutrality.
While the prospects for effective co-operation with the 
Manchu government seemed thus improved, the possibility of 
maintaining a working arrangement with the rebels was 
weakened,in the judgment of British officials,first by events 
at Ningpo and later, and more decisively, by events at Nanking
(2) cont*d tom previous page..
etc.); also see S.Lane Poole Life of Sir Kenrv Parkes (189^) 
vol I ppl+60—2 - "a marvellous coup d*etat...a new era can 
dawn unon this distracted land” (Parkes to his wife Oct.30,
1861)
(1) this rage. A & P (1862 (297&) pl^3 Bruce to Russell
Jan 18, 1862.
(2) F.O.17/370 RusselliromBruce Feb.23,1862 (also F.O.17/372 
June 20); and P.D.vol 16? (1862), col.1812.
and Shanghai. In December, l86l, the long feared rebel 
attack on Ningpo took place, and a treaty port passed for 
the first time under Taiping control. The official British 
reaction to this was tiro-fold. On the one hand it was 
regarded as disturbing evidence that the rebels could not 
be relied upon to keep clear of the treaty ports, even when 
they made an agreement to do so; and on the other hand it 
was seen as providing a useful test casfe, an opportunity "of 
ascertaining by positive experience whether it would be 
possible to conduct trade from a seaport held by the Taipings". 
Bruce instructed the consul at Ningpo, to seek answers to 
such questions as,
"Do they show any disposition to govern and organize 
the country? Do they wish to encourage trade? Are the 
orders of their leaders obeyed? Do the respectable and 
wealthy classes of Ningpo return to the city and resume 
their avocations? Are property and life respected, or is 
the city treated as an orange to be squeezed dry and 
then thrown away? In short, is their administration a 
hand to mouth affair, or is it conducted so as to show 
that they understand that to form a government, the wealth 
and the industry of the country must not be destroyed?
(1) A & P 1862 (2976) p 82 Hope to Admiralty Dec. 7,l86l; 
also ibid p l1+3» Bruce to Russell Jan. 18, 1862.
"For information on these points I look with anxiety” 
Ningpo became an experiment in direct relations with the 
Taipings.
It was, perhaps, hardly a fair test, unless the rebels 
were to be given some time in which to consolidate their 
gains from the threat of an Imperial counter attack. Further­
more, the consul, Harvey, for all his protestations to the 
contrary, appears to have been a far from unprejudiced 
observer, and his reports, although commended by Bruce,
illustrate the official British view of the rebellion by
(2)
this stage in its most extreme form.
(1) F*0.17/370 Bruce to Harvey Jan. 18, 1862 enc. in Bruce
to Russell of S.D.
(2) For Harvey*s strong predisposition against the rebels see 
A & P 1862 (2976) pp 82, 107* 112; When presented with 
conflicting reports of rebel behaviour at their capture 
of Hangchow (Dec. 29, l86l), Chinese informants reporting 
wholesale massacres, European reporting not, Harvey him­
self had no doubt that "Hangchow suffered most dreadfully" 
(F.0.228/326 Harvey to Bruce March 18, 1862; cf.Hummel 
op.cit. vol I p W l  and Forrest in JNC3RAS Dec.1867 p 188); 
he first reported no customs adminstration whatever being 
set up by the rebels at Ningpo, but when challenged on this 
admitted that "a pseudo-Customs establishment" had existed 
(A&P 1863 (3101+) pp76-7; cf Wesleyan Missionary Notices 
May, 1862, p 72 where a Wesleyan missionary reports visit­
ing the Taiping Customs house in January, 1862)5 and he 
judged the "tone" of rebel replies to British communications 
at Ningpo to be much more offensive and challenging than 
did other interpreters (MP 1862 (3058) ppSS,^-?). The 
validity of Harvey*s reports were several times challenged 
in parliament (see P.D.167 col.l6l7; 170 col.1786; 172 col. 
318). For Bruce commendation of his report quoted below 
see M  P 1862 (3058) pl8 ; cf A.F.Lindley*s analysis, op. 
cit., vol II pp 521-5*
"Three months have elapsed since Ningpo fell into the 
hands of the insurgents", he reported to Bruce in March, 
1862, "and from the hour of its capture to the moment 
when I am penning these lines, not one single step in 
the direction of ‘good government1 has been taken by 
the Taepings; not any attempt made to organize a political 
body or commercial institutions; not a vestige, not a 
trace of anything approaching to order, or regularity of 
action or consistency of purpose, can be found in any of 
their public acts; the words ‘governmental machinery* 
as applied to Taeping rule, have no possible meaning here; 
and in short, Desolation is the only end obtained, as 
it always has been wherever the sway of the marauders 
has had its full scope, and their power the liberty of
unchecked excess..... The Taeping rebellion", Harvey
concluded, "is the greatest delusion, as a political 
or pouular movement, and the Taeping doctrines the most 
gigantic and blasphemous imposition as a creed or ethics, 
that the world has ever witnessed.....! look in vain in 
the darkest ages for a similar faction and upheaving of 
men; but there is nothing in past records so dark and 
bad... The ravings of John of Leyden and his impious 
Munster adverturers in are left far behind in
the race of folly by the Tae-ping madmen.....Taepingdom 
is a huge mass of ‘nothingness*.... There is nothing
to lay hold of in it. It is a gigantic bubble, that 
collapses on being touched, but leaves a mark of blood 
on the finger".^
It is hardly surprising that Harveyfs reports were challenged 
by defenders of the Taipings in England, but they were accepted 
by his official superiors as proving beyond all question the 
impossibility of looking to the rebels to provide a govern­
ment under which trade could develop profitably.
While these conclusions were being drawn from the 
situation at Ningpo a crisis had developed in British rela­
tions with the rebels after Hope’s second visit to Hanking 
at the end of December. Hope’s object in making this visit 
was to secure firmer guarantees from the rebels that they 
would not attack any of the treaty ports not already in 
their possession, whether on the coast or along the Yangtze.
But his approach on this occasion was far less accommodating 
than in March, for he demanded this without offering any 
guarantee in return that the Imperialists would be prevented 
from using these ports as bases. Parkes, who again accom­
panied Hope as interpreter, confessed himself in some per­
plexity about the matter in a letter to the Permanent Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Hammond, and felt
(1) A & P 1862 (2992) ppl2-l6 Harvey to Bruce March 20,1862.
that "nothing less than hostilities would appear to have 
been resolved on unless the rebels do just as they are 
directed". In threatening to defend all the treaty ports 
against rebel attacks Hope was indeed going beyond any 
instructions received up to that time, as was pointed out 
by Hammond in a note on Parkes’ letter. But Palmerston, 
then Prime Minister, added a second note on January 18th, 
1862, to the effect that,
"These Rebels are Revolters not only against the 
Emperor, but against all laws human and Divine, 
and it seems quite right to keep them away from the 
Treaty Ports. That is all that it is necessary to
say to them. Those Treaty Ports are under the
authority of the Imperial Government, and we have
no right to prescribe in what way the Emperor shall
« (1)use them".
Hope’s initiative in adopting a tougher line towards the 
rebels was readily approved and confirmed by the government 
at home.
The rebels refused to do just as directed by Hope, 
and insisted that the agreement made in March, 1861, to 
keep their forces two days march from Shanghai was not 
binding beyond that year. This claim,although questioned
(1) P.O.17/360 Parkes to Hammond Nov. 23, 1861, with 
memos attached.
by Parkes, seems to have been justified. They refused to
extend the agreement in any way, but on the contrary made
plain their intention to advance upon Shanghai. To this
Hope replied by warning them that they would incur "not
merely a repulse, as on a former occasion, but such further
(1)
consequences as your folly will deserve". Nevertheless,
shortly after Hope’s return from this unsatisfactory inter­
view, large rebel forces under the Chung Wang approached 
Shanghai in the middle of January, 1862, and without actually 
storming the city itself, overran the countryside around, 
including Woosung and Kaokiao which commanded the approach 
to Shanghai from the Yangtze river. Their object, Hope 
believed, was to reduce the city by.depriving it of supplies. 
By the end of February he was leading the available British 
forces, in co-operation with Ward’s force and the French,
to clear the Taipings from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai,
(2)
and was recommending still more extensive action. At the 
beginning of March Bruce was justifying the need for offen­
sive action also,^and by the beginning of May, the Foreign 
Office, necessarily several months behind developments in 
China, wras convinced that "events have proved that the
(1) For Hope report on this visit see A & P 1862 (2976) pp97-10l+.
(2) A & P 1862 (2976) pp 157-8 and A & P 1862 (3058) p.10.
(3) A & P 1862 (3058) pp 6-7 Bruce to Russell March *+, 1862.
British Treaty with China cannot be carried into effect
where the Taepings have possession. They have spread so
much terror and devastation wherever they have gone that
no trade can be carried on in the Districts which they 
,occupy".
Thus, under the immediate pressure of aTaiping
threat to Shanghai at the beginning of 1862, the attempt
to get round the rebellion, which was the basic feature of
British policy during l86l, was abandoned in favour of an
attempt to destroy it. There is no single, clearly
marked point at which this can be said to have taken place,
nor was the change in policy complete and consistent in
every detail. A British consular representative remained
(2)stationed at Nanking at least until the end of 1862,
and there were suggestions, never followed up, for a possible
(3)renewal of negotiations with the rebels, But broadly
(1) F.0.17/382 F.O. to ¥.0. and Admiralty May 6, 1862.
(2) For presence of a British Consular official at Nanking 
during 1862 see F.O.17/37? Bruce to Russell Nov. 22, 1862 
enc. letter of resignation from G.T.Lay after his "miser­
able existence" in a boat "scarcely fit for a Chinese to 
live in", and with little correspondence to carry on 
with the Taiping authorities.
(3) The suggestion of a possible renewal of negotiations 
with the rebels after they had been "chastised" at 
Shanghai came, surprisingly*though perhaps consistently 
with his rather wavering line on the question, from Bruce, 
but was rejected by Hope, (see A & P 1862 (30?8) p20
and A & P 1863 (310*0 p.9).
speaking, the early months of 1862 saw the real and decisive 
change in British policy towards the rebellion. The policy 
of neutrality laid down in 1853, qualified and imperfect as 
it was in the first place, and applied in a manner increasingly 
favourable to the Manchu cause, was now more or less explicitly 
abandoned in favour of a policy of deliberate intervention 
against the Taipings. The major issue in British policy on 
the question during 1862 became how far and in what manner 
to help towards their defeat.
CHAPTER VI
INTERVENTION (1862-^
Few now argue, as most Western writers on the subject 
once did, that foreign intervention was the decisive factor 
in the defeat of the Taiping rebellion by 186^. Neverthe­
less it continues to be recognised as of primary importance, 
and it is generally assumed that, being important aid, it 
was also very extensive aid. Morse, for example, wrote 
that China had been “rescued*1 from the rebellion “mainly 
by foreign aid** which, he added, was “given grudgingly in 
i860, but with no sparing hand in the years 1862 and 1863 
. Chinese historians have never seen the matter in
this light, and have emphasised such things as the deficiencies 
and divisions of Taiping leadership, their strategic errors, 
and the campaigns of Tseng Kuo-fan*s fbrces, rather than the 
role of the Ever Victorious Army* It is notable, however, 
that Chinese Marxist historians, while not elevating the 
intervention of the Western powers into the main reason for 
the defeat of the rebellion, do give it very considerable 
weight and, like Morse, suggest that it was on a very sub­
stantial scale* By 1862, Lo Srh-kang writes,
(1) H. B. Morse, International Relations of the Chinese
Empire^ vol.II, p*lll.
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“the foreign invaders had armed forces they could use 
(against the Taipings). Retained in China to ensure that 
the Manchu government followed the Peking treaties were the 
English and French armies, while the Americans organised a 
Foreign Legion. Besides this, after the defeat of the 
unrising of 1857-9 in India, England was able to send part 
of her armed forces from there to China. So in the Spring 
of 1862 England began big scale military action against^the 
Taiping State, and a new phase in her interference began”.
“Big scale” and “with no sparing hand” are, of course, rela­
tive Judgments, which need not be taken too literally, but 
it is important to recognise that the British government had 
neither the intention nor the resources to attempt more than 
limited action in China in 1862. In certain respects at 
least, British aid was given to the Manchu government with 
a hand deliberately sparing rather than otherwise.
Bruce in particular urged strictly limited intervention, 
for he was thinking beyond the immediate question of the
(1) Lo Erh-kang, op.cit.,pl75* For Chinese Marxist historians* 
assessment of the' importance of foreign aid in the defeat 
of the rebellion see Hu Shehg, op.cit.p5l, and Fan Wen-lan, 
T*ai-'PlinR Tien-kuo vfln-tung (19^ -9) P*+5« Chinese National­
ist historians do not give it nearly so much emphasis.
Cf., for example, Hsiao I-shan Ch'ing shih (1955), ppll8-21-
and Huang Ta-shou Ching-kuo chin-tai shih (1953) v°i 2, 
pp 1+99-51*+• Cf. il.N.Roy, op.cit., pl62 - foreign interven­
tion “was solely responsible for the defeat of the revolu­
tion”. Also Xi Chien-nung, Political History of China (1956) 
pp79-80: cf. also Lo Erh-kang, T tai-n,ing: T*ien-kuo shih
kang (19*+8) pp76-7, 102-8, where Lo does not much stress 
the importance of Western intervention in the defeat of 
the rebellion’1.
suppression of the rebellion, major problem though that was.
H i s  great object, while British Minister at Peking, was to
secure the adherence of the Manchu government in spirit as
in letter to the new treaty settlement. He hoped thereby
to create a situation in which the treaties would be applie d,
not under the constant threat of superior Western force,
though he recognised that for a long time to come this must
remain their ultimate basis, but under a government able and
(1)
willing to co-operate to this end. It needed to be an
able as well as a willing government. Bruce did not wish
to see preserved in Peking a weak, corrupt and incapable
government which could be easily browbeaten into giving way
to every Western demand. * Such a government would simply
invite rebellion from its own subjects and, ultimately perhaps,
partition by ambitious Western powers. China would then become
a second Turkey, a field for imperial rivalries of the most
dangerous kind rather than for peaceful, profitable trade.
”1 am fuibly convinced that we, who neither seek territory
nor promote by arms religious conversion, have little to
apprehend from any success that may attend our efforts to
(1) Note, for example, F.O.17/339 Bruce to Alston Dec.31,i860, 
where he defined his approach as being designed to convince 
the Manchu government, “that our objects are essentially 
pacific, thaVour demands are reasonable, and that we are 
inclined to be moderate and conciliatory if we are met in 
a corresponding spirit...I have set my heart on effecting 
this change, and I am persuaded that the interests of our 
tqrade, and of China herself, require that it should be 
made without delay”. See also F.O.17/372, Bruce to Russell, 
June 20,1862. W.Davies, opccit. ch.7 develops this aspect 
of Brucefs policy.
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"raise the Chinese Executive out of its present helpless
condition", Bruce told Russell in March, 1862.
Nor do I consider that it will he a matter of regret or
hostile to our interests, that China should he encouraged
by a consciousness of her strength, to use bolder language
in defence of her just rights. The weakness-of China,
rather than her strength, is likely to create a fresh .
Eastern Question in these seas".^
The basic object of Bruce1s policy was simply to provide
for the future security of British interests in China with
as little trouble and expense to the government at home as
possible. For that a friendly and efficient government in
Peking, capable of enforcing the treaties, willing to do so,
and at least strong enough not to invite partition at the
hands of ambitious powers, was essential. His programme
of aid against the rebellion was part of his programme to
(2)help create such a government in China. '
( D T &  P 1862 (3058) p9. Some British officials were Very
doubtful of any policy of strengthening the Manchus1 militar­
ily, at least until it was more certain that the treaties 
would be fully observed and other reforms carried out. See 
Parkes to Thurlow Aug.11, 1862, in Elgin Correspondence 
(India Office), Private Secretaryfs Correspondence, Bundle 
9, No.838, and also H.N.Lay, Our Interests in China (186*+) 
pp63-1f.
(2) "With a view to the permanent improvement of our position . 
in China, and the permanent security of our vast interests 
here, the object to be arrived at is the re-organization of 
the Executive of the Chinese, simultaneously with its recog­
nition of our rights, so that it may be able to tranquillize 
the country, by making itself respected, and be able to give 
us that protection which by Treaty it is bound to give us 
in the exercise of our Treaty rights....Our future position 
in China is involved in the success of the experiment".
(Bruce to Rear Ad.Kuper,Nov.22,1862 in M P  1863 GlO^Oppl^-^
As the later history of China sufficiently shows, Bruce 
failed in this object. The Manchu government was neither 
effectively reformed in itself nor really reconciled to the 
presence of the West. The "break-up of China11 remained a 
constant possibility throughout the later nineteenth century, 
and British trade there was always dependent upon the 
presence of British gunboats. The difficulties in the way 
of success for Bruce’s plans were indeed formidable, as 
was the opposition he aroused. British merchants and 
missionaries who looked for quick returns under the new 
treaty settlement were critical of a policy which at times 
seemed more concerned to protect Manchu interests than 
their own. He had also to curb consuls, brought up under 
the old dispensation, who were quick to call upon the nearest 
gunboat to force satisfaction from the local Chinese authori­
ties when faced with what they considered an infringement 
of the treaties. If grievances were to be handled in this 
way, Bruce objected, not only might it lead to general 
hostilities, as in 1856, but there was little point in having
a diplomatic representative to the central government in 
(1)
Peking.
TlT"For merchant complaints against Bruce's policy see below
Ch.8 and N.Palcovits, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office. 
(19^8) pp21ff; for missionary complaints note reactions 
to Bruce’s despatch on the failure of the Protestant 
missions in China (cit.below p 2^5 ) ln Evangelical Christ­
endom, Sept. 1863, pp*fl8-20, Mf6,- and English Presbyterian 
Messenger, 1863, pp3l6-l8; for Bruce’s efforts to encour-
cont’d at foot of next, page
1 8 5 .
. a
There was also little point in having such/representative
if the Peking government itself was incapable of enforcing
its authority upon its own subordinate officials in the
provinces. Bruce wanted to strengthen the hand of the
central government and make it the sole effective military
and political power in the Chinese state. His attempt
to do this, however, ran quite counter to the realities of
the political situation in China by i860. Very largely as
a result of the failure of the regular ("Green Standard11)
Imperial armies to crush the Taiping rebellion during the
eighteen-fifties, effective miliary and political power in
Central China, and, through the likin tax, a great measure
of financial power also, was passing into the hands of the
(2)
great provincial officers. Chief among these were Tseng
Cl) cont'd from previous page...
age a more conciliatory attitude among consuls see esp. 
his circular to them in A&P 1863 (310*+) pp82-6, and 
also ibid. pp ^5* ?6, 65*
(1) this page.... "The Taepings, I think, are the effect not 
only the cause of disorder. To destroy them will not save 
this country from anarchy, and possibly foreign partition, 
unless the Chinese Government are inclined to provide against 
the recurrence of brigandage by a more powerful executive, 
and if this executive is not directed by the Government it-, 
self, as distinguished from the local authorities, it is 
evident that it will become in its turn dangerous to the 
State". (Bruce to Elgin June 10, 1863, in Elgin Correspond­
ence. (Broomhall)). For failure of his plans see below on 
the Lay Osborn flotilla and the Ever Victorious Army.
(2) See Franz Michael "Military Organisation and Power Structure 
of China During the Taiping Rebellion" in Pacific Historical 
Review vol 18 (19^9) pp^69-88.
Kuo-fan and his nominees, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung t ’ang, 
who became governors of Kiangsu and Chekiang respectively 
in 1862. These were the men who actually created the armies 
and devised the strategies which defeated the rebellion.
Given their growing power and authority, any attempt to 
bring about changes in the government of China which did 
not win their support and co-operation was bound to,fail. 
Indeed it could be said that it might have served Brucefs 
long term plans better had the campaign against the rebellion 
organised by the provincial governors failed, like the earlier 
campaigns of Hsiang Jung and Chang Kuo-liang, for then the 
central government might have mounted another and more effi­
cient campaign with western help, and have emerged from the 
rebellion militarily and politically stronger, at least in 
relation to its own provincial officers. But the protraction 
of the rebellion could equally well have led to the actual 
partitioning of China by the Western powers, and it is 
difficult to see that there was ever much prospect of success 
for Bruce’s plans, especially since they ignored the deep
(1)
seated social origins of revolt in nineteenth century China.,
(1) Mot that Bruce was altogether blind to the economic causes 
of discontent in China (population pressure, unemployment 
due to changes in the course of trade &c*), but he saw the 
nroblem of settlement essentially as one of law and order. 
See M P  1863 (310*0 pp8, 138, and esp.l*f2; also F.O.17/351 
Bruce to Russell May 9>l86l.
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However unsuccessful in the long run, this general plan 
of reforming the government in Peking nevertheless condi­
tioned Bruce’s approach to the question of aid against the 
rebels, and made him the chief spokesman in British counsels 
for limited rather than extensive intervention. The problem, 
he told Russell in February, 1862, was to render assistance ”in
a shape which will strengthen and not weaken the authority of
(1)
the government11. To this end, indirect aid which helped 
organise the resources available to the Manchus was the 
approach he recommended. Major points in Bruce’s programme 
were foreign assistance in the organisation of the Imperial 
customs, and the training of Imperial forces by European 
officers. But the direct use of Western forces against 
the rebels he opposed, at least beyond the defence of the 
treaty ports.
’’Whatever the risk to our trade”, he wrote to Brig.
Gen. Staveley in April 1862, T1it had better be incurred 
than that we should undertake to fight the battles of
(1) F.O.17/370, Bruce to Russell, Feb. 23, 1862. In this
despatch Bruce also said he was ”of the opinion that direct 
assistance ought not to be afforded to this government 
(except in as far as it flows from the protection that we 
give to our own interests) because it takes away the only 
motive, namely that of self-preservation, wThich will be 
strong enough to enable those who see these evils (i.e. of 
inefficiency and inactivity) to break through the shackles 
imposed by custom, and to undertake seriously the task of 
improvement by availing themselves in a teachable spirit
of the experience of the arts of the Western nations”.
"this Government for it, or afford it more than casual 
and temporary assistance, which is all that will he 
required to enable the Imperialists to triumph, if they 
can be induced to turn their own resources to proper
account ” ^
The aid actually rendered to the Imperialist cause by 
England over the next two years cannot, perhaps, be accurately 
described as ’’casual and temporary”, but the phrase reflects 
Bruce’s own approach to the question.
Such an approach is not altogether what one would expect 
from Bruce’s earlier reports on the rebellion and his scepti­
cism during 1861 as to the possibility of making effective 
arrangements with the rebels. It must be said that Bruce 
was certainly not remarkable for the steadiness and consist­
ency of his views on the question of aid, for despite his 
general objection to British forces fighting the battles of 
the Manchu government he showed a recurrent urge to deal the 
rebels a ’’deadly blow” at Nanking, while at other times becom­
ing so exasperated \*ith the Manchu government as to threaten 
to withdraw aid altogether, and even, on certain conditions,
(1) A & P 1862 (3058), p.25.
to hand over Shanghai to the rebels. Yet basically
he held to a policy of limited and indirect aid to the Manchus,
to be given through the central government rather than through
the provincial authorities.
The Foreign Office approved Bruce’s moderate and con-
(2)
ciliatory approach to the Manchu government. It agreed
also that direct British intervention against the rebellion 
should be limited in extent, though it was readier than 
Bruce to approve the,tendency of service officers to go 
beyond the limits set. But Russell agreed that England 
should not undertake to use its forces to put down the 
rebellion, for
■'we should soon be engaged in an extensive war, while 
the Chinese government would only leave the burthen 
and expense of it to us.
The rational course for us to pursue,” Russell added, 
”is to defend our own trade, to protect the Treaty ports, 
and to encourage the Chinese government to arm a suffi­
cient force of Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry, to over-
(1) For Bruce’s inclination towards strong action against the 
rebels see ibid, p.18; for threats to withdraw aid M  P 
186*+ (33*f j & 3^06); for threats to hand over Shanghai, if 
the populace made an agreement with the rebels and the 
government took no active measure to protect it, F.O.17/370 
Bruce to Russell, Feb.23, 1862. Note H.N.Lay’s criticism 
of Bruce’s changes in attitude towards the Peking Govern­
ment in Our Interests in China (186*+) pp.36, 39-*+2, 6g-5 &c
See foot of next page for (2)
’’come the rebels and reduce them to subjection”.
The British government ”do not propose to give to the
Chinese government the whole force of the British Empire
for their support”, Russell added in the House of Lords in
(2)
July, 1862, after quoting this despatch. The motives
which made the home government insist on the limits of the 
committment it was prepared to make on this issue were some­
what different from those uppermost in Bruce’s mind. Con­
siderations of economy are apparent in Russell’s despatch, 
and to these may be added considerations of domestic politics. 
The Palmerston government had won an election in 1857 
precipitated by the outbreak of the ’’Arrow” war in China, 
and the opposition had remained very critical of its conduct 
of that war, including the second campaign of 1859-60, which 
at the time was often referred to as ”the Third China War”.
For the government to have become embroiled in another large 
scale war in Chiha, for whatever reason, was likely to prove 
too much even for Lord Palmerston to carry off successfully 
with the electors. The possibility of becoming deeply 
embroiled in China was a main point in the.arguments of the
(2) from previous page.... ”Her Majesty’s government entir ely 
approve of the spirit of forbearance and conciliation in 
which your intercourse with the Chinese Government is con - 
ducted”. F.O.17/3^9 Russell to Bruce Dec.9, 1861.
(1) this nage.. A & P 1862 (3058) p26, Russell to Bruce,
July 7, 1862.
(2) P.D. vol 168 (1862), col.897*
numerous critics in England of the policy of intervention,
and the government was at some pains to insist that it was
(1)
only going so far and no further.
Moreover, the British government was not urged to commit 
its forces deeply by the Manchu government, which maintained 
a decidedly ambivalent attitude on the question of foreign 
aid against the rebellion. The need for it, within limits 
the desirability of it, was recognised, but it was accepted 
with many misgivings as the lesser of two considerable evils. 
After the rejection of the Russian offer at the beginning 
of l86l there was no further discussion of the question 
among high Manchu officials until the beginning of 1862, 
although plans for acquiring foreign arms and vessels were 
developed. The initiative in re-opening the question of 
direct foreign aid came from the local gentry and officials 
at Shanghai. The former were particularly active, one of 
them, P ’an Tseng-wei, writing to Tseng Kuo-fan and travelling 
himself to Peking in order to urge the need for hiring foreign 
trooos, not only to protect Shanghai but to help recapture 
inland cities such as Soochow. Leading Manchu officials 
were, however,very chary of these proposals for the extensive 
use of foreign troops in the interior. Tsang Kuo-fan argued
(1) On the strength of public opinion against further 
involvement in China see below, ch.10.
that, whereas at rorts such as Shanghai and Ningpo Western
and Chinese interests were bound up together and should be
defended in common, this was not so in the interior. If
foreign troops were hired to help recapture cities such as
Soochow, Changchow or Nanking, "failure would lead to ridicule
and success to unpredictable difficulties later”.^   ^ Prince
Kung raised practical objections to the use of foreign troops
in the interior. They moved much more quickly than did the
Chinese, yet would be dependent on them for supplies; they
were imoatient, and always anxious to advance, but China
would have to supply the garrisons for the places they
recaptured. Altogether, the value of using foreign troops
(2)beyond the treaty ports was questionable.
In addition, although this was no doubt partly a face 
saving formula, such aid as was accepted was to be on a 
temporary basis, in a period of acute crisis.
”The English ambassador says it is possible to 
send troops to help suppress the rebels, but only 
temporarily, not permanently”, an Edict of February
(1) IWSM. TC. *+, 28a-29a - Tseng there states he has received 
letters from P ’an Tseng-wei and others.
(2) ibid. TC. 6, 13a-l*+a, where Kung refers to P ’an visiting 
the Capital. For other complaints of tactical difficul­
ties in co-operating with foreign troops see Li Hung-chang’ 
memorial in TC.7, *+8a.
25th 1862 read, "He should he Informed that after the 
alarm was sounded at Shanghai, troops were despatched 
from every quarter. But since this relief has not 
yet arrived it is necessary to borrow the help of foreign 
countries; but once our strength has been concentrated 
there, and put under competent command, naturally there 
will be no need of help11.^^
The hiring of foreign officers to train and lead Chinese 
troops had many troubles inherent in it, Prince Kung wrote 
in April, 1863, in a memorial on the difficulties which 
developed over the leadership of the Ever Victorious Army 
after Hard’s death, "but since the rebels are everywhere
(2)
and not put down we just have to use this expedient temporarily.
Further, there was no anxiety to see large numbers of 
foreign troops brought to China to help suppress the rebels.
In the middle of 1862, after the failure of the first combined 
attempt to clear a thirty mile radius around Shanghai, there 
were reports that the English proposed to get more troops 
from India to assist in a later campaign. Tdo Tsung-t'ang, 
who was leading the Chinese forces in Kiangsu and Chekiang, 
and Tseng Kuo-fan both expressed their opposition to this,
Tso being sceptical of their value on the ground that recent
(1) ibid TC. h, 26b-27a.
(2) ibid. TC. I1*, l8b-19a.
19^.
reverses near Shanghai showed that the ■‘barbarians were as
■/ (1)
much afraid of the rebels as China's own forces. ■ Tseng
Kuo-fan, whose troops were just beginning their siege of
Nanking, argued that China's own resources were adequate to
the task in hand.
"There can be no question", he wrote ih July, 1862, 
‘'that in the Spring and Summer of; this year we have 
subdued, one after the other, more than twenty cities, 
and pacified more than a thousand miles along the 
Yangtze. The rebels cannot hold out much longer.
The means for subduing Kiangsu and Chekiang exist, and 
if our policies do not succeed and the rebel conflagra­
tion die out, China should bear the burden herself.
Through the Emperor lies the path to self reliance, 
not through seeking the help of foreign countries in 
our difficulties and distresses, while our officials 
have their duties to fulfill. How can we lightly hire 
foreign forces and so become an object of scorn to lat er 
generations?"
China, in suppressing the rebels, should not plant the seeds
(2)
of future complications, Tseng concluded.
(1) ibid TC.8, *+2a, quoted by Tseng Kuo-fan. On Tso Tsung-t'ang 
attitude to foreign troops see also W.L.Bales, Tso Tsung-
t'ang (1937) PP 150-1.
(2) IWSM. TC 8 *f2b-V3aj *+3b; cf Hail, op.cit. pp256-8
ttr
When criticised for being too accommodating towards 
the foreign powers in the interpretation of the treaties, a 
situation in which Bruce could sympathize with him, Prince 
Kung vehemently defended the policies of the Tsungli Yamen, 
and indicated another aspect of the official Manchu attitude 
towards foreign aid.
"As for the opinion that foreign help in puttipg down 
the rebels is not trustworthy, I am very far from say­
ing that it is. It is just that there is a danger 
(fear) that if we do not make them our allies, they may 
be used by the rebels. The harm in that would be 
immeasurable (beyond words)
Aid accepted in this spirit was, needless to say, readily 
abandoned when the need for it was felt to have passed. 
Foreign officered forces, such as the Ever Victorious Army, 
were a constant., source of apprehension to the Manchu govern­
ment, for it was difficult to keep control over them or to 
be sure of their later loyalties. There were no regrets 
when the Ever Victorious Army was disbanded in May, 186^, 
before the final capture of Nanking, although that event was 
obviously at hand by then, for it had long been regarded as
(1) ibid. TC.5, 55a.
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1 a tail that was too big to wag”.
Altogether, the official Manchu view on the extent to 
which foreign aid against the rebels should go parallelled, 
on the obverse side of the coin, the official British view. 
Limited assistance, at the ports rather than in the interior, 
indirectly by provision of arms and equipment rather than 
directly with foreign troops - all these points were common 
both to 3ruce and the high Manchu officials in their approaches 
to the question. This is not to say, of course, that the 
aid actually given was exactly on this pattern. The local 
pressure at Shanghai in favour of more extended intervention 
was strong on both sides, while the Foreign Office was less 
insistent on the precise limits to be observed than was Bruce, 
But although there were differences in detail, there was 
agreement on fundamentals. In the circumstances foreign 
intervention was necessary, but it should be limited and it 
was better given indirectly.
Limited intervention was, in any case, all that was 
possible with the military forces England had available in 
China by 1862. Although her naval forces in the station
(1) For doubts on the reliability of foreign trained troops 
see ibid. TC. 10, 2a, 13a,~l5a$ for complaints on the
E.V.A. see memorial of Li Kung-chang (seen Feb.11, 1863) 
in TC.12, 53a-51+b. The Edict following instructs that 
it be limited to 35000 men and brought under more effect­
ive Chinese control.
were increased by about a third on wrhat they had. been in
I larch, 1861, her military establishment in China remained
within a few hundreds, one way or the other, of the five
thousand mark, and it was not increased in the last years
n )
of the rebellion. There was, however, a very consider­
able increase in the force stationed at Shanghai. In 
January, 1862, this was between six and seven hundred men, 
to whom should be added four or five hundred French, two
hundred and fifty volunteers and perhaps the same number of
(2)
marines, a total European force of about fifteen hundred.
During March and April the number of British and Indian 
troops at Shanghai was considerably increased, from the 
garrison then being withdrawn from Tientsin, and by the 
middle of the year the regular British force there was about 
two thousand five hundred. With other additions the total
(3)
force available was probably in the region of four thousand.
In the circumstances this was certainly a formidable force, 
especially wrhen the great superiority of its arms and training
(1) See Appendix C. On Aug.5, 1862, Raar-Adm«Hope wrote to 
Elgin saying there was no need to send extra troops from 
India, although earlier these had been asked for. On 
Sept.9*1863, Elgin was asked by the War Office to send
some reinforcements to China, not for use against the rebels 
but to release other forces for service in Japan. . See 
Elgin Corres. (India Office), Letters from Miscellaneous, 
Vol.1861-3, pp 397-^00, and 861-8.
(2) n0ur foreign force here is by no means large. It consists 
of 700 English and Sikhs, b or 500 French^ 250 volunteers 
and a number of bluejackets1 (Rev.W.Muirhead from Shanghai, 
Jan.23,1862, in London Miss. Scty Cent.China Letters,BoxIII)
(3) The numberx of French troops at Shanghai seems to have 
remained at about 5QC* See M P  1863 {310^)5 PPl6,25*103*
are taken into account. But it was not of a size,nor was
it ever intended, to be used beyond the defence of Shanghai
and a thirty mile radius around it. In fact one of the
arguments used by Rear Admiral. Hope in favour of defending
a radius around Shanghai and not simply the port itself was
that it would take fewer troops, using them in flying columns
to support Chinese garrisons, than to man walls four and a
half miles in extent. The object was to keep the size of
(1)
the force needed at Shanghai as small as possible.
The British military commander in China during most of
1862, Brig. Gen. Staveley, was ahthorised to send for addition
al troops from India if he felt it absolutely necessary, but
he was certainly not encouraged to do so. When he did call
for them, upon what the War Office regarded as the inadequate
ground that Indian troops stood the Shanghai climate better
than British, he.was reprimanded and told that it was the
opinion of the Government that “the British military forces
(2)
at Shanghae may safely be reduced”. In March, 1863, over
twelve months before the capture of Nanking, Bruce also urged 
upon him the desirability of making arrangements with the 
Chinese authorities for the defence of the port “which would 
gradually enable us to reduce the number of troops at Shanghae
(1) Adra.1/5790, Rear Ad. Hope to Admiralty June 17*1862. Cf.al 
Hope to Elgin June 18,1862, in Elgin Correspondence (India 
Office) Letters from Miscellaneous, vol.1861-3* pp8*f5-5?8.
(2) F.0.17/399 enc. in W.O. to F.O. Feb.l6, 1863.
and consequently the expenses of the occupation; for I
look with dread at the consequences of the financial difficul-
(1)
ties that must result from the present state of expenditure". 
In the middle of 1863, by which time the threat to Shanghai 
was safely past, the British force there was reduced to about 
fifteen hundred. The British forces maintained at Shanghai 
during 1862-3 were never capable of ah extensive campaign 
against the rebellion.
The occasions on which regular British naval and military: 
forces were engaged in action against the rebels were confined 
to the year 1862. The manner in which these engagements 
were first undertaken illustrates the quite unplanned nature 
of the change in British policy in the first part of that 
year, for they were begun well in advance of any Foreign 
Office approval or instruction. At the beginning of 1862, 
British policy as understood by the Foreign Office did not 
go beyond the defence of the foreign settlement areas, save 
at Shanghai, while negotiation with the rebels where necessary 
was still an accepted part of it.
"It is true that the accounts we receive on all 
sides show the Taepings to be little better than Banditti 
organised on a large scale and bent on free quarters and 
plunder," a Foreign Office memorandum of February 22nd
(1) A & P 186*+ (3295) p.68.
read, "and we have abundant evidence of the destructive 
nature of the insurrection and of the blasphemous and . 
immoral character of the superstition on which it is 
based; but our efforts in the various interviews which 
our agents have held with the Rebel leaders have been 
directed chiefly to securing the persons and Property . 
of British subjects, and maintaining our rights to 
trade as secured for us by Treaty".
A few days after this was written Rear Admiral Hope’s report 
telling of the refusal of the rebels to extend the agreement 
not to approach the treaty ports was received, and early in 
March his instructions were extended to provide fob the 
defence of all the ports not already in rebel hands by the 
naval forces under his command. There was no instruction 
about the use of military forces, and any need for action
(2)
beyond the ports was not yet envisaged by the Foreign Office.
Yet such action had already been taken and more was being 
nlanned, even before these instructions were sent. Early 
in February the consul at Shanghai, Medhurst, had urged the
(1) F.O.I7/38O Memo by Hammond Feb.22, 1862. ,
(2) For these new instructions see A & P 1862 (2976) pill.
They were sent to Bruce by telegraph via Russia on March 
12 (F.0.228/318). The W.O. was informed of them, but not 
requested to send comparable ones to the military command­
ers in China (F.O.17/38I F.O. to ¥.0.March 11). In May 
Bruce told Prince Kung that the British Govt was "inclined" 
to use its naval forces to protect the Treaty Ports, but not 
its land forces. Bruce added that unless the Kanchu Govt 
improved its own forces at the Ports he would recommend that
cont'd at foot of next page..
need for action by British forces beyond the walls, on the 
ground that it was necessary to clear a,belt of country 
around Shanghai in order to maintain supplies for its popu­
lation, now swollen by refugees. He saw such action as 
essentially defensive and consistent with a policy of strict 
n e u t r a l i t y . O n  February 21st Rear-Admiral Hope used 
naval forces to co-operate with Chinese troops under Ward 
in clearing the rebels from the immediate vicinity of Shanghai, 
and to capture the towns of Woosung and Kaokiao, which 
commanded the river approaches to the port. He also urged 
upon Bruce the need for more extensive action, and suggested 
clearing the country within a line running through towns
approximately thirty miles out. Bruce thought this project
*
"within the scope of the intentions of the Government", but 
insisted that the Imperial authorities must provide adequate 
garrisons to hold the line, "for I do not think Her Majesty’s 
Government would approve of our being committed to hold any 
other position than Shanghae itself". Hope was confident 
bcbth that the Chinese would provide forces capable of holding
continuing (2) from previous page.. only the settlement
areas be defended. (See Bruce to Kung enc. in Bruce to 
Russell July 8, 1862, in F.0.17/373)* This was probably 
just one of Bruce’s periodic threats.
(1) this rage..
A <?: P 1862 (2976) pp 1^0-1, 151-3*
the towns when recaptured, and that the projected campaign
(1)
was merely anticipating the wishes of the Government.
At the end of April, 1862, therefore, substantial 
British, French and Chinese forces began their attacks on 
the rebels within the line proposed. It proved easier to 
capture the towns than to hold them, for, as Bruce had feared, 
the Chinese garrisons to which they were handed over proved 
quite incapable of holding them against renewed rebel attacks, 
and by the beginning of June the situation around Shanghai 
was back much to what it had been before the campaign started. 
Despite the urgings of Hope, Staveley refused to renew it 
during the summer months, and was content to hold Shanghai 
itself and the river approaches, concentrating meanwhile on 
training Chinese forces for a new campaign in the autumn. 
Actually, the pressure on Shanghai eased considerably without 
further action, and by mid-July Staveley was able to report 
that "the rebels have ceased to give any annoyance in the 
vicinity of Shanghae". From information received from 
Europeans in the silk districts, h^4dded, the bulk of their 
force appeared to have gone towards Nanking, "which city is 
pressed by a force of Imperialists". This was in truth
(1) For Hope’s first action against the rebels beyond Shanghai 
itself see A & P 1862 (2992) ppl-6; for his recommendations 
to Bruce for more extensive action and his confidence that 
the home government would approve see A & p 1862(3058) 
po 10, 38; for Bruce's Qualified agreement ibid, pnlO-11, 
20, 2^-5.'
the situation, the Chung Wang, having been recalled urgently
by Hung to assist in the defence of the capital. It proved
a much easier task to clear and hold the thirty mile limit
when the campaign was renewed in October.
It is clear that the thirty-mile radius policy was very
much the creation of the officers stationed at Shanghai.
Bruce gave it qualified approval before it was first applied
in May, but the idea certainly was not his, and he was later
(2)
very critical of it. The Foreign Office really did
nothing more than acquiesce in the scheme. On May 6th,
a week after the campaign had actually started, it agreed
that action by British forces up to fifteen or twenty miles
from the forts was allowable, and by July 10th it had got
as far as laying dovm that
"our Policy should be directed to two points:
1st To protect the Treaty or open Ports
and their vicinity, but not extending
beyond thirty miles from the Port. : .
2nd To aid the Chinese Government by encour-
agement and advice to form an organized
(3)
force for military.and naval service".
(1) For details of these two campaigns to clear the 30 mile 
radius see A & P 1862 (3058) ppl7, 28-9* 33-5, ^1-2 and 
A & P 1863 (310*f) pp 11, I V 1 5, 2If-5, bif, 72,
102-D+, 110, 120; also D.C.Boulger, The Life of Sir 
Halliday Maeartney (1908) pp k7£f*
(2) F.0.17/375 Bruce to Russell (private letter) Dec.11.1862 
"You are aware that the 30 mile radius around Shanghai
For rest o f ’(2) and (3) see next page*.
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But neither the Foreign Office nor Bruce ever directed that
offensive operations beyond the ports be undertaken, and they
were agreed in rejecting a suggestion that the whole of the
Silk district around Shanghai be occupied,^
At TTingno also, service action outran Foreign Office
instructions. On July 7th Russell instructed Bruce that
(2)
"Ningpo ought to be recovered by the Imperialists11. In 
fact it had been recovered for the Imperialists as early as 
Kay 10th, by the combined action of British and French naval 
forces. Friction with the rebels in occupation of Ningpo 
had quickly developed over their refusal to give up a claim 
to jurisdiction over the foreign settlement area outside the 
town, which had been hastily defined and proclaimed by the
(2) from previous page... was not my scheme. Admiral 
Hope had embarked on it before I was consulted (cf. above) 
and I consented to it on certain conditions which were not 
observed". Bruce went on to object that it was a misuse, 
of forces, and served a short term end (the protection of 
Shanghai) rather than a long term one (the eradication
of the rebels). See also A & P 186*+ (3295) p 162 for 
later criticism of it by Bruce.
(3) F.C. 17/3F2 F.O. to W.O. and Admiralty, May 6, 1862 and 
F.O. 228/319 Russell to Bruce, July 10, 18o2.
(1) this page....
F.O.17/373 Bruce to Russell July. 8 , 1862 and F.O.228/319 
Russell to Bruce, Oct. 17> 1862.
(2) AS:? 1862 (3o58) p.2 6.
foreign consuls there soon after the Taiping capture of the 
port, apparently without any prior reference either to 
Manchu or rebel authorities., The situation was greatly 
aggravated when the rebels began strengthening the defences 
on the city wall opposite the foreign settlement. This 
was readily interpreted as the prelude to a rebel attack 
on the foreign settlement, but it could as, readily have been 
interpreted as a purely defensive measure, for the foreign 
settlement area was unfortunately placed in the direct line 
of fire between the city and any forces advancing up river 
to attack it. There were "incidents" over firing from 
the wall by the rebels endangering foreign ships and residents, 
and altogether it was a thoroughly explosive situation, 
especially since the foreign settlement area was crowded 
with refugees from the city. Early in May the Imperialists, 
based on Chusan Island, were ready to attempt its recapture, 
and the English and French naval commanders thereupon issued 
a remarkable warning to the rebels to the effect that
"we maintain a perfect neutrality, but if you fire the 
guns or muskets from the battery or wall opposite the 
settlement on the advancing Imperialists, thereby 
endangering the lives of our men and people in the 
foreign Settlement, we shall feel it our duty to return 
the fire and bombard the city".
This was certainly a very peculiar kind of "neutrality".
After the inevitable shots from the wall had been 
fired, the city was bombarded by the two British and one 
French naval vessels there, between 10 am. and b p.m., with 
a two hour break for lunch, according to Capt. Dew’s report ■ 
of the action. It was then stormed, captured and handed 
over to the Imperialists on the same evening, their forces 
having taken virtually no part in the battle. In the 
following months British naval forces in the area helped 
to clear a thirty mile radius around Ningpo as at Shanghai, 
but foreign assistance to the Manchus in this area became 
mainly a French affair. The actual recapturing of the city 
was, however, carried out mainly by British naval forces 
which, strictly speaking, had never received instructions 
from the Admiralty going beyond those ordering the defence 
of the treaty ports not in rebel hands. The action.at 
ringpo hardly came within that scope, but it was nevertheless 
in harmony with the trend in official British policy towards 
the rebellion by this time. On June 6th, Bruce expressed, 
his approval of it to Russell, arguing that a collision at 
Ningpo was bound to come sooner or later, and on July 22nd, 
a fortnight after writing that Ningpo ought to be recapture d 
by the Imperialists, the Foreign Secretary was approving its
recapture by Her Majesty’s forces.
These two campaigns, at and around Shanghai and Ningpo, 
were all in which regular British forces were engaged against 
the rebels. But in addition to this direct intervention, 
assistance was given to the Manchu cause in a number of other 
important ways. The training of Chinese troops by British 
officers was begun at Tientsin early in 1862, and extended 
to Shanghai after the failure of .the first thirty mile radius 
campaign. The co-operation of the Imperial authorities in 
this project was not altogether whole-hearted, from their 
fear that the troops trained in this way would become diffi­
cult for Chinese officers to handle, and Staveley complained 
at the numbers and quality of the troops provided for train­
ing at Shanghai. Bruce was fearful lest British action of 
this sort provoke the jealousy of other rowers, and would have 
preferred to see officers of a smaller treaty power (he
suggested Prussia) carry it out, but it was actually done
(2)
by English and French officers during 1862 and 1863.
(1) For details of the situation at Ningpo seV MP" 1862^ (3058), 
pp 29-31? 36-^0, Mf-52 and F.O.228/326. For Bruce’s and 
Russell’s approval see ibid p bO and A&P 1863 (310*+) P 35* 
Adm.1/5790 Hope to Admiralty May 11, 1862, has a map of 
the action. For accounts of it see L.Brine The Taeping 
Rebellion in China (1862) pp 312-36 and A.E.Wilson The 
Ever Victorious Army (1868) ch.7*
(2) On training of Chinese troops see F.O.17/370 Bruce to 
Russell Feb.23,1862 and A&P 1863 (310*0- pp.l6,2*f,*f2-3* On 
Nov.10, 1862, Bruce reported to Russell that he had recommen­
ded Prince Kung, ”to avoid jealousies by engaging Prussian 
officers as instructors.,,..Prussia, as representing the
Zollverein and the states of Northern Germany,has a.large, 
trade, and has no navy, and her officers arevless liEely to
mix in political questions in China than those of any other 
Treaty Power". See also A&P 186V  (3295), p.68.
Again, in March, 1862, a large body of troops from Tseng
Kuo-fan’s forces were transported down the Yangtze from
Anking to Shanghai, in order to assist in the defence of the
treaty port and its perimeter, in British trading vessels
chartered for the purpose-by the Chinese authorities. This
appears to have been the main occasion upon which aid was
given in this way. Hope approved the firms owning the
vessel^s undertaking the commission, "provided the permission
is looked upon as entirely exceptional", and Medhurst asked
for Bruce's approval of what would, he noted, amount to "a
violation of the Neutrality Ordinance". Later attempts by
British shinowners to charter vessels to the Manchu authorities
( 1)
at Ningpo for the same purpose appear to have been discouraged.
Aid was also given by supplying Manchu forces with arms. 
Early in 1862 Ward's force had been provided with arms and 
supplies at cost price, while Bruce applied for musket and 
field guns from India. The arms supplied seem to have been 
chiefly of the kind going out of use in the British array at 
this time - smooth bore muskets and old-fashioned field guns,
(1) On transport of Chinese forces in British vessels see 
A & P  1862 (2992) pn 9-10. and F.O.228/329 Medhurst to 
Bruce Dec.19?1862. There is evidence suggesting that 
Bruce disapproved of the transport of the Chinese troops 
down the Yangtze - see F.O.17/372 Bruce to Russell June 
10, 1862 enc.letter from Wyndham, May 20,1862. Private 
vessels were contracted for the Ever Victorious Army, 
however - see A & P  186** (3295) pp* 139-^0.
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not the Enfield rifle or the Armstrong shell firing gun.
As to their extent, it is difficult to get any clear idea,
but it was fairly substantial. Staveley reported in November,
1862, that the Ever Victorious Army had recently received
"10,000 stand of arms, 12 twelve-pounder guns and 1,000,000
round of ammunition", and at the same time reported his
intention to sell to the Manchu authorities at Shanghai,
"at a valuation", the arms and accoutrements of two regiments
(2)leaving for India. '
Quite as important as the provision of arms for the
Kanchus were the measures taken to prevent their reaching
the rebels. In July, 1862, Staveley called attention to
the large smuggling trade in arms being carried on by Western
traders, and reported that deserters from rebel forces claimed
that ten ner cent had muskets or rifles, though these were
(3)later said, to be of "inferior description".  ^ In July 
Bruce requested that action be taken at Hong Kong and Singapore 
to stop supplies of arms being acquired by traders at those 
ports, and this was accordingly done by the Colonial and
(1) When the India Office asked the F.O. about Buuce's request 
for muskets and field guns Russell said it should be 
granted, provided the field guns were not Armstrongs
(F.0.17/376 Nov.21-2, 1862).
(2) F.O.17/375 enc. in Bruce to Russell Nov.25, 1862.
(3) A & P I863 PP 25?*t2, 102-3. Forrest reported in l86l 
that "the foreign arms of which (the rebels) have a large 
quantity, are far more dangerous to themselves than their 
enemies". (A & P l86l (28*+0) p.28).
India Office at the request of the Foreign Office.
Further, on January 1st, 1863, new regulations for trade on
the Yangtze came into force which specifically forbade
foreign trade at any point on the river apart from Chinkiang,
Kiukiang and Hankow, under rain of confiscation of both
ship and cargo. There was no question of stopping foreign
trade altogether, but a stronger determination to see that
(2)the rebels did not benefit from it was apparent.
Very important for this purpose was the scheme to provide 
the Manchu government with a,modern flotilla of ships, capable 
of enforcing these trade regulations on armed Western trad­
ing vessels. This had been suggested to the Manchu govern­
ment in l86l by Robert Kart, acting head of the Imperial 
Customs while H. NT. Lay was absent on long leave in England, 
and in 1862 Lay was instructed to buy suitable vessels and 
recruit officers and men. Bruce gave the scheme his encour­
agement, while the home government facilitated the buying 
of the vessels and removed the legal obstacles in the way by 
an Order in Council of August 30th, 1862. This authorised 
Lay and the chosen commander of the flotilla, Capt. Sherard
(1) A & P I863 (310*+) PP 58-9, 7^-5* For further corres­
pondence on this question between the F.O. and C.O. 
see F.O.17/386, **02-3 and *KL7. V
(2) See A & P 1863 (310*f)'pp 153-b and A & P l86*f (3295) p l*fl.
Osborn, to enlist British subjects for military and naval 
service under the Chinese Emperor. The chief purposes of 
the fleet referred to in these early, negotiations were the 
suppression of piracy in China waters and the policing of 
trade. For the British government these were certainly 
major reasons for its support of the scheme, for it was 
anxious to reduce the naval forces it was obliged to maintain 
in China waters to protect British trade. But there is no 
doubt that the flotilla was also intended for action against 
the rebels, and that it would have been, in effect, a substi­
tute for the direct use of British naval forces against the
(1)
rebels on the Yangtze.
In fact the Lay - Osborn flotilla was never used in 
any capacity at all in China waters, being dispersed soon 
after its arrival on account of disagreements over the terms 
under which Osborn would serve. The point at issue was 
whether he should be required to act on orders from provincial
(1) On the Lay-Osborn flotilla see A & P 1862 (3057) and A & P 
186b (327D ;  also S.F.Wright Hart and the Chinese Customs 
(1950) ch.p and J.L. Rawlins on in Parers on China No A T  
(mimeograph by Far East Department Harvard University,195°) 
Kr. J.Gerson is preparing a thesis for the University of 
London on Lay's career in China, which will deal more fully 
than has been done to date with the flotilla. On its pro­
jected use against the rebels note Osborn at a Royal 
Geographical Scty meeting - "he and his brother officers 
would never forget that they were both Christians and 
Englishmen. They were not going out simply to slaughter 
a wretched. Taiping; they had nobler motives in view, and 
he felt it v/ould be the greatest feat of his life if he 
could take a Taiping town, and be able to say that not a
Cont'd at foot of next page.
governors and commanders, as veil as from the central
government* According to a prior agreement drawn up
between Lay and Osborn, the Chinese government Was to issue
orders to the flotilla only through Lay who would, as it
were, censor them* Not surprisingly,. both the Peking
government and the provincial authorities refused to approve
such conditions of service, while Lay and Osborn also refused
to give way* Layfs argument was that ,!a European force in
the hands of local authorities would be infallibly misapplied,;
and, its immediate object accomplished, would be cast aside,
(1)
without any permanent good either to China or Europe11.
Bruce played a rather wavering role in the crisis, which was 
strictly speaking one between the Manchu government and ■ 
officers in its employ, seeing the point of view of the, 
government but also approving Osborn1s refusal to accept 
orders from provincial Chinese authorities. Lay was blamed 
for the contretemps, but the main point to note here is that 
it provided a clear illustration of the difficulties in the 
way of attempting to by-pass the authority of the great
continuing (1) from previous page
single sould had been slaughtered in itu. (London 
and China Express Dec.29* 1862, pp.76-8).
(1) this page*.
K. U. Lay Our Interests in China (186*+), p.25*
provincial officers in any plans, either for the suppression
of the rebellion or for strengthening the government of 
(1)Chiha.
The employment of British military officers, notably 
Gordon, to serve in the Ever Victorious Army is much the 
best known aspect of British action against the Taiping 
rebellion. As with the thirty mile radius scheme, the 
initiative in this matter came from some of the British 
authorities, civil and military, serving at Shanghai, not 
from Bruce or the Foreign Office. Bruce, in fact, never 
approved this kind of aid at all, but his objections were 
over-ruled by the support given to the idea by the Foreign 
Office itself.
The original commander of the force, Ward, was killed 
in fighting near Ningpo in September, 3862. Consul Medhurst 
and StaVeley were quick to advance proposals for replacing 
him by a British officer, who might improve the quality and 
discipline of what was a far from model army. Bruce
(1) MThe Chinese Government has latterly shows its inability 
or indisposition to carry out the various suggestions I 
have made for strengthening the Central power, of which 
the flotilla is only one, and it was evident that there 
was no disposition on the part of the Chinese to incorpor­
ate it into their system so as to subscribe the general 
purposes of police and revenue, but that if forced to 
accept it they would have directed it against Nankin 
and would have left it to be disorganized by the ill 
will and intrigues of the provincial authorities...fl
F.O.17/395 Bruce to Russell Nov.19, 1863»
disapproved of these proposals, thinking it preferable
that "the successor should be taken from among the officers
of the corps11, while Sear Admiral Hope, returned to Shanghai
from a visit to Japan by the beginning of October, "put a
stop to1* these early moves to place the Ever Victorious
Army under a British officer. Hope and Bruce both backed
the claims of Ward*s second in command, another American ad-
(1)
venturer named Burgevine, who was for the time appointed*
But by the end of the year the Foreign Office, h£d: learned,
through the War Office, of Medhurstfs and Staveley*s proposals.
of September, and gave its approval to these* On January
9th, 1863, a second Order in Council was issued authorising
British military officers to take service in the armed
forces of the Emperor of China, without making this depend-
(2)
ent on recruitment by Lay or.Osborn.
(1) See F.0.1/7/37^ Bruce, to Russell Oct. 13-1*+, IS62 and
F.O.228/329 Medhurst *to Bruce Sept. 25, Oct 2 6 and 9,1862.
(2) For F.O.approval of the Medhurst-Staveley proposal see 
F.O.228/319 Russell to Bruce Dec. 29, 1862. It is not 
clear whether the oOrder in Council of Jan. 9,1863, was 
directly inspired by this proposal, but I have found no 
evidence suggesting it before this time. For both the 
Orders in Council see A & P 1863 (3^1)• The main legal 
obstacle they were intended to surmount ytas the Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1819 (59 Geo.Ill c.69), though Bowring’s 
Neutrality Ordinance of 1855 was an additional complication 
The lack of any planning behind the decision to release 
British officers for. service in Chinese forces is indicated 
by the fact that by Jan.5, 1863, the F.O, was agreeing with 
Hope that Burgevine should command the E.V.A. (F.O.228/337 
Hammond to Bruce Jan.9, 1863). To complete the confusion, 
Bruce*s despatches criticising the proposal had been 
delayed by shipwreck (ibid .Jan.10).
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Before the new Order in Council was received in China
difficulties had already arisen between Burgevine and the
Chinese authorities at Shanghai over the payment of his
troops and their proposed transfer to assist in the siege
of Nanking* Burgevine was dismissed by Li Hung-chang,
who then arplied to Staveley for an officer to replace him,
and on January 22nd, 1863, an agreement was drawn up for
the ioint command of the force by Chinese and British officers,
the latter, however, still not to serve beyond the thirty
mile limit* At the end of; February news of the Order-
in Council had been received and the Ever Victorious Army
had meanwhile suffered a severe repulse at Taitsan, just
outside the thirty mile limit, partly because of uncertain- .
ties over its leadership* Staveley then reported his
intention of nutting Gordon in command, and asked how far
restrictions on his movements would apply* The Foreign
Office replied that British officers under special licence
(they were placed on half-pav, but retained their regimental
(2)
rank) might serve anywhere in China. But this was as far 
as it was prepared to go. When Staveley proposed that it 
might be well to take over the force altogether and make a
(1) A & P  lB6h (3295) pp.21-2.
(2) ibid pp*59-62.
British contingent of it, officered and paid for by the
British government from funds derived from the Shanghai
(1)
customs, the Foreign Office refused to entertain the idea* 
Bruce disapproved of the whole principle of using any 
British officers to lead Chinese forces in the field* nI 
cannot be a party, in any way, to the emnlovment of these
(2)
officers beyond the radius, either at Ningpo or Shanghae", 
he told Major General Brown, Staveley1s successor, in.June, 
at which time he was engaged in upbraiding the Peking Govern­
ment for its failure to exact strict observance of treaty 
terms from its provincial officers* - Indeed, the core of 
his objection to the system was that, apart from being likely 
to arouse the jealousy and suspicion of other treaty powers, 
it encouraged and strengthened provincial rather than central 
government independence and authority. The Ever Victorious 
Army was a force employed by and responsible to the local
(1) F*0.228/338 Russell to Bruce May. 22, 1863* Staveley later 
nroposed raising a force of 10,000 Chinese, trained and 
officered by Europeans, which Bruce considered "neither 
practicable nor expedient". (F.O. 17/39*+ Bruce to Russell 
0ct*29i 1863 and F.O.228/338-9 Layard and Russell to Bruce, 
June 26, July 20 and 31? I063).
(2) F.O.17/392 enc. in Bruce to Russell June 2?,1862. Bruce 
told Russell "If the capture of one or two strongholds 
were likely to prove a deathblow to the insurrection, and 
if on the other hand the government showed a desire to be 
guided by our advice in "Its general policy, It might be 
advisable to allow this system of co-operation, however 
imperfect, to continue. But the government shows a dis­
position rather to connive at infraction of treaty rights 
than to incur unpopularity with local authorities in 
enforcing them".
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Chinese authorities at Shanghai. It was officered by 
Europeans, mostly Americans, while Its rank and file, who 
numbered between three and five thousand about this time, 
were Chinese volunteers, known.as "false foreign devils" 
by the rebels on account of the half European uniform they 
wore.^*^ Although a troublesome and potentially dangerous 
force, quite capable of deserting en masse to the rebels,
Bruce was anxious to see it held together on account of its 
military value. But he did not wish to see-provincial control 
over It underwritten by British officers, especially through 
agreements with the local Chinese authorities which ignored 
the central government at Peking. He particularly resented 
the support given to Li Hung-chang early in 1863 by the 
British military authorities at Shanghai when'LA refused, 
to reinstate Burgevine, despite Bruce*s own advocacy of that 
adventurer*s claims to.the Peking government.
"The encouragement given to the Governor (Li Hung-chang) 
in thwarting an arrangement suggested by the foreign 
ministers and recommended by the Central Government tends 
to weaken the central executive which it is our true 
policy to strengthen", he told Russell in September,
"and thereby to render more difficult.the restoration
(1) On the E.V.A. see esp. A & P l86*f (3295) PP 26-9 and 
A.E. Wilson, opx.cit., pp.126-35*
"of Tranquillity, and less effectual our means of 
enforcing the observance of Treaties by remonstrance
(1
at Peking, instead of by violent action at the ports".
The system, he complained a few weeks later, had "invigorated
(2)
the pernicious system of provincial independent Government11 ;
Like the collapse of the Lay-Osborn scheme, the employment
of British officers to lead a provincial Chinese force was
really a defeat for Bruce’s main policy in China.
Russell did not share Brucefs objections to British
officers leading urovincial Chinese forces, and saw no reason
why they, rather than foreigners or adventurers, should not
(3)do so. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
Foreign Office, and still more the service officers in China, 
with the possible exception of Hope, who left at the end of 
1862 in any case, never fully appreciated the long term 
objectives behind Bruce’s insistence on giving only strictly 
limited aid to the Hanchus. For them the suppression of 
the rebellion tended to fee an end in itself, and they were 
always ready to stretch the limits.
(1) A & P I86lf (3295) P-156; also ibid p.96. 1 !
(2) F.O.17/39*+ Bruce to Russell Oct. 29, 1863
(3) A & P  l86lf (3295) p.69 and F.0.228/339 Russell to Bruce,
Sept. 7, I863.
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Gordon assumed command of the Ever Victorious Army in 
March, 1863, and thereafter the main British contribution 
to the defeat of the rebellion was made through the very 
considerable support given him and the other English officers 
who joined the force.^ The campaigns and difficulties 
of Stracheyfs 1 faintly smiling Englishman” have been described 
many times elsewhere. The main point to be emphasised here 
is that his victories, the chief of which was the capture of 
Soochow at the end of 1863, were the more readily gained 
because of the support provided by the regular British forces 
around Shanghai. The thirty mile radius area provided him 
with a safe base and source of supply, while in September, 1863, 
some British forces were temporarily moved up beyond the 
thirty mile limit to provide him with advanced support when 
it was feared that Burgevine, who in true adventurer fashion 
had deserted to the rebels, would succeed in fomenting a muth- 
iny within the ranks of his force. This affair led Bruce to 
complain to Elgin that Madmirals and generals have gone 
Taeping mad”, but the Foreign Office proved once again willing
(1) I have found no clear indication how many other British 
officers joined the E.V.A., but it would not appear to
have been many. See Palmerston cit. below p 221-2, 
and C. Beatty, his Country was the World (195^) pp?0-l.
( 1 )
to condone service initiative. Gordon went on to capture
Soochow and, in May 186k, Changchow, after which the Ever 
Victorious Army was disbanded, to the relief of nearly all 
parties. By that time the Orders in Council authorising 
British service in the Emperors forces had been withdrawn.
The repeal, on March 1st, 186k, of the two Orders in 
Council was prompted by reports of the execution, on the 
•orders of Li Hung-chang, of the Taiping Wangs who had 
surrendered Soochow to Gordon after he had promised them 
safe conducts. Gordon himself was so outraged by this 
affair that for a time he threw up his command, but even­
tually resumed it again, asking 1 However ungrateful or hope­
less it may be to try and redeem the Mandarins, do we better 
matters by having the Rebels back again? The one has some 
Government, the others have none”.^' But a considerable 
outcry had been raised among foreign observers, a netting
(1) See A & P  186k (329?) pp l?3-k, 1?7 and F.O.228/339 
Russell to Bruce"Nov. lb, 1863 - "Under present circum­
stances British officers on full pay should be allowed 
to join the force under Major Gordon1s command and to 
serve beyond the 3C mile radius”. Bruce wrote to Elgin 
111 am labouring against ray instructions to preserve the 
country being drifted into fresh Chinese complications.
But admirals and generals have gone Taening $ad. I try 
to prevent British officers serving beyond the radius 
around :the ports, and I am overborne by orders from home” 
Bruce to Elgin Nov.8, 1863 in Elgin Correspondence (Broom- 
hall). On the importance of Chinese andforeign assistance 
to Gordon note 8hen Lien-chjh Rble du General C.G.Gordon 
dans la repression de 11Insurrectjon des Thai Phing (1933) 
esp. p.lOk and Conclusion.
(2) F.G.17A 07 enc. in Bruce to Ptussell Feb. 12, 186k; also 
A & P  186k (3k08).
of consuls at Shanghai condemning Li’s action .as ,one of
1 extreme treachery, abhorrent to human nature". The
British government had already faced a great deal of
criticism at home for its,policy of intervention,■and had
several times shown itself anxious to avoid the charge of
implicitly condoning atrocities* In Hay, 1862, when first
approving a policy of direct aid, Ruseell had insisted
that it be impressed upon Prince Rung "that if he sanctions
cruel and indiscriminate punishments he will entirely lose
the support of the British authorities", and there was more
than one enquiry into charges of this kind before the Soochow 
(2)
incident. This provided the occasion for the repeal
of the Orders in Council, the first of which had in any 
case become pointless after the collapse of the Lay-Osborn 
scheme. In doing this the British government does not 
annear to have been anticipating the imminent defeat of the
j. ’ -
rebellion, though its eventual defeat wras becoming clear.
The reasons given in the House of Commons by Palmerston were 
simply the "disgraceful*1 conduct of the Manchu officials 
and the fact that only Gordon and "one or two other persons"
(1) A. & P 1861* (3295) pp.192-3
(2) F.0.328/318 Russell to Bruce May 6, 1862. For .•• 
enquiries about atrocities see A & P I863 (3105-) PP 70-1, 
78, 112-19 and A a P 1861* (329?) pp 108-10, 116-22, 126.
had taken advantage of the Orders. They were accord­
ingly repealed, but without first advising or consulting 
Bruce, who was quick to point out ”the grave complications 
that may arise, if orders that amount to a change of policy 
are based unon the conduct of a provincial governor, with­
out awaiting the result of a reference to the Government
(2)
at Peking through Eer Majesty’s Renresentatjve”. The
"change&f policy” was not complete, since the British Gov­
ernment was presumably still ready to use its forces to 
defend a thirty mile area around the treaty norts. But 
the withdrawal of the Orders in Council represented a sort 
of half step backwards towards the old policy of limited 
neutrality. Intervention had not been a popular policy in 
England itself, and the government appears to have been glad 
to begin to contract out of it before the rebellion was 
finally destroyed.
By the time of the repeal of the Orders in Council the 
rebellion was in fact facing destruction. The armies of 
Tseng Kuo-fan, actually under the command of his brother 
Tseng Kuo-ch’Ran, had begun their siege of Nanking in May,
(1) P.D. vol I7*f (l86Lh) col. 1V73; also A £ P 186>+ (3295)
pp 198-9
(2) P.O. 17A 08 Bruce to Russell June 8, 186*+.
1862, and were slowly tightening their grip upon that city. 
Other armies, of which the Ever Victorious was one, were 
pushing the rebels back from the coastal provinces they had 
over-run in i860 and 1861. The rebellion was slowly con­
tained within a shrinking area of territory between Nanking, 
Soochow and Hangchow.^  The wisest policy to have followed 
in such a situation, and that recommended by the Chung Wang,
would have been to staee a ’’Long March” to some other area
(2)
and there to establish a new base, but Hung Hsiu-ch’iian 
refused to abandon his proclaimed capital. With the fall 
of Soochow in December, 1863, and of Hangchow in March, 186 k, 
the main rebel force was bottled up in Nanking and destroyed 
there in July. A few remnants fled southward and maintained 
the struggle a little longer, but to all intents the Taiping 
rebellion as a serious threat to Manchu rule ended in the 
middle of 186k-.
The main British contribution to this had been the 
denial to the rebels of any chance to capture Shanghai and 
its rich revenues, or to establish themselves firmly in the 
coastal provinces after their expulsion from the central
(1) See maps in W.L.Bales, op.cit.
(2) Hail, op. cit., p2kk, says Tseng Kuo-fan's ”annaconda” 
strategy was designed to prevent this.
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Yangtze valley. Tt is impossible to deny the great 
importance of this aid to the Manchus, who would at least 
have had a. longer struggle to defeat the rebellion but for 
it, Vet it should also be said that there were limits set 
to the extent of this a^ ’d by the British government, even 
though it was indulgent towards the tendency of some of 
its arents to ?o beyond those limits* that it was aid
v -* v-1 */ 7
given and withdrawn in an unplanned, unco-ordinated, at 
times'almost haphazard fashion; and that it was aid intended 
in part to serve as a steering stone towards stronger govern­
ment in China. Insofar as it can be said to have had ends 
beyond merely helping to crush the Taiptng rebellion, the 
ritish policy of intervention was a failure. It helped in 
ca~f to preserve a corrupt, reactionary and incapable govern­
ment, not to create a more efficient one. But it is a great 
oven simplification to suggest that it was a nolicy designed 
to preserve the Manchu government because it was weak and 
corrunt. Re stilts are no sure guide to motives.
(1) This seems to be the assumption behind such judgments as
that of C.' .Fitzgerald (C h i n a 19?0 edn, rp that
the alliance with the Manchus was one of the rtmost discred­
itable in the history of Si no-European relations11, and that 
the unreformed Manchus were assisted as part of 1 the cynical 
policy of western imperialism in 1860”. There was certain- 
lv nothin? verv hi^h minded about the British nolicv of 
intervention on behalf of the ' ancshus, but a nositive and 
conscious desire to keen China as weak and. backward as 
possible does not seem to me to have been part of it.
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CHAPTER VII 
REASONS FOR BRITISH INTERVENTION
The basic reason for British intervention against the 
Taiuing rebellion is agreed upon by all historians of the 
subject, whatever view they take of the rights or wrongs 
of that, intervention. England intervened from motives of 
cure self-interest, in defence of the treaty rights she 
had exacted from the Manchu government in the wars of l§k0-2 
and 18B6-60. The real question is why those rights, and 
especially the trade which had developed under them, were 
felt to be seriously threatened by the rebellion by 1862.
Some of the reasons which have been advanced in answer
to this question seem to me to attempt to force nineteenth
century issues and events too rigidly into twentieth century
categories of thought, while others, although the kind of
reasons which could well have operated in the minds of those
responsible for the British policy at that time, are difficult
to establish convincingly from the evidence of official reports 
(1)and papers. So long as one is convinced that British
intervention was a long intended nolicy, then it is necessary
(1) For examples of the arguments examined in this chapter 
see Introduction above.
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to find deep laid, long nourished reasons for it. But it 
would seem that the farther one stands back from the detailed 
historical record, the easier it is to see these.
The argument that the British government acted against 
the rebellion because it feared it as a popular national 
movement which would establish a strong government upon 
which British demands would be less successfully pressed than 
upon the weak and unpopular Manchu government, is open to 
objection on several counts. Whether in fact the Talpings 
would have been able to establish such a government had they 
succeeded in overthrowing the Manchus, British officials in 
China certainly did not believe that they were at all likely 
to do so. Not nationalism but anarchy was what they most 
feared.
’’The overthrow of the Government by the insurgents as
at present constituted”, Bruce wrote in Nay, 1862, "will
be the commencement of a state of anarchy and disorganization
by the side of which the condition of China during the last
ten years, will appear to have been one of prosperity and
peace. Its unity as an Empire will disappear, and the
disjointed members will turn to foreign protection for t.h e
tranquillity which they will look for in vain among con-
(1)tending native factions”.
(1) A & P 1863 (310k) p 9.
Indeed, it was the conviction that the Taiping movement had 
by this stage lost any popular support it might once have 
enjoyed that became one of the justifications used for aiding 
in its suppression. After receiving reports of the repulse 
by the mass of the populace of an attempt by the rebels to 
capture Chusan Island early in 1862, Russell wrote, 1 It 
was obvious that unless the Chinese would themselves act, 
it was useless for foreigners to try and rid the country of 
the Taipings; but now that a spirit of resistance to these
scourges is shown, we ought to help the people and encour-
(1)
age their Government to resist their destructive progress”.
The standard by which the rebels were judged in this 
respect by British officials tended to be very much a 
nineteenth century, liberal standard.
”The right of the Taepings to be considered as a political 
body, as distinguished from a mere force, will be 
established by the adhesion of the wealthy and trading 
class of the natives” Bruce wrote in January, 1862.
”This is the best test to apply to the claims of the
various pretenders to supreme force who are found in 
different parts of China: and it is desirable that this
(1) A & P 1862 (3058) p 16: cf. also Bruce, cit. above p.142 ,
l,The ’hundred names* and they alone must settle the question”.
"species of national recognition should precede any
(1)
more intimate relations between us and them”.
A middle class national movement of resistance to the Manchus, 
imagining such to have been possible in China at that time, 
would have won recognition and probably encouragement, but 
a peasant revolt, almost by definition, was not national.
In any case, by 1862, a claim to any kind of popular support, 
gentry, traders or peasants, was denied the Taipings by 
British officials in China. They merely represented "the 
dangerous classes”.
Admitting the limitations of this view of the movement, 
it is important not to assume that the attitude of mid­
nineteenth century British imperialism towards national mov e- 
ments in trading areas was identical with its later attitude. 
About i860 Utilitarian-Benthamite views on empire and trade 
still predominated in British political and economic thinking, 
and although the tide was beginning to turn towards imperial 
protectionism an optimistic belief in the existence of a 
natural world market was still almost axiomatic. The main 
obstacle in the way of the free working of this market was 
not nationalism but Mercantilism, which survived in the
~(1) A ft P 1862 (2976) pl^3; cf. also P.D.vol 165 (1862) col. 
1807, where the Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Layard, denied that the rebellion was a patriotic 
Chinese movement of resistance to the Manchus on the ground 
that "not a single Chinese of respectability- not a man 
of landed property, literature, or of trade - had joined 
the rebels”.
policies of autocratic, out-dated governments such as that
(1)of China. Popular movements of revolt against govern­
ments of this kind were to he encouraged rather than other­
wise, as had been done in the case of the South American 
renublics and Italy. The Taipings had anneared in something 
of this light in 1853? and if they failed to win consistent 
British approval this was not on account of any suspected 
nodern-type economic hationalism in the movement but on 
account of its failure, in the eyes of the British government, 
to promise the basic political.ana social conditions for trade 
The extension of this argument from nationalism in China 
to the suggestion that fear of the Taipings as the vanguard 
of nationalist movements throughout Asia influenced the 
official British view of the rebellion is even more difficult 
to accept. Whether or not the Mutiny in India was in any 
sense an ’echo1 of the Taiping rebellion, the connection does 
not seem to have been drawn at the time. The only suggestion 
of a fear that India might be stirred by events in China 
that I have met with was the alarm of the Times” in September 
1.859? lest news of the British repulse at Taku 1 fly through
China....(and) agitate all the bazaars in India, and penetrate
(2)
even the ravines of Fepaul”. But neither the Times nor
(1) On the ] ercantilist type policies of the Manchu government 
see C.J.Ch’en The State Economic Policies of the Ch’in? 
Government. 18^ +0-95 (U.of L. thesis, T9567.
(2) See MTimes1 Sept. 16-17 and. Oct 22,1859* On Aug. 15,1853? 
in a leader praising the rebellion as a national movement 
of resistance to foreign rulers, ’’Times.” suggested it
cont’d on next page......
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any other observer seems to have seen the Taipings as having
this kind of influence* The usual line of argument was,
indeed, not from events in China to their effects in India,
but rather the reverse. England’s expensive military and
political committments in India, acquired in the first place
by interfering in the internal struggles of that country,
were frequently cited as warnings against becoming involved
(1)in a similar way in China, while Wade used the Indian 
parallel to warn the Manchus away from direct foreign inter­
vention at the beginning of 1861. If the Mutiny in India 
and the Taiping rebellion were the first two waves of the 
rising tide of Asian nationalism, the latter at least was 
not seen In those terms by British officialsconcerned with 
policy in China about i860*
Another rather anachronistic argument is that which 
suggests that British hostility was provoked by the Socialistic 
element in the Taiping programme. This feature of the rebell­
ion was certainly observed by British officials, at least in
its early years. Bowring, for example, noted in 185^ that
"an absolute community of goods and no right of property"
continuing (2) from previous page....
might have some importance for India - not in stimulating 
a similar movement there, however, but in possible frontier 
disputes in Tibet, if Manchu control was removed.
(1) this page.. See below cc. 8 and 10 for examples, pp 2 8% 37 7*
386.
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was reported to exist among the rebels, while in 1856
Alcock wrote of "a saturnalia of social anarchists1’ as
(1)
like!v to result from success of the rebellion. But
V
for the most nart official rerortsdid not credit the rebels
with having any sustained and organised social system. The
few which indicated otherwise did not suggest that the
economic system of the rebels was fundamentally different
from that nrevailing under the Manchus. Robertson in 1857
reported that under the rebels “the Husbandman cultivates
his land and the produce accrues to himself”, while Forrest
in l86l simply reported monthly exactions of tribute from
(2)
the villages, but not more. Bruce expressed the fear that 
if the rebels triumphed China would be ‘’reduced to a mass 
of agriculturists governed by a theocracy”, and insofar as 
he credited them with any social system at all it was its 
agrarianism, not its socialism, which alarmed him. There 
would simply be no nlace for trade and industry in a Taiping 
state. Bruce was, it may be added, rather sceptical of the 
sincerity of the proposals brought forward by Fung’s cousin,
(1) F.0.228/lob Bowring to Clarendon June 11,185ft-5 and 
Bombay Quarterly Review April, 1886, p297*
(2) See above np H7^and 5 . T.T.Meadows, in his book The 
Chinese and their Rebellions 0 856) p^57 noted the tenden­
cies toward a primitive communism in the rebellion, but
he presented it chiefly as a ’’politico-religious” move­
ment .
Hung Jen-kan, for the introduction of western science, and
(1)
thought these merely a move to win western sympathy.
Difficult to accent, save as a very general consideration 
in the minds of British officials, is the argument that fear 
of action by other rowers prompted British intervention.
Had such action actually occurred before 1862 it is probable 
that it would have been a sufficient cause for British action 
also, but Hail’s suggestion that the mere prospect of Russian 
Intervention at the beginning of l86l was a major reason 
for the change in British policy is not supported by the 
evidence of Wade’s talks in Pekinr.or by Bruce’s desnatches 
at the time. Bruce, in fact, rather discounted the danger 
of extensive aid from the Russians, arguing in July, 1862, 
for example, that
’’though T have no reason to doubt they will see with 
pleasure the suppression of the insurrection, I do not 
apprehend that they are likely to be active in promoting 
any serious improvement of the Chinese forces in the 
North of China. I think there is a feeling among them 
that the Chinese, well disciplined and armed, would 
require to be treated with management, and that territor­
ial questions would not be so easy of settlement if her
(2)
national forces were more developed”,
O.V A f- P 1861 (27*?Tf) pt> 91,131 and A P 1862 (2976) p.52.'
(2) P.O.17/372 Bruce to Russell Julv 2, 1862, and F.O.i7/370
Bruce to Russell April 13? Ioo2.
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Bruce certainly counted both France and Russia as powers
which would be less inclined than England to look upon the
break up of China as a misfortune, but with him this kind
of fear worked in favour of the idea of limiting the extent
of British intervention lest their ambitions be provoked.
The Foreign Office was advised about possible Russian moves
by the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, and was naturally
interested in the question. But the practical difficulties
in the way of effective Russian assistance in the Yangtze
area were recognised, and there was no alarm expressed at the
idea of the Russians ousting the British from their trade
(2)on the river. ' Insofar as fear of other powers stealing
a march on her existed, it was a general rather than a specific
fear on England's part, and was not an immediate or major
reason for the adoption of a policy of intervention in 1862.
The argument that the British government intervened in
defence of the opium trade, and especially in defence of the
revenue derived from that trade by the government of India,
seems obviously to have much truth in it. About one sixth
of the Governments revenue in India at this time came from
(1)the trade in opium, while the strict prohibition of opium
(!) F.0.17/373 Bruce* to" Russell July 8 , 1862V
(2) For reports on Russian interest see F.0.228/318 Russell 
to Bruce March 25 and April 8 , 1862; F.0.228/337 Russell 
to Bruce ^eb.23, 1863; also A & P 1863 (310*+) pp 121,155.
(3) See Appendix B, Table 7*
s moking was a well known feature of Taiping rule, whereas 
the anchu government had agreed to legalize the trade in 
18^8. It is when one comes to look for precise evidence 
to sunport this argument from general considerations that 
difficulties arise.
In the first nlace, it is to be remembered that the pro­
hibition of opium smoking under severe nenalties was no new 
thing in China, and not in itself likely to cause great 
alarm to opium traders who were well used to smuggling in 
the drug with the connivance of many Chinese. In June, 185*+ 
nowring considered that,
"with reference to the one great article of imuort, ouium 
it is most likely that the general disorganization will 
tend to rromote rather than diminish its sale. The 
severe nenalties proclaimed by Tae-ning-wang aeainst
the use of the drug will urobably be just as inoperative
. (1>as all the Imperial thunderings have been", 
further, the effect of the rebellion upon the trade does 
not seem to have occasioned great alarm among traders. In 
Kay, I8565 the head of Jardine, Fatheson & Co., one of the 
greatest opium houses in China, noted that the rebels were 
"making head again" near Shanghai.
(1) P.O.228/16*+ Bowring to Clarendon June 8, 188*+.
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“It is somewhat difficult to form any very decided
opinion as to the future from the contradictory reports
current as to the strength and intentions of the Rebels11,
he wrote, "but I am inclined to think that the demand
for opium will not be materially interfered with for
any length of time, from the experience the dealers have
had in finding outlets for it in the event of the usual
(1)
channels being closed or partly so”.
A few months later the firm!s agent at Shanghai commented on
a report that opium was being smoked at Nanking that this
(2)
"will probably swell their numbers considerably11.
After i860 especially, when many more English observers 
visited the rebels, friend and foe alike agreed unon the 
continued prevalence of the habit,
"Though the use of opium is strictly forbidden", wrote 
Rev. Griffith John, a missionary who was a strong 
advocate of the rebel cause, after a visit to Soochow 
in i860, "yet we know that it is largely consumed by 
them. Both the common soldiers and many of the chiefs 
partake of it freely.... Continued applications were
(1) J.M. & Co., Private Letter Book (185^-6) p 186, to 
R.S.Cowie, May 9? 18$6. The copies of the letters are 
unsigned, but they were probably from David Jardine.
(2) ibid., Local Correspondence - (Shanghai), Jan.9, 1857*
( 1 )
made for opium and arms".
Tn May, l86l, Parkes reported that opium was freely smoked
(2)outside the walls of Nanking,' ' while in February, 1862,
the North China and Japan Market Report argued that although
it had been generally supposed that the rebels abstained
from the use of opium, "this is contradicted by everyone
who has come into contact with them, for it is one of the
first things they ask for when they meet foreigners". It
added, in fine yellow press style, "it would appear that
they greedily use opium to excite themselves in committing
(3)the atrocities they do". Whatever the truth of that,
there was certainly some truth in its other claim, for 
comments on the continued interest of the rebels in opium
(V)
re very common in contemporary British reports upon them.
(1) cit. R.Wardlaw Thompson Griffith John (1907)? p.137*
(2) A c: P 1862 (2976) p26; cf.ibid.pp5S-7; also S.Lane-Poole, 
op.cit., vol I pp ^21-2.
(3) A & P 1862 (2976) p 15^.
(*+) For other official comments note A & P 1859 3ess 2 (2571) 
pA5l, where Wade reports a conversation with a Cantonese - 
"He himself smoked and so, he said, do one-third of the 
people of Nankin; not openly, however, for indulgence in 
the vice is forbidden by law, nor is the drug openly sold;" 
also A & P l86l (275^) pl60, Bruce to Russell Sept.2C,lP6C - 
"Beyond what is required to clothe their troops, the insur­
gents seem to buy little but opium and arms".
For firsthand, unofficial comments on the rebels interest 
in opium still, see L.Oliphant Narrative of the Earl of 
Elgin's Mission (1859) vol.II, p.330; G.J.Wolseley Narrative 
of the War in China in i860 (1862) pp 3^ '7-B ("To say that the 
(Taipings) deserve any praise for their proclaimed laws 
prohibiting the use of opium is absurd....it will be laughed 
at by every man who has lately paid the Yang-tse-kiang a 
visit at any point where the rebel territories touch upon it.
Cont’d at foot of next cage....
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By the time British intervention against the rebellion
actually occurred, therefore, it is safe to say that there
was considerable scepticism among British observers, official
(1)
and non-official, about this ’aspect of the rebellion. Nor
have I found any evidence of pressure being nut upon the 
British Government to act against it for the sake of the 
opium trade or revenue, although it could no doubt be argued 
that it djd not need to be urged to do so. Yet the absence 
of any evidence of such pressure weakens the argument that 
opium was a conscious or major issue for the British govern­
ment. Jardine, Matheson & Co. were, in fact, very critical 
of the policy of intervention, and there is some evidence also 
that J. Dent., of Dent & Co., the second of the great opium 
houses, also opposed the policy. In fact the whole argument 
that the China merchants in general and the opium merchants
(k) from previous page cont’d...
We visited many such places, and at all, as at Nankin, 
the great cry was for opium and arms”.); also Wesleyan 
Missionary Notices Kay 1862 p 71? (where Retf.J.Cox reported 
his guide in Nanking as pointing out two streets and say­
ing ’’Canton men live here; they all smoke opium”); cf. 
on the other hand A.F.Lindley, op.cit., vol II pp 
who says all offenders were punished with decapitation. 
Lindley’s experience of the Taipings was mainly with the 
Chung Wang’s forces, in which discipline and organisation 
were probably better than elsewhere.
(1) this page...
Note, for example, that even an article highly favourable to 
the Taipings in the London Quarterly Review Apr.,l86l, stated 
(p232) that, ’’With regard to the provisions directed against 
opium, we have good reason to believe that the Tae Pings are 
not faithful to their principles; but that, on the contrary,
Cont'd at foot of next page..
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in particular urged such a policy upon the government is open
. .  T1 CDto challenge.
Nor does it appear that the British government in India
advocated intervention against the rebellion, though it
certainly did not oppose it, as did many of the merchants.
India Office correspondence about 1860-2, both with the Foreign
Office in London and the Finance Department in India itself,
(2)
reflects no great alarm for the future of the opium revenue. 
Such doubts as existed came from the anti-opium campaign in 
England, rather than from any prospect of political change 
in China. But the Times of India, a pro-Talping paper, 
felt by October, 1862, that the opium revenue was at last
(3)
safe from the “ignorant opposition” of English philanthropists,
continuing (1) from previous page..
our unscrupulous countrymen who trade in it find a good
market among them as among Imperialists”.
(1) this page... See below, chap.8. 6n Dent and Jardine, Mathe-
son as the two leading opium houses at this time note 
Letters and Journals of James. 8th Earl of Elpin (1872) 
ed. T. Walrond, p.226, and. J.K.Fairbank, op.cit., p 226.
(2) This statement is based on an examination of correspondence 
in the India Office Library (Letters to India on Finances 
1860-k; financial Letters from India 1860-3: and Home
Correspondence: Political and Secret 1860-k), as well
as of the 'Domestic Various” volumes in the F.O. files 
in the P.R.O., which include F.O.-India Office correspond­
ence on affairs relating to China.
(3) Times of India Oct. 20, 1862; for the pro-rebel, anti­
intervention sentiments of this paper see also March 22,
May J and June 27? 1862 and Feb.21, 1863.
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while Samuel Laing, Financial Member of Council in the
Government of Tndia from the end of i860 until 1862, saw
"no reason why the revenue derived by India from opium
should be considered more precarious than that derived by
(1)
England from gin and tobacco.1 On the other hand,
Laing was also the author of a pamphlet, published in 1863,
in which he emphasised "how intimately the urosperity of
India and the course of trade between India, and England are
affected by the commercial relations between India and China11,
and argued in favour of intervention against the rebellion.
But Laing did not specifically attack the rebels for being
anti-opium, and referred only to their "devastations1 destroy-
(2)
ing the prospects of trade in general. The argument from
opium seems to me at least not -proven.
The crux of the problem from the point of view of the 
British government was the destruction and disruption which 
accompanied the rebellion and was believed to be central to 
it. It was basically a question of law and order..
"It anpears to Her Majesty!s Government, after a 
long experience, that the Taipings are incapable of 
establishing a regular authority or of giving protection 
to the peaceable ihhabitants of the country they over- 
CD cit. R. Temple Men and Events of Mv Tims in India (1882),
p.220.
(2) S. Laing England!s Mission in the Far East (1863) esp. 
pp.^9-5?•~
"Pun with their savage hordes% Russell wrote in 
Kay, 1862, "Her Majesty*s Government therefore consider 
it a duty, within the limits I have mentioned, to favour
the restoration of order "^^
The primary concern was, of course, not to protect the
"peaceable inhabitants", but British treaty rights and trading
(2)
prospects. These faced "practical annihjlation" in the
"process of demolition" which accompanied the rebellion,
Bruce wrote in April, 1862, adding
"Any nolicv in China founded on the assumption (which 
is generally the true one in civil contests) that 
tranquillity will be restored as soon as one of two 
political bodies contending for mastery has triumphed 
over the other, is founded upon a complete misappre­
hension of the character and composition of the 
Taeping Insurrection. The experience of several years, 
and the testimony of all foreigners who have been among 
them, show that they are unable to govern..., I do not 
think any grounds exist for assuming that a regular 
government can spring out of the anarchical and disorderly 
elements which constitute the physical force of the 
insurrection. An impassable gulf separates it from
(1) F.O.228/318 Russell to Bruce May 6, 1862,
(2) "Horrible as the proceedings of the Taepings are, murdering 
as they do men, women and children whever they go, it is for 
the Imperial authorities and not for E.K.G. to protect the
cont’d at foot of next page..
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(1)
”the orderly and industrious part of the population”.
The justice and correctness of this view need not be debated 
here. It was, by 1862, firmly established as the consular- 
foreign Office view of the rebellion, the product of a whole 
series of reports and observations which went back to at 
least 185^5 and confirmed into dogma by the experience of 
attempting to treat with the rebellion during l86l.
To this frequently expressed conviction that the 
rebellion would dimply destroy the basic, elementary con­
ditions for treaty relations and trade in China must be added 
the suspicion that, assuming the rebels did establish some 
kind of p-overnment over China, they we re likely to prove 
more difficult to handle that the Manchus themselves. Bonham 
had expressed the opposite hone in 18^3? but in general Taiping 
professions of friendliness and brotherhood towards foreigners
were not much believed in. This was partly the result of 
some
the idea among/British officials that the native Chinese were
more deeply dyed in assumptions of universal supremacy over
the ”outer barbarians” than were officials of Kanchu race.
Whether a Chinese dynasty would be more favourable to foreign
interests than the Manchu was not certain, Alcock wrote in
continuing (2) from previous page....
subjects of the Emperor from Taeping atrocities. You will 
be careful, therefore, to distinguish those cases in regard 
to which we have a right and obligation from those in which 
we have neither”. (Russell to Bruce Nov.26,1862, in A & P
1863 (310V), ^.93)*
(1) this page A & P 1862 (3058) p.19.
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January, 1853? but Mso far as our experience extends of the 
two races, the Tartars have been the less bigoted and blind
(1)
in their prejudice against Foreign intercourse of the two,.'1
Bruce also came strongly to the conclusion that the rebels
vere indeed v/orse in this respect than the Manchus, though
iore on grounds of religion than of race.
‘’The pretensions of the Taipings are more extravagant
than those of the Imperial Government; their Head issues
declarations of the divine will to natives and foreigners,
and the subordinate chiefs publish decrees inviting
obedience to this divinely constituted Power. But as
vet there is no evidence o^ a recognition of the Treatv
rirhts of foreigners, or of a wish to conciliate their
(2)
friendship by respecting and considering their interests.1 
The fear that the Taipings would not acknowledge British 
treaty rights in China was certaihly present, and helped 
incline British policy in favour of the Kanchus. But this 
•Tear seems to have rested, not on any assessment of fervently 
nationalist political principles among the rebels so much as 
on the suspicion.that their racial and religious assumptions 
would lead them to assert claims to some kind of universal
( 1 )  F . O .228/161 Alcock to Bowring Jan. 2*+, 1853; of. also
J. Bov/ring Autobjographical Recollections (1877) PP 226-7.
(2) A & P 1863 (310*0 p.9.
supremacy over "tributary" nations. Treaty relations with
such a rower would be quite as difficult as they had ever
(1)
been with the Manchus.
Religious considerations pure and simple did not count 
for much in British policy towards the rebellion. The 
"blasphemy" and "superstitions" of the rebels were sometimes 
denounced in official reports and statements, but it can 
^airly be said that the British government was not very deeply 
concerned whether a "Christian" or a "heathen" government 
ruled in China, so long as it was a stable and friendly 
government which offered no obstacles to the development 
of British trade. Indeed, one of the points made against 
the rebels by Bruce was that their religious principles made 
them quite unacceptable to the mass of the Chinese people, 
and therefore the less likelv ever to establish a stable
V'
government. In Bruce’s view, the Manchus, though hardly
popular, were at least more acceptable to the Chinese people,
(2)
because they preserved Chinese traditional beliefs. As
(1) Note, for example, Bruce to Russell Feb.23, 1852, in 
F.O.17/370 - "A Divine Commission to rule the world 
engrafted on the contempt and arrogance characteristic 
of the low Cantonese type would speedily display itself 
in pretensions and in indifference to treaty privileges 
which would embroil us with them"; see also A & P1862 
(2976), p.56.
(2 ) "The profession of novel doctrines resting on the testimony 
of a modern and obscure individual must tend not only to 
deprive the revolt of its character as a national rising 
against the Tattar yoke, but must actually transfer to the 
Tartars and their adherents the prestige of upholding nation­
al tradition and principles against the assaults of a numer­
ically insignificant sect". (Bruce to Russell Aug.l, I06C m
A i- Pl86l (275*0 n.91); also A&P 1862 (2976) pp52-3,and
above p  13.) n
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far as possible Bruce wished to dissociate the British 
government from the activities of the Christian missionaries 
in China, being convinced that,
"foreign Governments will most effectually serve 
Christianity in China by abstaining from protecting 
it as if it were a matter in which they have an inter­
est, for the Chinese Government do not yet understand
that Governments can be interested in this question
„ (1)except In a political sense'.
Russell approved these views. There was thus no tendency
in British policy, as there was in French, to set out to
(2)
serve the advancement of Western Christianity in China. 
Suonression of the rebellion was certainly not undertaken 
in that spirit on the British side.
If the advancement of Christianity was no part of the 
ritish government ' s policy on this question, the advance­
ment of trade certainly was. As a motive for British action 
against the rebellion, however, it was the prospect rather 
than the fact of disruption to trade in China by the rebels 
which dhiefly counted. Up to the time when intervention 
became British policy there had been no serious and lasting
(1) A <L PlB'63 (310V) p.33; ibid.pT^-3 for Russell's agreement.
(2) Cn the importance of religious considerations on French 
policy in China at this time see Cady, op.cit., pp.129-30, 
139* Tong Ling-tchTouang, op.cit., pp 229-^; and Prosper 
Giquel La Politique Francaise en Chine depuis les traites
de 1858 et de i860 (I872) pp U~6.
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disturbance to foreign trade in China which could be clearly 
nut down to the effects of the rebellion. T. R. Banister, 
in his Historv of the External Trade of China has written,
’’The total effect o~r the Taiping Rebellion on the foreign 
trade of China is, of course, incalculable; the develop­
ment that night nave taken place if the sources of supply 
had not been devastated and if widespread ruin and im­
poverishment had not cut down demand can only remain a 
matter for speculation”.
But he is obliged to add, ”It is remarkable that, even in
spite of the fact that (about 1858)...this terrible and
ruinous civil war was at its height, so much progress in 
foreign trade has actually to be recorded. Inis remains
true even beyond 1858 and up to 1862. Progress is still to
(2)
be recorded, especially in the export trade.
As regards this aspect of British trade with China, there 
was a steady increase at Shanghai, even after the rebel 
occupation of Kiangsu province in i860. Despite disturb­
ances and occasional interference, supplies of tea and silk 
continued to come down from the interior. In October, 186.1,
(1) T.R.Banister A History of the external Trade of China
l8*+3-8l (1931), p.28.
(2) ^or the trade figures on which the following argument
is based seeAppendix B.
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Bruce rather grudgingly admitted, "to me it is rather a matter
of surprise that trade should continue at all, than that
occasional losses should be suffered. The export of silk
between June, i860, and June, l86l, has, in suite of these disad-
(1)vantages, amounted to 88,000 bales1' , In July, 1862,
Staveley also reported from Shanghai that 11Europeans continue
to visit the rebel country for the purpose of trade and are
treated with civility; large quantities of silk have been
brought into Shanghae during the last fortnight, and trade
(2)seems in a thriving state”. On the other harxj, this is
not the whole story. Silk supplies fell away disastrously 
after 1862 with the destruction of the mulberry trees by the 
rebels, while according to a letter from the chairman of the 
Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to Medhurst in March, 1862, the 
supplies of tea reaching the port no longer came across the 
old land routes, but down the Yangtze.
"Although Shanghae can carry a considerable trade by the 
Yangtzekiang in both imports and uroduce, ” the letter 
added, "yet it can never attain its former importance 
until the towns of Soochow and Hangchow are recaptured 
from the rebels, and the transit to the westward thrown
(1) A & P1862 (2976) p.68.
(2) A & P 1863 (310*0 p.9-3
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'’open; whilst should, by any chance, the river traffic
be interrupted, all trade at the port must entirely 
„cease”.
But despite these fears for the future, until 1862 tea and 
silk supplies continued to reach Shanghai in considerable 
quantities. The major disruption to China’s export trade 
caused by the rebellion came after British intervention began.
Apart from opium, the British import trade into China 
fluctuated a great deal more before 1862 than did the export 
trade, but in this, too, progress is to be recorded. The 
market for British manufactured goods in China at this time 
was far from strong and in any period of crisis was likely 
to slump disastrously, as happened at Shanghai in 1853-1**
But apart from those two years, it does not appear that the 
rebellion had any very disturbing effect on the not very 
great, ^low of British goods into China up to l86l. On the 
other hand, the sale of these goods was stagnant during 1861-2, 
and a temporary slump in British imports occurred, during 1862-3* 
This slump was probablv due in part to the rebellion, for
j. /
import figures rose considerably in the later sixties, but it 
was also partly due to the speculative nature of the boom in 
imports sent, through the customs after the signing of the
(1) A & P 1862 (2976) pp 7-8*
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treaty of Tientsin. Tt provides some evidence for arguing 
that the rebellion was in fact upsetting conditions for 
Pn'tieh trade before 1862, but on the whole trade figures, 
whether for exports or imports, ho not reflect this very/  V
clearly.
Ircept in the case of Ningpo, where there was clear 
evidence of the decay of foreign trade under rebel rule, 
>itlsh officials argued in general rather than specific terms 
about the effect of the rebellion upon trade.
” hacts have proved”, Russell wrote to Bruce in November, 
1.862, 1 that a resident oorvulati on. secunitu for nersons 
and property, the pursuit of industry and the n^osecu- 
tion of trade, ace incompatible with the occupation 
of a town by the bands of murderers and robbers who 
are called Taenings” . ^ ^ 
further, although they did not generally distinguish any 
nortieular branch, of trade, certainly not oniurn. as reaui rin?I V  A ' / O
n«otection, there is some evidence to suggest that they were
especially concerned to secure, as best they could within
the limits of the committments they were prepared to make,
a stronger market for British manufactures i.n Chiha. It is
notable that a merchant house such as Jardine, Matheson & Co.,
which did its main inrnort business in opium and found this,
as well as its exnort business in tea and si]k.continuingu *
strong despite the rebellion, was very critical of the policy
M  ) A ?■ P 1863 (310*+) p. 93.
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of intervention. Bruce on one occasion distinguished the
interests of such mercantile houses in China from 11 the
(1)
manufacturing interests of Great Britain”, while Palmerston, 
defending the policy of intervention in the House of Commons, 
argued that
”those who view this question only in the asoect
which it bears unon the particular merchants who
export to China, and who have establishments in that
country, take a very narrow and limited view of the
question. These merchants in reality only form the
outfalls by which the thousand rills of upland industry
in this country find their way to the great oceans of
(2)
the markets of the world”.
The Taiping rebellion was, by its alleged anarchical char­
acter, an obstacle in the way of the free flow of British 
manufactures into the ”great oceans of the markets of the world”, 
and if it could not be easily got round, as had been attempted 
in l86l, it must be swept aside.
As a reason for British intervention against the Taining 
rebellion then, the general proposition that it was done in 
defence of British trade in China seems to me to mean essen­
tially that it was done in defence of the future prospects of 
that trade, especially the future prospects for Brjtish manufac­
tures. ______________________________  ___ _____
CO A ft P 1861+ (3295) T).C3
(2) P.D; vol 175 (1861+-) col.973; also below ch.?.
But in seeking to explain why British policy changed as 
it did from a sort of neutrality to limited intervention in 
the early nart of 1862, it is not enough to set out a list 
of large, general reasons of the kind just discussed. By 
themselves they imply that the change in policy was decided 
upon by a process of logical analysis, and carried out by 
British officials who had all these reasons clearly in the 
forefront of their minds. In fact the change of policy 
came about as an unplanned and immediate response to the 
pressure of events. This is not to suggest that it was 
simply the fortuitous result of such events, for it is 
plain that the tendency in British policy towards interven­
tion was strong before 1 862, and that, in terms of the official 
British view of the situation in China, it was a logical 
development. But it was not a certain development. It is 
pt least- arguable whether direct British action against the 
rebels would ever have been taken but for the second attack 
upon Shanghai, although a large measure of indirect aid to 
the '■'anchus probably would have been given, and to some extent 
had already been given before that event. "We had nothing 
to do with (the rebels) until them approached the treatv ports", 
said a government spokesman in the House of Commons, "and 
they might have gone on fighting for centuries if they had
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( 1 )
not threatened those ports”. Like most government
apologies for policy t.hj s puts the matter in too simple a 
way, but there was some force in the argument.
This raises one final point which should not be over­
looked in any explanation of why England intervened against 
the rebellion. The rebel threat to Shanghai at the beginning 
of 1.862 was to a considerable extent the result of their 
defeats in the central Yangtze valley during l86l. The 
victories of Tseng Kuo-fan’s armies had, by the end of that 
year, deprived them of their former main base in Anhui and 
virtually driven them back upon the coastal provinces, where
conflict with the western treaty rowers was much more likely
(2)
to develop. British intervention against the Taipings
cannot be explained without reference to the larger military
fortunes of the rebellion.
(1) ibid, col.937*
(2) A.E.Wilson, op.cit., ch.6 etc., suggested this was Tseng’s 
strategy; on this note also, Parkes in A 8; P 1862 (2976)
p.95*
PART II: UNOFFICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE
REBELLION AND TOWARDS OFFICIAL POLICY.
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CHAPTER VIII
BRITISH MERCHANTS AND 
THE TAPPING REBELLION
The China market was theoretically rainbow’s end for
the British merchant. In 18*+3, returned from negotiating
the Treaty of Nanking, Sir Henry Pottinger promised them
that ”all the mills in Lancashire could not make stocking
(1)
stuff sufficient for one of its provinces”, while twenty 
years later, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Tientsin, 
Samuel Laing wrote,
”Our trade with China has reached a uoint which makes 
it impossible for any Government to ignore its exist­
ence and to abstain from all action if it be imnerilled. 
And yet this trade is merely in its infancy. A slight 
acquaintance with what China really is suffices to con­
vince us that, when the barriers which have impeded our 
intercourse are fairly removed, there is no limit to 
the extension of English commerce, and that this commerce 
is destined to exercise an immense influence on the 
fourth nart of the human race.... The trade between the 
British Empire and China will go on increasing year by
(1) cit. A & P 1859 Sess. 2 (2571) p.2M+.
year if not checked by political events, until it attains
(1)
a gigantic magnitude”,
11 If every inhabitant of China took from us, in any form,
imports to the extent of 5/- each”, another writer calculated,
(2^
”the gross value of the trade would be £200,000,000 a year”. 
Few among the merchants doubted that a large not of gold was 
really there. The problem was to get at it effectively,
Great private fortunes were made in the trade with China 
during these years, but it never fulfilled the promise that 
it showed on naper. In the years immediately preceding the 
outbreak of the Taiping rebellion one of the major reasons 
advanced by British merchants to explain this, arart from 
such things as the high rate of duty upon tea in England, 
itself and restrictive practices among the Chinese merchants, 
was the obstruction still offered hy the Manchu government 
to the development of foreign trade in China, 111 consider 
the present treaty to be contravened every day of the week 
by the Chinese Government themselves”, Alexander Matheson 
stated bluntly to a Select Committee appointed by Parliament 
in I8V7 to enquire into the reasons for the unsatisfactory 
state of commercial relations with China, ’’Chinese diplomacy 
upon naper and the reality are two very different things” ,
(1) S.Laing, op.cit,, p.50.
(2) Liverpool Daily Post, cit. London & China Express April 26,
1862, p/3^ -1.
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he adde d. ^  In June, 1850, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
presented a memorial to the Foreign Office urging that efforts 
be made to extend commercial openings in China. This ex­
plained Mthe disappointment universally felt in respect to 
the results expected from the treaty of Nankin” as being in 
large part due to the attitude of the Chinese authorities at
Canton, who had “unremittingly fomented every species of
(2)opposition to us'*. The dissatisfaction felt by those
British merchants interested in trade with China towards 
the Manchu government was certainly considerable about the 
time the Taipings emerged as a possible alternative, and 
one naturally looks for clear cut support on their part 
for the rebel cause about 1853*
On the admittedly slender evidence which I have been 
able to gather about early British merchant reactions to 
the rebellion, however, it seems to me easy to exaggerate 
the extent to which positive approval was given the movement. 
This is not to suggest that the merchants as a group were 
hostile to it. Like British consular officials, they 
certainly placed hopes, and in some cases high h o p e i n  
the rebellion as promising an opportunity for improving their 
situation in China. But information on what was for them 
the main point, of concern, namely, the real feelings of
(1) A & p 18V7 (65P  Evidence, qq.2691, 2703.
anchsster C. of C. Procs.(18^-9-58) pp 128-9, also ppS^-S.
2?6.
the rebels towards foreigners and foreign trade, was 
so much less certain and authentic than the information 
received about the religious character of the rebellion 
that, as a group, the merchants seem to have taken a less 
consistently hopeful view during 1853 than did the mission­
aries.
At one extreme was Alexander Galder, who claimed to
have traded in China since East India Company days and to
have had direct experience of the Manchu government by
(1)
virtue of having once been the counsul for Denmark.
C-..lder wrote the Foreign Office in November, 1853? recommend­
ing a nolicy of active support for the rebellion. Strict 
neutrality woul’, he argued, be ’‘fatal to our interests*’, 
since without foreign intervention division and struggle 
in China might well become chronic. To support the Manchus 
would be to perpetuate the system of exclusivism which chills 
and narrows our intercourse with a great people”, and to 
attempt to uphold “a ruined cause”.England should ’’turn 
to something more durable, more promising, and countenance 
it”. Calder therefore concluded by suggesting, in rather 
“Schoolboys’ Own” fashion, that three steamboats and a 
”Secret agent” should be sent to "Yung Sue Tsuen” (Hung 
Hsiu-ch’tlan). The outlay would be small; the possible
(1) On this practice among foreign merchants in China at
this time see Fairbank, op.cit., pp213-l)+*
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4 - (1)gams tremendous.
In contrast to these views may be set some of those
which appeared in the British press in China and which may
reasonably be taken to have reflected and to have helped to
form merchant opinion on the question there. For the hong
Kong Overland Register and Prices Current the rebellion was
Ma dark and ominous affair, which time alone can unravel*1.
It attacked l!the stupid irreflecting wonder ”of many, such
as the Shanghai North China Herlkld, at the reports of the
Christianity of the rebels, about which the Register itself
was thoroughly sceptical. It was equally sceptical of the
Long term prosuects of the rebels.
,!That (Hung Hsiu-ch’llan) or any or all of his present
followers are fated to overthrow the present dynasty
we have always doubted and we still do doubt, 1 it wrote
in October, 1053* ,fOne singular fact may be noticed,
and it is this, that all his successes have not induced
one man of rank in the kingdom, connected or disconnected
(2)
with the Government, to join his standard**.
The China Kail, the leading paper at Hong Kong, believed the 
accounts of the religious fervour of the rebels to be ‘’ridi­
culously highly coloured*’, and attacked Bonham both for
(1) F.0.17/209 Calder to F.O., Nov. 28, 1853-
(2) See Overland Register and Prices Current May 2*+, July 23,
Oct. 27, Dec. 27, 1853."
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going to Nanking and for ’’negatively supporting the Rebels”
with his proclamation of July 7th warning British subjects
against taking any part in the struggle. The restoration
of tranquillity under a purely Chinese dynasty was an event
(1)
unlikely to be witnessed in that age, the Kai1 predicted.
The North China Herald, however, did hone to witness it, and
it attacked both trie Register and the Mail for their hostile
views of the rebellion. At the beginning of 185^ the
Pie .raid still believed that Hung was
’’hastening forward with rapid strides the real onening
of China and her union with the Western world; and
we trust that under his more enlightened sway our
merchants will speedily exchange nresent difficulties
and impediments for all the advantages of a free,
(2)
reciprocal and unblemished traffick”.
By the middle of that year, however, the Herald had changed
its views, to the great satisfaction of its Hong Kong rivals,
and after reports of the visits to Nanking by the American
Commissioner McLane, and by Medhurst and Lewin Bovring, it
joined them in denouncing ’’the crazy and deluded fanatics in
(3)possession of Nanking”. J
(1) See China Mail May~26, July 7: Oct.27, etc. 1853* The 
columns of the China Mail during April and May, 1853, 
carried a correspondence between two writers for and 
against the rebellion styling themselves ’’Progress” and 
’’Conservative”. ’’Progress” soon left the field to ’’Con­
servative”, who was very probably a Canton merchant. He 
favoured intervention against the rebellion in return for
further treatv concessions from the Manchus.
See next page for ff.(2) & (3)***
259
It is in the nature of the press, especially of colonial 
press, to present strong views, and these extremes of opinion 
■probably give a rather false picture of the true state of 
merchant opinion on the question during 1853* The detailed 
business correspondence of Jardine, Matheson & Co* reveals 
no very strong views either for or against the Taipings^ 
some doubts as to their real attitude towards foreigners, 
and much concern for the immediate effect of the rebellion 
on trade. For example, David Jardine reported the Mdis­
heartening intelligence1 of the fall of Nanking to some 
of his correspondents in India at the end of April, adding, 
"It is said that the rebels of late have expressed no 
friendly feelings towards Foreigners in consequence of a
number of American vessels purchased by the Chinese author-
(1)
ities having proceeded up the river towards Nankin11. He
also expressed the conviction that, 1 it is now pretty evident 
that whichever of the Contending parties prevails, the 
disorganised state of the country will continue to 
exercise an injurious influence on all commerce for
^  r, (2>some time to come".
(2) from previous page... North China Herald Jan.7? 185*+"” 
(cit. S.P.Boardman, op.cit., n7n.); for controversy with 
the Hong Kong papers see China Mail Jap.26,185*+ and 
Overland Register July 23, 1853*
(3) ' orth China Herald July 8, 185*+ (cit.Boardman, p . 122); 
cf. China Mail July 27,185^.
(1) this page... J.M.& Co., Private Letter Book (1852-^) pll5,
April 21,1853 To J.R.Hadow.
(2) ibid, nl25, May 21, 1853, To C.B.Skinner.
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Dallas, the firm’s agent in Shanghai, also reported in 
April that, '’Nothing certain is known as to the intentions 
of the rebels towards foreigners, but as they have a large 
army and are likely to be ioined by all the vagabonds in
the country, it is thought only prudent to be prepared for
, . „  (1) any contingency”.
Later reports on the rebels do not arrear to have 
caused any marked swing in their favour. Early in May, 
after Bonham’s return from Nanking, Dallas wrote,
'’There is no doubt whatever of their being Christian 
nrotestants hostile to Homan Catholicism and priest­
craft in any share. This will at once account for 
the orinions of the Trench concerning them. They 
declare inveterate (?) war not only against opium, 
but against Tobacco, and they say their mission is 
from Heaven. They arrear to be fanatics and deter­
mined to wage war against fornication and every vice.
he only incongruity arrears to be that the head man 
of them has 36 wivesi Captain Fishburne.(sic), his 
officer and Mr. Meadows are all very favourably im- 
rressed with the general bearing and efficient organisa­
tion of the rebels, but Sir George Bonham arrears to
(2)think not so well of them”. '
(1) ibid., Private Letters (unbound) from Shanghai, Dallas 
to Jardine, Arril 12, 1853*
(2) ibid, May 7, 1853-
In June, Jardine reported to one of his correspondents in
India that ’’the opinion is beginning to force itself upon
people’s minds that the days of Tartar rule in China are
numbered”, but does not appear to have regarded this prospect
with any particular approval.^ At the end of July, Dallas
still felt that whether the ultimate designs of the rebels
towards foreigners were really friendly or not was a point
on which there was ”yet some doubt” , and certainly
showed no confidence that commercial prospects in China were
(2)likely to be better under Taiping than Manchu rule.
In the Jardine, Matheson correspondence about 1853-*+ no
clear cut support for the rebels at Nanking is apparent,
while the suppression of the risings on the coast was greeted
(1)with relief and approval. ~ As a source of evidence on 
the early opinions of British merchants in China about the 
rebellion the main conclusion suggested by this correspondence 
is that they did not feel sure enough about its attitude to 
foreigners and foreign trade to accord it strong support.
(1) ibid, Private Letter Pook (1852-M p.132, June 26,1853?
to J.R.Hado\\r.
(2) ibid., Local Correspondence, Shanghai (Box 1853-6), July 31?
1853 (no675 -3)? cf.however the American firm of Russell 
& Co. (cit. in Dennett, op.cit. p212) - I hone Tien Teh 
(i.e. Hung) will be successful and upset the present 
dynasty. We cannot be worse off, and he is said to be a 
liberal man”. I have found nothing as definite as this in 
support of the Taipings in the J.M, archive,
(3) see J.M.&Co., Europe Letter Books, vols.30-1, Circular
letters of Aug.21, 185*+? March lU- and July 9? 1855*
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As regards merchant reaction In England in 18535 it is 
difficult to distinguish this clearly from the general popular 
reaction to the rebellion, which was one of anproval and 
support. In May, the Economist wrote,
:,0ur merchants, our tea and silk dealers, our manufact­
urers of woollens and cottons, almost all who work, 
and almost all who drink tea or wear silk or are con­
cerned. In trade, are deeply interested in the consequences 
of the rebellion in China*1. ^  ^
Although itself favouring a policy of non-intervention, it 
nrinted, in this same issue, a circular from the firm of 
: offatt 8: Co, of Fenchurch St,, in which it was suggested 
that
"Should foreign interposition be hanplly successful 
in maintainjng order in China a highly favourable 
opportunity will occur for extending friendly relations 
with that vast Empire, and ouening its untold commercial 
resources to Western enterprise'*.
But this was, the circular went on, **a somewhat remote 
contingency'*, and meanwhile there must be great anxiety for 
future supplies of teas and the security of commercial trans­
actions generally in China. The Economist itself was con­
fident that there was no serious danger to Western trade, 
the Chinese being, like the English, natural traders, and
(I) Economist May 21, 1853*
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it continued to urge a policy of non-intervention. “Adhering
to the character of merchants11, it noted with approval in
August, “our neonle in China profess a nerfect neutrality,
and, whichever way the contest may end, they will probably
(1)
be equally well protected”.
Kore than purely business calculations helped to form 
the opinions of merchants in England on the subject, for 
like the great majority of their countrymen, they were 
impressed by the religious character of the movement. Hewett 
& Co., also of Fenchurch St., issued a pamphlet on The 
Religious Precepts of the Tae-ninp Dynasty which they 
“nresented gratuitously1 to their customers. Besides 
advertising their own wares, this provided translations 
of some of the religious documents of the rebels, intro­
duced by a letter from the firm expressing their strong 
support tor the cause. As befitted such a pamphlet, the 
letter emphasised the religious rather than the commercial 
benefits to be looked for from the rebellion, and suggested
that any attempt to stem the progress of the rebels, “if
(2)they may be so called.”, would be fruitless. But the
publication of a pamphlet on the religious aspect of the 
rebellion by a business/firm illustrates the then prevalent
(1) ibid., Aug. 6, 1853
(2) The Religious Precepts of the Taeping Dynasty (1853)5 
printed by W.Hewett & Co., (copy in B.M.)
26*+.
■idea that Christianity and Commerce went hand in hand.
n -itherto Christianity and Commerce have gone together’1,
w^ote one naper at this time. 1 As Christianity snreads,
civilisation will grow, with all its corresponding wants.
It is impossible to anticipate the effect of Christianization
unon China. No country in the world is better adanted from
(1)
situation, climate and products for extensive commerce”.
The two ideas went naturally together in nineteenth century 
England, and the fact that the rebels were believed to be 
Christian certajnly helued to make them anrear also as
favourable to commerce.
(!) British Banner May 18, 1853? cf. also Calcutta Review 
March, 185*+, P-139 - ”The wider ouening of China, con­
sequent on the establishment of a dynasty professing the 
Christian religion, and friendly to foreigners, may be 
exoeeted to produce a renid advancement in the material 
nrosuerjty of the country and the moral j.mnrovement of 
the people. The arts and sciences of Christendom will 
be introduced. Steam vessels, railways and the electric 
telegraph will bring into close proximity each remote 
extremity of the Empire. The internal resources of 
the country will be developed. An impetus will be given 
to native produce and manufactures. The materials of 
a lucrative, reproductive and mutually beneficial commerce 
between the Eastern and Western worlds will be multiplied. 
The artificial wants and tastes created by a orogressive 
civilisation will cause a fresh demand for imports from 
foreign regions; and the looms of Manchester and Leeds, 
the foundries of Sheffield, Birmingham and Pittsburgh, 
and the shins of London, Liverrool and New York, will 
find additional employment”. Note that all this was 
seen as ’’consequent on the establishment of a dynasty 
professing the Christian religion, and friendly to 
foreigners”.
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A more obviously hard headed approach than that of 
Hewett & Co, is seen in the memorial of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce of January 26, 185^, to Clarendon, 
expressing satisfaction at the appointment of Sir John 
Cowring as Superintendent of British trade in China and 
Governor of Hong Kong, and suggesting that his powers be 
as ample as possible. The Chamber was thinking especially 
of treaty revision, and suggested that the rebellion improved 
the prospects of getting this. After noting the unsatis­
factory features of the present treaty which 1 stunted and 
crippled" British trade with China, the memorialists expressed 
themselves
"not without hope that under the circumstances which
seem likely to arise out of the present aspect and
probable result of Chinese affairs, these and many
other hindrances to the development of British trade
may be removed through the active intelligence and
knowledge of the Chinese character and customs so
(1)
eminently possessed by our new Representative".
In this the idea that the rebellion might be used indirectly 
to favour British trading interests in China is apparent,
but there was no suggestion of offering direct aid to the 
Manchus in return for treaty concessions.
(1) ; anchester C. of C. Procs. (18^9-58) p.370.
Any idea of abandoning neutrality was, on the contrary,
explicitly rejected in a resolution of merchants in England
interested in trade with China sent to Clarendon at the
beginning of 1855* This was prompted by their anger with
" owring for his attempt during the Shanghai customs crisis
in 185*4- to secure for the Manchu government payment on the
promissory notes collected by Alcock, and it called for Bow-
ring’ s removal from his office. Among the complaints listed
against him in this resolution was
"2. His interference with the two Belligerent Parties
in China - an interference which his predecessor
Sir G. Bonham's resolution carefully to abstain
from, Your Lordship's despatch of Mas7" 31st, 1853 >
pronounced to be one of which 'Her Majesty's
Government approved as in entire conformity with
their wishes and intentions'", (sic)^1^
A policy of neutrality was still in conformity with the wishes
of these merchants also. Bowring defended himself by asking
for examples of his interference, and by pointing to the
difficulty of avoiding becoming involved in some way in "the
(2)
general anarchy" prevalent in China. But the suspicion
(1) F.0.228/185 S.Gregson to Clarendon Jan.5? 1855? einc. in 
Clarendon to Bowring Jan.12, 1855; cf also Manchester 
C. of C. Procs. (18*4-9-58) pp Vl3, *f20.
(2) F.0.17/230 Bowring to Clarendon May 1*+, 1855*
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that he had nfot followed a really neutral policy towards 
the civil war in China was one of the things, though certainly 
not the chief thing, which earned him the criticism of China 
merchants in England.
The case for British intervention against the rebellion 
was, however, argued later in 1855 by the Shanghai merchant, 
James Macdonald, when on a visit to England. In a series 
of letters on the rebellion published in The Times during 
August and September, Macdonald described the rebels as hav- 
ing only one redeeming feature, their condemnation of opium, 
and he suggested that the best prospect for the extension 
of British privileges in China was an offer of aid on a quid 
pro quo basis to the Manchu government. In anticipation of 
this, >acdonald urged, an exploratory expedition should be 
sent up the Yangtze, perhaps as far as Hankow, in order to 
obtain information about the trading prospects there, and to 
seek answers to such loaded questions as, “Would the extirpa­
tion of these river pirates and brigands, if they shill be 
proved to be such, or the driving them from the strongholds 
where their presence so seriously affects our trade, necessarily 
imply any permanent responsibility on our part for the support, 
of the Chinese Government, any more than our occasional attacks 
on the pirates on the coast?” ^  Meadows, who was then in
(1) The Times Sept. 20, 1855? P*10$ for other letters of 
MacDonald see Aug. 9, 1>+, 21 1.855*
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England on leave and writing his book The Chinese and their 
Rebellions, wrote to the Times in answer to these "injudicious 
recommendations1 of Macdonald which, he said, would endanger 
rather than further the long-range commercial interests of 
England in China, 511 beg the British commercial world to 
rest assured that the Chinese do know something about govern­
ing themselves", Meadows concluded, "and that, if carefully
let alone, thev will reappear under a stronger Government,
(1)
anchoo or native, than they have had these fifty years".
On the whole, it can fairly be said that during the early 
and middle years of the rebellion the inclination of that 
part of "the British commercial world" which was directly 
interested in trade with China was to let things alone. Th e 
official policy of non-intervention won general, if not 
absolutely unanimous approval, while the suppression of the 
risings on the coast and the fact that the Taiping rebellion 
itself remained clear of the treaty norts during these years 
meant that alarm over the possible effects on trade soon 
passed. The short lived threat of the middle of 1856, when 
the Taipings destroyed Hsiang Jting!s forces besieging Chinkiang 
and approached Soochow, created a temporary panic in Shanghai, 
but trade there was soon back to normal. After 1856 Western 
attention concentrated on the war with the Manchus and the
(1) ibid, Oct. 1, 1855, p.5*
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struggle to obtain and have ratified a new and more satis­
factory treaty. The rebellion was far from the centre of 
the stage, as seen by European eyes, and was not an issue 
of controversy and discussion as it had been in 1853? and 
was to become again after 1860.^ ^
With the ratification of the Treaty of Tientsin at 
the end of i860, the rebellion became once more a dominant 
issue in the minds of British merchants, as of consular 
officials. But there is certainly no easy generalisation 
that can be made about their attitude in the last years of 
the rebellion, for it is clear that there was real division 
of ouinion among them over the wisdom of the government 
policy of aid to the Manchus, though not so much over the 
character of the rebellion itself. Although British uolicy 
was officially justified in terms of the defence of British 
trading interests in China, it does not follow as the night
the day from this that the merchants themselves all thought
(2)
it the policy best designed to urotect those interests.
(1) Elgin’s trip at the end of 1858 naturally renewed interest 
for a time, but the main conclusion drawn arrears to have 
been that the rebels were on their last legs, and there was 
no call to interfere. See Overland China Hall Dec.15?1858, 
Jan. 15? 1859; China Overland Trade Report Jan. 1*+, 1859;
The Times March 2, 1&59? n .12.
(2) It seems simply to have been assumed by most writers on the 
subject, of British intervention against the Taipings that 
all, or nearly all, British merchants favoured and urged 
that policy, and were hostile to the rebels because they 
upset trade. (e.g.H.Cahill, ops. cit., p287? and Baranowsky, 
or.cit., who identifies the British bourgeoisie .and "capit­
alists” with the British Government in ’’smothering the
rebellion). See also Teng Ssu-yli, op.cit., p 7l(-«
The opinion that it was not is illustrated by the Hong
Kong trade naper, The China Overland Trade Renort. The main
English language paners in China at this time, the China hail
and the Berth China Herald gave fairly consistent support to
the policy followed by the British government,but a
number of other napers did not, and among these the criticisms
(2)of the Overland Trade ienort were particularly lusty. In
i860, while, condemning "the bootless rapacity and repulsive
brigandage" of the rebels, it was no less condemnatory of
truce’s action in ordering their repulse from Shanghai by
'British forces. This apparent inconsistency - the rarer
was not remarkable for its consistency, and one is often
bewildered by the logic and assumptions of its arguments -
is to be explained by the fact that the Trade Rerort took
the view that this attack by the rebels had been unnecessarily
rrevoked by Bruce's havipg allowed Shanghai to become a
rallying point for the defeated Imperialists.
"Had common courtesy been extended towards the Rebel
chiefs and a bona fide system of neutrality proposed,
which would have left Shanghai in the hands of the Allies,
the present disaster might not only have been averted,
but there is no saying how far the friendly disnosition
(1) The China I ail was for a time during i860-1 fairly open 
minded about the rebellion, but it backed the later policy 
of intervention to the extent of arguing that "the radius
boundary is a mistake, we cannot stor> at any given boundary 
with the Taipings". For N.C.H. advocacy of aid to the Manchu
see above p. 170 n 2.
For ffi. (2) see next pa^e....
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'of the rebels might have induced them to have fostered 
trade. As matters now stand, a small allied force, 
protecting a large amount of British property, has to 
resist the fanatical onslaught of some 4-0,000 rebels, 
and ey’en should the Allies succeed, they will incur the 
animosity of the dominant party, who at least have the 
trade in their hands".
Tor was this all, the paper added, for if the rebels should 
eventually triumph, as then seemed very possible "foreigners 
will be placed In an entirely false position with the insur­
gents by this wanton, suicidal policy, and it is impossible 
to prognosticate where the calamity will end". In this 
argument two ideas very common among China merchants about 
this time emerge. The first, that Shanghai should be taken 
over altogether from the incapable Nanchu government and made 
into a free port; the second, and more significant here, 
that the rebels controlled the main areas from which the for­
eign trade at Shanghai was drawn, and any policy which provoked 
their hostility towards foreigners was "suicidal".
During 186]., while still condemning the rebellion as a 
"devastating scourge", the Trade Report continued to attack 
official policy.
(2) from previous page.... Other China papers critical of
the policy of intervention and rather pro-Taiping in out­
look were the Hong: Kong Register and the Friend of China
(see the (anon.) pamphlet The "Position of Affairs in China).
(1) this page.. Overland Trade Report Aug.2b,i860: also Oct.12,  . ^  lg6^
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”Tothing can be clearer, 1 it claimed in April, flthan 
that whether the Taipings should, as ruthless brigands, 
be exterminated as the foes of mankind generally - or 
whether they should be treated with the consideration 
due to a national party, nothing can be more futile, 
baneful nor impolitic than the present experimental, 
unauthorised and crotchetty system of Intervention 
pursued by the British authorities”.''^
By intervention at this time the naper meant the encouragement 
given to the extension of the foreign inspectorate principle 
in Chinese customs to all the treaty ports, which was an 
important part of Bruce’s plan to increase the efficiency of 
the Manchu government. This customs house ’hobby” of the 
British authorities was highly unpopular among many of the 
China merchants, the Trade Report objecting that it merely 
had the effect of securing a large revenue for an Imperial 
Government ’’impotent, corrupt, sensual, selfish, perfidious 
and careless of consequences”, without guaranteeing that 
this revenue would be spent on the protection of trade or 
the suppression of the rebellion. It suggested that if some 
r^ art of the revenue, which it never doubted was in the ”entire 
control” of the British authorities, were paid to the rebels,
(1) ibid., Anri! 30? l86l.
thev would be given an interest in the progress of foreign
(i)
trade in China instead of in its destruction, as at present.
It was the following of a policy which was likely 
neither to conciliate nor bring about the speedy destruc­
tion oG the rebellion which particularly aroused the Trade 
Report’s opposition.
”If the British Minister’s espousal of the Imperial 
cause were at all calculated to overthrow the Taipings” 
it wrote in February, 1862, ’’the foreign community 
would lend him their co-operation almost to a man.
But the tendency of his efforts is quite the reverse”. 
Bruce’s policy of ’’aggressive defence” was really ’’greatly 
jeopardising British trade”. The issue resolved itself 
into the question ’’whether it would be more advisable to 
conciliate the Taipings, or, adhering blindly to a ruined 
cause, irritate them as is now being done”. The Trade
Report advised that ’’the mnjury the Taipings can inflict
(2)
upon us should make it our policy to conciliate them”.
Over the last two years of the rebellion it was steadily 
critical of what it called ’’the impotent interference of 
the British”, attacking the thirty mile radius plan and the 
Lav-Osborn flotilla especially, and by the middle of 1863
(1 )  ibid Feb. I 1*, March 13,  31,  July 27 ,  l 8 6 l .
(2) ibid Feb. 28, 1862 (as cit. by Times of India March 21,1862)
2?h.
it was even taking a far more favourable view of the
rebels than formerly.
f,The silk producing districts are and have been for
the last three years in the undisputed uossession
of the insurgents", it observed in June, 1863,
“through whose hands the trade in this article
has been conducted in a manner which has inspired
the utmost confidence in the minds of the Foreign
mercantile community, whose sympathies they have
almost universally secured by their courtesy and
spirit of fair dealing. Foreigners visiting the
Silk producing districts attest that prosperity
and contentment are there the order of the day.”
It was not the merchant body, but the British diplomatic,
naval and military authorities who were most in favour of
supporting the Imperialist cause, this article concluded,
and thev had foisted their views uuon the home government
(1)
“by a vast amount of misrepresentation".
The views presented in the Overland Trade Report are 
parallelled in many respects in the Jardine, Matheson corres- 
uondence for these years. In this also is found, during 
l86l, hostility to the rebels together with condemnation of 
"the half measures of our government" which were exerting
(1) ibid.June 12,1863; cf also Nov.1^,1863, April 1^,28 and 
May 29, 186*+.
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”a very prejudicial effect on our commercial interests”,
Tn June, 1862, the then Hong Kong head of the firm, Alexander
Perceval, told a correspondent in India,
”1 do not think we should interfere in this struggle
without the assistance of at least 10,000 men, and if
(the) Government are not prepared to undertake the matter
properly, it would he much better to come to terms with
the de facto rulers near Shanghai. These troubles are
interfering seriously with our import trade and no
(2)
doubt tend to raise prices considerably”.
The firm also wrote in condemnation of government policy to 
its businesscorrespordents in England in July, 1862, calling 
their attention to the fact that since the aggressive measures 
taken against the rebels in the course of the first campaign 
to clear a radius around Shanghai had ceased,
”the market for Imports in that quarter has assumed a
much healthier appearance.....  We firmly believe”,
thev went on, 1 that the long period of stagnation to«/ 7 «-> s •—>
which the Import trade at Shanghae has been subjected
(1) J.M.&Co., .Europe Letter Book, vol. VcT (l86l-2) pl22, to 
Matheson & Co., May 1, l86l; also p87, April 15, l86l - 
”The opinion is becoming almost universal here that the 
Taiping Insurgents are merely a destructive scourge and 
that no possible benefit either to the empire itself or to 
foreign relations with China can attend a continuance of 
their successes. Their presence will materially check the 
development of trade u p  the river, and in all probability 
the immediate results will be but small and gradual”.
Cf below for later, more pro-rebel views.
For fn.(2) see bottom of next page...
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‘•would have been avoided if the policy of strict
neutrality had been nersisted in on our part, and
it is therefore devoutly to be wished that the large
reinforcements of Troops, which, it is reported, have
been asked from the Home Government in order to subdue
the rebellion may not be granted, as we are convinced
that both the Import and Export Trade in China cannot
fail to be seriously prejudiced by a renewal of hos-
(1)
tilities .... “
The interests of British trade in China demanded neutrality, 
not intervention.
A more favourable view of the rebels was also taken as 
it was found that, despite their encirclement of Shanghai,
(2)
they offered “no serious impediment to the passage of Silk”. 
“We attach little credit to the stories of the atrocities 
committed by these neople, and believe they have been
(2) from previous page... ibid., Private Letter Book (1860-3)
to C.H.Brown June 12, 1862; cf. also ibid to J.A.Baurnbach 
June 10, 1862, and Sept.10,1862 - “The allies as usual have 
occasional brushes with the Rebels around Shanghae, which 
must be looked for until we either take active measures to 
nut down the movement or endeavour to make terms with them. 
The .latter in ray opinion would be our best and wisest course 
to adopt51.
(!) this page... ibid. Europe Letter Book, volAl (186.1-2)
p 293-5? to S.l endel (Manchester) and 
others.
(2) ibid. p 256, to Matheson <5: Co., June 27,1862.
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"propagated for a purpose", they told Matheson & Co.
of London, "the Imperialists being the real oppressors
of the people and devastators of the country".^^
The departure of Rear Admiral Hope, who was regarded as the
chief architect of the policy of intervention, was greeted
with the wish that "the aggressive nolicy of our authorities
will be considerably modified"; Bruce was condemned as
"imperious and inaccessible", and as not exerting "any
salutary influence whatever" in Peking; while it was hoped
that the failure of the Lay-Osborn scheme would make ministers
in England "come fully alive to the folly of the course they
(2)
have been pursuing". Jardine, Matheson & Co., the greatest 
of the opium trading firms in China - and it is worth emnhas- 
ising here that I have found no suggestion of hostility 
towards the rebels on account of their sunnosed prohibition 
of opium smoking in the correspondence of this firm - certainly 
cannot be counted as among the supporters of the official 
policy of intefvention against the Taipings. They were, 
in fact, pro-rebel if anything by 1862-3 .
(1) ibid. n 283, to Matheson & Co. July 12, 1862.
(2) see ibid. pn 209, 3^6, *+71 and vol b2 (1863-*+) p *+96
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Such merchant opposition to the official policy as 
that represented by the Overland Trade Renort and by the 
Jardine, ratheson correspondence was essentially opposition 
to the kind of intervention actually undertaken by the British 
authorities in China after 1162. 'ore than the Mhalf and 
half11 character of British intervention was behind this kind 
of onposition. At the end of 1862 a naper published by 
Jardine, Matheson & Co. called the Shanghai 'Recorder criticised 
the revised regulations for trade on the Yangtze which restricted 
British vessels strictly to the norts named in the Treaty of 
Tientsin, and called for what the China Mail summarised as,
”A return to the old state of affairs which existed 
before the Treaties were framed for the regulation of
trade a right to trade at any part of the coast
whatever, and settle terms as to import duties with 
the local mandarins”.^
Bruce, commenting on this point of view in a despatch to 
Russell at the beginning of 1863, pointed out that
”if the Chinese Executive were to continue in its former 
condition, the proposed policy would be favourable to 
the interests of the large houses in China, for their
(1) cit. A & P 186*+ (3295) up M+-5* The B.M. has no file of 
the Shanghai Recorder, nor is there one in the J.M.archive 
at Cambridge.
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"command of capital would give them a decided advantage, 
and they would conduct their trading operations in expen­
sive vessels, heavily armed, which would over-awe ornosj- 
tion. But this monopoly would not be beneficial to the 
manufacturing interests of Great Britain, and the calcula­
tions of its promoters will be defeated if the Chinese 
are in uossession of a naval force.
Large trading firms established on the China coast, such as 
Jardine, Matheson & Co., were not averse to the continuance 
of weak government in China, since this increased the chances 
of extending trade beyond the limits set by treaty. But 
chances of doing this would vanish if Bruce's uolicy of con­
ciliating, strengthening and reforming the central government 
in Peking succeeded, and that government acquired both an 
efficient customs service and a modern navy - two features 
of British aid to the ! anchus which, in the share of the 
foreign Inspectorate of the Customs and the Lay-Osborn flotilla, 
were especially attached by both the Cverland Trade Rerort 
and Jardine, Matheson & Co. The opposition of such groups 
to the policy of limited, would-be-reforming aid to the Manchu
government was, in part, orrosition to the whole Bruce pro-
(2)
gramme of a strengthened central government in China.
(1) ibid p.*+3
(2) Note the President of the Hong Kong C. of C. in Oct.1862, 
(Perceval?) as cit. in P.D. vol 17** (186*0 col. 1717 - "The
great majority of the respectable commercial classes
\
C ont'd at foon of next rage...
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Views more sympathetic to the government nolicy were, 
however, certainly to be found among British merchants in 
China. In March, l86l, the report of a deputation of 
merchants representing the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, 
which had accompanied Hope on his first expedition up the 
Yangtze, was presented. This was quickly published, and 
called by the Times, "in a commercial point of view the 
most Interesting and important document that has appeared 
in our age".^'^ The report reviewed the commercial possi­
bilities of the Places visited by Hope's expedition. Although 
hopeful of such cities as Hankow, so long as they remained 
in Imperial hands, the deputation saw no prospects of trade 
with centres under rebel control. Of Nanking they stated, 
"There seems no prospect for the development of commerce 
with this city, or the districts controlled by it, while
continuing (2) from previous page....
(foreign) in this country strongly disapprove of the 
present action of our authorities; and many persons, 
even who at an earlier period gave all their influence 
in opposition to the maintenance of neutrality, have 
seen reason materially to modify their opinion. The 
commercial body, for the most part, have no faith what­
ever in the regeneration of China by such foreign aid as 
is now afforded, nor do they believe that hearts co-opera-
1 V  V X
tion in introducing the foreign element in the various 
branches of the Chinese public service can be expected from 
any native officials beyond, perhaps, the few men at Peking 
within the personal influence of the foreign ministers..." 
Cf Michie below r£6k
(1) this page... The Times. -ay 3^, l86l.
"under its present rulers. The people are enslaved.
The soldiery unpaid, but habituated to plunder, are 
little likely to engage in any industrial pursuits.
The rulers, so far from being able to govern the country, 
do not even admit within the walls of their capital the 
shopkeepers necessary for the supply of the daily wants 
of the residents. The proclamations which occasionally 
appear, apparently designed to encourage trade, must 
be read with regard to this state of affairs. Their 
design can at present extend no further than to bring 
in provisions at cheaper rates, or supply a market 
for the soldiery, which, commercially speaking, can 
only be on a very small scale. It remains to be 
seen how far these evils can be mitigated by foreign 
influence".
’"heir report concluded by expressing the "strong opinion 
that this movement can in no just sense be considered 
political, still less patriotic or constructive," and also 
the fear that the advantages reasonably to be expected from 
the opening of the Yangtze to foreign trade "may be counter­
acted bv the anarchy and disorganization which entail such ,
‘ 1 (1)
dire evils on all classes of society in the Chinese Umpire".
(1) See A & P l86i~"(28*f0) p p 11-16 esp.p.12: cf also A & P
1862 (2976) p p 7-9.
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Although an implication in favour of action against
the rebellion can be read into this report, there was in
it no definite statement of opinion about the best government
policy in the circumstances. As evidence already quoted
sufficiently illustrates, condemnation of the rebellion
cannot be taken as synonymous with support for a policy of
active intervention against it. But at least one of the
members of this deputation, Alexander hichie, became a
strong supporter of a poljcy of intervention, so much so
that he was more than once quoted in debates in the House
of Commons as illustrating merchant support for such a
policy. In July, 1862, for example, the Under Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Layard, quoted him as writing,
"This conflict has been dragging on for over twelve
years, with no result but the devastation of the country
and the ruin of trade. Our interests demand that one
of the parties be destroyed, and as the Imperialists
have at least the traditions of a Government, there is
more hope of their reviving than of any of the insurgent
parties coming to anything".  ^ ^
Tl) cit. P.D. vol TS8 (18S2) cols.IxL-2; the London & China 
Fxnress May 10,186*+, p378, commented of a later letter of 
L'ichie's which was also quoted in the H.of C., that his 
experience and judgment "eminently mark him as the repres­
entative of British merchants jn communicating with the 
Government". It is quite certain, though, that many would 
not have chosen him as their spokesman on policy towards 
the rebellion.
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Michie!s business partner in England, H. H. Lindsay, for­
warded to the Foreign Office copies of several of his letters
and himself echoed Michie1s suggestion that ranking be taken
(1)
and an amnesty declared under English and French guarantees.
Michie, in fact, rather regretted that the emergency in
China had not occurred a hundred years earlier, for then
11 an easy solution would have been found and China would
have become the richest nossession of the British Crown.
Now such a thing is not to be thought of’. But he- urged
that China should at any rate be ,Tcolonised,f as rapidly as
possible, by which he meant that capital investments should
be made to develop roads, railways, telegraph, mines and
"in short introduce machinery.... In ten years*1 Michie
added, "China would be as^ich and prosperous as it ought
to be - and as for the Rebels we should give them no room
and they would die out - they could not stand railways'1.
It was a couple of decades too early for the British govern-
-.3lit to respond to that kind of investment imperialism, and
Michie's plans for transforming China wholesale in a short
time were dismissed by Russell and Palmerston as "somewhat
, (2>wild" and "quite impracticable".
(1) F.0.17/381 H.H.Lindsay to F . C .April 30,18§2~, enc. Michie 
to Lindsay March 7? 1862; also F.0.17/380 R.C.Antrobus
to the F.C. Feb. 23, 1862.
(2) F.C.17/383 Michie to Lindsay July 30, 1862, with comments 
by Russell 8: Palmerston dated Oct.1: and 7*
As a spokesman for merchant opinion about government 
policy towards the rebels, however, Michie was listened to 
with more respect. Towards the end of 1862 Michie visited 
England and gave the following reply to queries put to him 
by Layard about the attitude of the merchants in China to 
government policy.
"The British merchants most largely connected with China", 
Michie wrote, "are in favour of the British Government 
giving such assistance to the Chinese Government as 
will enable them to keep the Taepings out of the treaty 
ports; nor do I think there is any difference of opinion 
as to the advisability of pushing our assistance to the 
ultimate crushing of the rebellion. The modus operandi 
may have been questioned, and I know some merchants have 
considered the Government might with advantage have gone 
a step further than it has done. But all feel and ack­
nowledge the delicacy of the position.... The great 
majority, however, have been in favour of the plan pur­
sued as being the most economical to this country and 
the soundest in uolicy, not compromising the British 
Government more than necessary and teaching the Chinese
to help themselves "
Layard quoted these views in the Commons as providing "remark­
able and complete testimony" of the success of the government
2 85
(1)
policy, and of its approval by British merchants in China,
But although Michie may have been right in his claim that 
1 the great majority1’ supported the policy, the evidence 
already quoted shows that there was a significant body of 
merchant opinion in China hostile to that policy, especially 
as it developed after 1862,
In England also a division of opinion, both about 
whether the policy of intervention would really serve British 
commercial interests in China and about whether the merchants 
themselves approved it, revealed itself. The latter noint 
emerged especially as a result of a debate in the House of 
Commons in July, 1863* In this Lord Naas roundly attacked 
the policy of intervention, and claimed that many merchants 
looked upon it with alarm.
”1 have had an opportunity of consulting many London 
commercial houses engaged in trade with China, ’’Lord 
Naas stated, '’and T find that they are almost to a man 
opposed to Capt. Sherard Osborn’s expedition, and against 
an interference, calculated, as they believe, to damage 
the commercial interests of England”.
Later in the debate Samuel Gregson, who was chairman of a 
trade organisation known as the East India and China
(1.) cit. P.D.vol 17*+ (186*+) cols. 1536-9*
Association, replied that ”our merchants were perfectly 
satisfied in the nolicv nursued by Her Majesty’s Government,
.1 O  t/ fJ 9/ /
and we were never in a better position than at nresent in
(2)
resnect of China”. Lord Naas took un the question
further in a letter to the Times in which he gave the source 
of his information about merchant feeling on the question 
as Mr. J. Dent, of Dent & Co., and Mr. Walkinshaw, of Turner 
& Co., who had called upon him and informed him that he was 
”at liberty to state, on their authority, that the China 
merchants as a body were opnosed. to the new policy of the 
Government”. A week later Walkinshaw, writing from Glasgow, 
supro.rt.ed Lord Naas and contradicted Gregson’s claim with 
the assertion that merchants in China were
”almost to a man dissatisfied with the policy that 
authorizes British officers and men to carry arms in 
the employ of the Chinese Government; they consider 
such policy to be fraught with the most dangerous con­
sequences, and one far more likely to rrejudice than 
benefit the trade between the countries......”
(1) T have been unable to trace any surviving records of this 
Association, in Liverpool or London. It had a representative 
on the Countil of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce from 
1853 to 1875? though it was in existence at least as early as 
I8V7. (see Manchester C. of C. Pres, vol.1839-^9? p695? 721). 
The Secretary of the Chamber, Lt.Col.P.G.R.Burford, informed 
me (Nov.1955) that such files as they had covering that 
neriod ”went to salvage during the Second World War”.
(2) see P.D.vol 172(1863) cols.296, 329*
28?.
 The defence of the treaty ports, but beyond that non­
interference between the Manchu government and the rebels was, 
Walkinshaw added, the policy wanted by the mercantile community 
in China. Gregson replied, referring in general terms to 
his conversations with "several gentlemen largely engaged in 
trade with China and some of them recently returned home”,
but without naming names. On the whole the honours of the
(1)exchange would seem to have gone to Lord baas.
The Gregson noint of view on government policy certainly
had its supporters, however, notably the London and China
•Ixnress. This was a fortnightly paper founded at the end
of if 88 devoted to the extension of commercial openings in
the Far East and looking, as the Prospectus in its first
issue stated, "specially for the support of the Mercantile
(2)
Community'1.' During 186] the Express favoured a nolicvV *  ■ ■ ■■■ — 1■■ -T
of keeping an good terms with both Taipings and Imperialists
(1) See the Times July 13?1S63, p.6; July 20,p.12 and July 22, 
p.6. Walkinshaw was Vice-Chairman of the Hong Kong C. of
C. ih l86l (Overland China Mall June 28,lP6l); Gregson was 
chairman of the East India and China Association, though 
himself an Indian rather than a China trader. On the atti­
tude of Dent & Co. cf A.F.Lindlev, op.cit., vol II,p56l 
Lindley says that the failure of that firm to establish an 
opium trade with the rebels at Wuhu made them "become their 
most signal revilers, and use all the interest they possess­
ed against them". This is not supported by Dent's visit to 
Lord Naas. Of their trade at Wuhu, Wyndhair, attache to the 
Mission at Peking, reported after a journey u p  the Yangtze, 
that they were doing "a considerable trade, or rather a 
lucrative trade, ^or the rebels pay largely". (F.0.17/372 
enc. in Bruce to Russell June 10,1862).
See bottom of next Page for fn.(2)...
if possible, though without putting any faith in the rebel
(l) "
movement. By January, 1862, even before the second
Taining attack on Shanghai, it was. arguing that there was
"no reason why we should seek to avoid any legitimate onpor-
tunitv which mav offer of interfering in favour of the cause
op order in China". It naturally greeted the change in
official policy with approval, seeing it as one of outright
war against the rebellion, and it was convinced that England
"must either act against the Taipings with the full conviction
that force is the only logic they are capable of appreciating,
(2)
or we must give up all the privileges we now enjoy". During 
I063 it saw, at first with some apprehension but eventually 
as an unavoidable development, the emergence of a British 
Protectorate in China, and although giving fairly consistent 
support to the policy of intervention as followed by the 
government would, if anything, have preferred it to have
(3)
been more frankly expansionist. On the question of merchant
opinion about that policy the Express admitted some opposition,
(2) from previous page.. The China Express Bov.2?,1858. It 
changed its title to the London ft China Express at the end 
of l86l. It was published to catch departing mails for the 
Far East, while a companion paper, carrying much the same 
editorial comments etc., the London 8: ChinaTelegraph, was 
published on the arrival of mails from the Far East. J have 
used the Express, since it carried a column called "The 
Spirit of the Press" which quoted the views of other English 
(inc. provincial) papers on China affairs.
O  ) this ua^e.... ibid May 27, June 10,186.1 etc.
(2) ibid Jan.10, March 26, Aug. 26, Sent. 10, 1862
(3) ibid Jan.10, Feb.10, April 10, May 26, Nov. 26, 1863.
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but argued that this was more over methods than principle. ' '
<:uch more qualified support for the government!s policy 
came from the Economist. Writing in March, 1862, of the 
change towards a more aggressive line towards the rebellion 
it agreed that it was necessary to protect ”the newly blossoming 
commercial interest” in China, but was alarmed lest England 
”be led almost insensibly and inevitably to a policy in 
China such as initiated our Emuire in India.... hTe are 
inclined to agree in the policy now decided on, but we 
do so with fear and trembling. We should wish our 
Government to weigh well the great fear of involving 
ourselves inextricably in the internal government of 
China. We would wish them to shape their policy with 
an anxious view to avoid the risk of contracting such 
resnonsibilities, to intervene as little as in any way 
possible, to draw out again at the first feasible moment, 
to make it a primary dutv not to let our power creep on-E v v —— i.— ■
(2)
into the foundation of a new dependency”.
(1) ibid July 27, 1863. In this issue the Express was, how­
ever, critical of the Lav-Osborn scheme, which it thought 
‘’fraught with great mischief to trade, and will ultimately 
lead to a collision, not only with the Chinese Government, 
but also with other foreign powers”.
(2) Economist March 22, 1862; cf. also Oct. 20, i860,
article on ’’The Drift of our Chinese Policy”.*
r;ihe chief* fear of the Economist was not in the direct use of
snail British forces against the Taipings but in the release
of officers and officials to serve the Chinese government, a
tyre of assistance which would make it virtually impossible
(1)
to disengage from responsibility for Chinese affairs. Tt
was impossible to remain absolutely neutral, but ”there should
(2)be a minimum of interference" it urged.
Outright rejection of a policy of intervention came from 
some of Jardine, latheson’s Manchester correspondents, in 
reply to that firm’s strictures on the government policy in 
the middle of 1862. Sam Mendel, writing in September, 
stated that he had ,!all alon^ thought that strict neutrality 
would have proved far more judicious11, while at the end of 
the year Calvert &. Co. agreed that it was ’’most unfortunate 
for the extension of trade with the Chinese that a policy of 
strict neutrality with regard to the Taipings was not per­
severed in by the Allied authorities”. Other reactions to 
the Jardine, Matheson complaints were, of course, also to 
be found. William Paton of Glasgow felt the subject to be 
one of great difficulty and put his trust in ”the present
(1) ibid. July 12, Aug. 2, Oct.3 and 31, I863.
(2) ibid. June * f, l 8 6 * f .
excellent and able statesman at the head of Foreign Affairs
in Great Britain, Bari Russell'1, whom he thought had every
disposition to remain neutral, "were it possible consistently
with the safety of British interests".  ^ Matheson & Co.,
although glad to learn "that the Taipings seem disposed to
afford every protection and encouragement to foreigners and
their trade", were far more concerned with the development
of events in America, and expressed no particular views about
(2)policy in China. This is a warning against exaggerating
the degree of concern in British merchant houses over the 
Taiping issue in China.
Very appropriately,the division of merchant opinion in 
ilng.land on the question of policy towards the rebellion was 
revealed most plainly in the House of Commons. There were 
several debates on the issue there, as well as in the Lords, 
and on July 8, 1862, a vote was taken on a resolution calling 
for British officials in China to be directed "to avoid any 
intervention beyond that absolutely necessary for the defence 
of those British subjects who abstain from all interference
(3)in the Civil War now raging in that country". ' This was
(1) J.l .J:Co. Correspondence In - Great Britain (Box 1862-3)
Sent. 26,1862 (from Mendel and Paton), Dec.27,1862 (from 
Calvert).
Box
(2) ibid., Correspondence In - London (1862) Sept.8, 1862.
Matheson & Co generally just acknowledged any political news
or observations without commenting - seeibid June 2k, July 2k, 
Aug.8,1862 and Beb.8,l86k, June 2k. l86l etc.
(3) ^or this debate see P.D.vol.l68 (1862) cols.29-8.1; for other
debates see below, ch. 1C.
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defeated by a large majority (197 to 88), but it is to be
noted that the resolution was moved by James White, who had
been for many years a merchant in China and who was described
in Walford's Shilling House of Commons for 1862 as being then
"a China merchant in the City". He criticised Russell's
recent instruction that all the treaty ports should be defended
against the rebels on the ground that this was a potentially
"stupendous task", and rejected the government argument that
it was all for the protection of trade by pointing out that
tea and silk exports from China were still increasing, including
the particular types of silk produced in the rebel held areas.
White was supported in this vote by a number of other merchants
and manufacturers, as also, of course, was the government.
But the weight of merchant opinion in the House, insofar as it
was expressed in the division list, was fairly evenly divided.
Of about forty members listed in the Shilling House of Commons
for 1862 as bein” either merchants or former merchants, twenty
three voted on this issue, fourteen for the government and
nine against; and of twelve listed as manufacturers, seven-
voted, three for the government and four a g a i n s t * T h e r e
(1) These figures were obtained by checking the division list of 
the vote of July 8,1862, against the information about members 
contained in Walford's Shilling H. of 0.(1862). They are not 
presented as giving an accurate indication of merchant and 
manufacturing representation in the H. of C. at that time (the 
information in the Shilling H. fif C. is very sketchy), but as 
providing some kind of statistical evidence of the division 
which existed among such representatives on this Issue. The 
government was, in fact, persistently attacked by merchants in
the E. of C. from l862-6k for its policy towards the,rebellion, 
and its claim that it was acting for the benefit of trade only 
served to irritate some of them the more.
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was certainly no unanimous cry from trading and manufacturing 
representatives in Parliament for the British government to 
take active measures against the Taiping rebels.
In a later debate, in If6k, after W. 3. Baxter, a Dundee 
merchant who did not vote in the 1862 division, had also 
attacked the policy of Co-operating with what he called the 
’’cruel and corrurt government of the Kantchou Tartars” Palmer­
ston complained of ’’the inconsistency of these mercantile 
gentlemen”, who were constantly urging the government to make 
treaties and extend commercial apportunities yet were reluctant 
to accept the necessity for action to maintain those treaties*
”We have interfered with great success in the affairs of other 
countries, and with great benefit to the countries concerned”, 
^almerston claimed, listing Greece, Belgium, Portugal, Turkey 
and Sgypt as examples. To these he was ready to add China.
(1) Bor this debate see P.D.vol 175 (186k) cols.527-^5? note 
also Thos. E. Horsfall, M.P. for Livernool and a former 
President of the Liverpool Chamber of Co merce at half- 
yearly General Meeting of the Chamber in Aug.l86k - ’’With 
regard to the war in China, Lord Palmerston stated, I think 
to some extent erroneously, that that war was carried on 
for the nrotection of the" commercial interests of the country 
That war was to a certain extent carried on for the protec­
tion of the commercial interests so far as this, that notice 
had been given that British interests would be nrotected 
for 30 miles around the various treaty ports. Had the war 
been confined to thes<| 30 miles, I am satisfied it would 
have been a comparatively unimportant war; but it was 
because Major Gordon, acting I believe with the concurrence 
of the Government, went beyond that circle that the great 
difficultv arose”. (Livernool C. of C. Renorts, Aug,l86k,
P.35).
.is aristocratic government certainly did not feel it
necessary to wait upon the approval of middle class merchants
before interfering in what it conceived to be the true commer-
(1)
oial interests of England, especially when those merchants 
spoke with a divided voice, as they clearly did on the ques­
tion of helping to suppress the Taiping rebellion.
One naturally asks whether this division of merchant 
opinion reflected any division of merchant interests. It 
is not obvious that it did so. The lines of division suggested 
at the time were that it was the oniurn traders who were the 
^reat opponents of the rebels and advocates of their destruc­
tion, and that it was the merchants engaged, in arms running
on the China coast who were the chief opponents of any policy
(?)designed to end the rebellion. ' The first of these dinply
(1) On the aristocratic composition of Palmerston’s government 
note h L. Woodward, The A"e of deform (1938) pp 155,166,
. Palmerston’s cabinet at this time included ’’three 
dukes and the brother of a fourth, five peers and sons of 
peers, three baronets of ancient standing and landed pro­
perty, and only three men without titles”.
(2) or the argument that the opium merchants were the chief 
instigators of government nolicv see A.F.Lindley, op.cit., 
Vo3 • T pp 55-6, 209-10 and vol II p561, and W.H.Sykes The 
Taenlnv Hebeilion in China (1F63) pp ii-iii and 3°; for 
the gunrunners as its chief opponents (one wonders whether 
they were not the same merchants.’) see A & P 1862 (2976)
p 15k and 1863 (3-1-0*+) pp 76-7*
does not stand up arainst the evidence of the Jardine,
Matheson correspondence, which is carped by the letter of 
Lord Naas to the Times naming Mr. J. Dent of Dent and Co. 
as being opposed to the government policy of intervention.
The second seems obviously inadequate to explain the extent 
of publicly expressed merchant opposition, especially in 
England. The British government thought of itself as 
acting particularly to secure a good market in China for the 
home manufacturer, but the evidence of the 1862 division 
list indicates that not all those manufacturers appreciated 
its objectives. The only sure conclusion about British 
merchant opinion on this question seems to be that it was 
distinctly divided, not primarily over the merits or demerits 
of the Taiping rebels, but over the necessity for and the 




The missionaries have had a very had press for their 
attitude towards the Taipings. They have been criticised 
bv writers hostile to the rebellion for ever beinr deludedv w
by it, and by writers favourable to the rebellion for ever
forsaking it.
”The Protestant missionaries then in China were elated 
by the outbreak of the great Rebellion”, wrote Alex­
ander Michie, in 1892. ” For eight years and
uerhaps longer (they) continued to be partisans of
the Rebels  The tide eventually turned, and in
view of the decidedly polygamous proclivities of the 
Wang himself, and some rather serious aberrations in
o  7
doctrine, the missionaries gradually withdrew their 
sympathy, washed their hands of the new Christians
( D....and uassed by on the other side".
In their 1 ignorant fervour” on behalf of the rebels, wrote
D. C. Boulger, the missionaries ”strained all their influence
(1) Alexander Michie, China and Christianity, (1892) u.i+3.
to commit our Government to the adventure of espousing these 
spurious Christians*1, while G. J. Wolseley judged it not 
surprising that 1 in their joy at so much anna rent spiritual
good, they should lose sight of the great evils attendant
n <Dthereon1’.
On the other hand, A. F. Lindley criticised the mission-
(2)
aries for their ’’negligence” of the rebellion, while 
Holger Cahill felt that although the onposition of the British 
merchants and consular officials to the rebellion was under - 
standable, that of the missionaries was not.
’’the missionaries quarrelled with the Taipings for 
reasons which had to do with their own sectarian and 
national rivalries rather than with any passion for
Christianity”, he wrote.”...... Each sect demanded
that the religion of the rebels be of its own exact
tyre  The missionaries did not understand the
Tanning movement......(they) failed in any constructive
(3)action in the Taiping rebellion”.
(1) D. C. Boulger, The Life of Hallidav Macartney (1908) nn^l-2 
and G. J. Wolseley, Narrative of the War in China in i860
(1862) p.333*
(3) A. F. Lindley, on. cit*, vol I nn 309-10.
(3) H. Cahill, on.cit., n 287; see also C.P.Fitzgerald,
China (1950 edn) pp 57^-81.
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Deluded or disillusioned, in support of the rebellion or 
in opposition to it, the role of the missionaries has been 
very generally criticised. This chanter attempts an overall 
survey of the reaction of British Protestant missionaries 
towards the Taiping rebellion, as far as possible letting 
them speak for themselves. Some of the charges made against 
them clearly have much force; others are no less clearly 
unjustified.
The situation of the Protestant missionaries in China 
in the years immediately following the Treaty of Nanking was 
certainly such as to make them elated at news of a native 
Christian rebellion. The opening of the first five norts 
under that treaty had seemed to rromise a great new field 
for enternrise and expansion to the missionary, as it had 
to the merchant. Sir Henry Pottinger's pictiire of the wide 
prospects for trade in China was matched by the Rev. Dr. 
Liefchild at a public meeting of the friends of the London 
jssionary Society in January l8*+3.
"When Christianity once ^ets into China, and the inhabitants 
of that empire are able to compare the statutes of Confu­
cius and Buddhu (sic) and all the puerilities mixed in 
them with the Christian scriptures universally diffuse d 
in their own language and eagerly perused by that inquisi­
tive and reading people, think you not that the objects
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"of their idolatrous worship will soon begin to totter 
and tumble and fall, and be entombed in the very soil 
out of which they arose? When they shall come to see
the superiority of our knowledge and civilization....
can you doubt that their nuerile conceits will crumble 
and vanish?"^^
The missionaries actually in the field were rather more 
alive to possible dragons in their nath, but for them, too, 
it seemed that "the acceptable year of the Lord, the set 
time to favour the land of Sinim" was at hand. The Rev.
W. H. Medhurst, father of the consular official, wrote from 
Shanghai rejoicing in "the animating fact of the accessibility 
of China to missionary labours", though he added that "as 
propagators of a new religion in cities but recently opened 
to foreign intercourse we are somewhat delicately situated.... 
it would auuear to be the dictate of nrudence to conduct our
(I) 1 issionarv Ma^azine~ 18^3? n.20. The Rev. Dr. continued, 
"When our women - the glory of our land and the charm of every 
circle, whose superiority is acknowledged in every country under 
heaven...shall mingle with them in the person of the wives cf 
Missionaries, or the consorts of noble and illustrious visitors 
to the nalace, how will the female portion of the Chinese non- 
ulation rise in everything graceful and dignified by such an 
association. The Chinese ladies, in a very few years, will be 
copying the manners of English women....How wondrous are the 
ways of Providence, how mysterious to our annrehension, that 
this little nation - this handful of neople- should be the means 
of saving, by her civil, moral, intellectural and spiritual con­
dition, the teeming and swarming population of the globe.1".
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operations with as much caution and stillness as nossible".
Dr. Lockhart urged that more missionaries be sent out, "for 
it is a pity to lose any time when so effectual a door is 
thrown onen before us in this land".^^
In 18^3 the undenominational London Missionary Society 
was the only English society actively in the China field, 
with eight renresentatives in a total Protestant missionary 
force in China of about twenty five, most of the remainder 
being American. After the signing of the Treaty of Ranking 
there was a considerable expansion of Protestant missionary 
organization in China. By l8*+8 the London Missionary Society 
had doubled its numbers, the Church Missionary Society of the 
Church of England had renewed the efforts it had abandoned 
in 18^0, Baptist and Presbyterian Missionary societies had 
sent out their first renresentatives, and the number of 
British missionaries alone had reached twenty-five, in a 
total Protestant force of seventy-three, of whom over forty 
were American. Five years later ap*ain, however, by which 
time the Taipings were establishing themselves at Nanking, 
the number of British missionaries had increased only to 
twenty-nine, and the total to eighty-one. There had been 
significant falling away of impetus, indicative of the check
(1) ibid, 18^3, 13.180 and 18M+, p.US.
to missionary hopes under the first treaty with China.
The fact was that the missionary, like the merchant, 
found China a difficult field to nenetrate effectively. He 
did not doubt thfc ultimate triumph of his message, any more 
than the merchant doubted the ultimate worth of his gospel 
of free trade, but in both cases the early returns were dis­
appointing. 111 have laboured in China for seven years11,
said the Presbyterian, William Burns, in 1853? ,fand I do not
(2)
know of a single soul brought to Christ by me". After
nine years of labour by several London Missionary Society 
missionaries at Shanghai, the Rev. W. C. Milne felt "not a 
little gratified that we can sneak of a native church of 
twenty one members....Though our success is limited, very 
limited in amount, yet we rejoice11. °  In a despatch to 
Palmerston about this time Bowring contrasted the position 
of the Roman Catholic and Protestant missions in China, and 
observed of the latter that "the results of their preaching 
and of their labours for the conversion of the natives are
(1) For sources of these and later figures on British mission­
aries in China see Appendix D. Catholic missions in China 
at this time were mainly conducted by the French.V  V
(2) cit. D.McGillivray, A Jsntury of Irotestant Fissions in China 
(19C7), p.175.
(3) Missionary Magazine. 1853? P*29; cf. also J.Lesson, -he 
Cross and the Dragon (185*+) pp 232-8.
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incredibly small, considering the large sums o" money which
have been spent upon the missions, the number of protestant
missionaries, and their undoubted devotion to the work they
have undertaken'1. ^
This lack of success was variously explained, Bowring1s
comment being that "indifference, not fanaticism, is the
difficulty with which they have to deal". The special
degradation and corruption held by many to be characteristic
of the Chinese, was, of course, a favourite reason given,
the Church Missionary Intelligencer, for example, exclaiming -
"Alas! There is nothing but moral decay in China. From
the sole of the foot even to the head there is no soundness,
and whatever of actual vice and corruption can originate is
to be found there. What need of the Gospel in China! ....
(2)
Oespised and scorned it will be; but who can doubt the issue?" 
ore moderately. the London lissionarv Hagazine argued that 
"in a country where the prevailing systems of belief, 
and the social usages of the entire copulation have 
been stereotyped for ages, the attempt to introduce 
ideas at variance with every preconceived notion 
must necessarily be a work of great difficulty. Hence 
it can be no matter for surprise that the indefatigable
(1) F.0.17/189 Bowring to Clarendon Lay 1, 1852.
(2) Church Missionary Intell 1 frencer, IP50, p^66.
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11 labours of our 1 issionaries in China, though followed 
bv many tokens of encouragement, have hitherto made
(1)
little or no imnression upon the masses of the people".
(1) H1ssionarv Magazine, 1852, p.170; cf. also Rev.
W.A.Russell in July, 18*f8 - "A teeming population w^ 'th 
much intelligence and, to my mind an extraordinary degree 
of outward sobriety and general good conduct, would all 
seem to encourage the hope that this was just the field 
for Missionary enterprise; but on the other hand, 
when you hear of the faithful proclamation of Gospel 
truth unattended with visible fruit you are constrain­
edly diverted from the comparison of outward favourable 
symptoms to the conviction that not here or there, as 
man conceives, is the good ground where the seed of the 
word will spring up, but only where the Lord chooses to 
bless. That he will choose to bless this numerous 
people in His own good time I doubt not .... But 
that there is yet a stirring among the "dry bones" I 
do not think, at least to any extent.... " (Church 
Missionary Record, lBkR, n.292). For other moderate* 
views on the moral condition of the Chinese see W.
Gillespie, The Land of Sinim (185*0 120-2, who concluded
that they had "probably gone as far as any heathen neonle 
could co in the acquisition of correct manners and the 
nractice of good morals, without a revelation from heaven 
to guide them". But wholesale missionarv condemnation 
of Chinese morality was very common, and probably the 
more usual attitude.
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Indeed, the whole Chinese approach to religion, based on
expediency rather than on faith, and accommodating in temper
rather than narrowly exclusivist, was very far removed from
the fervour of nineteenth century evangelical Protestantism,
so that, in rational terms at least, the limited anneal of
(1)
the missionaries’ message was hardly surprising. Tn
addition, at Canton and Foochow especially, there were poli­
tical difficulties to contend with, although on the whole
the missionaries complained much less than the merchants of
(2 )official obstruction. But despite their disaupointments,
(1) See Missionary Magazine, l8o2, u .12, for the complaints 
of Rev. J, MacGowan on ’’the apathy with which the Chinese
regard the future life”, and "their very imnerfect idea,..•—1 /  *
in regard to sin. In fact very few are willing to admit 
that they have any sin at all, and therefore when the 
Gospel is preached, denouncing man as the subject of 
corruntion, it clashes with all their preconceived ideas, 
and brings in a doctrine which is almost wholly new to 
them”; also ibid, 186*+, ppS-^? "When the Gospel is preached 
to them a primary consideration with them is what are the 
advantages connected with it". In his Charge to the Anglican 
Clergy, March 16, i860, pp9-10, the Bishop of Victoria 
noted the less favourable position of the missionary in a 
country such as China, which had its established literature 
and civilisation (which the missionary did not do wisely 
to disdain), compared with more primitive countries where 
the missionary might establish his influence by bringing 
other benefits in addition to religion.
(2) See A d: P l8*+7 (65*0 qq2902-3* where Rev. G. Smith (later 
Bishop of Victoria) told the Select Committee on Commercial 
Relations in China that "not the slightest" obstruction 
from the native government or priesthood had been met with. 
There were some complaints and difficulties, however, (e.g.
C.M.Intelligencer 1851, p p87-9)•
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having faith, they did not despair; they simnly deferred
.. . . CDtheir hopes.
Being human, though, the missionaries looked for a 
sign, and it is not surprising that they gteeted news of 
a native Chinese movement of reform which proclaimed a 
Christian ideology with great iov and ontimism. Yet it 
was a joy and optimism tempered from the very beginning 
with a considerable element of caution, and even of doubt.
A mixture of caution and hopefulness, even if not always in 
very equal parts, is apparent in the great majority of their 
early reports, beginning with Med.hurst1 s summing up of 
Taiping Christianity on the basis of the pamphlets he collected 
at ' anking when accompanying Bonham on his vi sit of April,
IB53* On the Christian worth of these productions Medhurst 
found it "exceedingly difficult to arrive at a definite con­
clusion. There are some things good, very good, in the
productions before us....... There are, however, some things
(2)
of which we most highly disapprove......" On the day
‘oil owing the return of the "Hermes" from Nanking, the Rev.
'■J. C. Milne renorted that the London Missionary Society 
missionaries in Shanghai
(1) To some extent these were encouraged by early reports
on the rebellion in Hwangsi - see Church Missionary Record 
T ov.l852, ur>262-3: but cf. above pp. ZO-\ for pre-lP?3
missionary reactions to the rebellion.
(2) A & P 1852-3 (166?) u.k3.
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?!wish it distinctly to be observed that at present we 
refrain from expressing an ouinion as to the sinceritv
A W  I.
of any of this people in what they hold of Christianity; 
and we particularly request the Board that, should they 
issue any account of the above, they will give the 
whole - coupled with a caution not to look at the fair 
side of the nicture onlv, nor be carried awav by thoseJl 7
semblances of ^ood that perhaps are after all hollow
and false, while they are mixed un with much that is
(1)
undoubtedly presumptuous and criminal”.
^he Rev. J. Hobson, in forwarding Kedhurst1s translations
of the Taiping pamphlets to the Church Missionary Society,
observed that '‘while on the one hand they will grieve you by
showing marks of rampant uride and ambition in the leaders
of the rebellion, and worse than these a systematic attempt
to wrest Christian truth to serve mere uolitical purposes,
on the other hand you will rejoice to see these men in
(2)
possession of so much Christian truth “ The emphasis
(1) LMS Central China Letters (Box I,U N o".253 Milne to~lhman 
(Secretary of LMS), May 6,1853$ also li 1 s s i on a r M a ga z ine.
L85^ 35 np 205-6.
(2) CMS China Letters, Hobson to Venn (Secretary of CMS), May 
3-1,1853; c8 also Bishop of Victoria to Archbishop of Cant­
erbury, May 23,18535 ir» C.M . Intelligencer ■> 1.853.an. 193-*+ - 
“There is, of course, much in these imperfectly enlightened 
men which may lead into fanatical excesses; and we must use 
great caution lest we crudely identify Protestant Missions 
with a movement of which the whole character has not as yet 
been fully developed....vet some sympathy may surely be
Cont’d at foot of next page
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varied, but the early missionary reports on the rebellion
did emphasize both the hopeful and the less hopeful features
of the movement, as seen from the missionary viewpoint.
On the basis of such reports the home societies in
ingland warned their supporters against excessive optimism.
The Committee o*' the Church Missionary Society, while noting
the enthusiasm of rnany Christians for the movement, could not
itself ^o beyond the expression of “hopeful but anxious
expectations”. It saw many tokens of the good hand of the
Lord in this development in China, but was anxious lest “the
evils which now hover above the movement should settle uuon
it - of religious fanaticism, or of reactionary vengeance,
(1)
or* of destructive socialism..... " The London Missionary
Society, in publishing its first renorts on the movement in 
September, 1853? warned that “our Missionaries are extremely 
desirous that the English public should not be induced, by 
the avowed adoption of the Christian faith by the insurgents, 
to draw inferences which subsequent events may fail to justify, 
more especially as the better element that characterizes the 
movement is evidently mixed up with much that is heterogenous 
and immoral". At the end of the year the warning was
(1) Procs. of the l853J+, n.l*+G.
Concluding fn.(2) from nrevious nage..
"felt with the population of a vast continent now awaking 
from the long slumber of ages, and at last, it is to be 
honed, about to enter into the great fraternity of civil­
ized and Christian nations".
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repeated that Tainj.ng religious development was "very partial 
and imperfect", and it was "doubted whether the chiefs and 
teachers of the Chinese Insurgents can even be regarded as 
almost Christians". (' ^  Both in China and England early
missionary reaction to the rebellion was far from unguarded
. .. . (2) m  its optimism.
This is not to deny that hone mounted far higher in 
issionary circles than did doubt, or that an immense improve­
ment in position and prospects in China was not looked for 
as a result of the rebellion, "As a missionary, when I 
came to China, T felt all around the gloom of midnight 
darkness", ivfrote the Wesleyan, Rev. Josiah Cox from Canton.
(1) ' i ssjonarv Magazine, 1853? rn 20*+, 2^6-81; also Tidrnan to 
Le<-ge in LMS Outgoing Letters-China (Box 4), Oct.2^,18J3•
(2) Cf. the conclusions of J.B.Littell in his article "Mission­
aries and Politics in China - The Taiping Rebellion" in^ 
Political Science Quarterly vol XLIII, b (Dec.1928) up886-99* 
Littell dealt with the early reactions of American mission­
aries, and emphasised "the great divergences in American
missionary opinion  Contrary to the almost universal
ideas of historians, missionary opinion even at the Glorious 
beginning of the Taiping rebellion was anything but unani­
mous," (pu570-l). British missionaries were, I think, 
uractically unanimous in favouring the rebel cause against 
the Manchus at first; the difference among them was 
mainly in the strength of their doubts as against their 
houes. But the doubts were always uresent, and the houes 
rather short-lived for the most part.
1 Now the clouds are breaking and (though) I know not what
(1)
the day may bring I hail the glimmering dawn”. Especially 
encouraging to the missionaries was the prospect of China 
being thrown open by a government friendly to them and their 
teachings, for little doubt was entertained that the fall 
of the Manchus was imminent.
TtThe prospect thus uresented to our view is indeed too 
glowing to be pressed'1, wrote Rev. Muirhead in October, 
18?3• "Should the country be thrown ouen, should 
we be permitted to nenetrate into the regions beyond 
and unfold to their myriad, myriad inhabitants the 
tidings of a SaviourTs love, it were a privilege too 
great to be realized in thought..... To the utmost 
extent of the influence of the insurgents idolatry is 
proscribed and Christianity in some of its most Protest­
ant features established. That these principles would 
be maintained and acted unon, jn the event of their 
obtaining the ascendancy, we have no reason to doubt, 
while such is the native feeling on religious subjects 
that little or no ounosition need be aoorehended from
the great, mass of the neonle, were the chancre in creed
(2)
urgently insisted on...... "
(1) Wesleyan' M:i sslonarv Tot ices , 18 53 5 p. 158
(2) LMS. Central China Letters (Box I, U-), Muirhead to Tidman, 
Oct. 20, 1853-
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The Anglican missionary, Rev. R. D. Jackson, also believed 
that the triumph of the rebels would result in "the annihila­
tion of the exclusivism which has hitherto presented so for-
(1)
midable a barrier to the preaching of the gospel". The 
ishop of Victoria speculated on the possibility of a native
(2)
Christian ministry being drawn from the ranks of the rebels, 
while the Rev. V. H. Kedliurst looked forward to the day when
the Christian scriptures would replace the Confucian classics
(3)as the examination texts of China. ~ The Bishop, wno was
one of the most enthusiastic in his support of the rebellion,
reported to the Church Missionary Society that "it arrears
a wonderful moral revolution. We behold a hundred-thousand
Chinese living separated from their wives, abstaining from
wine, opium, tobacco, quarrelling, lying and bad words, and
engaging in daily worship, a common table, a common treasury - 
(If)
and no pay". There could hardly be a more far-reaching
change.
Tn England, William Gillespie a former London Missionary 
Society agent in China, called the rebellion a "mighty moral
(1) C.M.S. Letter ' ook-China (l§5l-9) p 359, Jackson to Venn, 
July 18, 1853.
(2) C.M.S. Box of Bishop of Victoria's letters, April 7,185^ 
to Archbishop of Canterbury.
(3) L.M.S. Central China Letters (Box I,1*-), 1 edhurst to Tid- 
rnan, Dec. 29, 1853*
(b) C.M.S. Letter Book - China (1851-9) P^33? Dec.7, 1853? see 
also article by the Bishop in the Calcutta Review for 
March, l851+.
miracle”, ‘'while the Chinese 7‘ 1 ssionarv Gleaner, the organ 
of the Chinese Evangelization Society, which was the fore­
runner of the China Inland Mission. (1-865), was nersuaded 
that ’’these men will ultimately prove the nioneers of the 
greatest work that has been accomplished since the days of 
the apostles. The axe is laid at the root of idolatry, 
and the decayed trunk will soon fall". Strongest proof
of popular faith in the movement was provided by the Million 
ew Testament Scheme, launched by the British and Foreign 
Bible Society. The subscription target, calculated at
fourpence a cony, was soon passed and the two million mark
( 0 )
reached by June, 185*+• Nineteenth entury England wanted
(1) see W, Gillespie, opcit., np 210-38•
(2) C h 1 n e s e Missionary Gleaner April, 18 5*+, np 73~I+*
(3) On this scheme see W. Canton, A History of the British 
and Foreign Bible Society (1910), vol II ppV^-7-52 and 
vol III nr ^3^-6: on its later working note Rev. J.S.
Burdon in C. 1. Intelligencer, i860, p.283 “ ’’The million 
scheme is still (Sept., i 860) being carried into effect: 
but experience is showing that it was at least a premature 
step. The Bibles were to have been printed for the bene­
fit of imperfectly enlightened Christians.... (But) the 
military occupation of great parts of the country has neu­
tralized all efforts at Missionary work among the insurgents 
and the Bibles hitherto have had to be distributed among 
those who know nothing of, and care less for, the subjects 
of which the Bible treats, and thus the rebels having dis- 
appointed us, it has been found difficult judiciously to 
dispose of such an immense number of Bibles in the limited 
districts of the heathen to which we have been confined".
very much to hasten the conversion, which would also be the 
opening of China.
There were some, however, who even in 1853 viewed the 
movement with suspicion, if not with actual hostility. The 
Christian Times, though approving a policy of neutrality, 
was convinced that it was all a Jesuit plot, and that Taining 
Christianity was "a palpable and offensive imposture". "Pre­
mature hopes and hasty sympathies cannot be too carefully 
discouraged", it insisted. '  ^ The Rev. V/. H. Rule also 
argued, in quasi-scholarty fashion, on the basis of Taiping 
religious publications, that the teaching of the insurgents 
was "but a continuation or reproduction of the elementary
teaching of the Jesuits in China", and saw nothing to further
(2)
the cause of evangelical Christianity in the movement. Rut 
for many others the rebellion was not only Christian but 
frotestant. This was for them its great, virtue. The 
‘nfluence on Hung of the tracts distributed at Canton in 
1 37 by the American Baptist missionary, T. J. Roberts: Hung’s
later brief association with Roberts; the printing and circu­
lation of portions of scripture in Protestant translations by 
the rebels; their destruction of temples and idols; the 
hostility shown towards them by Catholic missionaries in 
China - all these things were taken as evidence of the
(3) The Christian Times May 20, July 22, Aug. 5? 1853*
(2) W . .Rule, The Religious Aspect of the Civil War in China
(1853)5 esp. r>p 38-9, 63*
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essentially protestant nature of the movement. "It is with 
Protestant Christianity these ueople sympathize, not with 
Romanism", reported the committee of the Church Missionary 
Society in October, 1853* "The idolatry of Rome is utterly 
repugnant to them. But to Protestant Christianity they 
look as a kindred element, and in their ignorance of its 
real character, believe it to be identical with their own
... . « <13religious views".
This concern to fit. the Taiping movement into he stern 
religious categories, rather than an "ignorant fervour" 
which failed to recognize the "heresies" in it, was the 
great limitation in the attitude of the Protestant mission­
aries. Their failure to consider it as a possible Christian 
rove cent which was neither Protestant nor Catholic, but simply 
Chinese, ade their ultimate disappointment in it certain, 
hit given their intellectual background, compounded of a 
vigorous set of religious beliefs and of assumptions, bv no^  O  XT 7 V
means peculiar to the missionary, of the superiority of all
things Western to anything Chinese; and given also the
claims made by Rung and by the Eastern King, Yang, to new
and author^ tative revelation, it would have been surprising
(1) CMS Circulars and Other Papers Vol T Noi75 - "Minute of the 
Committee of the CMS on the Present State and Future Pros­
pects of China", p.7; cf also Vi.Gillespie, op.cit., pp228-9; 
Wesleyan Missionary Notices, Sept. 18-53? p..137;and above p.3^9*
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had the missionaries adjusted themselves to the idea of
(1)
so Chinese a form of Christianity as this.
What is surprising, though, is that the missionaries 
made so little positive effort in the first years of the 
rebellion to influence it in the direction of greater 
Protestant orthodoxy. Thev talked of this and saw the 
danger of still greater heresy if they did not. Yet 
apart from the attempts of a few missionaries, mainly 
American, to reach Nanking, no serious effort seems to have 
been made during 1853-*+ to establish a permanent mission 
among the rebels. The difficult and changing military 
situation, and probably also discouragement from the con­
sular authorities, helu to exulain this, but in view of 
their mixed fears and hones about the nature of the movement
it seems hardly to have been consistent with their own large
(2)
objectives in China. There was not even any significant
(1) On Taiping Christianity see esn. E.P.Boardman, Christian 
Influence uron the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion (1952). 
There seems little doubt that the real extent of Christian 
influence upon the Taipings has been exaggerated in Most West­
ern accounts of the movement.
(2) See J.B.Littell, on.cit., rm.578-86, on the visits or 
attempted visits of American missionaries to the rebels 
about, this time, esr.pSB^ on official discouragement.
Among British missionaries the Presbyterian Rev.W.C.Burns 
attempted to get to Nanking in IP55 (Renorts of the China 
Fission at Amoy. Nov.1855, p6). But there is no report of 
a missionary representative included in the ilRattler!- 
!Styxf visit of June, 185*+, and Bowring almost certainly 
did not wish to encourage such visits. Fishbourne renorted 
of Bowring, 11 He hasoften told me that he has no syrrmathv
with the Protestant Missionaries: that he has noi belief
that they have done anything in china; and that he nas
Jont’d at foot of next page...*
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increase in the number of missionaries in the field in the 
years after l853>^^and at the end of that year Medhurst was
writing
,?This is a class of men that can with difficulty be 
controlled. They must for a time be allowed to go their 
own way. It may not be in every respect the way which we
could approve, but it does not appear to run directly
counter to our objects. In the meantime we can go on
» (2) m  ours”.
Such a policy invited the growth of heresy. Until Elgin’s
voyage at the end of 1858, there were no further direct con-
tae's between British missionaries and the rebels.
During these years the decline in the fortunes of the
rebellion on the one hand, and the improved prospects created
or the missionaries by the Treaty of Tientsin on the other,
meant that less and less consideration was given to the
possible place of the Taipings in missionary plans for the
conversion of China. The element of doubt, present from the
be -inni g, became more marked in their observations, now only
made occasionally. Alexander Wylie reported to the London
conducing (2) from previous pa?e ... a most thorough belief 
that the Roman Catholic Missionaries have done a great 
deal”. (Wesleyan Missionary notices Jiine-Ju1y ,1C55,p .131). 
Bowring was often accused of being under Roman 'Jatholic 
influence in his view of the rebellion (see The Record 
Jan.1,1855? and Chinese Missionary Gleaner Feb,1855?pl65)•
(1) this page.. See Appendix D. Appeals were launched and funds
raised, but it was difficult to get, suitable candidates 
(see Tidman to Medhurst Sept. 2,l85^,in LMS Outgoing Letter
-China, Box 5)•
(2) Missionary Magazine, lP5d poo.
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Missionary Society in June, 185*4-, on the ’’evident reaction 
in the popular mind” following the visit of the American
Commissioner, r.cLane, to Nanking.
’’The arrogance of their assumptions, one chief calling 
himself the Son of God, and another entitling himself 
the holy Spirit, has given rise to a feeling of dis­
appointment in the minds of many of their friends..... 
That Tae-ping-wang will succeed in subverting the present 
dynasty there seems little room for doubt", Wylie added. 
"Whether he will realize the high anticipations that 
have been formed respecting his religious character 
is more open to doubt".
"In common with all friends of the Chinese Mission", the 
secretary of the London Missionary Society wrote in October, 
185*4-, "we have been greatly perplexed and dismayed by the 
extravagant and blasphemous doctrines recently breached by 
(Hung) " But whjle it was "difficult at first to dis­
engage the mind from the pleasant illusions which so fair a 
felt that much missionary labour 
beginning had inspired", he/would have to be expended yet
before China was converted. The Taipings no longer seemed
(2 )likely allies in that work. ' ' By September, 1855, even
(1) L.i .3. Central China Letters (Box I,*f) Wylie to Tidman,
June 26, 185*4-.
(2) L. .S.Outgoing Letters - China (Box 5) Tidman to Muirhead, 
Oct. 22, l85*f.
ed.hurst, then an old and sick man, was admitting that ”our 
estimate of the insurgent movement oust undergo considerable 
fications  vie cannot but withhold our assent to
their being denominated Christian brethren until we know
more of them, and are enabled to separate the precious from
, (1)
the vile”*
The death of Yang, the Eastern King, in 1856, encouraged 
some to hope that ’’the most mischievous and caigerous element 
in the revolution has thus been taken away”, but the Church 
: issionar^ Record warned that ”with such internal elements 
among the Taiping leaders, it will be wise for the friends 
of Christian missions to form verv moderate expectations
(2)
of the immediate results to the cause of true Christianity,” 
'T'he Chinese Evangelization Society clung more persistently 
than any other missionary body in England to its early high 
hones in the rebellion, and in January, 1887, still honed 
for ”the best from this remarkable movement. The good even 
at Present far outweight the evil”/' ^ But by that time 
r: t ssionary opinion generally, both in England and in China, 
had moved very far from the hopes of 1873*
(1) L. .S, Central China Letters (Box IT,1) Medhurst to 
Tidman, Sent.6, 1888,
(2) Kh. Record, 1887, rm3V+-8: cf.Procs. of the C ,M, S. 1888-8,
p . 18-3
( 3) Chinese Kiss1onarr Gleaner, Jan.1887,p .16.
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The Treaty of Tientsin strengthened this tendency to 
look away from the Taipings. Article VIII of the treaty 
"ave suecjfic recognition to the Christian religion as ’’in­
culcating the nractice of virtue11. Persons teaching or nro- 
fessing it were to be entitled to the rrotection of the Chinese 
authorities, ”nor shall any such, peaceably pursuing their 
calling and not offending against the laws, be persecuted or 
Interfered with”. The kind of hopes entertajned after the 
less favourable treaty of I8*f2 were renewed, while jn appealing 
for funds to extend the mission in China, the directors of the 
London Missionary Society observed significantly that
!,In the year, 185*+? in the expectation that the providence 
of God was about to open China through the influence of 
internal insurrection, a srecial anneal was made to the 
friends of the Society for funds to enable the Directors 
to take advantage of the anticipated event. The prospects 
of that day were not realized; but God has now answered 
our supplications by other means, with the nrosuects of 
harrier results and greater security11. ^  '
V] ) v s s i on a r y la p-azine, TV ^9 ,nA3; cf. also C.H. Record, De^c.
l; 58,p3^-9, quoting the Bombay Guardian - ’’Four years ago we
were honing almost everything from the success and policy
of the Tae-Ping-Wang party; but God has brought about the
liberty that was sought In a very different way11. For the
hones aroused by the new treaty note Rev.G.John to Tidman,
July 38,1858 in L.M.S. Central China Letters (Box 11,2)-
”Thus China has been opened almost unexpectedly to the
missionary, the merchant and the man of science. The country
is virtually in our hands, and it will be the fault of the 
churches at/hone If thev don’t go forth and take nossessnon
of the land and gain a permanent footing in the very heart ot
each of the eighteen provinces.”
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( V is view the existence of a native Christian movement of 
such heretical tendencies as the Taiping rebellion was likely 
to be an embarrassment rather than an aid to the .missionary 
cause in China. Hanpier results seemed likely without it.
There was as yet no overt missionary hostility towards 
the rebellion. But whereas in 1853-*+ they had urged a 
policy of neutrality, confident that the overthrow of the 
Manchus was certain if no foreign intervention was forth- 
coning, by 1858 the missionaries arpear to have been much 
ore dispassionately neutral. Given the "decreutltude, cruelty 
and corruption of t! a anchow Tartar Dynasty1 on the one hand, 
and the "degeneracy and decay1 of the rebels on the other, 
the once very pro-Tairing Bishop o*' Victoria was convinced 
that "non-intervention in the civil convulsion of China 
was clearly the course for British statesmen to pursue".
"Tn the earlier stages of the Taeping movement" contin­
ued the Bishop, "the entrance of Protestant missionaries 
among them at 'lankin might have turned the tide in the 
right direction, and given a sounder character to their 
rractice and belief. As it is we must patiently abide 
the issue, moderating excessive hopes and repressing undue 
despondency and. fear. However much a nearer view of the 
rebel movement, may hereafter repel our rninds, it must at 
the same time be remembered that doubtless, in the hands 
of Providence, it will have accomplished a good result".
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It would have weakened the hold of Buddhism, scattered the 
seeds of Scriptural knowledge and generally prepared the way 
for a purer faith, the Bishop believed. "If truth, when 
deformed and caricatured, has been thus effective in demolish­
ing error, what may not be honed for from the unimpeded 
circulation of the Holy Scriptures and the zealous teaching 
of Protestant Missionaries through the length and breadth 
of the land".^'* The rebellion had helped nrepare the way, 
nerhans, but little more could now be said for it. By 1858-9*
British missionaries in China were no longer "partisans" of
(2)the rebels: they were almost above the battle.
The resurgence of Taiping power about, i860 naturally 
forced the missionaries, in common with other Westerners 
in China, to think of the rebels once more as possible masters 
of the emnire. ^or a time this nrospect renewed the hopes 
of some among them in the movement, but by the end of l86l 
missionary opinion was decidedly hostile. For some indeed, 
it had even become more dangerous to the cause of "true"
(1) C.M.Record^ 1859* pp2-3, also in Hlssionarv~i agazlne,3.859<> 
nn 25“? and the China Mail Oct. .1.8, l858; cf also his 
Charge to the Anglican Clergy March 16,i860, for similar 
sentiments.
(2) Cf.however, G.Wingrove Cooke, China in 1857-8. np106-8.
Cooke was the Times snecial correspondent with Elgin’s 
first mission, and he reported that "the missionaries 
still hang their hopes upon this rebel cause". Although 
it is no doubt true that the missionaries retained some 
kind of hopes in the Taipings their reports and publications 
in the .later fifties show that these were really not very 
great. In a sermon pblished in 1859 as The Land of Slntm,
Concluded at foot of next nag©
Christianity in China than the heathen Mainehu government 
itself. During the later years of the rebellion, many more 
missionaries had opportunities to observe the rebels at ^irst 
hand than had been the case about 1853* Missionary renres­
entatives accompanied the expeditions of Elgin and Hone up 
the Yangtze; others made indeuendent journeys to visit the 
rebels at Soochow and Nanking; while still others were 
present at Ningro to witness the capture and occunation of 
that city at the end of l86l. There is a considerable number 
of reports of these observations in the missionary records, 
and of course conclusions varied. But on the whole it did 
not, take the missionaries long to decide that, both from a 
political and a religious noint of view, the Taiping rebellion 
was a movement in which they could place no real hones and 
which they had no prospect of changing. By 1862 missionary 
energies and interests were turned to develoning the new 
stations made possible by the Treaty of Tientsin, and the 
last years of the rebellion are largely ignored in their
concluding (2) from previous page...
Legge considered the favourable prospects for the future 
Protestant evangelisation of China, but made no mention 
of the rebels: nor did 1.A.James in his anneal to extend
the work in China in God's Voice to the British Churches 
(1858); W .C.Mj lne in his Life in China pp 513- P+ di s - 
counted the religious worth of the movement; while Griffith 
John, in. the letter quoted n.318(1), noted the great need 
for native agents and evangelists in the future work of 
converting V00 millions of immortal souls, but did not 
suggest the rebels as a possible source of supply, as the 
Bishop of Victoria had in 1853*
records, although a few among them -protested at the change 
In British policy.
The first British missionary to renew direct contact 
with the rebels had been Alexander Wylie, who accompanied 
ill gin1 s expedition at the end of 1858. The doubts Wylie 
had expressed about the movement in 185*+ were far from resolved 
by this visit. The Christian element in it, if it ever 
existed, had been “overborne by other interests11, Wylie stated 
in a renort to the British authorities>“and while much of the 
letter has been retained, the spirit has almost entirely evap- 
orated11. There was little cause to think they could ever 
be admitted into the “confraternity of Christian nations”, for 
the tendency in the movement now was towards indifference and 
atheism. From a political and social point of view Wylie 
considered there was “little feeling of security among the 
people in the territories under their control“, and little 
discipline was apparent in their camps. “Opium and tobacco 
smoking, although not now pursued with the vigour that it was 
formerly, is yet a very common practice among them(sic).
Spirits also may be obtained in small quantities in their 
territory. Prostitution is said to be very uncommon."^^
To the London Missionary Society he reported that the only
(1) This report is enclosed in F.0.17/322 Admiralty to F.O.
March 2,1859-
form of worship common among them was a grace said at meals, 
but he thought the chances of a foreign mission to Nanking 
leading them "to abandon their errors1 remote. Wylie's
implied iudgment that the rebels were, from the missionary 
ooint of view, practically incorrigible, was supnorted by 
the findings of later visitors, some of whom were for a time 
interested in the idea of working at Nanking.
In the middle of i860, however, there was a temporary 
renewal of hone among some of the missionaries stationed at 
Shanghai. In July, three representatives of the London 
Missionary Society and one of the Baptist Missionary Society 
visited the rebels at Soochow and reported that
"From the information acquired it is evident that the 
religious element enters very powerfully into this ^reat 
revolutionary movement. Nothing can be more erroneous 
than the sunnosition that it is a purely uolitical one, 
and that religion occupies a subordinate place in it.
 The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are
their nronosed standard of faith now as they were at the
(1) For this report see Missionary Magazine I859?ppl79-8l; see
also L.M.S.Outgoing Letters - China (Box 5) for Tidman's 
comments upon it (June 10,1859) - ’’it may prove no less 
difficult a task for the Christian Teacher to disabuse 
their minds of (their) errors, than to convince the avowed 
idolater of the falseness of his system".
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"commencement of the movement* This is a very important
fact. As long as they receive them as the word of
God, we have reasonable grounds to hone that their errors
will gradually be corrected".^
This report led the London Missionary Society to issue a
special circular expressing 1 sanguine hope" in the movement
(2)
once again, and in a letter to the Foreign Office in November, 
i860, representatives of all the major missionary societies, 
save the Church Missionary Society, urged the continuance of 
a policy of neutrality. They criticised the recent repulse 
of the rebels from Shanghai as being "at direct variance with 
the impartial and dignified neutrality of this Country as 
expressed by former British Authorities in China". -They 
watched the progress of the insurrectionary movement "with 
lively interest not unmixed withbope", and djscerned a 
"decided attachment to Christianity" in the leaders of the 
movement, despite their confused and imperfect acquaintance 
with the truths of Revelation.(3)
(1) Missionary Magazine, Oct.i860, p p270-7 esp.273“1+*
(2) L.N.3. printed circular "Chinese Insurgents" dated Aug.28, 
i860 (in vol II of Newspaper Cuttings on China in L.N.S. 
Library).
(3) F.0.17/3**7 Rev. J. Hamilton to F.G. Nov.(22), i860.
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The strongest advocate for the Taiping cause among the
ritish missionaries in China was the Rev. Griffith John,
of the London Missionary Society. With the Rev. Joseph Sdkins
of the same Society, John paid a second visit to Soochow in
August, i860, and in November went with the Baptist missionary,
(I)
the Rev. Z. Kloeckers to Nanking. On the basis of these 
journeys he published a pamphlet in which he gave a very 
favourable and detailed description of the Taiping religious 
and political organization, and in which he argued strongly 
for a policy of non-intervention.
'’Notwithstanding all their errors, which are neither 
few nor insignificant, T firmly believe that they are 
the chosen instruments to relieve China from the dark­
ness and thraldom of idolatry and, in connection with 
foreign missionaries, to bless her with the light and 
liberty of the Gospel’1, wrote John.".... The interests 
of religion, commerce and civilization, point out 
neutrality as the one legitimate ground for Western 
nations to take”.^^
(1) For accounts of these visits see Missionary Magazine, i860, 
pp.296-302; ibid, 186], up5^ — 8; Baptist Missionary Herald. 
July l86l jPd105-!1 . Bruce was much opposed to these ’’indis­
creet visits” to the rebels by missionaries, and did his 
best to dissuade Edkins and John (Ac~P 18615275^) PP77?92).
(2) Rev. G. John, The Chinese Rebellion (186.1) p . 13 etc.
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To the secretary of the London Missionary Society John was
able to report, that, on his visit to Nanking he secured an
Sd.ict of toleration, promising freedom of movement and of
nreachinr in Taining territory to all Christian missionaries,
so that the way seemed open to repair the deficiencies and
heresies of the rebel faith. ’’They have doubtless gross
defects11, John concluded, "but in every resnect., religious,
nolitical and social, they are centuries ahead of the Imperial-
(1)
ists”.
3ven in i860, however, not all the British missionaries 
in China shared such convictions. The Church Missionary 
Society’s representative at Shanghai, the Rev. J. Hobson, 
warned against the reports of the London Mission's representa­
tives, whom he described as "to a man, red hot Rebels.....
sore of them seem determined to write up the Rebels with an
amount of faith, hope and charity sufficient to whitewash
(2)
the blackest character who ever lived”. In London mission
circles also there were those who doubted. James Legge, for
example, wrote from Hong Kong that he could not ’’make the
same apology for the errors of the rebels which our brethren
at the north seem disposed to do, nor be equally sanguine as
m   ^ssi onarv f-■agazine, ] 961 ■tn5h--8. The Edict of Toleration 
was nrinted there, and also in the North China Herald 
Dec.29,i860.
(2) CH.S.Letter Rook - China (1859-62) p80. Hobson to Venn, 
Sept.35i860.
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to the prospects of their -ultimate success. Unless they
can attach the people to them they will never get the empire,
and thus far they have failed to establish in any place a
vigorous and righteous government”. ^ ’ Legge did have some
hopes in the reform of thefhovement through the influence of
Hung Jen-kan, Fung Hsui-ch’uan1s cousin, who, after spending
several years in the London Missionary Society’s employ at
Hong Kong, had reached Nanking in Anril, 1859 3 and been made
the Kan Wang, or Shield King. But "Hung Jin”, as he was
called by the missionaries at the time, proved a great dis-
anpointment. ”At first when I heard of his being among them
and read his Essays and Memorials, I was willing to hone that
he would be able to remedy the crying evils which disfigured
their movement,” wrote Legge in October, i860. ”3ut then
came the melancholy ^act of his own adontion of the practice
of nolygamy. It was wrong to fight against them as the
French and Snglish did at Shanghae, but the salvation of
(2)
China does not seem likely to come through them”.
(1) L.I'.S. South China Letters (Box VII)2) Lerre to Tidman 
July 25,1860.
(2) ibid, Oct.27j i860; cf.also D.Matheson Our Mission in 
China (1882, 1st edn 1866) ppl2-]_3* Donald Matheson resign 
ed from the firm of Jardine, Matheson & Co. out of disanpro 
val of its opium trading activities and was very active
in the missionary work of the Presbyterian Church of 
England.
During l86l such doubts and disappointments, rather 
than John’s optimism and faith, increased among the British 
missionaries, and the tone of their comments upon the rebellion 
became steadilv harsher. As the Rj.shon of Victoria had anti-.1.
cipated, a nearer view of the rebellion servedto repel them, 
on nolitical as well as religious grounds. The Rev. W.
I uihead, who joined Hope’s first expedition up the Yangtze, 
reported after some three weeks in Nanking, that
"in a secular point of view the movement at present
is only destructive. It breaks up all domestic and
social ties; it annihilates trade....and blasts the
ueace and prospects of the empire  Tn a religious
point of view the movement at present is no less 
destructive... It is proposed to Christianize the 
empire by a process truly Chinese and perhaps effectual 
in a mere nominal light. The means in operation will, 
we fear, be productive of vast mischief, and only serve 
to introduce a spurious kind of Christianity”.^ '"^
Reform was wanted in China, Muirhead added, but "for this end 
we do not consider a change of dynasty at all requisite”.
After the same expedition, the Rev. J. Hobson reported to
the Church Missionary Society that the religious men among 
the rebels were ”but a very small portion of the whole, and 
(1) A c- P 18d2~(2976) pp 18-22.'
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’the religion of the religious is hut a cross between 
ahomrnedanism and Mormonism,... T saw Roberts dressed in 
his dirty, yellow, Chinese robe, a miserable snectacle of 
dirt and slovenliness, a reproach to Western civilization, 
and I very much fear, of our relirion likewise.... Call
the Rebels ’the national, party* I Why, the people
loathe them - the very land abhors them.....
This rejection of the claim that the Tairings represented 
any longer a popular movement was expressed more judiciously 
by the Presbyterian missionary, Rev. W. C. Burns.
"In regard to whether the population are generally 
favourable to this rebel movement”, he wrote in 
March, l86l, "I would remark that it can hardly be 
supposed possible that they should be favourable to 
this or any other movement in which they are the chief
sufferers  At first, Indeed, when the Nankin party
seemed to be going to victory, there was evidently a
Chinese national feeling in favour of their success; 
but that feeling has, I fear, long since given place to 
a sad despondency at the prospect of an indefinitely 
prolonged vivil war. Of late years the ranks of the 
rebel party have been recruited partly by the banditti,
(!) C.M.S. China Letters, Hobson to Venn May 18,1861.
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’’who abound everywhere, and partly by forcibly carrying 
off the flower of the youth from the various places 
which they visit. When these new followers have been 
a few months among them, and have passed into regions 
where, in language as well as in other respects, they 
ace strangers, it is almost impossible for them to 
make their escane, and so, from necessity, they become 
adherents of the party”.
A great deal of missionary comment upon the rebellion by this 
state wa
disannoint.ed hopes, and by that peculiar twist in human nature 
which makes men feel somehow more bitter towards those who 
come part of the way with them, and then diverge, than towards 
those who were never among their company, But there was also 
much that was balanced and perceptive in missionary observa­
tions on the Taining movement, as Burns’ statement illustrates.
: ost disappointing to the British missionaries was the 
realization that, despite the Edict of toleration granted to 
John at the end of i860, there were considerable difficulties 
in the way of attempting to establish mission stations in 
Taining territory. Edkins and John seriously considered 
making such a move, but after a further visit to Nanking in
^6bviously warped and prejudiced by the bitterness of
(1) English Presbyterian Messenger, l86l, p.225.
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March, 1861, became convinced that 11 the design of converting 
the Taining chief to correct scriptural oninions was a hope­
less one”. What Hung chiefly wanted, they concluded, was 
recognition from foreign Missionaries who would not challenge, 
and by their presence would implicitly acknowledge, his 
claim to special revelation and religious authority. He 
wrote agreeing to allow, them residence in Nanking, Sdkins 
noted, "as if he entertained the hope of persuading the for­
eign missionaries to recognize him as a sort of Son of God'1. 
Sdkins, though disappointed, did not become violently hostile 
to the rebels, and seems to have retained a sort of affection 
for them; but he concluded of them that they were ,!not 
statesmen”.
"They have a certain system and strong convictions 
regarding some great religious truths. They have 
entered upon a political enterprise too great for them. 
Hnder the influence of these convictions and undaunted 
bv difficulties which they cannot surmount, thev are 
careless of the future, and indulge in imaginary re­
creations of a reconstituted China, modelled by them­
selves, or rather by some force of fate, which is to 
work the change for them11. ' ! ^
(1) J.Sdkins, Narrative of a Visit to Nankin.which was printed 
as an appendix to a collection of letters by his wife, Jane 
Edkins, published as China’s Scenes and Peonies (1863;• See 
esp. p p280-1, 292-3,299-300$ also Edkins to Tidman Kay 12, 
l86l, in LMS Central China Letters (P>ox IT,3)*
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After much debate with themselves, therefore, Edkins and 
John abandoned the idea of a mission in Nanking, the one to 
•o north to Tientsin and the other inland to Hankow. ”It 
waswhx our hope at one time that the Tai Ping movement was 
destined to be a direct means to the evangelization of China”, 
John wrote in March, 1862. MIn this we may be disappointed.
Je that as it may, there can be little doubt of its indirect.
(1)
influence for good’1. Me could not turn his back entirely
on the rebels, but the high hopes of i860 had gone.
Another to consider the same project was the Wesleyan 
missionary, Rev. Josiah Cox, who went on Hone’s second voyage 
to Nanking at the end of 1861. Cox reported the Shield King 
as saying in reply to his query whether he should come and 
live in Nanking, ’’missionaries ought not to come, for the 
doctrines are different and the Heavenly King will not allow 
other doctrines than his own”. Only Fung's former teacher, 
Roberts, stayed long at Nanking, and he abandoned the rebels 
soon after Cox's visit, pronouncing Hung to be "a crazy man”.
opes of reforming the rebels were by then altogether abandoned, 
and Cox, who in 1853 had hailed the glimmering dawn, now 
reported "I did not anprehend that, on a nearer view of these 
insurgents, they would appear to my judgment so bereft of 
hopeful elements. • I certainly at nresent fail to discover
(1) i issionary Magazine, 1862, p212.
333.
"amongst them any party which promises to be capable of 
administering a government, and can only regard them as 
r arauding hordes....."  ^' ^
Finally, and perhaps most extreme and comprehensive of 
ill, were the condemnations uttered by the Church Missionary 
Society’s epresentatives at Ningpo as they witnessed the 
Taiping occupation of that city, which was their main base 
in China. Sufficient to note here th&t Rev. ¥. Russell con­
demned them not only on religious and political grounds, but 
also for their "impracticable system".
"A training of several years in the practice of living 
together in plunder, accustomed during this time to 
overlook the rights of others, has so seered their 
consciences that the principle of I eum and Teum seems 
now completely forgotten. Consequently, as there is
no security under their rule for life and property, 
the ~eG*-le fly from them wherever they are, so that 
even in those places longest occupied by them, there 
is not the slightest appearance of the resumption of
trade or of any confidence in them on the cart of the
(2)neoule generally".
(1) Meslavan Missionary Notices fcav. 1862. rm6^ f-6: on Roberts 
departure see A cl P lP>62 (3058) pp 6-7 .
(2) C.M.S.Letter Book - China (1859-62) pl89, Russell to Venn, 
Jan.15,1862; also C. .S.China Lettops, Burden to Venn,
Feb. ^,1862; C.M.Record, 1862, pp 3^-5? 66-7 end Frocs.
of the C.M.S., 1861-2, ppl92-9.
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This kind of reference to the socialistic tendencies of 
the Taining movement is rare in missionary comments, and 
it would certainly be an exaggeration to suggest that fear 
of radical social doctrines was a major reason for their 
rejection of it. They rejected it, not simply because it 
as, Trom their point of view, grossly heretical, but 
because they became convinced that it was incorrigibly so; 
and also because, politically, it seemed to them to give no 
promise of the stability or order necessary to the missionary
enterprise. In short, the Tainings appeared by 1862 to be
(1)
"more hostile to Christianity than the Imperialists themselves'1. 
Presented with such reports, the home societies naturally 
also abandoned their remaining hones in the rebel movement,
"The favourable judgment which some of our Missionaries . 
heretofore entertained in relation to the character 
o° the Taeping Insurgents, has been greatly qualified*,} 
the London Missionary Society*s annual report of 1862 
stated, ,f So bold and blasphemous are the preten­
sions of the Tien Wang, and so cruel and oppressive is 
the exercise of his despotism, that any immediate advan­
tage to the cause of Christianity resulting from the
(2)
success of his adherents is well nigh relinquished",
O  ) Report from Amoy, Jan,2V, 1862", cit. Evange 1 ic.a 1 Chr1 s t en - 
dom, Anri 1,1862, p 207*
(2) Missionary Magazine, 1862, pl73? cf, also Wesleyan Mission­
ary Society Reports. 1862, pn^S-g and Annual Renorts of the 
Baptist Missionary Society, 1862, p,10.
he last years of the rebellion were passed over without
much comment in missionary records, and there were no obvious
stirrings of regret at its final defeat, or doubts lest
perhaps a great ormortunity had passed. It was fop the
later historian to ask, ”did ever Christians have so ^olden
(1)
an opportunity of winning a great heathen nation for Christ?” 
Speculation as to possible lost opportunities seems rather 
pointless, however, for it is difficult to see that either 
the fete of the rebellion or the course of British policy 
towards it would have been any different, even had the Pro­
testant missionaries given it strong and consistent svmuort 
throughout.
The missionaries of the time, busily establishing new
stations in the north and the interior of China, under a
treaty guaranteeing them full toleration, had no difficulty
in finding some place for the rebellion in their conception
of God1 s plan for China. Griffith John was sure that ”this
wonderful movement had not been remitted to rise and progress
(2)
so far without some great productive end.” For others the
(l) Eugene Stock, History of the Church Missionary Society 
(1899) vol.II, p.3-12; cf. also C.P.Fitzgerald, Revolution 
in China (1952) ur 123-^ +j l*+l-2, and E. R.Hughes The 
Invasion of China bv the Western World (1937)j n.£F7 
cf. also J.Foster, ”The Christian Origins of the Taining 
Rebellion” in Tnternational Review of Missions vol.XL,
No. 158 (April 1951) nn 156," 167.
(2) 1missionary Magazine, 1862, n.212.
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work of the rebels had been (,one of .judgment alone, sent on
this miserable land for the long night of gross idolatry and
fearful iniquity”.  ^ ' The Rev. Hudson Taylor saw their
influence 1 in shaking the confidence of the people in their
gods of wood and stone, and in leading them to feel the need
of something better”, as one of the factors favouring the
(2)
future work of evangelization in China. “Whether the
Taepings get the whole of the country or part of it, or
whether the whole be regained by the Imperialists, in either
case we have good prospects before us”, reported Rev. Z.
(3)loeckers.to the Baptist Missionary Society in 1862. 'Since 
his work was God’s work the missionary felt he could not
lose.
Some of the British missionaries, despite their condemna­
tion o^ the movement, continued to advocate a policy of 
neutrality.
“The Manchous have had their time in China as the Stuarts 
had in Britain and the Bourbons had in France”, wrote 
Legge in July, 1862. “It is not ours to hasten their
>. j • > t / v
downfall by interfering against them in the struggle
(1) C .H .S.Letter Book China (18*19-62)" a 188, Russell to Venn, 
Jan. 18, 1862.
(2) J. Hud son Taylor Ch in a; It s Su 1 r 1 tu a 1 Needs and CI a ims (1.865) 
n . 1+3? also G. 3.Houle The China Mission (n.d.) p .67•
(3) Baptist Missionary Herald, Aug.1862, p.122.
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’’between them and the Taepings, but neither are they
worthy that we should interfere on their behalf....
There was ore fair course for us to rursue - a real,
(1)
1 mart. ia 1 n eut ra 1 i ty ” .
This letter was widely published, the secretary of the
London Missionary Society forwarding it to the Foreign Office,
at the same time expressing the hone that, if an ’’honest
return to neutrality” was impossible, the British government
should at least lay down limits within which its action would
be confined, ”Let the severity of our dealings with the
Taepings be tempered with mercy”, he wrote: ”it should not
(2 )be ours to co-operate in their extermination”. • J The British 
government was not so sympathetic to the work of the Protestant 
missionaries in China as to be ready to adapt its policies to 
suit their views, and if it confined itself to limited inter­
vention, such as was suggested in this letter from the secre­
tary of the leadinr missionarv society in England, it did so 
'"or reasons of its own. In any case not all the British 
issionaries were opposed to action being taken against the 
rebels, some iud^inv such a nollev to be ’’the only nossible
(3)
one, the only honourable one, under the circumstances” .
( ) : issionary Marazine. 1862, n.286.
(2) F.0.17/385’ Tidman to F.0.0ct.30, 1862.
(8) Archdeacon A.S.Moule Personal Recollections of the Taining
Rebellion 1861-8 (iPPlf) npl8-19. (Houle was amonc the C.M.S.
renresentatives at lingno l86l-2).
It is not my purpose here to pass judgment on the 
British Missionaries for their attitude towards the Taining 
rebellion, but two points seem worth making about the kinds 
of criticism, illustrated at the beginning of this chanter, 
which have been directed against them. In the first place 
they were, as a group, less ignorantly fervent and uncritical 
in their early sunnort for the Tairings than many of their 
nineteenth century critics accused them of being.
11 It is assumed by many that Missionaries have been and 
still are their advocates, in suite of the plain witness 
of undeniable and melancholy facts”, Legge wrote in his 
letter iust auoted. ”1 do not wonder that some should 
do so* they are under the influence of a foregone con­
clusion - the result of ignorance I will surrose, rather 
than malice - namely, that Missionaries, as a class, 
are weak and ignorant men, with a tendency to fanaticism. 
The utmost that can be alleged against the Missionaries 
is that when the rebel movement first came prominently 
before the world, in 1.853? after the capture of Nanking, 
many of them hailed the religious sentiments expressed 
in the tracts and manifestos of their leaders, much 
wondering whereunto they would grow, and hoping as 
they wondered. When they knew that nortions of the 
Word of Pod wer*e printed and circulated, without note
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"and cot •■merit., they rejoiced exceedingly - and strange 
it wonId have been if they had not done so: but when,
in the course of time, the blossom of promise connected 
with the movement began to wither and die, their regret 
was corresponding to the hopeful interest which they 
had previously cherished; and as they had opportunity, 
they remonstrated, with the Taepings themselves, nor did 
they hide anything which they knew from the public. As 
I carefully send my thoughts back over the past nine 
years, I can single out from amongst the Missionary 
body in China, but one solitary, eccentric exception 
to the statement just given”.
Legge glosses a little, as who does not in his own defence, 
but this gives a less distorted picture of missionary opinion 
about the Taiping rebellion than the statements of some other 
writers.
(1 ) Missionary ■ ar-azlne p.283. rphe exception Legge had
in mind was probably Roberts. On the missionaries as 
ignorant fanatics, it seems to me probable that the gen­
eral intellectual standard of* the Protestant missionaries 
in China before i860 was higher than it later became, 
when many more were attracted by easier conditions of 
service. Many of them in the fifties were certainly con- 
temptuously ignorant of Chinese civilisation, as were 
most of their countrymen, but among a fairly small body 
of* men there was a significant proportion whose attitude 
to and knowledge of that civilisation must command respect - 
Medhurst, Wylie, Legge, Edkins all made important contri­
butions to Western studies on China.
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In the eecomd place, the missionaries’ ultimate reject­
ion of this "Christian” rebellion in China, complete and 
extreme in many cases as it was, should not be regarded as 
due simply to their sectarian narrow-mindedness. Certainly, 
being nineteenth century evangelical Protestants, they took 
a rather narrow view of v/hat was and was not Christian, and 
they showed little capacity to adjust themselves to the 
idea of a non-Western form of their faith. But in a real 
sense they faced not just another kind of Christian sect 
but virtually another religion - a religion as much thei
personal creation of Hung Hsiu-ch’tian and of the Chinese 
traditions he inherited as of any effective Christian 
influences. It is too simple to talk of the Taining 
rebellion as a Christian rebellion. It was a Chinese 
rebellion which developed its own peculiar Ideology around 
a few, mainly Old Testament, Christian ideas, but the influ­
ence of these ideas upon it seems to have been less profound
(1)
t an some later critics of the missionaries have maintained.
It. seems to me, therefore, not very surprising that the
ritish missionaries in China eventually reacted to the Taining
(1) S.P.Boardman, on.clt., null3-it, concludes that "As a
result largely of the character of the founder, the Tainings 
were not exposed to the more vital part of the Christian 
ethic-....The Taiping religion was still not Christianity”, 
also, F .S.Latourette A distort of Christian Missions in 
China (1929) pp295-8. It denends, of course, upon what 
one takes to be essential to Christianity, but Luther’s 
claim that everv man was his own Driest, was hardly revolu- 
tlonary at all compared to Hung’s claim to direct new 
revelation and semi-divine authority.
rebellion as they did. I find it also difficult to believe 
that the result, whether for themselves or the Taipings, would 
have been very different had thev suunorted the rebel movementK- ~
throughout. The missionaries failed to evangelize. China or 
to exert any very effective Christian influence upon the 
emerging revolution of the Chinese reonle. That they would 
have had any greater success by identifying themselves more
closely with the defeated Taipings is very unlikely.
CHAPTER X
BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION
"Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay”. 
Tennyson’s famous line sums up the prevailing attitude of 
nineteenth century England towards China, that "vast, quaint, 
stagnant,isolated community of three hundred millions, which 
has walled itself up for three thousand years”, as the
leading organ of public opinion in the country once described
(1)
it. The static, unchanging society of the Far East
was frequently contrasted with the dynamic, progressive 
society of the West, of which England itself was the pre­
eminent example, and it became almost a moral duty, as it 
was a determined intention, to open China to ’’civilisation”, 
t'• pt is to material science, to Christianity and to trade.
The ”opening of China” was achieved in the middle 
decades of the nineteenth century by the use of force, mainly 
' r-'fish, auplied from the outside. But there was always the 
hone that it micht be done more peacefully, and more economi­
cally, by co-operation from within. There were many British 
attempts to encourage this, from Lord Macartney’s embassy at 
the end of the eighteenth century to the negotiations for
(1) The "Times” Jan,19, l8?8
3^3*
treaty revision in the middle of the nineteenth, after it 
had been found that the first breach made by force in l8*+2 
was inadequate for England's purpose. The nersistent 
refusal of the Manchu government to respond to these attempts 
at peaceful penetration meant that if China was to be effect­
ively opened to the West, which was the issue by the eighteen- 
fifties, that government had either to be forced to give way 
or be replaced by one which would be readier to co-operate 
with the Western powers. For a short time in 1853 it seemed 
that the latter alternative was a real possibility.
hews of the early great successes of the Taiping rebels 
was welcomed in England fundamentally for the promise it 
contained that the Misolation" and exclusivism of China were 
at last about to end.
,,r?he issue of the contest now going on will be the 
opening of China to the European world. It is impossible 
to over-rate the wonderful significance of these words - 
the opening of China. The greatest, the most compact, 
the most intelligent, the most enterprising, the most 
industrious and the most populous nation of the East.... 
will then form nart of the vast union of civilisation which 
has metamorphosed the West, and must produce still greater 
revolution In the East11.
(l) (h .Vizetelly) The Chinese devolution (1853)* Authorship Is 
uncertain; the last ^art of the work is comuosed largely 
of extracts from newspaner editorials (Times, Morning Post.&c)
3 ^
foting the struggle of " the two dynasties1 in China and 
anticipating further Taining success at Peking itself, the 
Daily hews judged the insurrection to he "the commencement, 
not only of great moral changes in China, but also of '"rest 
intellectual development which will end in bringing the 
v mens3 kipire of the East into communion with Western civil­
isation, It would be madness therefore on our nart to inter 
fere in a struggle the consequences of which promise to be 
as advantageous to the Chinese as to ourselves". ^
" 'e the government of China what it may", said the Times 
"it cannot be worse than that which now seems likely to be 
overthrown. The Mantchoo dynasty has shown itself ready, 
whenever it dared, to persecute the Christian religion, 
to restrict the foreign trade of the empire, and to evade 
its engagements with foreign nations,.,. It is not 
improbable that the rebellion now occurring in China may 
be destined to play a most important nart in the extra­
ordinary events and discoveries of late years, to unite 
the extremities of what we term the Eastern and Western 
world, and to complete that circle of civilisation and
unrestricted intercourse which will one day encompass the 
(2)
globe".
(1) Daily hews. Sent. 19, 1853
(2) The Times July 18, lo53-
It would be very impolitic for any Christian power to inter­
fere in the struggle, The Times added. Tt depended in all 
-robability upon the final success or defeat of the Taipings,
The British Journal wrote, "whether cur relations with the 
celestial empire shall become indefinitely extended, or 
whether they shall be subject to restrictions still more 
harassing than those they have hitherto experienced at the 
alous ha. Is cf its nresent rulers".^ Unlike British 
observers in China itself, there were few in England who 
doubted in 1853 that the success of the rebels would mean 
a vast extension and improvement of British relations with 
China.
It is some measure of the confidence and optimism of 
mid-Victorian England that there was no sense of alarm at 
the prospect of a sleepy giant with ten times the population
of England itself "awakening" and joining the family of nations. 
Change must come to China, as to India, Japan and the other 
"obscure nations of the earth", observed the horning Post.
These were being sought out,
"they see their betters, mingle with them, imitate them, 
learn their arts and share their improvements. To this 
’genius1 of our ’epoch’ China, like the rest of the 
world, must yield and is yielding.... By the force of 
circumstances, China must be revolutionised".
(1) The Brit i sh~ Journal, Oct. 1853 ?p289.
3^6.
It would be less a revolution than an awakening, the Post 
added, “and a fearful awakening too”. But fearful for China, 
not for the West.
tn?our hundred millions coming suddenly upon the know­
ledge that all their philosophy Is a lie will be an 
unprecedented spectacle. A trying crisis will that 
be when the Celestial Empire opens its eyes to read 
that all along it has treasured u p  a false history, 
a false geography, a false chronologv, a false morality,» l '  /  *—•' V /  v /
a false religion ” ' ^
The popular Chambers Edinburgh Journal felt more simply that,
now “the spell which has hitherto made this singular people
move in circles1 was about to be broken, ,fwe may look forward
(2)
to a great and interesting future for China”. At least 
one voice was raised to protest against “the common but 
preposterous notion, that this most ancient of empires had 
undergone no changes since its first establishment”, and to 
suggest that the rebellion would, “in conjunction with the 
influences of new ideas pressing upon them from without, 
inaugurate a stirring and revival of the national intellect, 
and the development of practical abilities among them which
(1) Korning Post. Aug.10, 1853*
(2) Thanhers Edinbiirph Journa1, Sept, 10, 1853, p.165•
will astonish the self complacent critics of the West11 *
Bn.t for the most part it was a confidently patronising 
Interest which was displayed towards the struggle of the 
Taipings in China.
The chief reason for the very general belief that the 
success of the rebellion would mean the wider opening of 
China to the West was, of course, the reported Christian 
character of the movement. On this point there was certainly 
a great c&al of exaggerated optimism, but there was also much 
doubt and even scepticism apparent in early comments in 
3ngland. An anonyrnous History of Christian Missions and 
of the Present Insurrection, one of a number of popular 
accounts of the rebellion published during l853”*+> was con­
fident that the genius of Christianity had "at length pene­
trated the very heart of the oldest empire in the world; and 
the ’flowery land’ is succumbing to its all pervading influ­
ence". It went on to describe how "a small band of Protestant 
Missionaries, with the Bible in hand and clothed in the armour 
of Truth, succeeded in penetrating into the very heart of
the country, and laying Prostrate the superstition and idolatry
(2)
of five thousand years". The Standard rejoiced in the
(1) Blackwoods Magazine Jan.185*+, p*72.
(2) (An on.) The History of the Christian Missions and of the 
Pee sent Insurrection (1853) PP v-vi. Like The Chinese 
Revolution noted above, this is partly put together from 
newspaper editorials.
3^8.
Protestantism of the rebels, and dismissed charges that their 
leaders uractised uolvpamv themselves and condoned it among
wL X  v  O  e- 1— '
their followers* MThis we do not believe of any Protestant, 
though we can easily understand how difficult it may be to 
prevail upon the newly converted nolygamists to nut awav all 
the 1 r supernumary wivesTt • Some deviati.ons in doctrine and
teaching were to be expected, but it was enough that ” the 
voly work of bringing three hundred millions of human beings 
to (Christian) light has been auspiciously commenced11. rphe 
t 1 sh Journal also thought that Taiping religious publica­
tions breathed Mthe purest Christian philanthropy”, excepting
onlv the punishment of death imposed for looking on Rung’s
(2)
harem* Polygamy or not, some were ^ery ready to be convinced 
that the rebels were true Christians* The character of the 
revolution in China was !,that of a Christian, liberal, pro- 
r-ressinre movement against the savage, cruel lop-sided despotism 
of the :antchusM, The eastern Star concluded, after giving a 
highly romantic account of the introduction of Christianity
(3)into China.
fuch views were certainly very widespread, especially 
am on? sunnorters of missionarv societies, but against them
&  .1, J. V  /
TTT Standard Jul^ 30, "
(2) The ,Q'r1 t.1 sh ,T on rn a 1 Oct.l853> PP 290-1.
(3) Eastern Star July 30,18 (L.M.S. Newsnaner Cuttings on
China, Vol.I pp.29-30).
3^9.
ay be set many r ore critical and rational comments. The
1 i: ss felt that 1 although the foundation of their faith may
be ’ ristian, there is nothing to show that the superstructure
is not as extravagant a superstition as t'ormonism itself, and,
as we have seen, thev nroselvtize bv massacre as much as by
(1)
faith". John. Cxenford, the translator of Gallery and Yvanfs
i storv of the Tnsur-recton In Ch 1 na which became the basis
of any other early accounts, put the emphasis differently
and .nidged that the rebels were "orthodox Confuciahs with
(21
a superstructure of spurious Christianity". ' Either way,
they v ere far from be inn seen as propagators of a "pure11 
1 ristian faith. The Dal lv News, even while uresenting the 
rebellion as the commencement of great moral and intellectual 
changes in Ghana, emphasised that Taiping Christianity was 
"defiled by the admixture of much that is degrading and 
suuerstitioustf, and the Spectator* in an article entitled 
"Christianity a la Chinoise", felt that it was natural that 
the ^urnoses of the rebels "should be vague and therefore 
incapable of communication, even still more natural that 
lelr Christianity should not be that of England or of Rome,
(3)but of juantung and Shanghae"• fra ser1s Magazine ^
(1 ) n’he Times Aug.2, 1$53•
(2) 0 l 1 ary P' Yvan, 11 story of the insurrection .in China 
(1853)5 p«812 - translated, with a supplementary 
chapter, by J.Oxenford.
> 'hy "ews vSept. 1Q, 1853? and Snectator Aug. 135 1853♦
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.reviewing Gallery and Yvan1 s work, concluded that, ’’while we
gladly welcome their awakening from idolatry, we cannot but
fear that the Chinese reformers are still far from Christian”,
add i/nr that ”of the ultimate success of the insurrection there
(1)
seems to be little doubt”. Finally, in one of the most
judicious of the articles on the rebellion which appeared during 
1853, the Quarterly Review argued that it was far from impossi­
ble that the rebels would yet receive a check, while
”of the disposition of the people at large towards the 
new creed we know absolutely nothiner. All ordinary 
experience is against their throwing up their ancient 
sunerstitions at the mere bidding of an army who are 
but a handful of the vast population, and if the rebels
win the urize it is no unlikely alternative that they(2)
will compromise their e^eed to consolidate the throne”.
Critical and balanced comments on the religious aspect of the
rebellion were by no means lacking in 1853> therefore, although
since they mainly appeared in the r^ ore serious nolitical and
literary journals they certainly did not dispel more fervent
and uncritical hones.
The view that the rebellion was essentially a political
rather than a religious movement.suggested by the Quarterly
(1) Fraser’s ¥apazine Nov,1853, P •oOb.
(3) Quarter1y Review Dec.1853, n.193*
Review and others.was armed most strongly bv John hesson 
in a work called The Cross and the Drago^, Basing his argu­
ment largely on the evident weakness of the Christian missions 
in China, lesson maintained that the rebellion could be “but 
feebly charged with the spiritual element”. Its real 
strength came from the secret societies and it was, in that 
sense, a rebellion in traditional Chinese style, “only a 
repetition of phenomena that have startled and annoyed the
c-overnments of the empire of China, at various neriods,
, (1)during the last two centuries”. But even as a political
■ovement the rebellion won general approval in Bnrland at 
that time, and there were none to argue, as there were in 
China, in favour of British intervention. The rebels soon 
became “the patriots”, and the likelihood of their rapid 
success in overthrowing the Manchus was rarely questioned.
”The nrogress of the Chinese rebels, or rather of the 
’patriot army’ as it is now called by our Gastern in­
formants, continues as wonderful as ever”, The Times 
noted in mid August. “To us, of course, nothing can 
be so intelligible as that a nation should suddenly 
throw off the authority of an alien and a hated race.
The wonder was,” it added, confidently changing tense,
(2 )“how the Fanchus had held China so long”.
(1) J. Kesson, The Cross and the Dragon (lF5^) esp.Preface
and t)T).238-^1 .
(2) The Times Aug.15,1853; also May 20,1853*
The rebellion was uraised not only as a national revolt but 
as a movement of resistance to oppression, Charles Macfar!ane 
;?'! ost applying the Whig interpretation of history to China 
in hi s 'book The Chinese devolution. :,The political principles 
nut forth by the partisans seem to have been conceived in an 
English or Anglo-American spirit,1 he judged, and from the 
reports received the rebel government at Nanking seemed to 
be nimpressed and permeated with European ideas, and is such 
a form of government as never yet originated in an Asiatic
t (1)mind".
Any possible social o r i g i n s ' o r  objectives to the 
rebellion were rarely suggested in these early British 
accounts of it, in strong contrast to the emphasis in 
modern works. "From the commencement of this strange 
'■•banter of history, we have anxiously asked what is the 
present nature of the rebellion in China'1, stated the ■ ornlnr 
Post. :lIs it a social, a political or a religious movement?
It appears to be a combination of all three’1. The emphasis, 
however, was all upon the nolitical and religious character 
of the movement, even its possible commercial results receiv­
ing, for the time, rather less emphasis than one would expect. 
The ""ornine Dost thought that, 1 in a mere commercial point 
of view - as a question of money and trade - it is difficult
P )  Ch acFarlane, fnhe Chinese he vol. tion (1853) PP 5 35*208, etc.
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(1)
to say how important the results of the struggle may be”.
?or the Economist it appeared to be “on the whole a great
social change, though ostensibly assuming the form of a change
in the dynasty”. What was of greatest concern to the
economist was its possible effect on trade, and on this
noint the future prospects were encouraging, despite a
(2)probable temporary drop in British imports. The Few Monthly
I arazine became almost rapturous at its vision of trade in 
Jhina “once opened to civilisation”. "What an outlet for 
manufactured goods, from broadcloth to glass, does this 
dense population lay open.*” it exclaimed, and saw the rivers 
of Jhina '‘covered with steamboats” and great new fields for 
the scientist and the tourist, as for the trader and the
(3)missionary. J The Times nut the benefits to be looked 
for in a strictly respectable order, feeling that there was 
“great reason to believe that the successful progress 
of this insurrection, if it be not put down, will be 
favourable to many of the first interests of humanity 
and civilisation. We may hope that it will extend the 
blessings of Christianity, and that it will at least 
insure toleration to the teachers of a purer creed.
(1) Morning lost Aug. 30? 1853•
(2) Economist. April 3° and May 21, 1853.
(3) TTew Monthly Magazine Sept-Dee.1853? pr>196-8; cf.also 
Calcutta Review eit. above p26^ffn(l)
“It has long been seen that the obstacles to unrestricted
freedom of trade with China lay principally, if not
entirely, in the jealous policy of the Government, and
there is reason to suppose that, if a new dynasty be
established over any considerable portion of the empire,
our trade will be extended far bevond. the five ports
‘  (1)
reluctantly opened to Europeans by the treaty of 18^-3*n 
In short, whether from China1s point of view or the world *s at 
large, the Taiping rebellion was unquestionably a good thing.
The interest aroused in England by the success of the 
Taiping rebels in 1853 was certainly very considerable, but 
should not be exaggerated. News of the capture of Nanking 
reached Enviand at the beginning of May, at a time when there 
was a crisis in relations with Russia over the Middle East, 
and the prospect of war with another great European, power 
was of far more moment than strange revolutions in distant 
China. The receipt of Bonham’s report in August and the 
temrorarv nassinv of the Middle Eastern crisis provoked more 
comment in newspapers and journals for a time, but so little 
was certainly known, it was all so far away, and England was 
so soon again facing the prospect of war with Russia that the
(1) The Times Aug.2, 1853*
rebellion could be little more than a nine days wonder. It 
is apparent that public reaction in England was more complete­
ly unanimous in its approval than was the case among British 
residents in China, but some signs of a reaction appeared 
even before the end of 1853. ‘‘With the progress of the 
Chinese rebellion a doubt also makes progress as to what 
may be the effect of that movement on the ethics of the 
empire, commercial as well as religious11, observed the 
noptafor at the end of October, noting possible difficulties 
over their religious nretensions, the opium trade, and the 
general state of corruption and disruption in China, which 
might well end in the establishment of “bandit adventurers*’ 
in the seat of government. “There arrears, therefore,” 
it concluded, “good reason in those who look forward with 
some anxiety to the course hereafter”.  ^  ^ In November Eraser1s 
t'agazine feared “that the first impressions respecting the 
character of the insurgents have been too favourable”, while 
in December the Quarterly Review concluded that, “with the 
very limited information we possess, the conclusions that have
been formed of the ultimate issue of the rebellion arnear over
(2)sanguine and hasty”. " The highly favourable, optimistic
first reaction remained for some time yet the nrevaillny one 
O ) Spectator Oct.22, 1853-
(2) Fraser’s a "azine ■ Tov. 18 S3 ? p , 60 5 and Quarterly Review
Dec.1853, n.193*
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in Sngland, The Tj.mes at the beginning of 185^ still feeling
that ”there can be no doubt that the total change of
institutions contingent upon the rebellion will communicate
(1)
a new tone to the foreign policy of the (Chinese) Government11.
■’bit the size of the question mark over the rebellion was
growing rather than diminishing by the end of 18?3*
During 18^* there was a considerable falling away
of public interest in England in the rebellion, and to some
extent also of optimism about it. Whereas The Athenaeum,
reviewing Oxenford’s translation of Gallery and Yvan in
Sentember, 1853? could say with confidence that the book
’’could hardly fail to find a curious and interested public”,
by June, 185*+? its comment upon Gillespie’s Land of Sinim
was that ’’public attention has naturally been diverted from
the nrocress o^ the insurrection in China by the war with
(2)
Russia”. By July the Daily News could scareely believe 
that the rebellion would
’’produce any immediate great change in the manners, 
the religion or the civil institutions of a people 
who for five and twenty centuries have undergone little
material alteration  As to the protestant Christianity
which some over sanguine parties had imagined was quickly 
to enlighten the darkness of China, as our readers are 
aware, vie cannot believe in its probability, knowing the
(1) The Times Jan.l^, 185*+.
(?) Athenaeum 1.853, np.!0?9-60 and l8^f,p.715.
3'’Chinese to be sensuous and obdurate idolaters, and 
remembering that thousands bad for whole centuries 
lived under Christian rule and mized with Christians, 
impenetrable to anv religion more rational than that<o
of Fo or Confucius”.
denorts of Fedhurst’s and Lewin Bowring*s trip to Nanking
in June tended to confirm such doubts, although The Times
for the u.resent maintained its charitable view of the movement,
in contrast to its later extreme hostility.
"That the Chinese have imbibed anything like the
spirit of true Christianity it is impossible to
believe”, it stated, ”but we do not know that their
errors are worse than were to be anticipated from
what aupears to have been a total absence of
instruction...... There is no necessity for hastily
despairing of Chinese Christianity, or concluding
that the Divine doctrines of the "osueIs have been
deliberately depraved for any purpose of men... It
will, probably, be long before this extraordinary
revolution is consummated, but wre do not see that
the hopes entertained of the eventual conversion of
China need be despondinglv abandoned”♦^^
(1) The rfwas Sent.20, iP'B^ y cf. The Christian Times Sept..29,
1 f Bk. C. G. v i s hb oi i r n e I uressions of China (1P 5 ? )7 no ted 
further below, was at some pains (ch.6.) to answer the 
objections raised after the visit, of the ’Rattler1 and 
’Styx1.
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but apart from periodical reports or developments in China, 
narers and journals in England carried increasingly rare 
comments nr on the rebellion, ’’Intelligence from China is 
of the d bind”, the Spectator reported in December, 1P5+.
»»The rebels have failed before Canton, and trade was reviving.
At Shanghai they were becoming demoralized; from Fankin 
and Pekin there was no news”. It was not long before the 
wits were complaining that China, like Uranus, was slow to
1 4- 4 C Om a k e a r  evoIn 11on.
Hopes in the rebellion and its effect upon China 
certainly did not at once disaunear, however. An article 
in the Edinburgh Review for April, 1855, prompted by the 
arpearance of an English translation of Due's travels in 
China, stated that
"Revolution has occurred, and the ultimate auguries are 
assuredly bright, whether its immediate course be pros­
perous or adverse, whether it lead to the quiet establish­
ment, at a comparatively early period, of a new and 
renovated empire in which Christian and European ideas 
shall be predominant, or whether an enoch of political 
anarchy and religious fanaticism be destined first to 
intervene. One thing is tolerably certain: the
exclusive and iealously-barred system of the ancient
(1) Cneetato  ^Dec. 2,18?^ and"Blackwood'y Farazine I 'ay, 1?55“
n .J02,
1 empire is effectively broken up; China is at length
open, in the most effectual sense of the word; into
it the elements of light, civilisation and Christianity
(i)
will continue to flow”.
A few months later the British Quarterly Review, in an
article based on Fishbourne!s recently published Impressions
of CM no. expressed the conviction that Hunt’s trances were
the result of l,a childish simplicity, a harmless quietism”.
The real marvel was not the amount of error but of truth in
the movement. ”Tn our solicitude for the better government
and the better faith of Chiba, our hone turns towards Nankin,
notwithstanding all the error and felse pretension set forth
(2)
there by the Eastern King”.
Fishbourne, who was an active supporter of the Protestant 
missions in China, argued especially against any foreign inter­
ference in the struggle, and while describing Yang as ”a 
deceiver, the Judas of the party”, reaffirmed his faith in the 
religious worth of the movement as a whole. ^or Fishbourne, 
as indeed for many other sympathisers with the Taipings, it 
was what he conceived to be their remarkable un-Cvineseness 
which was especially praiseworthy.
(i ) Edinburgh Review, Anri] 1ft55, n . V +3
(2) u  British Quarterly Review. July l8Bk, pp.128, 131 etc.
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‘’They are moat frank in their manner, quite unlike what 
we are accustomed to in Chinese.,,.. It was obvious to 
the commonest observer that they were practically a 
different race  The quiet self poseession of the
(1)
leaders we came in contact with \vras quite un-Chinese”.
The less Chinese the more to be admired, seems to he the view
behind these Judgments. It required a conscious effort for
most English observers <bf that day to recognise, as The Times
>.aunanimously did a few years later, that ’’these Chinamen
(2)
have their civilisation, their affections, even their virtues”.
fishbourne’s book was not everywhere received so uncritic­
ally as by the British Quarterly Review. rihe Athenaeum, 
while still calling the rebellion ’’that wonderful movement”, 
believed that he accented ’’too credulously the best inter- 
urelation of events”, while the Cnectator thought the book 
based on “the groundless hopes and headlong reasonings of a 
sanguine man engaged in riding a hobby”, observing of the 
rebels that it auneared that ”their arrogance and self-
sufficiency are quite as great as those of the present Tartar
(3)
rulers, with the notion of a religious superiority added”.
lutherford Alcock, in an article in the Bombay Quarterly
(!) E.G.Fishbourne, on.cit., prl80-5T Fishbourne was on the 
"eneral Committee of the Chinese Evangelization Society 
(see Chinese Missionary Gleaner May l8TG,r. 192 and June 1858,
p. 73) and wasthe author of a number of devotional works,
(2) The Times Dec. 12, .1.862.
O) Athenaeum iPee. pn971-2 and Spectator March 31?l855.
devtew in October, 1855, described Fishbourne as a “shallow 
enthusiast”, and took his book as the starting point for quest­
ioning the value of the Protestant missions’ work in China.
As being carried out, he believed it to be “a vast waste of 
money and time”, and was strongly of the opinion that “the 
whole work is vet to do.’1. Certainly the Taipings had not 
advanced it, whatever Fishbourne said.
By 1856 it was becoming necessary to remind people in 
ingland of the continuance of rebellion in China. “We have 
almost forgotten China as a theatre of civil war”, the Manchester 
iyarr.iner and Times stated in October of that year, going on 
bo insist that the Chinese rebellion was really of greater 
si nlficance than ’movements of inferior importance nearer
(2)
home”, such as those of Kossuth, Garibaldi and Louis Napoleon. 
These unusual reflections were the result of the publication 
in England of a letter from an American missionary, hT. A. P.
: artin, urging the American government not to give any stive 
support to the ' anchus, an object with which the Examiner and 
i uos fully sympathised, while giving Martin “the full benefit 
c " the rather large balance which he has struck in favour of 
the insurgent party”. This letter also led the ^silv hews 
to comment again that
(1) Bombay Qua.rte.rlv Review 0ct. 18555 PP2 3^ !~5
(2) anchester Sxarniner and r: 1 mes , Oct.7* 1856 (ip L.K.S. 
Newspaper Cuttings on China, vol I p151+? cf also 
Scottish 'h~ard1an Sept, 23/1856, ibid, p.152).
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"the interests of the Western world, are far more 
identified with the success of the revolution than 
with the perpetuation of the effete dynasty of the 
1 k.ntchoos, and the worn out type of the old civilisa­
tion  In the end we can feel little doubt that the
insurgent cause is destined to prevail, while it is 
absolutely certain that the true policy of the nations 
of the West is not only to abstain from all armed 
intervention on either side, but especially to avoid 
giving any indirect countenance or support to that 
barbaric dynasty whose rule of government has long 
been a standing insult to the outer world, and is
now regarded as an intolerable burden by the best and
, (1)most advanced of the Chinese themselves11.
But public interest in China was stirred about this time, not
by the rebellion but by events at Canton which led to the
outbreak of war. The Times, which in 1853 had welcomed the
Taipings as the probable means whereby “that huge, strange
looking, amphibious hulk of antiquity - China“ would be
unmoored and brought into the main stream of world civilisation,
(2)'
now looked to Englishmen to perform that task.
(7) Dal lv News Oct. 6, l8|56 (ibid pp 155-7)•
(2) The ^imes Jan. 19? 1858
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o^ards the end of 1856 Meadows' book The Chinese and 
t; oip Tehelljons appeared. The extent to which public 
interest in the Taiping rebellion lad receded by this time 
h  reflected in the reviews which this work received at the 
tine of publication. Arart from eadows1 involved style 
and poor organisation of his ideas, what chiefly aroused 
the interest and comment of reviewers was his exnosition 
of the principles underlying Chinese philosophy. This 
was a new theme, and certainly a major part of Meadows' book; 
but his symrathetic account of "the uotttico-religpus rebellion" 
of the Taipings, which included some very perceptive observa­
tions on the economic and social content of the movement and 
was by far the most searching analysis of it that had then 
appeared, was much less remarked unon. The Times, indeed, 
ip a review snread over more than three columns, was chief1^/  V
delighted and amused by the idea that here at last was a
spokesman for the superior virtues of Chinese civilisation.
"A corning to our loose barbarian notions the Chinese Empire
is an overgrown anomaly", its reviewer be^an. " Let the
barbarians, meaning the British, henceforth perform the kotow 
with their faces towards the direction of Pekin, for their 
interpreter has come to the Flowery Land, and has been 
enlightened as to the inferiority of his countrymen". Meadows'
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book, it was suggested, corresponded with its subject in a 
variety of ways. "It is studious and accurate, like the 
products of Chinese penmanship; it is quaintly luminous, 
like a Chinese lantern: it is as destitute of proportion as
a Chinese picture: and it is quite as involved as a Chinese
puzzleM. rphe idea that thought or civilisation in China 
had much advanced over the cast two thousand years was 
completely rejected. "The geological transformation of the 
earth’s surface affords a fair parallel to Chinese advancement. 
Coal is made quicker than Chinese ethics, and continents grow 
while their philosophers sleep". Certainly the Taipings -were
Jm .L _L
not presented as being now likely to hasten the process.
ev received but one brief mention at the end of the review.v 7
(1)
eadows being commended as their "worthy historian".
In the Cc 1 ectic Review also, it was -’eadows’ acc< i t 
of Chinese philosophy which was of chief interest, though 
it was observed that he "elucidated"the revolt, and his
(2)
arguments against foreign intervention were briefly commended. 
rphe Athenaeum gave much the same emphasis, though with a little 
more weight on the arguments against interference. "If the 
Taepings are worthy to be free they will doubtless achieve 
their own freedom", this reviewer commented, after a lengthy
(1) The Times Dec. 295 18?6, p.10.
summary of the "metaphysical jargon" in which -eadows 
presented his account of Chinese philosophy. home years
later, in January i860, a writer in the Quarterly Review 
described Meadows’ hook as "the production of a highly 
educated rentleinan whose brain is somewhat befogged with 
(Jerman mysticism: he gives much interesting information,
though it is unhappilv buried arnonrst a mass of erroneous 
conclusions and learned nothingness". This writer went on 
to attack 1 eadows’ views on the virtues of competitive exam­
ination in recruiting the civil service, but said nothing
(2)
of hi s v iew s on the rebels.
Two other books which appeared about this time and which, 
unlike Meadows^ were favourable to the Imperialists rather 
than to the rebels, were those of the botanist, Robert 
fortune, and of Sir John Davis, who had been Superintendent 
of British trade in China from iPkk to 1FVC. Fortune was 
verv critical of the pre-rebel sentiment he had observed
■ - s r
a"iong foreigners at Shanghai in 18535 thopugh for the time 
he suspended judgment on the rebels at ranking. Davis was 
frankly hostile to the Tannings and, after noting Meadows' 
"curious work", undred himself that "they were no more like 
Christians than Mahomet was like a Jew: and. the hones7 z
(1) Athenaeum 1856m up 771-2•
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which were at first raised by their success as Christians
were verv soon succeeded bv dismay and disgust at their
(2)
blasphemy as impostors’*.
During most of the period of the war with the Manchus
there were few comments and only occasional reports on the
rebellion in China. The account of Elgin*s voyage to
ankow reached England in March, 18595 and prompted The
Times to refer to what it now called ’’the canker which   (2)
lies at the heart of China”. But although it was noted 
that the rebels presented an obstacle to the development 
of trade in the interior, there was no immediate call for 
a campaign to exterminate them. Nevertheless, nubile 
faith in the movement had certainly much diminished by this 
time. In a lecture to the British Association in September,
1859, Bowring argued that the prohibition of the opium trade 
would really be a.considerable disservice to China, since it 
would mean that land now used to raise food crons would be 
turned over to the nonpv. in reply to a question on the
M  A. ,1- V  4t> ±
rebellion ^owring reneated the kind of views he had expressed 
in official despatches, saying that the Tairings were ignorant,
lived solely on plunder and had no popular support in China,
(1) R.Fortune, A Residence Among the Chinese.... 1853-6 (TF57) 
nn 17-21, 118-28 and J.F.Davis, Milna... 1857? voT- U
   h-1 2 - 1 3 .
(2) The Times March 3? 1859*
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mhe reaction to his views is the interesting point here, for 
though his remarks on the opium question aroused “considerable 
dissent1’* according to the London and China Sxnress renort,--------------------------------  ( 1 j
those on the rebellion were received “with great satisfaction”.
Bowring was probably the author of an article which
anpeared in the Cornhill I'a a^zine in January, i860, in which
it was argued that there was now nothing to be hoped for
from the rebellion. ”Tt has become little better than
dacoity; its progress has been «rerywhere marked by wreck
and ruin; it destroys cities but builds none.... We cannot
afford to overthrow the government of China”, the article
concluded. “Bad as it is, anarchy will track its downfall,
rd the fewT elements of order which vet remain will be whelmed
(2)
in a convulsive desolation”. Against these views may be 
set those in an article which anpeared in the previous month 
in t e hew Monthly Fagazine. The writer of this, while not 
suggesting that the allied armies should set out to overthrow 
the banchus entirely, argued that the rebels “have still some 
redeeming points about them.... There cannot be a question 
but that, with all their faults, they uresent the best material
(3)
with which to work out the regeneration of China”. The
(1) London and China Exnress Sent.26.;859 utA 89-90 and Oct.10, 
I8'S9, u S67; cf The" Times Sent.23,1859;, p. 5.
(2) Cornhill bagazine Jan.i860, nA 3; J.Scarth, Twelve Tears
in China n 278, says the article was attributed to Bowring.
(3) r sw bon till y Magazine Dec. 1859? p • 393 •
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prevailing view, however, if one may use so positive a word 
of a situation in which the chief feature is the absence of 
views, seems to have become that the rebels offered, at best, 
little or no imnrovement on the corrupt and unreliable lanchus.
The action of the banchu government in renewing the war 
in lF?9* and its seizure of the truce emissaries in September, 
i860, naturally provoked a strong reaction against it in 
fingland.
"We have no need to be tender of this corrupt old 
dynasty which is hateful to the people'1, asserted 
the Spectator in an article entitled ’More Chinese 
Dunlicity,f. "It has never respected anvthinr buta. X ■ *;
'"orce, whether displayed by Chinese rebels or European
armies, and we should achieve a rreat thins if we can
(1)
bind it down to terms and force it to observe them".
!n August, i860, The Times argued strongly against any inter­
vention on behalf of the hanchus against the rebellion, and 
insisted that it would be "a scandal to humanity if, in face 
of the facts before us, the policy of the Empire should be 
diverted from the pursuit of our own plain rights and interests
in order to sustain a desnotis so faith-less, so feeble and
(2)
so dreadful in its effects as this".
(1) Spectator Nov.17> i860.
(2) The Times, Aug.13, i860.
3^9.
Condemnation of the Kanchus did not, however, imply
a positive reaction in favour of the rebels. Since they
helped weaken resistance to the allied armies in the north
the ' airings were "in a certain sense our allies11, the
! orning Post noted, but it also warned that "it would not
be policy to shake the Chinese Government in such a degree
that it could itself make no head against the rebels11, who were
(1)
•’<rr*eater barbarians than the constituted authorities of China'1.
"Generally speaking, when the population of a country is 
srlit into two factions, an invading force would be 
disposed to coalesce with one of them", said The Times 
in a leader on the repulse of the rebels from Shanghai, 
"but the politics of China resemble the zoology of 
Australia, and exhibit an inversion of all ordinary 
rules... By this time" it added, "even the most 
sanguine of our countrymen in China have discovered 
the falsity of the character originally attributed to 
the rebellion. It is based neither unon religion nor 
patriot! sm". (> -)
Nevertheless, the question "who are these Tainings?" which 
1nad often been asked "in a spirit of listless curiosity", was 
becoming one of some real political importance, The Times
(1) orrin^ Post Oct.l, Nov.3 and 12, i860.
(2) The Times Nov.l6, i860.
continued a month later. But until more was certainly
known, England should remain neutral between them and the
Lanchus, defending only her proper rights in the treaty nort-s.
"Whether Tartar or Ming (i.e. Taiping) shall sit upon the
throne of China is no business of burs; and, so far as we
r r hi 're from the known facts, is not of eereat consequence
(1)
to the neople themselves". By the time the Treaty of
r:; lent sin was finally ratified there was no strong current
of uouular sunnort for the rebellion: but equally there was
no demand for action against it. - There was too much
istrust of the Manchus for that.
This remained the reneral pattern of oninlon during
:ost of l86l. Even the London and China Express, which had
no sympathy whatever for the rebel cause, argued that as
f ings were, with the Taipings renewed in strength and in
control of much of the Yangtze valley, "it would be injurious
to the commercial interests o^ England to swerve in the
slightest degree from the strictly neutral attitude we have 
(?)a s s u m e d " . ^ h e  Times continued to hold to the view that, 
although the rebels were desneradoes and robbers, it was not 
England!s work to suppress them - "we might as well undertake 
to notice Europe" - so long as they did not threaten trade.
0.) r’he Times Dec. 12, i860 and Jan.l6, l86l.
(2) London, and China ixnress June 10, l86l; also April 10,
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At the same tine it argued strongly that England’s interest 
in China would he best advanced by strengthening the Kanchus.
In a leader that was practically a statement of official
r'vi ti sh nolicy at this stage The Tines said on May 3G,
T,We never had a greater risk at stake than that which 
is now put upon us by these Chinese rebels, who have 
seated themselves upon the great river up which we 
desire to go, and who are periodically plundering the 
cities with which we desire to trade. As far as 
the interests of humanity are concerned, no greater 
service could be rendered to the race of man than to 
rout out these Taiping robbers. This, however, for 
a hundred reasons we as a nation must not do. It is 
not our work. But we are not therefore to suffer and 
do nothing. This is a matter for diulomatic action.
Tf Mr. Bruce should find that anything like a civilized 
Power is to be made out of these -Taipings - well; if
not, the Tartar Government has already had experience
of the benefit to be derived from European supervision 
in the collection of their Customs, and it is not, 
perhaps, quite impossible that they might be Inclined 
to listen to European advice as to the means of restoring 
neace in China. The Tartars are keeping faith with us, 
and it is our interest that they should be strong”.
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A few clays later it was approving the result of a debate in 
the House of Commons in which members were ”haunirv and 
wisely unanimous in their advice to do nothing1’. ^ ^
Tn the course of that debate Russell, who was soon to 
move ;nto the House of Lords, stated that he would not denv/  V
that ”some of the local (British) authorities may show some
bias on one side or the other, but the Government at home,
as well as the chief authorities in China, are desirous of
observing a strict neutrality”. Save for one speaker, who
regretted that a single regiment and a few Armstrong guns
could not be sent to finish off the rebellion, which was the
work of ”a set of scoundrels”, all speakers supported the
principle of neutrality, although some questioned the way in
which it was being applied in China, especially to the Customs
(2)
service. Tn the Lords, Sari Grey also urged upon the
government of the wisdom of continued neutrality, warning 
that rebellion was the safety valve of the Chinese political 
system, "holding much the same place in their institutions 
as the power of refusing Supply in our own Parliamentary
(3history”. ' For the time thene was virtually unanimous 
agreement that neutralitv was the urorer uolicv to follow
(1) See The Times Mav 30 and .Time 3. \B6l,; cf .also" March 30
and. Vav 13.
(2) For this debate see P.D.vol 163 (1861) cols.379-1+06.
(3) P.O.vol. l6l (1861) cols 5k6-69
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towar d s the rebe11ion.
Less unanimous was opinion on the character of the 
rebellion. Under the influence of favourable missionary 
reports there was some tendency in the middle of 1861 towards 
a sympathetic view again, although not to anything like the 
extent of l8?3* ’That stratum of society - a very large 
ne - which derives its information from religious ueriodicals, 
>egins to be again permeated with accounts of the great Chinese 
ovement”, the Spectator noted in an article published in 
April entitled "The Truth about the Taenings”. After summaris­
ing what it conceived to be the changes in pub1ic opinion 
since 18?3 from ’’rapturous credulity” through annoyance at 
finding it had believed too much to the extreme reaction that 
the Taipi.ngs were ’’criminals unworthy of anything but the 
rope”, the Spectator saw evidence of another swing back towards 
recognising some virtues in the movement. It went on itself 
to rive a fairlv favourable Picture, based on missionaryC* .L /  *
reports. :,A great intellectual movement of some kind is 
taking place among the largest section of human beings”, it 
suggested, and although it was clear that the rebels were not 
really Christians, yet ’’neither are they a gang of mere 
marauders of unintelligible tenets and villainous cruelty”.
Under ^aiping rule considerable reforms were being implemented, 
including the prohibition of opium smoking, the setting up
of institutions for the poor, the denunciation of bribery
and of idleness ”the rich bein'* compelled to work six hours
a dav” and above all the encouragement of ^esnect to foreigners.
The ancient, system of China was breaking \ip, and ideas at
least as onnosed to the philosophy of Confucius as to
Christianity we^e permeating that ’’apparently immoveable
mass”. Tp short ’’chance has b e m n  in the onlv region where
(1)
change ten vears ago seemed impossible,” This kind of
favourable view of the movement was echoed in articles in
one or two other journals about this time, but their authors
felt it necessary to take the offensive against what they
(2)
plainly felt to be the prevailing popular view. The
ready assumption behind much of the comment made in 1853? 
that here was a wonderful reforming and progressive movement, 
had to be asserted and proved by l86l. By the early months 
of 1862, with the falling away of missionary hopes once more 
and the publication of further Blue Books containing many 
official reports on the rebellion, there were few ready to 
raise their voices in praise of the Talpings. There were 
plenty, however, who were ready to do so in condemnation of 
the change in government policy towards them.
(T) Spectator April 13, 1P61
(2) See for example, Dublin TTniversity ^agazine May l86l:
~r i t i sh Qua rt e r 1. v Rev 1 ew An r i 1, 18 61, and London Qi1 a r te r 1 v
Review, Ar^il I80I.
37T.
The question of policy- towards the rebellion in China
was the subject of frequent though not very stirring debate
in parliament between 1862 and 186b-. Apart from questions,
the issue was raised seven times in the Commons and twice in
the Lords between March, 1862, and May, 186b-, and altogether
received more attention than a comparable issue would he
likely to get today* mhe main, indeed the only spokesman
for the superior virtues o^ the rebels over the Manchus was
the member for Aberdeen, Col. W. P. Sykes, who in speeches,
pamphlets and letters to the press consistently presented
them as ” the National Party” who were in effective control
(1)of a third of China.
”Tf the Taepings were the desolating locusts they were
represented to be,1 he stated in the Commons in March,
1862, "it was a singular fact that during the time
they have held Nankin the silk and tea produce has
shown considerable annual increase. The Taeuings,
unfortunately for themselves, were Reformers and
Puritans - they professed to be eradicators of idolatry
and also of their Tartar conquerors. They also had a
religious ordinance which denounced the use of opium
and of liquor, and in Nankin and the other cities they
(1 1 See "J.F. Sykes, The Taeninr Rebellion in China (1.863), which 
includes many of his letters to the press; for letters of 
Sykes to the F.O, on such issues as Harvey's reports from 
T ingpo and • anchu atrocities against Taiping prisoners see 
<\ 0.17/382,b-00.b-02.b-0b-; on his argument that the Tanning 
rebels controlled an area of k00,000 sq.m* and that>with
other rebellions, two-thirds of China was out o r Manchn 
control see A ft P 1863 (310b-) ppl8-19, 1*3-?-
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“captured, neither opium nor spirits were permitted,
and the traffickers in onium and liquor found that those
customs were an obstacle to what they considered nrogress,
and he was much afraid that much of the hostile feeling
to the Taepings was caused by selfish views. Re was
not their advocate, but he was the advocate of an
honest adherence to our professions of neutrality; for
in case we interfered between the belligerents, we
, (1)
must have another Chinese war”.
Sykes found many supporters in the Commdms, but not for his 
view of the rebels as "Reformers and Puritans”. Lord Naas, 
for example, another leading critic of government policy, 
regarded Taiping religion as "sheer imposture”, and agreed 
that thev had shown no canacitv rCr establishing a dvnastvv «.* Q  t ' V
(2)
or creating a firm government in China. The real debate
was over whether it was advisable or necessary to British 
interests to support the Ianchus actively.
The arguments advanced in parliament against this policy 
were diverse. 48) One, already sufficiently illustrated, was
(IT P".D".Voi" 165 (1662) col.lBoST ”  "
(2) P.D. vol 172 (1863) col. 26b.
(3) For the debates summarised here see P.D.vol.165 (1862) cols. 
1802-19: vol.168 (1862) cols.29-81 and 882-901; vol.170(1863) 
cols.1783-I803; vol.172(1863) cols.270-329: vol.173 (186b) 
cols.M+1-52; vol. 17^ (186b) cols. 1505-23 and vol. 175 (1864)
cols.527-^5'and 916-80.
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that it was not only unnecessary but probably harmful to the 
future of British Trade in China* Any government led by 
Palmerston was also naturally suspected of being ready to 
advance the flag and to annex territory or to establish a pro­
tectorate wherever the opportunity arose. Even if not accused 
of actually Planning imperial expansion in China, it was 
warned that this was a too probable outcome of its policy.
P/hat has happened in India is certain to barren in China if 
we persist in our present course11, said Lord Faas, and there 
were many to agree with him and, at this stage in British im­
perial history, none to advocate the desirability of another 
India. Even if this danger were avoided, it would be a policy 
involving much expense. The merchant James White "had no 
sympathy with the Taepings, but he had an earnest sympathy 
with the taxpayer of this country who would, no doubt, be called 
upon to defray the cost of (a) gigantic scheme of interference", 
'he maintenance of the present force in China cost £1,000,000 
per annum, complained another speaker, "which amounted to an 
additional penny on the income tax". In the House of Lords 
iarl Grey criticised the government for lacking any clear and 
consistent policy at all, for being neither properly neutral 
nor properly at war with the rebels, while there was also 
criticism of a policy which gave support to a corrupt, despotic 
' untrustworthy government. But the main point made, anart
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fro ' .a danger of becoming deeply involved in the internal
government of China, was that British trade there did not
need, nor did its volume justify, the committments the
government was making. Cobden and Bright both advanced
this kind of argument in sneeches which hardly mentioned
the rebels, but which insisted that the trade with China -
!,the most miserable trade in the world when compared with
e magnitude of the copulation", said Bright - would best
develop by being left to make its own way. Wars in China
(1)
had been and were unnecessary to its advancement.
The government’s main answer to these criticisms was,
" course, to insist that the rebellion was a completely 
destructive force. Unless China was to be allowed to drift 
into a state of anarchy in which there would be no prospects 
whatever for trade, it had to be put down, and it was sound 
oolicy to help "the enlightened Government of China", which 
Palmerston describe' as having beer "rendered" friendly instead 
of hostile to the West, to do this. But there was no inten­
tion of undertaking more than limited intervention, which in
any case the Taipings had brought upon themselves bytheir 
attacks upon the treaty ports. The warning analogy of India 
was simply rejected. Palmerston, who seems to have taken a
(1) !?or Oobden’s arguments see vol.168, cols.63-7? and vol. 175 
cols.91^-23, and for Bright, ibid., cols.97*+-9*
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rather light hearted view of the whole issue, answered
Jobden's general attack upon the past and present China policy
tie government with the argument that, having weakened the
are us and helped create favourable conditions for rebellion
against them by defeating them in war,
"then, on the principle that there is a .lust Providence
which inflicts retribution uuon those who commit wrong
and refuse redress, we are bound now to do everything
in our power to make amends to that Imperial Government
for the injury they then sustained " 1 '
' \s following speaker observed that Palmerston had spoken
"with even more than his usual hilarity and vivacity", while
i-1 e Spectator described this sneech as containing "nothing
less than an assertion of his own will, and his intention to
nevsevere in a particular policy whether the country likes
it or not  It was a hilarious song of defiance, heard
with discust even by members who feel that the alternatives
(2)
ere Lord Palmerston or a Tory administration".
It is plain that this was not an issue uuon which the 
Palmerston government felt verv seriouslv challenged. Certainly 
td'ere was no sense of urgencv about these fairly freouentV  V  -
(1) P.D.vo1.168, cols.71-8; for other, moue serious, examples 
of this "atonement." argument to justify aid to the Manehus 
see P,D.vol.l6l (lP6l) col.579; A.S.Wilson, In~li sh 
Policy in China (i860) pn.28-9; London and China dxnress 
Jan 10, 1862, p.II1*.
(2) Spectator July 12,1862, n .762.
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dehates which, with one or two exceptions, were held before 
very thin and disinterested houses and which only once 
resulted in a division. Some of them, in fact, appear to 
have been begun as moves in the complicated game of parlia­
mentary nolitics. In the absence of any great domestic 
issues of dispute, pending a new Reform Bill, foreign policy 
provided the chief opportunities for criticism of the govern­
ment by the rather heterogeneous opposition of the time. 
According to the hanchester Guardian, ever since the "Arrow1 
war "the relations of this country with China have been
earerlv watched for opportunities of tripping up the govern-
(1)
ment by a coalition of opposing parties". Division on
this issue certainly ran across the not very well defined 
party lines of that time, but it is significant that of the 
one debate upon which a vote was taken, the Spectator wrote
that "the startled Liberals" followed Palmerston into the
(2)
lobby. The Spectator also thought it heard "a low growl
in their ranks, which bodes no good to the Premier", but the 
issue was never felt to be of such import, either by the 
leaders of the opposition or by Palmerston's own party, as 
to warrant an all out attack or a mutiny. The Times might 
assert, "we have almost, as much material Interest at stake
(1) 'anche ste r fTnard 1 an Jul.v 9, 1863.
(2) Spectator Inly 12, 1862*, p.757-
In the battles between the Taepings and the Imperialists 
in China as we have in the contest between the Unionists 
and the Secessionists in America",^ ^but the civil war in 
China was never looker! on by the British public or parlia­
ment with as much concern and interest ^s that in America,
Nevertheless5 policy towards it was for a time an issue 
of considerable nublic debate. By 1862 qihe Times itself 
was in full cry after the rebels, "the bloodthirsty and 
rapacious Taeping, the Thug of China, the desolator of 
cities,the provider of carrion to the wild dog, the pitiless 
exterminator, the useless butcher". Intervention in some 
share or o th e r  against this "travelling anarchy" had become 
"indispensable to our position in China", and The Times gave 
whole hearted support to everv aspect of government policy,
even to the Lay-Osborn flotilla which aroused the criticism* ?
(2)
of many of the usual supporters of intervention. The
orniny Post also gave steady support to the government, and
(1) Tha Times, Dec. 12, 1862.
(2) Bee The Times editorials on ‘eh.26, larch 11th, Nay 16, 
July 22 and 29, Aug. 9 and IN, Dec. 12, 1862: Jan.30,
April *f, July 7 and 9, Nov.2h-, 1863: Jan 5 and 11,
Feb. 16, April 23, Sept. 28, 186k. Note J.Scarth - "The 
rnimes is doing most harm, for* it still abuses the rebels 
whenever it can and suppresses anything favourable to 
them, though in possession of authentic knowledge sent 
by its own correspondent at Hong Kong". (in Presbyterian 
Church of England’s "Letters in Connection with the China 
Mission", Pox II, 2, no.10, Nov.12, i860).
382.
dismissed the arguments of its parliamentary critics as 
M simply impracticable and impossible11. Non-intervention 
as a general nrincinle in foreign relations was onlv intelli-O  .JL X  '  **
gible towards countries which had reached :,a certain grade 
of political, moral and philosophical development”. "he
(1) hv.T .S.A. was such a country, but China was not. '.he
anchester rhiadian agreed that it was "mere pedantry” to
apply this principle to countries “which know nothing of
international law and customs”, and nidged the policy of
the British government to be “faithful, straightforward and
rrlendly, and calculated to Drove eminent]v advantageous both
(2)
to China and Great Britain”.
Public opposition, however, was considerable. During
the latter part of 1862, after the change in the government’s
policy had been made plain by debates in Parliament, a number
of memorials were sent to the foreign Office urging that
ritish representatives in China be instructed ”to withdraw
*
as speedily as possible from this untimely intervention -in 
Chinese affairs”. rhey were all nearly identical in wording, 
and appear to have been the result of an organised campaign of 
nub1ic meetings. They came from as far apart as Cornwall 
and Glasgow (from the Society for the Promotion of Permanent
(1)~ ornlr~ Post July 9 and. 17. 1.862: July"8, 1863• ”
(2) ;■" a n c h e s t e r On a. r d 1 an July 9? 186.3.
3'83'
and Universal Peace), and included one from Manchester 
hearing the signature of T'hos, Bazlev, an h .P. foe the city 
and a former chairman of the Chamber of Commerce there. The 
chief argument used by these memorialists was "that, at this 
moment, when the shadow of a great calamity is facing our own 
country, it is especially incumbent on her ajestvfs Govern­
ment to avoid committing the nation to another war in China 
which is sure, as our past experience of Chinese wars abund­
antly nroves, to draw largely on our national resources". No 
judgment was passed on either side in the Chinese domestic 
struggle, only upon the impolicy of British interference in 
it.. (-! ^ Many of the memorialists no doubt felt, like the 
reviewer of BlakistorWs Five Months on the Yangtze in The 
Athenaeum, that by this time the bubble about the Taipings 
had burst, and they were revealed "in all their hideousness",
yet also that "if there is to be a regeneration of China, it
(2)must be the work of the natives themselves".
It was this last idea that Lav set out to change in two
articles which appeared in " I a ckw o od1 s I -a ? a z in e at the beginning
(T) For these memorials see F.\ .17/36.3-5 and If 02. There are 
about ten altogether, some with up to fifty signatures, 
others with one onlv on behalf of a crown. Those from 
religious groups added "and to affect our moral and 
religious character"to the passage quoted. The reference 
to "the si adow of a great calamity" is presumably to the 
depression in the North of England resulting from the 
American Civil War.
(2) Athenaeum 1862, vol.II, up.569-90.
of 1863. The Taiping rebellion was "the most anpalling 
scourge that ever fell upon a nation", but since the country 
was "decidedly opposed to direct intervention", while to 
allow another power to do so and establish a protectorate 
in China would be dangerous to British interests, the best 
method of aiding and regenerating the country, Lay argued, 
was by "encouraging officers of character and resnectability, 
subjects of European powers, to enter the service of the 
Chinese Government". As examples of this method the Foreign 
Inspectorate of Customs and the Lay-Osborn flotilla were 
commended to the British public.'^' But Lay had no great 
success in creating a public opinion favourable to his plans 
ror China, and the Lay-Osborn flotilla remained one of the 
most roundly condemned asnects o^ British intervention in 
11 le c i vi 1 wa r in Ch ina.
Strongest opposition to what it called "Lord Palmerston1
clandestine war" came from the Dai.lv News. Tn July, 1862,
it attacked government policy in several leaders, in one of
the
which it reprinted from/Times of Tndi a a particularly horrific 
eyewitness account of alleged Imperialist atrocities in the 
treatment of captured Taipings. This account prompted 
enquiries from the government, which seems to have felt more
(1) See clackwood * s I acazi.ne Jan.and Feb.1863, esn.pp lMf-8.
vulnerable on the charge of condoning atrocity than on any
(1)
other made on this issue. The Da.i 1 y News kept uu its
attacks, printing several letters from Sykes, but without itself
directly nraising the Taipings. "The best thing we can do
is to take China as it is," it was still arguing in June,
186*+, "and carry on the best trade we can with it, instead
of attempting to create it anew in the hone of doing better.
There are districts occupied by Imperialists and others by
Taipings. We should bear ourselves as neutrals to both
narties (and) give up the ambition of being in any degree
resnonsible for the Government of China, and be content with
doing as much trade as we can carry on, as traders and n«bt
(2)
as Anglo-Chinese politicians and partisans".
Among other newspapers the Dai1y Tele vrauh suggested
mediation as a possibility, while the Standard was inclined
to take ketternich’s view of revolt in Greece and advise
that it be left to burn itself out beyond the nale of
civilisation. The hjveruoo1 Da11w Post, while chiding the
■ ouse of Commons for its anathy on the question and attacking
the government for approving the "extraordinary conduct" of
Rear Admiral Hope without first seeking parliamentary approval,
(' ) sTe Pally Pews July 10, 12, 16 and 2*f, and Aug 7 and 11,1862. 
On government enquiries about atrocities see above n.221(2)
(2) Dailv News June 1, 186N: also July 7, 1863•
386.
believed that the Taipings had “always shown themselves more 
willing than the Mandarin party to foster trade, (and) are in 
■ os:'tion to offer’ far greater facilities and far greater 
rewards”. The Manchester Daily Examiner felt !,no doubt 
■ at, substantially, (China) is now divided into two de facto 
wnires. Lot us recognise both and do our best to trade
with both  At all events, let us not gradually commit
ur honour to the impossible task of resuscitating an emuire
which bears the stamp of inevitable decay M The • omlng
e--‘aid asked, in a nineteenth century brand of tabloid jour­
nalism. why England should Mcrusade to keep the Yellow Dwarf 
of modern times on his goblin throne? Why are we bound to 
cement up every crack in the obsolete willow pattern rlate? 
....China must take care of China’1. ^  ' Finally, the 
Mcctatw asked “What is the Mexican expedition which is now 
embarrassing France compared to a task like this? It is the 
very process by which we conquered India begun over again”. 
England was in danger of blundering into the government of 
third of the human race through “a war nobody ordered, or
(1) For these comments see “Spirit of the Press” column in
the London and Jhlnr Cwnress - l arch 26, June 10, Nov.10, 
1862; May 27, I8S3"; Feb.2^7 186U etc.
“vented, or nretends to understand”. By July, 1863, however,
in reporting “another totally useless Chinese debate”, it
was forced to admit that the current of opposition to
Palmerston it had seen in mid-1862 had come to nothing.
“The secret popular feeling is evidently that, if the Anglo -
Chinese officers do not conquer China there is no harm done,
(1)
and if they do, so much the better for trade”. So far
as newspapers can be said to reveal overt ponular feeling, 
however, it is sa^e to conclude that there was always con­
siderable opposition to intervention in China, and this
seems relevant in explaining the rather hasty withdrawal
(2)
from that policy made by the government in 186k.
(1) Spectator „ July 12, 1862, up 672-3 and July 19,1862, pp78j? 
and 792-3, Aug.2,1862; May 23 and July 11,1863.
(2) nice at least displayed some sensitivity to public 
opinion. He wrote to Hope on March 26,1.862, ”we must 
guard against the charge, however absurd, of being too 
ready to take the offensive against the Taeuings, and I 
am therefore in favour of an attempt at negotiation, as 
soon as they have received a good lesson near Shanghai”.
(F.0.17/371 one.3 in Bruce to Hussell April 9,1862). On 
May 6,186k, he forwarded extracts from the ~'orth China
■erald to Russell, hoping that “these statements, extracted 
from a nev/s paper, will produce some impression on those 
rversons in England who appear to think that the accounts 
furnished by Her Majesty’s agents and officers in China 
are biassed unfairly by a feeling of hostility to the 
Taepings. A little reflection would, however, render it 
evident to anyone that those who were called on to decide 
the course to be pursued in this question four years ago 
had every inducement to take the most favourable view of 
the insurrection and to have entered into relations with 
banking, had it been nossible to do so consistently with 
our Interests in China”.
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Tn all this dehate on government, no lie v between 1862
<-J -w «v
and 1 r6L!- there was not much discussion of the rebellion 
itself. Certainly the government’s critics were not 
particularly concerned to defend the Taipings. Tn its 
review, at the end of 1862, of Brine’s The Taeninc Rebellion 
~;r China which it considered to be the most impartial and 
balanced study of the movement which had till then appeared, 
though perhaps too impartial and. judicious, The Athenaeum 
observed that
"the Taepings in the sight of England are angels 
or demons, honey or vitriol, civiUsers or exterminators, 
just as we choose: for it is perfectly easy to cram
dogmatism in abundance on either side from books, 
pamphlets, speeches and leading articles"•^^ 
r),he final disappointment of missionarv hones in the rebellion
J. .L
■ leant that, even by the time The Athenaeum was making this 
comment there were really few left in England who regarded 
the rebels with positive approval. In October, 1862, the 
)uacteriv hsview argued that intervention was an undertaking 
" ore than Great Britain is at all disposed to sanction", and 
presented the rebels in ^oderatelv favourable terms, certainlv/  V
as no worse than the Imperialists, and "more willing to
(1) Athenaeum 1862, vol.II, rn688-60.
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l,encourare the approach of foreigners and in no way disnosed 
to  Interfere with foreign commerce”. The writer of this 
a r t i c l e  also observed that of the social condition of the 
re b e ls  very little was known, but. missionary reports indicated 
that 1 to a certain extent at least they have a community of 
i n t e r e s t s ;  with very few exceptions no one seemed to say 
aught of the things he possessed was his own”.^ '  ^ Not many 
such comments on the social system of the rebels are to be 
found in contemnorary British articles, but when distinguished 
as to  some extent socialistic this rarely aroused any particu­
l a r  condemnation. It was too remote and primitive to warrant 
t h a t .  In July, 1863, a writer in The London Quarterly 
Review admitted a strong revulsion of feeling against the
r e b e ls ,  though himself maintaining that "the rresent antjbathy
(2)
is as unreasonable and absurd as was the former sympathy11.
There was no swing of the pendulum back again in favour of 
th e  rebellion, however, and within a short time articles and 
leaders in praise of Gordon1s exploits began to arnear, and 
the legend that ’’the Taening monster has been crushed by 
British skill and valour'1 began to take shape.
(1) Quarter!^ Review Oct.. ] 862, esn. nu
(2) London Quarter1v Re view July 1863, rp,326-7.
(3) London and China Exnress Oct. 10, l86^,r>.8l7• The legend 
apparently still flourishes. See C.Beatty His 0ountry was 
the World (19?*+) n.30 etc; Lord 11ton, General Gordon (195^) 
n. ,  87-8 etc. It is interesting to note that Gordon him­
self is said to have pronounced the Taiping cause lost before
he ever assumed command of the Ever Victorious Army, but
the co ment. of D.C.Boulger on this was that "no cause could
concluded at Toot of next page....
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British "public" opinion about the Taiping rebellion, 
then, insofar as it can be pinned down, can be summed up as 
shifting from early support for the rebels as liberal,
Christian and tor some even Protestant reformers, through 
indifference and. a short lived, uartial revival of interest 
and hope, to final rejection and condemnation, with the rider 
that there was v.n.desnread disapproval of the policy of active 
intervention against it. Tt seems altogether in keeping 
with the ignorance and uncertainties out of which this 
n-'nion was largely compounded that, no sooner were the rebels 
defeated at hanking, than doubts began to be expressed as to 
whether this would be altogether a good thing for British 
interests in China.
"We are not at all sure we ought to congratulate ourselves
on the news", wrote The Standard. "With an enemy in the
field against him, occupying a portion of his empire,
threatening new conquests, a standing menace to his throne,
the hrperor of China was wonderfully complaisant to the
Inglish, upon whom he relied for something more than sym-
(l )pathy in his troubles".
Even The Times, which had called loudest r0r* the destruction
nr the rebellion and which refused to"retract one word or
continuing fn(3) from previous page... be pronounced irretrie­
vable with a leader so exnert and resolute as Chung Wang, 
and opponents so Incapable and craven as his were". (The 
Tm'de of r-ordon (1896) vol T pp 75-6.)
(l3 this name... cit. "ondon and China Exo-re ss Oct.10,l861f
     ‘ p. 818.
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"retreat ore step" from the course of policy it had advocated, 
agreed that 3ngland might expect "to find, the Chinese Govern­
ment much less tractable11. On December 31st, reviewing the 
events of lP6k, it could only say that, with the defeat of 
the rebellion, 11 it remains to be seen whether the Government 
of Pekin will maintain the friendly bearing to Foreign Powers
which has hitherto Pound a motive in the need of counsel and 
(i )assistance**. v ' rphe last fifty years of Manchu rule in
China are sufficient comment on that.
(.1 ) rihe times Dec. 30 and 31? l'86*f.
PART III: GENERAL CONC LU SION S
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A great many generalisations and assumptions have been 
made about British attitudes and policy towards the Taiping 
rebellion in China. This thesis has endeavoured to make 
these explicit where necessary, and to test them against 
the detailed evidence urovided by official and non-official 
British r e c o r d s .  Such a process Inevitably blurs and com­
p l i c a t e s  what, from a more distant standnoint. rnav annear7 / •
to be a clear cut and unmistakable rattern. The main lines 
of that rattern are certainly definite enough. British 
opinion about the Taiping rebellion moved from early general 
approval and support to later general disapproval and rejection, 
: i1e the official British policy changed from early neutrality
to later active intervention against the rebellion. But within 
this broad framework many points of quite significant detail, 
when <seeu at closer quarters than is possible in general 
istories of the rebellion op of British policy in China, 
take on a very different aspect from that generally attributed 
to them.
The main difference, in my view, is that there was no 
sudden, definite change, either in British attitudes or 
policy, at the end of the war of 1856-60 against the Manchu 
government. The significance of that war, and of the rpreatm 
of Tientsin which resulted from it, in creating conditions in
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which British interference in the civil war in China was a 
likely possibility cannot be denied. But it gives a quite 
false idea of the nature of British policy on this issue to 
assume that there was an immediate and unhesitating change 
to active support of the kanchus, once the Tientsin treaty 
was ratified. In a way it may seem a small point to insist 
that the real change came early in 1862, rather than at the 
end of i860 or the beginning of l86lj but the common assumption 
that ’ r itish int e rvent ion against the Ta ip in g s began alraos t 
as soon as the Manchus were brought to terms seems to me to 
nourish the more fundamentally mistaken assumption that 
British policy towards the rebellion was something carefully 
calculated and certain in its development. British inter­
vention came about in a way which reveals a complete absence 
of any p^e-conceived plan to help crush the rebellion. A 
read/iness to help the lanchus in some wav was certainly plain.C v v
before 1862, but so long as the rebels stayed clear of the 
main centre of British trade in China at Shanghai there was 
no certainty that this would have resulted in more than a 
very pro-Manchu policy of neutrality.
It is important to recognise that in so distant a field 
as China was in the mid-nineteenth century, the simple 
sounding concept "British policy11 was the result of a complex,
lonm draw, out process in which no one, sometimes least of 
all those in nominal but distant control of it, could be very 
sure of what exactly the end product would be. The short 
tern influence of local officers and local events could some­
times be quite decisive, and British policy might, and often 
did change in important if not quite fundamental ways before 
the British government itself knew what was happening. So 
long as such locally inspired changes in British policy were 
not inconsistent with the main British objectives in China 
them were likelv ultimatelv to receive higher approval. But—  j.
in considering the historical development of that nolicy, 
changes which began at the local level, however logical and 
to-be-expected they may appear to the later historian, should 
not be presented as the result of plans well thought out 
beforehand and directed from above. The evidence of the 
official British records shows quite plainly that the change 
in British policy towards the Taiping rebellion certainly 
did not come about in such a fashion,
? or did British opinion suddenly swing against the rebels 
as the result of the Treaty of Tientsin. Tn great part 
British hones in the gainings had evaporated long before i860, 
even as early as the middle of 185*+• Indeed, it seems to 
me that there has b^en some tendency to exaggerate the extent 
of the eaHy favourable reaction +o the rebellion. This was 
very marked, but it was far from being absolutely universal
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or uncritical. Some were sceptical and even hostile from the 
start, early official reports were very cautious and doubtful 
lp53 and frankly uessimistic by 185^, while even the mission­
aries, who were naturally the most enthusiastic, always had 
their qualifications to add. The failure of the rebellion 
to advance successfully beyond hanving after 1853 and the 
reports of later Western visitors served to diminish, if not 
auite to destroy, the early hopes aroused that a quick victory 
for the rebels would advance .British interests in China, and 
b^ r the later eighteen fifties it had almost, ceased to count 
in ca 1 cu1 ations about t.he future. The official consu.1 ar 
view of it was especially hostile.
Insofar as there was any significant chance in British 
opinion about i860, it was as much in favour as against the 
rebels. "hey seemed suddenly to have recovered all their 
former military vigour, to show once again some possibility 
of religious reform, and to be in any case not worse than 
the Tint rustworthy Fanchus, who were "reatly suspect after 
the events of 1859-60. This reaction in favour of the rebels 
was much less general than in 1853? however, and had passed 
almost entirely by 1862, after further first-hand observation 
and errerience of the movement. nevertheless, disapproval 
of tine rebellion was not the same thirv as suunort for action 
against it. The outstanding feature of British opinion on
the question from 1862 to hc6^ was the strength of the 
onuos‘tior to the government policy of intervention. The 
coots of this opposition spread very wide, reaching to politi 
cians in England who grasped at any stick to use against the 
palmerston government, to merchants in China wTho disliked 
'he element of strengthening the central Peking government 
nresent In the official British policy, to a few, hut a very 
few, who still believed that the Taipings were ureferahle 
to the kanchus. The uolicy of intervention against the 
Tau'.ping rebellion was very much an official policy, not one 
urged upon the government by some powerful lobby, such as 
the onium interest.
Viewing the development of British attitudes and policy 
over the whole neriod of the rebellion then, there is no 
sinrle, ciear]v marked turning uoint. Oninion fluctuated,
—  / */ j. .t /
though on the whole apter 1853 the trend was fairly steadily 
away from support for the rebellion; while official policy, 
though not originally biassed in favour of the anchus, soon 
; acame so, at "i r s t simnlv because what the British sovernmen 
chose to define as the defensible limits of British interests 
in China included 1 anchu interests also, and later from an 
avowed desire to advance a I anchu victory over the rebels. 
This police of limited and pro-Manchu neutrality which 
develoned during the eighteen fifties readily became one of
ictive and consistent sunport for the Peking government, once 
id e dritish government was satisfied that the Manchus won id 
observe the terms or the new treaty settlement and that the 
rebels could not be cajoled or bullied to keen away from the 
treaty norts. This was the situation by the beginning 
of 1862.
The British policy followed from that point was one of 
limited, not wholesale intervention. The idea that all the 
r,orces used to defeat the Fanehus in i860 were turned against 
tda '"a 1 pings in 1862 is quite mistaken. They were simply 
not in China. Direct British action against the rebels, 
although or prime importance In preventing them from establish­
ing a firm, new base in the coastal provinces at the mouth 
or the vanntze, was confined to a relatively small area and 
a relatively short neriod of time. Indirect assistance given 
the Fanehus, by the release of officers to lead Chinese forces 
and by the supplying of arms, was substantial, but. hardly seems 
to have been as decisive as some have made it. It is import­
ant to see the British contribution to the defeat of the 
rebellion against the background of the over-all decline in 
aw*ring military and political fortunes since 1853* In that 
decline the weaknesses of Taiping leadership and the slow 
pressure of the provincial Chinese armies directed by Tseng 
Kuo-fan appear of far greater Importance than the exploits of
the Tver Victorious Army, though that army certainly helped
to hasten the end considerably.
kinallv, British uolicv towards the ^airin^ rebellion
V  / *  v  i, W
° - w s to me to illustrate the uncertainties and hesitations, 
rat- r than the cynical astuteness of British imperialism in 
nineteenth century China, The British government stumbled 
into action against the rebellion, was anxious not to get 
brawn too far into the struggle, and had half-formed but 
unrealised theories about using its aid to imurove the quality 
or the Hanchu government. Tt did not deliberately set out 
ho su-nnress what it recognised to be a progressive, nationalist, 
anti-colonial rebellion in order to preserve a reactionary and 
conveniently weak government in China. Tn the light of later 
developments it is not surprising that the issue has been 
presented in such terms, especially bv modern Chinese histor-y v
in ■■•'is, But the choice the British government saw was between 
t' e break up of China and an admittedly weak, inefficient and 
untrustworthy government which it nevertheless honed could, 
with encouragement, become one to which the protection of 
'British interests might eventually be entrusted. British 
policy was, perhaps, based on a mistaken view of the real 
nature of the Taiui.nm rebellion, as it was certainly based-i- /  *
on motives of pure self interest. But despite superficial 
nmearances, British policy towards the Tain in g rebellion
in China does not provide a very convincing example of a 
cynically repressive imperialism at work. Too many 
assumptions, both about what the Taiping rebellion was 
capable of achieving in nineteenth century China and about 
the nature of British policy towards it, have to be made 
for such a view to be historically acceptable.
APPENDIX A
The Appointment of T. T. Meadows to Mewchwang
Thomas Taylor Meadows was the chief, almost the sole 
defender of the Taiping rebellion among British consular 
officers in China, and was transferred from the key post 
of consul at Shanghai in 1861 to the newly onened treaty 
port of Newchwang in Manchuria, very far from the scene of 
the rebellion and the possibility of influencing British 
policy towards it. One naturally asks whether there was 
anv connection between these facts. Was Meadows, in 
twentieth century terms, regarded as a bad security risk, 
and deliberately sent to a distant and inferior post as pun­
ishment for his unorthodox ideas on Chinese politics?
Writers holding very different views of the rebellion, 
as well as of Meadows himself, have certainly seen the 
r atter in this light. Colonel Sykes, the chief spokesman 
for the rebels in the House of Commons, wrote that Meadows 
was r,got rid of by accepting a post in Manchuria'1, while 
ontalto de Jesus, an historian of Shanghai who was very 
hostile to the rebellion and devoted to the memory of General 
Gordon, suggested that he was 11 relegated to a snhere where 
his blind Taiping partisanship could not be a source of 
misunderstanding as to the attitude of his own government
ifOl.
at Shanghai". A. 3. Wilson, the historian of the 3ver 
Victorious Army, m it Meadows in a class on his own as a 
supporter of the rebels, ’’not to be confused with the rest 
of the Tainin  ^ svmuathisers in China, or with Col. Sykesj.  a. 7 O
et hoc ornne genus at home11. But he too believed that 
Meadows had, at his own request, been ’’banished to the 
unimportant consulship at Newchwant”. Whether sympathetically 
o*-’ not, all three agree that the chief reason for Meadows 
leaving Shanghai was his attitude towards the rebellion.^1
There is certainly some evidence to support this theory.
At the end of August, i860, just after the first Taiping 
attack nr»on Shanghai, Bruce wrote to Elgin,
,fIt is amusing to see the implicit, faith reposed by 
I eadows & c . in these men. One would supuose a 
Chinaman with long hair incapable of telling a lie. 
Meadows as usual has been a great difficulty, and 
it was very fortunate, if the rebels were to be kept 
out of that town, that I was on the spot. He told 
Wyndham that he should have no hesitation in admitting 
them, and he certainly did everything he could to 
paralyze the measures necessary for defence, so much 
co that T directed Marchand Wynniatt never to apply 
to him but to come always to me. T hone that you
(1) See W.H.Sykes, laening Rebellion in China.. (186B) p6*+; 
C.A.Montato de Jesus, Historic Shanghai (1909) ppll^f-5;
A.E.Wilson, The Ever Victorious Army (1868) pp312-13*
*+02.
!lwi'll give me a pretext fop sending him at once to the 
north, where he will be out of the way..., T never 
had to deal with so impracticable and mischievous a 
subordinate”.
If this were all the evidence available the case would seem 
clearly proved. Bruce did not get on with Meadows, thought 
his attitude to the rebellion nositivelv dangerous, and was 
anxious to get him out of the way - so Meadows went to 
Manchuria.
The.^ e is, however, a good deal of other relevant 
evidence which blurs, and practically obliterates, this 
simple picture of bureaucratic victimisation. In the first 
nlace, Meadows' apuointment to the Shanghai consulship, made 
in July, 1859, was temporary, his gazetted appointment even 
at that time being Fewchwang. In January, 1859? there had 
been a general reshuffling of China appointments by the 
Foreign Office in anticipation of the ratification of the 
Treaty of Tientsin. As part of this Meadows was to go to 
the Manchurian port, Robertson was to leave Shanghai for 
Canton, Parkes, who had been Allied Commissioner at Canton 
during its occupation by French and English forces since 
January, 1858, was to take over the Shanghai uost, while
(1) F.0.228/281 Bruce to Elgin Aug.3-1?i860. Wyndham was 
attache to the China Mission; Wynnifctt possibly a 
military officer.
^03.
W. H. Medhusrt was to move from Foochow to Tangchow (Chefoo) 
on the Shantung peninsula. With the renewal of hostilities
after Bruce*s repulse at the Taku forts these arrangements 
were, of course, upset. Robertson did go to Canton, but 
Parkes joined Elgin's second mission, and it was temporarily 
impossible to open the new ports in the north. Medhurst 
therefore remained at Foochow, while Meadows, who had 
returned to Shanghai as Interpreter at the end of 18?8, was
given "temporary charge" of the consulate after Robertson's
(2)
departure, despite the vehement protests of Medhurst.
At that time Bruce probably thought Parkes would soon take 
up duties at Shanghai and that it was not worth disturbing 
arrangements at other consulates to fill a temporary gap 
there. In the event, Meadows stayed for nearly two years 
and, despite Bruce's strictures of August, i860, did not 
actually move before his long appointed post at Newchwang 
was available. In short, one can quite satisfactorily 
explain Meadows' move from Shanghai to Newchwang in April,
1861, without reference to his views on the rebellion or his 
disagreements with Bruce. It was a long-anticipated Move 
which was made at the first opportunity. This is not to
(1) F.O.17/311 Malmesbury to Bruce (no.6.) March 2,1859; also 
Foreign Office List, 1859*
(2) For Meadows' temporary appointment see F.0.17/313 Bruce to 
Russell, Aug.22,i8J9* Medhurst protested to strongly that 
Bruce asked him to withdraw his original letter and present
his case in more moderate terms. Bruce nevertheless advised 
Russell that Medhurst's protests were unreasonable - see
F.0.17/31*+ Bruce to Russell Sept.19, 1859*
deny that other factors were present, but the case for saying 
he was ”got rid of” from Shanghai would be far stronger had 
he been moved immediately after August i860, and not gone 
directly to Newchwang.
Another point is that Newchwang was certainly not 
regarded as an '‘unimportant consulship” in 1859 or in l86l, 
even though it later nroved to be a backwater. It was hoped 
that it would become a major port for the development of 
‘ rad'3 with anchuria, its uotential importance bein^ Indicated 
' the fact that Meadows went there on a salary of £1,300 ner 
annum, equal to that for Tangchow and considerably higher 
than those for the other new ports (e.g. Swatow £800; Chinkiang 
£900). It was inferior only to the major consulates of 
Shanghai (£1,500) and Canton (£1,600).^ ’ Meadows1 anpoint- 
•ent therefore cannot be regarded as in any sense “relegation”, 
e was being moved from a temporary to a nermanent consulship 
at a good salary. Moreover, he was certainly quite ready 
to go there, and for health reasons preferred it even to 
staying at Shanghai. As early as August, 1858, he had 
written asking for an arpointment in the north, and in January, 
i86l, his preference for that area was still strong. On the 
latter occasion he wrote to Russell from Shanghai, in what
(1 ) For salarv ^caie see F.0.17/311. Malmesbury to Bruce (No.6) 
March 2, 1859; also F.0.17/322 F.O.to Treasury Feb.2*f,l859.
arrears to have been quite gratuitous alarm lest Bruce 
suddenly order him, “not to my proper post at Newchwang, but 
to some uort south of this, at none of which can I possibly 
live”. He went on to write hopefully of the prospects of a 
considerable trade developing at his new post, and begged to 
reneat
“that I think that in that cold region I could remain
in active employ for the next three or four years,
that T am not only willing but desirous of remaining
there, with occasional leaves of a year and a half,
Nor the next twenty years.... Should, however, the
hon. Mr. Bruce, in making his arrangements, deem it
best that I should be permanently appointed to this
Shanghae Consulate I will not assert that I should
not be able to nass one or two years here without
leave, though T should have many misgivings about
the first summer, and would certainly have to retire
definitelv from China long before twent-v ^ears more
(1)
had elapsed”.
Meadows certainly did not feel that in going to Newchwang he 
was being banished to a remote frontier nost, like some 
degraded Chinese official.
(!) f,0.17/360 Meadows to Russell Jan.2*+, i860? for Meadows* 
original request for a northern post see F.0.17/298 enc. 
in Bowrin g to Malmesbury Aug.6, 18H8.
>+Ci6
There was tinconsci ous Irony in Meadows1 thought that
Bruce, "in making hj.s arrangements11: might deem it best to
leave him permanently at Shanghai, for Bruce assured Russell,
”T am. just as anxious to send him to Newchwang as he is to
(1)
go there”. Fore than Meadows 1 dangerous thoughts on the
rebellion were behind this continuing desire on Bruce's part
to get him out of Shanghai, however. It had been Meadows’
ormosition to the foreign Inspectorate of Customs and his
readiness to express this at length and in nubile which first
uromnted Bruce, in July, i860, to wish him heartily somewhere
3lse: and it was this issue which seems to have rankled most
with the Minister Plenipotentiary, Tn March, 1861, he
oomnlained to an official in the foreign Office that Meadows
11 has made it a rule to thwart in everything because I don't
(2)
fall in with his theories about Customs houses". This
rather netulant sounding complaint was prompted by Meadows'
remarkable behaviour in the matter of the resignation of his
brother, J.A.T.Meadows, from the consular service in January
1 Pol? an affair in which Meadows also incurred Foreign Office
(1) F.0.17/350 Bruce to Russell March' 10,18'&L.
(?) F.0.1.7/350 Bruce to Alston March 13, l86l. ^or other com- 
plaints bv Bruce about Meadows' attitude to the customs Question 
see F.0.17/31? Bruce to Russell Dec.?,1859; P.O.17/338 Bruce to
Russell July l6,l860: P.O.17/339 Bruce to Alston Dec. 3I5I86O' 
for* Meadows' views on the customs see also A & P 1859 Bess,2 
(2571) ppl 9*+“203 • Forth China herald, July 7.1860: S. F. Wright, 
on.nit., nr 1.36-7 • As early as July 11, i860, Bruce wished Mea­
dows out of Shanghai on this score. Be then wrote to Elgin,
” eadows has succeeded in stirring un the community against the 
Customs house on the confiscation question, and has maulgen
Concluded at foot of next page...
*t07.
O)
disaruroval. Brucs on more than one occasion also complained
of Meadows* readiness to let the routine business of the con­
sular office slide
‘’while he occupies the time of himself and his assistants 
on desnatches, manv of which a.ne unnecessary and most7 v  «.
of which are too long. Much labor would be avoided,
were he to confine himself to the work of his office.
But he has a very speculative turn of mind, and is
anxious to conform his practice to what he considers
sound principle, rather than follow in the steps of
his predecessors, on he guided by positive instructions.
e does not sufficiently consider that amidst the
anomalies of every kind that surround us in China the
safe princinle is to denart as little as nossible from
(2)
what is the received usage”.
concluding (2) from previous na,re....
in observations for which Davies and n’itzroy (Customs 
hous^ officials) have asked,  and been refused, explanations.
I wish you could send him to Newchwang, or take him away”, 
(Elgin Correspondence - Broomhall). As Minister Plenipo­
tentiary Bruce had been riven discretionary authority to 
decide when the new annointments should be taken Tin (F.C..»> L
17/311? asabove). Mr. J.Gerson has pointed out to me, how­
ever, that since Bruce did not succeed in exchanging treaty 
ratifications in 1859 he took the view that his rowers were 
not fullv orerative, esueciallv since Elrin had been an--* J A. It —
rojnted as Minister Extraordinary. Bruce therefore deferred 
to Elgin, even on matters op consular administration, while 
Elgin was reluctant to assert any authority in what he 
regarded as still Bruce’s province. Each hung back out 
of respect for the position of the other, otherwise Meadows 
might well have been moved from Shanghai before the rebels 
ever attacked the port.
(i) this nme.. ’h r  correspondence on J.A.T.Meadows 1 resignation 
q o  tp.c ,17/361 (the Meadows brokers to the F.O.), and 
C2.) next pa 4m continued at foot of next rage---
bc.P.
The after day historian is, of course, most impressed by 
2ust this characteristic in Meadows1 approach to China, as 
revealed especially in his book The Chinese and their 
Babeliions. Yet from the administrative point of view he 
was certainly a troublesome if brilliant subordinate, much 
crjven to tedious word snlining. This fault, and. his role
(or suspected role) in the resignation of his brother, are 
’*ot relevant to the question of his remaining or not abShanghai, 
though they were significant contributory causes of Bruce’s 
imnatience with him. His attitude to the customs was rele- 
vant, however, for the presence of a consul onuosed to the 
foreign Tnsnectorate principle at that key nort was all too 
likely to encourage the merchant opposition which Bruce and 
tee Foreign Office wished to allay.
continuing footnotes from previous rage...
(!) ’’.0.17/3^ Russell to Bruce June 26,186.1, for F. 0. 
disannroval.
(2) F.O.I7/350 Bruce to Russell March 10,l86l: cf.also F.O.
17/339 Bruce to Alston, Dec. 31, i860 - ”The vice of the 
consular service in China is that the Consuls are much 
more ant to pass their time in writing speculative des­
patches on general questions which may figure in a blue- 
book, than in arrying out the routine busln.es sof the 
Ports... They have been misled by Alcock’s examnle, The 
man least bitten with the mania is Parkes - he throws all 
his energies into practical questions - the worst of ail 
is eadows, who by raising difficulties and objections, 
makes practical improvement impossible For rosttions so 
anomalous as ours in China, an international, nedant is 
a bore and an obstacle”. Bruce went on to complain especially 
of Meadows** attitude to the customs service.
There is, T think, no simple answer to the question 
nosed, What is certain is that, Meadows* attitude to the 
rebellion was not the immediate or the sole cause of his 
ovincr to Newchwang, and was, perhaps, not even a major 
^ause. But it would be false to conclude that it had 
nothing to do with the move. Tt is noteworthy that when 
eadows left Shanghai it was not to make room for Parkes, but 
for other temporary consuls, the first of whom was Medhurst. 
This indicates that the fact that the northern norts were, 
by April ,l86l, ready to be opened was no compelling reason 
or- actually sending Meadows to Newchwang, since Medhurst did 
not go to Tangchow. Had Bruce been thoroughly satisfied 
with eadows he could, presumably, have left him at Shanghai 
and sent Medhurst to his post. That he did not do so but 
was, on the contrary, anxious to see 7-readows out of Shanghai 
was at least partly, but only partly, because of the Consults 
views on the rebellion. Meadows died at Newchwang in 1868.
kl 1
APPENDIX P
TRADE FTCURES IPRQ - nO
1, British Trade at Shanghai 1ft 50 - 6 (in $)
Source: ’‘Abstracts on the Reports of Trade or the various
countries and Places for the years 1856-7......M





I m n 0 r t s
Tea
E X T) 0 r t. S
(exc. Opium) 
Cotton Wool TOTAL Silk TOTAL
1850 5/- 2617,891t / 500555 ^908156 5526711 5,529,267 8020606 / /
1851 5/- 3685891 521608 5‘165525 5595958 5,963,765 11598168/ /
18.52 5/- 3669] 5-7 589,280 5685571 5,52556c 6,926200 11585200/ '
1853 6/6 3136200 553^22 3,939858 525352- 8,071763 13,355,892
1855 6/3 592558 8^878 1179756 5,556,09*; 7205129 II702157 / ✓
1855 6/5 1,7^ 7,152 27$590 5597,895 7939,76: 11395500 19963763v' r w
1856 ?/- 3159830 672850 6,162369 2,7507 7; 22287389 / >*■ 25803,632
2. Total Foreign Trade at Shanghai 1857-61 (in Taels)
Source: “Commercial Renorts of H.M.Consuls in China l862-R“ 
in A & P 1865 vol.LIII (3^89) p.6l.
Notes: (i) the tael was worth about 6/- to 6/8 at this time.
(ii) a memo in F.0.17/383 of July 28, 1862 estimated 
that 80$ of the total trade at Shanghai about 
that time was in British hands.
/















i 1857 15,863,393 1^,252,51^ 33,3++,“+35 302 61 633
| 1858 19,017,0^9 15,828,320 30,623,759 290 97 75+
| 1859 20,635,130 15,397,850 36,670,606 376 177 926
‘ i860 26,225,588 1^,8 57,^0 31,363,880 1+9I+ 2*+8 1,007
l86l 33,702,61^ 12,138,232 28,238,733 810 359 1,806
1862 1+6,701,581+ 18,60^,1^0 ^7,569,966 1,532 806 2,898
1863 61,70^,099 20,251,1+06 38,^85,*+65 1,790 820 3,^oo
3* Tea and Silk Exports from Shanghai 1850-8 (in £s)
Source:to 1856 as for No. 1 above, p.Mf; for 1857-8 see









1656 26,999,870 1,006,111+ l!+,l+62 1,311,612
1851 5^ ,233,865 2,17l+A25 18,108 1,601,805




^9,773,920 2 ,1+85,099 1+1,293 2 ,7^9,653
36,123,600 1,796,1+59 1+3,120 2,7li+,0i+9
1-8 55 76,711,659 3,^13,58*+ 55,537 3,568,906
J.8H6 ^2,871,1+33 1,61+7,012 9i,92i+ 7,7li+,9o6
857 I ^5,757,711 3,351,661 76,1+61+ 7,320,118
j.859 
L  • JL
1+5,1+65,702 2,77^,39*+ 72,729 5,5^1,+1.6
(x) "British only known; there being no Customs House".
bik
*+ • ^itjsh Tea and Silk Imports fro in China 1ft 59-70 (in £s) 
Source: ’’Return for Each Year since 1858 of the value of
Exports and Imports from and to the U.K. and 












iT?9 71,916,833 5,528,660 3,310,036' 3,179,251
i860 85,295,129 6,601,895- 2,203,300 2,296,228
I86I 92,1^ 5,365 6,5-99,55-2 2,766,65-3 2,360,987
1.862 109,756,857 8,759,763 3 ,270,206 3,035,552
I863 129,^39,857 10,051,803 1,696,602 .1,627,223
t£b
1.86*+ 115,102,527 8,606,705 5-61,357 572,636
1865 112,782,8^5 9,326,536 136,653 172,626
1866 130,86.3, 501 10,5-5-3,5-88 108,201 130,685
1867 117,551,978 9,179,21.6 5-0,016 59,807
1868 152,111,536 11,35-2,180 90,276 102,768





125,593,898 8,787,895- 578 ,¥fl 681,277
8* British Curorts to China and Kong Kong (exc. Oniiiiri) 1850-70
(in£s)
Sources: i "Return or the Declared Annual Value of British
Produce and >anufactures Exported to China and 
Hong Kong (183^-63)" in A P 186*4* vol XLI1 (281)
11 As above for Ho A, pA.
5-15
5. (conta) Britisn Exports to China (exc. Opium) 1050-70
(in £ s ) ~
Year Cotton Manufactures niotal Declared Value (£)
1850 - 1 ,575-,.1.5-5








1959 2,758,678 5-, 5-57,573
i860 3,160,105 5,318,036
l86l 3,179,581+ 5-, 81+8,657
1862 1,276,688 3,137,35-2
1863 1 ,.1.70,1+88 3,889,927
186 +^ 2,011,167 5-, 711,5-78
1865 2,788,059 5,512,293
1866 5-, 1+20,610 7 >77,091
i 870 . ___ 6,191+,27^ ...9,55-7,563 .
6. On turn T norts into China 1810 ■ 60
Sou roe: ? . B .■ 'orse The International Relations of
the Chinese dnuire Vol.l,
(Cf.? however, the figures given in “Return 
of Cuinm Snorted to China from Central Irdb’a 
...and Bengal1 in A &. P 186? vol. XL (9*f) pplO-12)
bl6
6. (contd) Opium Imports into China 1850-60.
Year











IP 57 72,385 60,385
I858 75,966 61,966
18 59 75,822 62,822
i860 58,681 5-7,68.1 I
7* Revenue Derived from the Opium Trade by the British Government 
in India IP-Bh - 6k.
Sou roe: F.S,Turner British Q-nium Policy (1876) u.306.






ii 859-60 5,169,778 39,602,850
1860-1 5,758,292 52,728,601







iilitarv (Source^ The thly Returns or British Troops
in China, listed in the P.R.O,under 11.0,17/ (vols 
1723-7). The figures for Total Effective Strength 
are taken from the Proof Sheet in each return, 
those "or Shanghai from the Distribution Sheet,
The latter include (after Aug,1862) small garrisons 
stationed in towns near Shanghai - "Fahwah”, 













Jan.i860 5,757 - )
) All at Hong Kong and
Feb. 5,666 — )
) Canton
■ arch 6,128 - )
An r i 1 7,7-7 6 7 c,2000 listed as 1 North of
China”
[May 16,909 7 5,268 ” ” Indian Troops
June (no return) 7
July Sth China TTth Chin;\
M ? 3  15,901 1, iMt Shanghai listed as nart of*
Nth China Command
Aug. 7,387 l?,970 918
Sent. 7-,639 16,796 1,732
pet. >+,796 16,717 2,370
p ov, >+,772 16,1+lR 2,388 Sth C ina force included 
2,862 Indian troops 
Nth China force included 
^,381 Indian troops
Dec, 7,160 7,7-70 1, .196 Nth China P^oof Shsot shows 





















Tv* arch 5,91+0 5,610
April 5,9^3 5,527
May 5,938 i+,9i+o (953)
June 5-, 835 5,Ul (1,056)
July 5,M+3 5-, 329 (1,103)
Aug. 5,1+29 5-,232 (717)
Sent. 5,350 i+,2?6 (722)





Sth China force included
2,806 Indian Troon 
Nth -do- -do-
Tientsin garrison was 339*+ 
Taku -do- 3^ +6
of. tt.0,17/363 ¥.0. to F. 0. 
April 20 gives Tientsin 
b,696 (inc. 3?663 British 
infantry and 36^ Indian 
Cavalry -'Fane’s Horae) 
■Shanghai 1}293 (SiKh regi­
ment of 1222 with \ a 
battery of artillery)
Canton 2892 (inc.1b^b Indian 
Infantry) V.or? Fong 2 3 3^ (inc. 
820 Indian infantry)
Total 11,215 plus staff and 
commissar!at.
)shown as ”H.K. Canton &
)
) Shanghai”.
689 (rno, 553 Ind i an) of
Sth China force.li sted
as Shan ghal:
i+i> of Nth China force as
,!H .K. Cant on and Shan?•-
hai1
683 of Sth Chi na force
1 isted as Shanghai etc,
1,593 at Hong Kong
903 it Kowloon
1,839 n Tientsin
25-3 it Taku forts


































































































Tientsin garrison was evacuated 
by May 24-' - A&P(3104-) n A 2
A&P (3101+)p.2S gives 288 French 
at Shanghai and 2_S0 at "Najaor”.
1.,3^ 3 at Hong Kong; 24-6 at Taku
cf. ^.O. 17/4*01 W.O. table dated 
May 14-, 1863.








Ad d i. t i on a 1 N o t e s
I
Jan.186b- 1b-,bb-c 1 ,67V 2,395 at Hong Kong]. 113 at
Feb. if, 501 1, 5b-7
Taku
Nar. h- • DQQJ " 1, 5b-5
April b, M6h-7 1,65b-
May 1,621
June U-,M+1 l,Ub
July b, 177 1,577
Aug, b- ,lb-0 1,336
Sent, If,166 1,297
Oct. if, 363 1,112
Nov. ^ , 3 U 1,130
Dec. • If, 281 1 ,079
2,
Hava l (Source; m0r table, Brace Fox, British Admirals and
Chinese Pirates (19W ) n.195* for 1862 details, 
Hone to Secretary of Admiralty, ! arch IS, 1862, 
in Adm 1/5790; see Fox,n.6^-5 o^.r man showing 
extent of the East Tndja and China Association 
in this period).
DATE 'To. of Shins Total Comnlement
Mar,1851 20 3,189
1852 18 2, 9b-b-
I853 22 3,55b
185^ 27 3,779
18 55 23 3,826
1856 23 3, Rif 6
*+21
GATE No. of Shi os Total Complement









186!+ 50 6,586 
------ ------------
(x) These comprised IFrigate 17 Gunboats
3 paddle wheel 2 troouships 
vessels
*+ screw driven 3 qtore ships 
sloops







and were based as follows -
7 in Fast Indian Waters (Trincomalee,
Singapore, Moulmein)
2 at Hong Kong 
5 at Shanghai
1 at each of Japan, Gulf of Pechili, 1 anil/a, 
Swatow, Fo o 0 h ow, Araoy, V.anking, 
Chinkiang, Kiukiang, Kingpo, 
Taku, Mewchwang, Chef00 




Numbers of Protestant Missionaries 
in China
Son roes: Tables and information in The Chinese Repository
(Jan, l8*+7 nn 12-1*+: Jan. 18^ +9* pp^ -8-5*+ and Aug.-Dec, 
1851, p#5l3ff); G. Smith, narrative of an
Exploratory Visit to each of the Consular Cities 
of China . ... 18*+*+-6 (l8*+7) no 530-2; Anrlo Chinese 
Calendar. 185*+T rmffit -6; List of Protestant Mission­
aries sent to the Chinese, compiled by S.W.Williams, 
July, 1, 1855; Wm.Dean, The China Mission (l859)pploO-*+: 
Director^ of Protestant l issions in China. June 5> 1-866; 
A .Wy1ie. Memorials of Protestant missionaries to the 
Chihese (1867); ed.D.MacGri11ivray. A.Century of 
Protestant Missions in China (1907; - for figures 
1867 -1907*
British Missionaries Total Protestant
DATE 'limbers Soci eti.es Missionaries 
Nos. Societies Converts
l8*+3 8 1 25 8
May l8*+6 11 3 *+0 15
beg.of l8*+7 12 3 51
end of l8*+8 2*t/2 6 b 71/73 15
rid 1851 23 5 78
Dec. 1853 29 6 79 17
.July 18?5 30 6 90
1858 33 6 .107 2^
(3)
c.1500-2000June 1866 c. 10 n d 2^
1867 - - 1.2V (3) C.5000 '
1877 - - *+73 13305
1890 - - 905 37287
.1907 - - _ 178261
( ) also 35 ’’missionary ladies”, mostly wives
M  St  St  • •(2) 93
/ -5 \ c0q n the son Our N t s s i on i n China (1882 ed.)r•136: of also 
c ^van^elicaT~ Christendom Sept#1863junH .8-2 .
b2$.
APPSNDIX E 
Consular Appointments in China 1850-6*+
Sources: Despatches in series F.0.17/- and F.0,228/- and in 
A & P. The Foreign Office List printed each year 
shows gazetted rather than actual appointments. The 






































Bowring consul at 
Canton (since Dec. 
I8*f8) and Meadows 
Interpreter there.






returns from leave; 
goes to Ningpo as 
Vice-Consul♦
July 1857 Flgin 
arrives on first 
Special Mission to 
China




Foreign Secretary Plenipotentiary Shanghai Relevant Appoint-
Consul ments
June 18, 18^9 
Russell








Feb. 185- Rear-Admir. 
Hope apuointed to 







June i860 Elgin 








Michel hands over 
as Military C.in C. 
in China to Brig. 
Gen.Staveley
Nov.1862 Hope hands 
over to R.Admiral 
Huper
April 1, March-April 1863 
I063 Har- Maj.Gen.Brown 
vey (actg) succeeds Staveley 
as Military C.in
C.













I. Official Papers 1* British
(a) Manuserint.... *+26
(h) Printed  ....  *+27
2. Non-British .... b29
IT Private Paners ......................... *+30
III Material on Merchant On in ion ...........  *+30
IV Material on Missionary Oninion ........  *+31~  — — ------------
V Fewsna^ers and Periodicals..............  *+35
VI Other Contemporary and Bear Contemporary
Material ..........................  *+38
VII Later Material ...................   *+*+0
^26.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
I. OFFICIAL PAPERS
1 . Brj ttsh
For the development of British policv in China-i. 0. V
nraotical.lv all the relevant official material is to he
•u
found in the bound series of Foreign Office papers, liste d 
as F.O.17/- and F.0.228/- at the Public Record Office, 
London. The first of these series contains the drafts 
(without enclosures) of Foreign Office despatches!,to the 
Plenipotentiary in China, and the originals (with enclo­
sures) of his despatches home. In addition, the volumes 
listed as "Domestic Various1 contain the correspondence 
of the Foreign Office with other government departments 
and with private individuals on China affairs. The 
second series (F.0.228/-) contains the originals (with 
enclosures) of foreign Office despatches to China, copies 
of the Plenipotentiary1s despatches home, and despatches 
to the Plenipotentiary from the various consulates. From 
about i860 a very large nart of the material relevant to 
the Taiping rebellion in these series was printed in 
Parliamentary Parers, and where available I have referred 
to the printed rather than to the manuscript source.
(a) Manuscript.
Foreign Office
General Correspondence - China 1850 - 6^ -.
Cited as F.O.17/-; Vols l65-J+17 used.
Consular and Embassy Archives - China 1850-6L 
Cited as F.0.228/-; Vols 113-3&0. (I have used 
chiefly the volumes containing the originals of 
F.O. despatches to China, and the volumes containing 
despatches from the Shanghai consulate).
Admiralty
w m ttm  Hit— ■■ mt
In letters from the East India and China Station 
l86l-3* Cited as Adm 1/- ; bundles 5?62, 579$ 5
582*+ used. All the important Admiralty papers on 
policy developments in China, such as Rear-Admiral 
Hope’s reports of his trips to Nanking, are in copied 






1 8 5^ f
1857
War Office
Monthly Returns of Troops Stationed in China, 1860-*+. 
Cited as W.0.17/- 5 vols 1723-7* Other War
Office correspondence on China is found in the 
Domestic Various volumes in the F.C.17/- series
India Office
Letters to India on Finances, i860—li-.
■Financial Letters from India, 1860-3*
Home Correspondence: Political and Secret, 1.860-*+. 
Consulted chiefly for signs of alarm at a 
nossihle loss of revenue from the opium trade.
(b) P.rl nted
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (3rd Series) 1873-6*+. 
Cited as P.D., volume, year and column.
Rouse of Commons1 Division Lists, 1862.
For details of the vote of duly 8, ]862r used 
in conjunction with E.Walford's Shi H i  nr House 
of Commons (1.862) to help establish the state 
of merchant opinion in the House of Commons 
on government policy.
Accounts and Parers -
The bound series of Parliamentary Parers.
Cited as A H  year, number of the rarer, and 
the page within the pa^*>ri itself (not within 








Number T i t 1 e
"73+ Report of Select Committee on
Commercial Relations with 
China.
1667 Papers Respecting the Civil
War in China.
1792 Correspondence Respecting the
Attack on the Foreign Settle­
ment at Shanghae.
2163 Parers Relating to the Pro­
ceedings of Her Majesty's 
Naval Forces at Canton.
1*28.
veaT' Volume in Number
  ’Pound series ______
1857 XT! 2173
1857 XTT 2175
1 8 5 7 (2 )  XLITI 2221









1863 XXXV 3 U  ■
T 1 t 1 e
Correspondence Relative to 
5ntran.ee into Canton, 1850-5•
Correspondence Respecting 
T n su 11 s i n C h i n a .
Papers Relating to the Opium 
Trade in China, 18H-2-56*
Correspondence Relative to the 
Sari of Elgin’s Special Mission 
to China and Japan, 1857-9*
Correspondence Respecting 
Affairs in China, 1859-66,
Further Correspondence resnect- 
ing affairs in China.
Correspondence Respecting the 
Opening of the Yangtzekiang 
River to Foreign Trade,
Paners Relating to the 'Rebellion 
in China and Trade in the 
Yangtze Keang River,
Further Papers Relating to the 
Rebellion in China.
Correspondence oh the employ­
ment of British Officers by 
the Government of China.
Further Papers Relating to 
the Rebellion in China.
Further Paners Relating to 
the Rebellion in China.
Order in Council Authorising 
the Enlistment of Officers and 
Men and the Equipment and Fitting 
out of Vessels of War for the 
Service of the Emperlor of China.
Year Volume in Number
T'm in ci s e r i e s ____
T j t i e
Cony of all Orders in Council 
at Present in Force (May 3^? 
18 6k) for the Punishment of 
Preaches of Neutrality by 
Pettish Subjects in the Civil 
War Re g in g in China.
Correspondence respecting* 
the Anglo Chinese Fleet.
Paners Relating to the 
Affairs of China*
Correspondence Relative to 
Lieut.-Col. Gordon’s Position 
in the Chine se Servi c e a<? t e r 
the fall of Soochow*
2 . Non-Rrltlsh Official Paners
IT. S.Congress!onal Papers :
Congress 38*1 'louse Executive Documents, vol.l6,
No.123 (Marshall Correspondence)
Congress 35*2 Senate Executive Documents, vols*8-9,
No.22 ( cLane and Parker Correspondence).
Congress 36.1 Senate Executive Documents, vol.10, No.30
(Reed and Ward Correspondence)
CN'ing Tai Ch'ou Pan T Wu Shih Mo (Details of the Management
of Barbarian Affairs in the Ch'ing Dynasty) (Peking 193^).
Cited as TWSM, followed by initials of the 
reign neriod, chflan and page numbers* J 
have used Fsien Feng (H.p *), chilan 69-80 
and Tung Chih (T.C.), o h u a n  1-27, covering 
the period Nov.i860 - Aug.186k.
China's Management of the American Barbarians (Yale, 1951) •
This consists mainly of translations by 
Earl Swisher, of Chinese memorials and 
edi cts f rom the J Wu Shi h Mo collect 1 on 
relating to American policy in China o v e r  
the period l8kl-6l. I'hore are, however, 
many extracts relating to British policy 
also, especially in Ch. 5 °p the joint Anglo 
American attempt at Treaty Revision in 1.85
3.86k XLII 525




Treaties, Conventions etc, between China and Foreign States.
Printed by the Imperial Maritime Customs 
(Shanghai 1907-,Q)*
II. Private Paners
Cl gin Papers (at India Office Library)
Cited as Elgin Correspondence (India Office).
This collection was still uncatalogued at the 
time of use. It consists of papers from 
Elgin's period asGovernor General in India, 
hiit some correspondence on affairs in China 
is to be found in it.
Elgin Paners ( at Broamha.il, Dunfermline, Fyffe, Scotland). 
Cited as Elgin Correspondence (Broomhall).
Ur. J. Gerson was given access to these napers 
bv the courtesy of Lord Bruce, and cen©pcnil5] vV v / .  ;-** ' «/
allowed me to examine the notes he made from 
them. They include a number of letters 
between Elgin and Bruce in 1860-1 which rna.^ 
be added to those to be found in F.O. 228/2181.
setters and Journals of tJames, ^th Earl of Elgin 
ed. T. Walrond (London 1872).
Printed selection of the Elgin Paners.
Ill a t e r i a 1 on Ver chant On ini on
Proceedings of* the Manchester Chamber of Commerce (1839-67). 
(at Manchester Public Library).
Little or nothing directly on the rebellion in’
China.
Reports of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (1851-6*+).
(at Offices of Liverpool C. of C.)
Jardine Uatheson and Co. Correspondence (at University 
Lib ra r v, Camb r1d ge)
Cited as J. ¥. Co. A great mass of essen­
tially business correspondence. Comments on 
political developments are most readily found 
in the lurone Letter Books (conies of letters 
to business correspondents, chiefly in England).
("for other scattered material on merchant opinion see 
references to Chapter VIII).
raterial on Missionary Gninion
There is a considerable amount of material avail­
able in London, at the headquarters of the various 
missionary societies, on missionary activities in China, 
which would probably repay careful study, Extracts from 
reports were often printed in missionary publications, 
and orovide a guide to the manuscript material.
1. Soc i etv Records a nd Pub11cations
London Missionary Society:
Manuscript - Central China Letters, Boxes T - TJJ
(l8J+3—66). 
South China and Ultra-Ganges Letters, 
Boxes V - VI (18*4-5-68).
North China Letters Sox T (1860-6).
Outgoing Letters - China Boxes TV - V
(1853 - 63).
Printed - Missionary Magazine and Chronicle (l8i+3-65) 
Church -■isslonarv Society;
Manuscrjnt. - Letter Books - China 1851-9 and 1859-62.
(1863-7 vol.missing)
China Letters (3 Boxes, arranged 
alphabetjrally by writers).
Bishop of Victoria’s letters (l8Mf-6*f).
Printed - Church ■"Missionary Record (I8M+-65)
Church Missionary Intelligencer (l8*f9-
65).
Proceedinp-s or the C.M.S. ror Africa and 
the East (1852-65).
Circulars and Other Papers (Vbls* T -II)
Presbyterian Missionary Society;
Manuscrint - Letters Relating to the China Mission
Box II (1855-62)
Printed - Renorts of the China Mission at Amoy
(1855-65).
The English Presbvterian Messenger 
(i853-6h-) . ‘
^32.
Nethodi st Mi ss j onary Soci.ety:
Printed - Reports of the Wesleyan Missionary
Society (1853-65).
Wesleyan Missionary Notices (1853-65).
Bantist Missionary Society;
Printed - Rerorts o^ the Bantist Missionary Society
0.853-6*0 .
The Missionary Herald (1853-65),
Chinese Evangelization Society:
Printed - The Chinese Missionary Cleaner (1851-9)•
2, Re 1.1 f i on s Press:
Chinese Evangelization Society’s Press Cuttings
(2 vols,, now in the library of the L.M.S,),
The Christian Times 1853-5,
Evangelical Christendom 1853-5, 1860-5.
1. Contemporary Publications Relating Especially to 
i ssi onapy Work in China:
(Anon.) - The History of Christian Missions
and of the Present Insurrection London 1853 
(Anon.) - The Religious Precepts of the ) printed by
Taeping Dynasty, ) W.Hewett & Co.
London 1853-
Dean Wm.- The China Mission............. I .Y. 1859
Sdking) - Chinese Scenes and Peoples (with 
Jane) “Narrative of a Visit to Nan­
king'1 bv Joseph Erkins) .. .. London 1863
Gi3lespie)-The Land of Sinim, or China and
Wm. ) the Chinese Missions .. .. Sdinlm.rgh.l855
J ame s J.A .-God1s Vo ice from China to the
Briti sh Churches .. .. ., London 18-58
John G. -The Chinese Rebellion (see above
p .$25 ) .. Canton l86l
Kesson J. -The Cross and the Dragon, or the
Fortunes of Christianity in















The Land of Sinim........... London 1859
Our Mission in China .. .. London 1882
(1st ed.1866)
The Connection between Foreign 
Missionaries and the Kwang-se 
Insurrection ..........  (Shanghai)
1853
- Life in China .. .. .. London 1857
- Personal Recollections of the 
T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, 1861-3 Shanghai 188k
- The Religious Aspect of the 
Civil War in China (see
above p. 31Z ) ......... . London 1853
- China: Its Spiritual Needs
and Claims....... .......... London 1865
- Narrative of an Exploratory 
Visit to each of the Consu­
lar Cities of China .. .. London l8*+7
- Memorials of Protestant
Missionaries to the Chinese Shanghai 1867
Extract from a Journal of a
Cruise up the Yangtze Keang. n.d.(l859)
k• Later Publications on the Missionaries in China:
Band E. - Working His Purpose Out: The
History of the English Presby­
terian Mission ..........  London 19^8
Boardman E.P. - Christian Influence Upon the
Ideology of the Taiping Rebell­
ion (Thorough study of Taiping 
Christianity) ..........  Wisconsin 195-
Canton Wm. - A History of the British and
Foreign Bible Scty (volsII-II) London 1910
Findlay and)-A History of the Wesleyan Method-












- The Christian Origins of) In Internat- 




- A History of the Ex­
pansion of Christian­
ity (Vol.VI - The Great 
Century in N.Africa and
Asia 1800-191*+) .. .. London n.d.
A History of Christian
Missions in China N.York 1929
(His chapter on the rebellion 
gives a very telescoped 
summary of missionary opinion.;
• Missionaries and Politics 
in China - the Taiping 
Rebellion (see above p.doS




• The History of the London 
Missionary Scty (Vol.II) London 1899
■ A Century of Protestant 
Missions in China (1807- 
1907) ...........  Shanghai 1907
• China and Christianity Tientsin 1892 
The Political Obstacles
to Missionary Success in
China .................London 1901
China and Religion . .. London 1905
Karl Gutzlaff: als missionar 
in China (Eng. summary
pp.291-301) *• Copenhagen 19*+6
History of the Church Mission­
ary Scty Vol. II .. .. London 1899
Thompson R.W.- Griffith John .. .. London 1907*
^35-
V* Newspapers and Periodicals 
1. Newspapers:
Times 1850-6*4-.
Morning Post 1853-^5 1860-3•





London and China Express 1858-6*+
China Mail l8*f5-58, 1863-*-+.
Overland China Mail 1858-61
Overland Register and Prices Current l853-1+? 1860-1.
China Overland Trade Report l860-*f.
Times of India 1862-3*
Friend of India 1853-^ 5 1859*
Newspaper Cuttings on China l8*+7-59 (2 volumes jn the 
Library of the London Missionary Society).
2. Articles in Periodicals
(See also Poole’s Index to Periodical Literature, 1802-81. 
Known or probable authors are put in brackets after the 
title of the article: For comments on the articles see
Ch.X above).
Athenaeum 1853-62 (various book reviews).
Elackwoods Edinburgh Magazine.
July lo52. * The Celestials at Rome and 
Abroad.
Jan 185*+ .. The Past and Future of China.
April i860. Our Position in China (Sherard
Osborn)
*+36
Jan.1863 •• Progress in China (H.N.Lay)
Feb.I 8 6 3  *. The Taenings and their 
Remedy (H.N.Lay)
Dec.1866 .. Foreign Interference with 
the Taipings (A.E.Wilson)
Bombay Quarterly Review
Oct. 18 5? •• The Chinese Empire and its
• estinies (R.Alcock)
April 1856.. The Chinese Empire in its
Foreign Relations (R.Alcock)
British Journal.
Oct. 1853 •• The War in China
British Quarter!^ Review
, , -   ■ «— ■■  —  ■ ■— '■■■ -
July 1855 *• The Insurgent Power in China
April 1861.. (Review article based on
eadows j  Hue, Fortune Oliphant 
etc.)
Caleutta Review
arch Recent Events in China
(G.Smith, Bishop of Victoria).
Ch a rube rs _Ed i n tro r g h J on rn a 1
Sept.18?3 .. The Rebellion in China
CorphiII bagazine
Jan. i860 ., The Chinese and the ’’Outer
Barbarians”. (Bowring?)
Nov. 186*+ .. Colonel Gordon’s Exploits in
China.
)ub:l in Ilniversity agazine
May l86l .. China.
^37
E d i n bu r g h H ©view
April 18?5 •• M . Hu c ’ s T r a v e 1 s in Oh in a
April 1857 .. Br i. ti sh Re 1 at i ons wi th Ob i na
Jar.i860 .. Lord Elgin’s Mission to China 
and Japan.
Eclectic Review
Dec, 18R6 . . (review of Meadows’ The Chinese 
and their Hebe11ions).
Frasers Magazine
Nov . 18 5.3 The Insurrection in China
(Vol.7) 1865 Rebellion, Diplomacy and Progre 
in China.
London Quarterly Review
April 1861 .. The Chinese Insurgents and Our 
Policy towards them.
July 1863 •• The Taiping Rebellion in China
(GoIburn ’ s) New Monthlv I Taeraz 1 ne. . - ------
Sept-Dee.1853 The Chinese Revolution
Dec. 1859 China
Quarterly Review
Dec. 1853 .. Religion of the Chinese Rebels
Jan.i860 China and the War
Oct. 1862 .. The Taeping Rebellion
Taits Edinburgh Magazine
Oct i860 The Christian Revolution in 
China (Scarth?)
Westminster Review
April I858 .. China: Past and Present.
^38
vj. Other Contenrporarv and Near-Contemporary Materials
(Anon) A History of China to the Present Time, 
Including an Account of the Rise and 
Progress of the Present Religious Insur­
rection in that Country (in Bentley*s 
Parlour Bookcase Series)..........
Alcock R. The Capital of the Tycoon (Vol.I)
Blakiston J.W. Five Months on the Yangtze., and
Notices of the Present Rebellion in 







The Taeping Rebellion in China, (A 
Solid ana balanced study, the least 
partial of contemporary British 
a c c oun is). ... ... ... ...
Fistorv of the Insurrection in China
The Chinese Repository (18^3“?!)
The Chinese and Japanese Reuository
(IP63-I*-)
deCourcy R.
Cooke G.Win- China in 1857-8 ••• ••• • ••
grove
L * Insurrection Chinoise (Pro-rebel ) 
account which reflects the prevail-) 
ing suspicion of the Manchu gov- ■) 




/' 1"i u a • • 1 o g • . . ... ... *•
Impressions of China and the Present 
Revolution (see above un )
Fisher A.A.C. Personal Narrative of Three Years
Service in China .. ........
.. London 18 
London 1863
.London 1862






in Revue des 
deux mondes 





Forrest R.J. The Christianity of Hung Tsue-tsuen) InJournalcf
(Hung Hsui-chiian). ) the N.China











Fackie J. M .





A Residence among the Chinese (1853—6) London
1857
La Politique Francaise en Chine
depuis les trait^s de 1858 et de i860 Paris 1872 
England’s Mission in the Far East London 186;
(see above pp.25-0,253)
Our Interests in China
Ti-ping Tien-kwoh .................
(The American toissionary-historian S.
Wells Williams described this as Ma 
rather untrustworthy record’1, and 
A.E.tyilson also criticised it sev­
erely in his "Ever Victorious Army”; 
yet Lindley made very full and some­
times very telling use of Parliamen­
tary Papers to attack British policy 
towards the rebellion. But T think 
he takes a much too conspiratorial 
view of that policy, suspecting secret 
government orders and deliberate pro­
vocation of the rebels by British 
officials in China where there is little 
or no real evidence to show this. His 
very favourable view of the rebel move­
ment is not supported by any other con­
temporary British observer after l86l, 
and is perhaps partly exnlained by the 
fact that he associated chiefly with the 
Ch\jrr Wang’s forces. It is a vigorous, 




. The Chinese Revolution ........
The Life of Tai Ping Wang
. A Cycle of Cathay .............
Desultory Notes on the Government 
and People of China ............
The Chinese and their Rebellions 
(see above np 155-n and 363-5)
The Englishman in China .
(Life of Sjr R.Alcock)




















The Past and Future of Our Relations 
with China
Twelve Years in China
British Policy in China
(Strong criticism of British policy 
towards the rebellion by an ex- 
China merchant, who seems to have 
greatlv influenced the views of 
Col. W". H. Sykes)
The Taeping Rebellion in China 






La Chine depuis le traite de Peki.n-)in Revue des 
Les Anglo Francais, les Imperiaux )deux mondes 
et les Taipings
(Anproves intervention as trans- 
forming Western relation s with 
the Manchu government)





England’s Policy in China .
The Ever Victorious Army 
(A more reasonable assessment of the 
role of* this force in the defeat of 
the rebellion than that given in 
many 1 a t0 r» ? tiidles).










(About the best of the many Gordon 
biographies)
Commodore Perry, Humphrey Marshall 
and the Tainin^ Rebellion.
London 1933
Tso Tsunrr-fans








A Historv of the External Trade 
of China'; 183^-81 
Amerikano-anglyskie kapitallstui 
dushiteli TainInskogo vosstam’ya.X w  ft/
(Anglo-American Capitalists - the 
stiflers of the Tanin^ ITnrisinp* -.ft J. W
translated for me by hr. J.Lust). 
(Everything fitted into a few 







His Country was the World
A Short Hi story of China
,:1he Life of Gordon
, . London 195^ + 
.. London 1893 
.. London 1896
Cady J.F.
The Life of Sir Tlalliday Macartney London 1908
(The history of the Taiping rebell­
ion becomes virtually the history«/ t/
of the campaigns of the Ever Vic­
torious Army in these works)nJ *
The Roots of French Imperialism
in Eastern A s i a ................... N.York 195*+
(Extensive study, but not always 
reliable in detail).
Cahill, "Tolger A Yankee Adventurer........
(An attempt to recapture some 
of the limelight for F.T.Ward 
from Gordon. Rather pro-Taiping 
in some wavs.)
I .York 1930
Chang CVerv-fu Chung-kuo chin pai-nien shih 
chjao ch’eng. (A textbook of 
Chinese History over the last Hong Kong
100 y e a r s ) ...........  19^9
Chao Tang-1j 
Chesneaux J.
Anglo Chinese Dinlomatic 
Relations 1858-70
La Revolution Taiping d ’apres 
quelques travaux recents.



















Anglo Chinese Diplomatic Ph.D.Thesis
Relations, 1856-60 .. .. University of4
London,1939*
Chung-kuo chin-tai shih
(A modern, history of China) Hong Kong 1951*
L ’Expedition de Chine (2 vols) Paris 1905-6
Paris 1901
Histoire des relations de la 
Chine avec les Puissances 
Occidentales, 1860-1900 0£.l.)
Gt.Britain and China,1833-60 Oxford 1 937 
(Vary thorough summary of the 
official material on British 
policy in these years)
Shanghai in the Tain in. er Period
Rise and Decline of Occidental 
Intervention in China.
(both very general studies).
British Diplomatic Relations
with China, 1 8 5 ^ - 6 9 .........
(The most thorough of several 
theses covering this period 
generally),
Americans in East Asia 
(Valuable though dated summary 
of American policy).
A History of China .........
General Gordon .........





















Trade and Diplomacy on the China
Coast .. . .  ............ Harvard 1953
(Invaluable on background up to





Fan Wen-lan T 1ai-p'ing t 1ien-kuo yun-tung 
(The Tainin^ movement) Peking 19^9
Fan Wen-lan (ed) T'ai-n'ing t ’ien-kuo ko-mingi f ' 4-
yun-tung Inn-wen obi (Collected 
essays on the Tajping revolu­
tionary movement)   Peking 1951
fThese two works provide the best 
short statement of the Chinese 
Marxist interpretation of the 
rebellion).
Fitzgerald C.P. China: A Short Cultural History London 1950
Revolution in China .........  London 1952
Fox Grace
Hail W.J.






British Admirals and Chinese 
Pirates ................ London 19*10
Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping
Rebellion (Important corrective Yale-Oxford
to earlier Western accounts) 192?
The Storv of Chinese Gordon .. London l88*f
Recollections of the Old 
Foreign Office London 1901
Ch'ing tai t fung shih (vol TV)
(History of the Ch’ing dynasty) Shanghai 1932
Ch’ing shih (Ch'ing history) Taipei 1955 
(Leading Nationalist Chinese 
historian, who gives little 
emphasis to Western intervention 
in defeat of' the rebellion).
Studies in Chinese Diplomatic
History .. ... ............. Shanghai 1926
T 1 ai-n'ing t ’ien-kuo shih-shih| j  1 o
lun-tsung (Collection of essays
on Taiping history) .........  Shanghai 1935
T 1 ai-p'ing t ’ien-kuo ts’ong-shu 
shih-san chung. (Thirteen
collected works on the Taipings) - 1938.
Chung-kuo chin-tai shih (vol.I)
(A modern history of China) Tainei 1953










Eminent Chinese of the
Ch!ing Dynasty ......... Washington 19^3
Imperialism and Chinese Peking 1955
Politics (Very tendentious 
use of the evidence).
The Invasion of China by
the Western World .. London 1937
Les influences Occidentales
dans la Revolution de lfOrient Paris 1955
Western Powers and Chinese ) in Pacific 
Revolutions: the Pattern of ) Affairs vol.26,3
Intervention............ ) (Sept.1953) PP23G
-6.
A Political History of China,
18^+0-1928 (translated by Teng
Ssu-yu and J.Ingalls) .. .. Princeton 1956
Far Eastern Government and
P o l i t i c s ............ . .. N.York 195^
T ’ai-p’ing t*ien-kuo shih kang.
(An outline history of the
Taipings)...................Shanghai 19^ +8
(1st ed.1937) 
T'ai-p'ing t ’ien-kuo shih kao Peking 1955*
(The earlier and shorter work 
seems to me to provide a more 
critical and balanced assess­
ment of the rebellion. The sec­
tion on the foreign relations 
of the rebels in the later work 
ranges from close and well docu­
mented arguments to sweeping 
assertions which seem to have no 
basis in fact. Lofs account of 
the role of the Western powers - 
in 19th century China, like Hu 
Sheng*s, illustrates Crocefs 
distum that "all history is con­















Western Concepts of China and
the C h i n e s e ................. N.York 1939
(Disappointing despite the title.
Drifts into a narrative of the 
rebellion instead of Western 
reactions to it, and has no 
bibliography).
Histoire de la Concession Francaise
de C h a n g h a i ............. Paris 1929
Military Organisation and Power) in Pacific 
Structure of China During the ) Historical Re- 
Taiping Rebellion ) view Vol.18,
(19^9) pp1f69-83. 
Historic Shanghai .............  Shanghai 1909*
The International Relations of 
the Chinese Empire - vol.I
The Period of Conflict (183^-60) London 1910 
Vol.II The period of Submission
(1861-93) London 1918
Far Eastern International Cambridge
Relations ......... (Mass.) 1931
British Opium Policy in China
and India ......... Yale 193*+
Asia and Western Dominance .. .. London 1953
Old China Hands and the Foreign
Office ................  N.York l°k8
(Illuminates the falsity of the 
assumption that British policy in 
China was always modelled to the 
demands of British merchants).
The Lay Osborn Flotilla: its ) in Papers on
Development and Significance ) China k (1950)
pp.58-93 (mimeo­
graph by Far East 
Dept of Univer­
sity of Harvard, 
U.S.A.)
Manchester Merchants and For­
eign Trade, 179^-1858 .. .. Manchester 193^













tion in China. (A highly in­
dividualist Marxist view) ... Calcutta 19^6
Recollections of a Diplomatist London 1902
Oxford 1907
Anglo Chinese Commerce and 
Diplomacy ........
Role des General C.G.Gordon 
dans la repression de I 1Insurrec­
tion des Thai P h i n g ...........Paris 1933
The Ideology of the Taiping) in Sinologica 
Tienkuo ) vol.3 (1953) t>p
1-15-
Some Chinese Rebel Ideologies in T ’oung Pao
vol.l^ (1956)
pp.150-226
(Both articles setting the 
rebellion firmly in the Chinese 
tradition of peasant uprisings).
China and the West Oxford 1925
Ideologies of the Taiping 
Insurrection
in Chinese Social 
& Political Scien 
ce Review XX,1 
(Apr.1936) onlkO- 
9*
The Taiping Rebellion .. .. In Chinese Social
(Still valuable Pilot article & Pol.Science 
reassessing the rebellion Review XVI,b (Ian 
for Western scholars).
New Light on the History of 
the Taiping Rebellion .. 
(Invaluable guide to Taiping 
studies).
1933) up 5*+5-6l b 
Harvard 1950
Men and Events of My Time in
India  ............... London 1882
Tong Ling-tch*ouang La Politique Rrancaise en) these pour le
Chine pendant les guerres) doctorat, 1950,
des Taipings. ) University of
Paris.
Turner U.S. British Onium Policy and its ,





Yip p • M •
Zcberi Z.
bby
3.L. The Age of Reform . Oxford 1938
3.Wells A istory of China . ♦ . ., London 1897
Kart and the Chinese Customs Belfast 19?0
The Impact of the Taiping ) in Pacific His- 
Rebellion upon the Manchu ) torical Review, 
Fiscal System ) voi *19 (Aug.1950)
p * 26R
Thg Mental Illness of Rung Hsiu- 




I* The Relation between the
Home and the Ind i an Gove rn- Ph * D .The sis
ments, 1858-70 .........  Un. of London.
10?0.
